

Preface

This is the final volume in a series concerning the history of the Islamisation of the Javanese people. Beliefs — or disbeliefs — about the supernatural are important in any society, so this series seeks to address questions that are not about the Javanese alone. The first of these books was *Mystic synthesis in Java: A history of Islamisation from the fourteenth to the early nineteenth centuries* (2006) and the second *Polarising Javanese society: Islamic and other visions c. 1830–1930* (2007); both of these are summarised briefly in the first chapter here. These two and the present book focus in large part on the connection between what people believe and what they do. Much is about religion and politics, about the relationship between two forms of authority, knowledge and power and those who wield them. Pursuing the broader issues, I have drawn comparisons with other societies and times in these books, and the final chapter in this volume considers some broad, I think universal, topics.

There is something of a writing tradition that regards the Javanese as mystically exotic, as somehow not quite like anybody else. Colonial-era literature is full of such mythologising and stereotyping. In those days, the Dutch sometimes called the Javanese ‘the gentlest people of the earth’ and some modern writers have succumbed to a similar temptation to romanticise them, to see Javanese as the people of an ageless land of ‘magic and mystics’ (the title of a 1974 book by the traveller Nina Epton). The Javanese have just seemed so ‘Eastern’. An absurd consequence of this was the title of a film released in 1969 about the eruption of Mount Krakatau in 1883, called ‘Krakatoa: East of Java’. Krakatau is actually west of Java, but evidently only ‘east’ was exotic enough.

I recognise that it is still possible to romanticise Java. One evening in 2006 I was talking with the idiosyncratic *kyai* Mbah Lim at his religious school near Klaten. With the sun going down and rain gathering, a breeze blew up across the rice fields and came through the open front area of the house where we were sitting, with frog and other evening noises rising — a reminder of how beguiling the Javanese countryside can be at the end of a hot day.

But this is not a book about romance or exoticism, and the Javanese experience is no less a part of the universal human experience than anybody else's. As one of Salman Rushdie's characters puts it, 'The curse of the human race is not that we are so different from one another, but that we are so alike'.¹

It may be worth briefly reminding ourselves of the scale of significance of this Javanese story. The ethnic Javanese total about 100 million people — about 40 per cent of Indonesia's total population approaching 250 million.² Indonesia is the fourth largest nation in the world, the world's largest Muslim-majority nation and its third largest democracy. The island of Java hosts not only the national capital Jakarta and the vast conurbation that surrounds it — with all of the political, cultural, social and economic significance that brings³ — but also several other important cities of Indonesia. In the Javanese-speaking heartland of Central and East Java are found Surabaya, Semarang, Malang and the venerable cultural centres of Surakarta and Yogyakarta. Outside those cities, from the coasts to the mountain ranges, are found small towns and smaller villages where millions of Javanese seek to improve their lives and those of their neighbours, loved ones and descendants. The political, social, cultural and religious transformations that we are about to chart are no small-scale matters.

I hope that by the time you have reached the end of this rather large book, you will be persuaded that the history presented here tells us some important things about how human societies change, in particular about the interaction between religion and politics and the links between what people believe and what, as a consequence, they do.

M.C. Ricklefs
Singapore, 2012

¹ Salman Rushdie, *The enchantress of Florence: A novel* (London: Vintage Books, 2009), p. 392.

² Based on estimates in the online CIA World Factbook, at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html>.

³ Jakarta and West Java are the subject of a forthcoming study by my colleague Chaider Saleh Bamualim, tentatively entitled *Islamisation and resistance in West Java: A study of religion, politics and social change since c. 1965*.

CHAPTER 1

Islamisation in Java to c. 1930¹

The Javanese developed a sophisticated literary and religious culture and were governed by sophisticated elites long before Islam made its first recorded appearance in Javanese society in the 14th century. This earlier civilisation was inspired by Hindu and Buddhist ideas and left behind legacies of art, architecture, literature and thought that continued to impress both Javanese and outsiders. There may well have been Muslims travelling in Java before the 14th century and there may have been Javanese converts to Islam, but all we can know is that the first evidence of Javanese Muslims is a series of gravestones beginning in 1368–9. These appear to record the deaths of Javanese of the aristocratic (perhaps royal) elite at the court of the Hindu-Buddhist kingdom of Majapahit in East Java, at the very height of its glory, who were Muslims. One theme that recurs throughout the history of Javanese Islam is the role played by elites. Only rarely is this a history of bottom-up religious change.

Creating the Mystic Synthesis

The early development of Islam in Java is poorly documented, but 16th-century manuscripts suggest both that Islam was accommodating itself to the Javanese cultural environment and that it was not. On the one hand is

¹ This chapter summarises briefly my books *Mystic synthesis in Java: A history of Islamisation from the fourteenth to the early nineteenth centuries* (Norwalk: EastBridge, 2006) and *Polarising Javanese society: Islamic and other visions c. 1830–1930* (Singapore: Singapore University Press; Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press; Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007). Details may be sought in those volumes. Only direct quotations will be footnoted in this chapter.

evidence of a hybrid culture in which being Javanese and being Muslim at the same time was seen as unproblematic, a culture in which older local terms for God, prayer, heaven and soul prevailed over their Arabic equivalents. On the other is evidence that people were expected to choose between being Muslim and being Javanese. All that this tells us is that Islamisation was a contested and complicated matter in this early period. Two processes seem to have gone on at the same time: foreign Muslims settled locally and became Javanese, while local Javanese embraced Islam and became Muslims. Legends about this period tell of nine saints (the *wali sanga*) who were the first to bring Islam to Java. Their graves became places of pilgrimage and through their legends they remain today symbols of how some people think Islamisation should take place, by a process of accommodation with local culture. But there is no reliable historical evidence at all about these men or their doings.

The court in the interior was still Hindu-Buddhist when the Portuguese apothecary Tomé Pires visited the north coast of Java in 1513. He was much impressed by the grandeur of the court (which he knew through its reputation): ‘They use *krises*, swords, and lances of many kinds, all inlaid with gold’ and had ‘stirrups all inlaid with gold, inlaid saddles, such as are not to be found anywhere else in the world’, he wrote.² A Javanese



Illustration 1 *Kyai Wali*, a Javanese *kris* with its scabbard; reputedly a 15th- or 16th-century blade made by the *wali* Sunan Giri, with a 19th-century Surakarta hilt

² Armando Cortesão (ed. and transl.), *The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires and the book of Francisco Rodrigues* (2 vols; London: The Hakluyt Society, 1944), vol. 1, pp. 174–5.

nobleman from the court whom he saw in person had ‘three handsomely caparisoned jennets with stirrups all inlaid, with cloths all adorned with richly worked gold, with beautiful caparisons’.³ This court fell to an alliance of local Muslim lords c. 1527, but its reputation and styles continued to be influential thereafter.

By the early 17th century, the ruling dynasty was that of Mataram (the area of present-day Yogyakarta). There the greatest king of post-Majapahit Java, Sultan Agung (r. 1613–46), acted to reconcile *kraton* and Islamic traditions. He continued his royal liaison with the most powerful of Central Java’s indigenous (and definitely not Islamic) deities, the Goddess of the Southern Ocean (Ratu Kidul), but he also took decisive steps to make his court a more Islamic one. In 1633 he made a pilgrimage to Tembayat, where is found the holy grave of Sunan Bayat, regarded as the *wali* who introduced Islam to the Mataram area and whose grave-site had been the centre for resistance to Agung’s rule, which he crushed. Agung is said to have communed with the saint’s spirit, which taught him secret mystical sciences; thus were Bayat’s powers attached to the monarchy. Agung also abandoned the Old Javanese Indian-style Śaka calendar for a hybrid Javanese dating system using Islamic lunar months, an act which no doubt was also supernaturally potent. He reconciled with the princely family of Surabaya which had been his main opponent while he was building his empire by marrying one of his sisters to the senior surviving Surabaya prince, whose ancestry reached back to one of the most senior of the *walis*. With this prince’s assistance, Agung introduced major works of Islamically inspired literature into the court canon that were themselves thought to have magical potency. One of these works, *Kitab Usulbiyah*, claimed that reading or writing it was equivalent to fulfilling two of Islam’s five pillars — undertaking the pilgrimage to Mecca and giving alms — and also to going on Holy War. In this work, the Prophet Muhammad is depicted as wearing the golden crown of Majapahit, thus bringing together two powerful Islamic and Javanese symbols.

Agung’s reconciliation of Islamic identity with Javanese royal traditions was not pursued with similar enthusiasm by his successors. For several decades, rebellions against the dynasty largely justified themselves in the name of Islam. From the 1670s, Madurese, Makasarese and other non-Javanese became involved in the wars in Java. The beleaguered dynasty turned to the Dutch East India Company for military support. The Company’s

³ Ibid., pp. 191–2.

intervention enabled the dynasty to survive, but it also enhanced the religious aspect of rebellions — for now the dynasty's enemies could see it supported by *kafirs* — and played a major role in the Company's own bankruptcy at the end of the 18th century.

After decades of destructive civil wars in which religious identity played a major role, a second reconciliation of the *kraton* and Islamic sensibilities took place in the reign of Pakubuwana II (r. 1726–49). The prime mover here was the young king's aged, blind and pious Sufi grandmother Ratu Pakubuwana (b. c. 1657, d. 1732). Inspired by the example of Sultan Agung, she had new versions of the magically powerful works of his reign recomposed in the court. She made it clear in the introductions to those versions that she herself was particularly blessed by God and that these books deployed supernatural power which would both bring her own life to perfection and make perfect the reign of her grandson, making of him the ideal Sufi king. There were indeed *kraton*-led efforts to make the society more devoutly Islamic. The people were commanded to be diligent in attending the mosque on Fridays, gambling was outlawed at the court (with an exception for cock-fighting) and there is some evidence of the hands of thieves being amputated. Pre-Islamic doctrines, works of literature and other practices were, however, preserved within the court, but they were understood as being properly Islamic. This Islamisation project was idiosyncratic in other ways as well. Opium was banned (in theory) but the court's taste for European wine, liquor and beer was evidently unabated.

Pakubuwana II, however, was no ideal king. He was young, inconstant, foolish and probably rather stupid. His court disintegrated into deadly cliques that he could not manage. When war began between the Dutch East India Company and locally domiciled Chinese with their Javanese allies in 1740, the king first sided against the Company. He attacked, besieged and eventually compelled the surrender of the Company fortress at his court city of Kartasura, forcing the surviving Europeans to convert to Islam. He was now the conquering Sufi king of Holy War, bringing low the Christian *kafirs*. But changing military circumstances then made him think that this had been a mistake, and that it would have been wiser to side with the Company after all. Tentative steps towards reconciliation produced disaster, since neither the Company nor the rebels could now trust him. He found that his own court became the target of the rebels; in 1742 the *kraton* fell to them and Pakubuwana II took flight. Now the Company was prepared to deal with him, since he was prepared to offer whatever the Company might ask to restore him to his throne. Eventually the Company and its Madurese and Javanese allies prevailed and Pakubuwana II was restored to his battered

court, which he soon abandoned. He seems also to have abandoned any enthusiasm he had for further Islamising efforts or demonstrations of muscular piety. He moved to his new court of Surakarta in 1746.

The following years spawned more conflict, notably the rebellion of Png. Mangkubumi, who fought the forces of Pakubuwana III (r. 1749–88) and the declining Company to a standstill. Mangkubumi was proclaimed as a king in his own right, took the title of Sultan Hamengkubuwana I (r. 1749–92) and established his new court of Yogyakarta in 1755–6. Surakarta's domains were further subdivided in 1757 when the flamboyant Png. Mangkunagara I (r. 1757–95) was given a sizeable territory. Yogyakarta's lands were divided further in 1812, when a substantial portion was hived off by the British interim administration and given to Png. Pakualam I (r. 1812–29). The once-great kingdom of Mataram thus came to consist of two senior courts — those of the Sultan of Yogyakarta and the Susuhunan of Surakarta — and the two subsidiary but substantial principalities of the Pakualaman and the Mangkunagaran. Together these were what the Dutch called the *Vorstenlanden* (principalities).

During these years of tumultuous politics, the reconciliation of Javanese and Islamic identities, beliefs and styles produced what I have termed a 'Mystic Synthesis'. Within the capacious boundaries of Sufism, this synthesis rested on three main pillars:

- a strong sense of Islamic identity: to be Javanese was to be Muslim;
- observation of the five pillars of Islamic ritual: the confession of faith (*Shahada*), five daily prayers in the direction of Mecca (*salat*), giving alms (*zakat*), fasting during the month of Ramadan (*puasa* or *pasa*) and the pilgrimage to Mecca (the *hajj*) for those who were able to undertake it; and,
- despite the potential contradiction with the first two, acceptance of the reality of local Javanese spiritual forces such as Ratu Kidul (the Goddess of the Southern Ocean), Sunan Lawu (the spirit of Mount Lawu, essentially a wind-god) and a host of lesser supernatural beings.

This synthesis is illustrated in one of the important Sufi works of the time, the 'Gift addressed to the Spirit of the Prophet' (*al-Tuhfa al-mursala ila ruh al-Nabi*), which was written in the court of Yogyakarta and derived ultimately from the work of the Gujarati scholar Muhammad ibn Fadli'llah al-Burhanpuri (d. 1620). The Javanese-language text departs from the Arabic original in ways consistent with the Mystic Synthesis: having encountered



Illustration 2 Depiction of the *wayang* character Bima (Werkudara)
(from Pigeaud, *Javaanse volksvertoningen*, 1938, pl. 102)

difficulty in setting out the Sufi doctrine of seven stages of emanation, the writer resorted to the Hindu-Javanese metaphor of the relationship between Vishnu and Krishna. Older-style arts such as the *wayang* shadow play, with its stories taken mainly from the Hindu-Javanese epics, also continued to be patronised. Yet all of this was within a context in which the sense of being Muslim was evidently powerfully felt across Javanese society. Similar compromises of faith and practice could be found across the Islamic world in the period before the reform movements of the 18th and particularly 19th centuries.

There is very limited evidence from this period for the religious life of Javanese outside *kraton* circles, but what we do have mostly confirms widespread observation of Islam's five pillars. One account is a description of Gresik in East Java in 1822 by A.D. Cornets de Groot, who was Dutch Resident there. He wrote,

The main points of the Islamic faith, which are carried out by many, are the *Shahada* [Confession of faith], the *sembayang* [daily prayer], the *puasa* (fast), the *zakat* [alms], *fitrah* [contribution at the end of the fast] and *hajj* [pilgrimage]. ... The *puasa* (fast) is carried out by most Javanese of all classes.⁴

Further support for this view comes from J.W. Winter, who had worked in Surakarta as a translator since the late 18th century and wrote a report in 1824. His observations of Javanese Islam combine insights with ignorance and are not always to be taken at face value. Nevertheless, it is of interest that in a section entitled 'Superstitions', he wrote, 'I'm not saying that the Javanese don't practice well their religion of the faith of Muhammad, which is professed by them across the whole of Java. Its adherents are devoted to it as strongly as possible.'⁵

Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles was Lieutenant Governor of Java during the interim British administration of 1811–6 and wrote a famous *History of Java*. 'Pilgrimages to Mecca are common', he noted, and 'every village has its priest, and ... in every village of importance there is a mosque or building set apart adapted to religious worship'. He also reported the practice of circumcision of both boys and girls, the latter said to 'suffer a slight operation,

⁴ A.D. Cornets de Groot, 'Bijdrage tot de kennis van de zeden en gewoonten der Javanen', *TNI* vol. 14, pt. 2 (1852), pp. 271–2.

⁵ J.W. Winter, 'Beknopte beschrijving van het hof Soerakarta in 1824', *BKI* vol. 54 (1902), p. 82.

intended to be analogous'.⁶ A rather dissenting picture was presented by John Crawfurd, who was also in Java during this time. He was a shrewd observer but also a sternly judgmental Scottish Protestant, who condemned the Javanese as 'semibarbarians'.⁷ He said further,

Of all Mahomedans the Javanese are the most lax in their principles and practice. ... Neither the prayers nor the fastings of the Indian islanders, commonly speaking, are very rigid. The lower orders know little, and care less, about these matters. ... The pilgrimage to Mecca is frequently undertaken by the Javanese, and all the other Mahomedan tribes, less on account of piety, than on account of the distinctions and immunities which the reputation of the pilgrimage confers among a simple and untaught people.⁸

Taking all of the Javanese and foreign evidence together, it seems to me clear that the depiction of the Mystic Synthesis here captures the essence of Javanese Islam as of, say, 1800–30. It also seems likely that — despite some conflict of evidence on this aspect — many Javanese of all classes adhered to it.

The culminating symbolic expressions of the Mystic Synthesis were a great book and a great man. The former is the monumental *Serat Centhini*, written in the court of Surakarta in the second decade of the 19th century at the behest of the Crown Prince (later Susuhunan Pakubuwana V, r. 1820–3). This work — containing something over 200,000 lines of verse — is full of variety and subject to real problems of analysis, but certainly depicts a Javanese society in which Islam (as understood locally) was central. One of the characters in the text declares,

Already embracing this holy religion [Islam]
is every blade of grass in the land of Java,
following the Prophet who was Chosen.⁹

⁶ Thomas Stamford Raffles, *The history of Java* (2 vols; 2nd ed; London: John Murray, 1830), vol. II, pp. 3–4.

⁷ John Crawfurd, *History of the Indian Archipelago, containing an account of the manners, arts, languages, religions, institutions, and commerce of its inhabitants* (3 vols; Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and Co., 1820), vol. I, p. 47 and elsewhere.

⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 260–71.

⁹ [Pakubuwana V] *Sêrat Cênthini (Suluk Tambangraras): Yasandalêm Kangjêng Gusti Pangeran Adipati Anom Amêngkunagara III (Ingkang Sinubun Paku Buwana V) ing Surakarta* (ed. and transl. Kamajaya; 12 vols; Yogyakarta: Yayasan Centhini, 1986–92), stanza 66:3.

The great man was Png. Dipanagara of Yogyakarta, a son of the later Sultan Hamengkubuwana III (r. 1810–1, 1812–4).¹⁰ He spent much of his earlier years away from the *kraton*, which he saw as an environment deeply corrupted by, among other things, the European presence and general irreligiosity. He withdrew from this atmosphere and spent time at the estate of his pious great-grandmother the Ratu Ageng (the widow of Sultan Mangkubumi). There he studied works of Islamic inspiration as well as literature from the pre-Islamic Old Javanese heritage, a range of inspirations consistent with the Mystic Synthesis. He formed relationships with pious Islamic communities in the countryside. Around 1805–8 he had an inspirational experience in which he met several major spirits — local deities, the *wali* Sunan Kalijaga and Ratu Kidul — which convinced him that he had been selected to be the purifying leader of an age of devastation in Java, which would usher in the messianic time of the *Ratu Adil*, the Just King. Over the following years, the situation at the court and in the countryside deteriorated, while further visions came to Dipanagara. In one such, according to his autobiographical account, Dipanagara met the *Ratu Adil* himself, who said that the prince was tasked to conquer Java and that his mandate was the *Qur'an*. His final visions occurred during the fasting month of Ramadan in April–May 1825, when he was told that God had bestowed certain titles upon him, including *Erucakra*, the title which Javanese messianic traditions ascribe to the *Ratu Adil*.

In 1825 a final break occurred between him and the *kraton* with its Dutch allies, and the devastating Java War (1825–30) began. With widespread support amongst both aristocratic and commoner Javanese, Dipanagara initially did serious damage to the ill-prepared Europeans. Eventually, however, the latter gained the upper hand. This was no minor conflict. In the course of the fighting, the government side lost about 8,000 European soldiers and 7,000 Indonesian, and at least 200,000 Javanese died. But it became clear that Dipanagara could not prevail. In 1830 he agreed to meet the Dutch side for negotiations: it is unclear what he really expected to happen, but in any case he was arrested and sent into exile, where he died 25 years later.

The Java War was the last major resistance to Dutch dominance in Java. In its wake, the truly colonial period of Javanese history began, and

¹⁰ Since the publication of my *Mystic synthesis* book, an outstanding and authoritative study of Dipanagara has at last been published: Peter Carey, *The power of prophecy: Prince Dipanagara and the end of an old order in Java, 1785–1855* (VKI vol. 249; Leiden: KITLV Press, 2008).

with that came dramatic political, social, religious and cultural change. By the 1850s, the three pillars of the Mystic Synthesis — the identification of being Javanese with being Muslim, the widespread observation of Islam's five pillars and the acceptance of the reality of local spirit forces — were all coming under challenge.

Polarising Javanese society

By the time that Dipanagara was sent into exile, reform movements were already arising in the Islamic Middle East and having an influence in Sumatra, but not yet among the Javanese. The Wahhabi movement began in Arabia in the 18th century, bringing a fierce martial puritanism to the task of restoring Islam to its original perfection. From the 1780s a reform movement began to spread in Minangkabau (West Sumatra); in 1803–4 it became more violent under the leadership of people known as the Padris. They were inspired in large part by the Wahhabis, whose movement they knew from their experience of the *hajj* to Mecca, which the Wahhabis conquered in 1803. A civil war followed in Minangkabau which by 1815 resulted in near-total victory for the Padri side. The Dutch were invited to intervene by defeated Minangkabau aristocrats, however, and they did so in 1821, precipitating the drawn-out Padri War which only came to an end in 1838 with final Dutch conquest and the imposition of colonial rule.

In Java, the end of the Java War in 1830 allowed the Dutch at last — after over two centuries of involvement there — to impose a true colonial regime. They implemented what is called the Cultivation System (*cultuurstelsel*), a means to wring profit from Java's peasantry through various compulsory mechanisms for growing export crops. The Javanese administrative-aristocratic elite (*priyayi*) were engaged in administering this 'system' (really a wide variety of local arrangements) and rewarded for their contribution. The *cultuurstelsel* also fostered a nascent Javanese middle class, for there were many tasks that were needed but which were not government monopolies. Tasks such as pottery- and gunny sack-making, smithing, brick-laying, textile production, entertainment, agricultural processing, fishing and fish-farming, land transport, shipbuilding and similar trades, even some sugar cane harvesting, were sectors in which local entrepreneurship could develop.

At the same time, Javanese population began to grow remarkably. Already since the ending of Java's civil wars in the mid-18th century population had been growing. This was probably at a rate in excess of 1 per cent per annum, and perhaps even substantially in excess of that rate, already in the third quarter of the 18th century (or so it seems, recognising the inadequacies

of the statistical records for that period).¹¹ In the 19th century the population took off, rising from something like 3–5 million at the start of the century and approaching 24 million by 1890. These figures cover the whole of Java, encompassing areas that were majority Sundanese in West Java and majority Javanese in Central and East Java, with substantial Madurese population in the last area particularly. In the 1870s the ethnic Javanese were estimated (there had not yet been a census) to total about 11.5 million. These colonial and demographic revolutions produced considerable social dislocation.

Not only such political and social change, but also religious change came to the Javanese in the 19th century. For the first time Christian missions had some success after the end of the Java War. There were only a few missionaries from Europe and they had a limited effect, but there were several pious lay Christians of Indo-European background — competent in Javanese and sympathetic to Javanese culture — who began to produce significant numbers of converts. The first and most flamboyant was the Russian-Javanese Conrad Laurens Coolen, who became in effect the first Javanese Christian *kyai*. Both his teachings and his personal life scandalised pious Europeans, but he was more effective than they in producing a community of Javanese Christians. Even more effective were indigenous Javanese Christians who, after embracing this new faith, also presented it in ways that were explicable within Javanese cultural contexts. The most colourful was Ky. Ibrahim Tunggul Wulung — the Christian *kyai* with long flowing hair, wispy beard and supernatural powers who conversed in riddles and had been converted by magical phenomena. A distinction was observed between *Kristen Jawa* (Javanese Christians) who were followers of these indigenous figures and *Kristen Londo* (Dutch Christians) who had been converted by the Europeans. The most influential of all was Ky. Sadrach, who produced the largest Christian communities in Central Java before his death in his late 80s in 1924. Some Javanese Muslims objected to the spread of Christianity. Between 1882 and 1884, almost all the churches built by Sadrach's followers were burned down, but such incidents diminished thereafter. By 1900 there may have been some 20,000 Christians in Central and East Java. The Christians thus represented less than 0.1 per cent of the Javanese population, but they had established that being Javanese did not necessarily mean being Muslim.

¹¹ This complicated issue is not discussed in my *Polarising Javanese society*. For a full discussion, see my paper 'Some statistical evidence on Javanese social, economic and demographic history in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries', *Modern Asian Studies* vol. 20 (1986), no. 1, esp. pp. 28–30.

Social change among the Javanese, particularly the emergence of a nascent middle class, encouraged the spread of Islamic reform movements. The increasing financial resources of this group enabled more of them to go on the *hajj*. While 19th-century colonial statistics are not to be taken too seriously, it is worth noting that in 1850, so far as the Dutch knew, only 48 people went on the *hajj* from Javanese-speaking residencies but by 1858 that number was 2,283. In the later years of the century and into the early 20th, it was normal for between 1,500 and around 4,000 to go on the pilgrimage each year, with 7,600 going from Javanese-speaking residencies and Madura in 1911. The Javanese middle class in towns and cities also often had business and other links with local Arab communities, which constituted another channel for disseminating ideas about Islamic purification.

Reform movements were not universally welcomed and the Mystic Synthesis continued to have a large following. There are multiple works from the 19th century reflecting this synthesis and not a few that criticise the more reformist ideas then spreading. In his famous poem *Serat Wedhatama* ('Superior wisdom'), the modernising prince and poet Mangkunagara IV (r. 1853–81) admonished his sons,

If you insist on imitating
the example of the Prophet,
O, my boys, you overreach yourself.
As a rule you will not hold out long:
seeing that you are Javanese,
just a little is enough.¹²

Mangkunagara IV also criticised those 'young people who boast of their theological knowledge' and should be 'reckoned as frauds': 'Oddly enough they deny their Javaneseness / and at all costs bend their steps to Mecca in search of knowledge'.¹³

Religious boarding schools (*pesantren*) — key institutions, as we will see throughout this book — became a significant feature of Javanese life in the 19th century. There have been various suggestions (none of them supported by reliable evidence) that the *pesantren* was an ancient feature of the Javanese countryside. In fact none are known of before the 18th century and it is only in the 19th century that they became a major phenomenon. In

¹² [Mangkunagara IV,] *The Wedhatama: An English translation* (ed. and transl. Stuart Robson; KITLV working papers 4; Leiden: KITLV Press, 1990), pp. 30–1, with minor departures from Robson's translation.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 36–7.

1863 the colonial government recorded nearly 65,000 professional religious (mosque functionaries, teachers at religious schools, etc.) and 94,000 students at religious schools. By 1872, those numbers were 90,000 and over 162,000 respectively. In 1893 there were reckoned to be some 10,800 religious schools in Java and Madura with over 272,000 pupils. Many of these schools merely taught Qur'anic recitation by rote and elementary Islam, and in many the Mystic Synthesis version of Islam remained. But some taught more advanced topics and more reformed, more orthodox and *shari'a*-oriented Islam, and many played a role in the deeper Islamisation of the Javanese — at least of those Javanese who were receptive to the message.

Sufi brotherhoods (*tarekats*) also underwent reform in the 19th century. The Naqshabandiyya (of the Khalidiyya branch) was particularly significant; it seems to have been introduced in Javanese areas around the 1850s–60s. The Qadiriyya wa Naqshabandiyya (combining the practices of those two orders) was also new around that time. Both of these gave greater emphasis to the need for adepts to adhere to the five pillars of Islamic ritual, countering the antinomian inclinations of some other Sufis. They were also more anti-Christian and played a role in leading some anti-colonial uprisings, all of which were crushed. The Shattariyya and other orders also had followers among Javanese. So also did various messianic movements, especially in the 1880s.

Some of Java's Islamic reformers were conspicuous in their denunciation of older Javanese ideas. The most extreme example was Ky. H. Ahmad Rifa'i (or Rifangi), the founder of a movement known as Rifa'iyah or Budiah. He returned from the *hajj* to Java in the 1840s and established a *pesantren* at Kalisalak south of Tegal on the *pasisir* (north coast). In his numerous writings he sought to cleanse local Islam from what he regarded as unlawful innovations. He denounced *wayang* and other Javanese entertainments as un-Islamic. He did not, however, reject Sufism as some other contemporary and many later reformers did, but insisted on Sufi practices being reformed of deviant ideas and local innovations. He objected strongly to Javanese officials who were prepared to work for the *kafir* Dutch rulers and did not recognise as valid a marriage conducted by a *pangulu* (mosque head) appointed by the colonial government. He and his followers withdrew from the corrupted (in their eyes) society around them and built their own mosques. Rifa'i did not call for physical resistance against the colonial regime, but he was regarded as a threat by both the regime and the *priyayi* elite who worked for it. So he was exiled to Ambon in 1859, where he died in 1876. His movement continued after his exile and even in contemporary times is said to have some 7 million followers, particularly on the *pasisir*.

Pious and devout Javanese Muslims called themselves *putihan* (the ‘white ones’), but there were a good many Javanese who were not prepared to accept these new and more demanding versions of Islam; they were dubbed the *abangan*, ‘the red (or brown) ones’.¹⁴ This originated as a term of contempt used by the pious *putihan* in the mid-19th century — it is not documented before that time — but the *abangan* came to wear it comfortably. The first references known to me of the use of this term are in Dutch missionary reports from the 1850s.

The term *abangan* seems to have become more regular in its meaning of nominal, non-observing Muslims as the years passed, and to have spread across the Javanese-speaking heartland. As it did so, *abangan* lifestyle seems to have evolved away from the widespread observance of Islam’s five ritual pillars that had marked the Mystic Synthesis. The Dutch missionary Carel Poensen, who spent some 30 years in Kediri, described a dynamic Javanese society in the 1880s, with more reformed Islam influencing *putihan* life while the *abangan* were withdrawing from previous religious practices:

The influence of Islam is active in ever greater degree, at the cost of the previous religious life. ... The truth is that, indeed, very many people are ever more penetrated by Arabic or Islamic concepts in a more or less unrecognised way. But among the great majority there flows another current¹⁵ which, under the influence of present circumstances, causes the

¹⁴ I repeat here points I made in *Polarising Javanese society* (p. 84 n1) and elsewhere about the etymology of this term. A folk etymology claims that *abangan* (a *ngoko* or ‘low Javanese’ term) derived from the name of one of the *walis* of Javanese Islam, Seh Lemah Abang, who was martyred for disclosing secret doctrines to the uninitiated, but there is no evidence for this. However unorthodox his methods, as a saint of Islam, Lemah Abang would certainly have been regarded as one of the *putihan*. The irrelevance of this etymology is confirmed by noting that in *krama* (‘high Javanese’) Lemah Abang’s name is given as Seh Siti Jenar, yet the *abangan* were never called *jenaran* in *krama*, but rather *abritan* (*krama* for ‘the red ones’). More recently, an Islamised etymology has also been suggested. This posits that *abangan* derives from *aba’an*, from the Arabic verb *aba* (to reject, refuse). This is unacceptable on 3 grounds: (1) it is grammatically unsound; (2) at the time the term emerged, contemporary sources describe it as meaning ‘red’, not ‘rejectors, refusers’; and (3) again, in *krama* Javanese the term is *abritan*, whereas if it were from the Arabic, we would expect the Arabic word to be used in both *ngoko* and *krama*.

¹⁵ Poensen’s Dutch term is *stroom*, which in modern Indonesian would be translated as *aliran*, the term that, as we will see, was indeed used for such political-social-religious categories in the 20th century.

previous — in many ways naïve — religion more and more to be lost to the people. Basically, people are beginning to become less religious and pious.¹⁶

The differences between *putihan* and *abangan* became profound, as differences in religious style were mirrored in broader social differences. In general (repeating my own summary from *Polarising Javanese society*),¹⁷ the *putihan* were wealthier, active in business, better dressed, had better homes, seemed more refined in manners, avoided opium and gambling, observed the pillars of Islam, gave their children more education and disciplined them more. The *abangan* were poorer, were not involved in trade and did not provide their children with education. *Abangan* still observed some religious activities, but did so in the name of village solidarity. Whereas the *putihan* read Arabic works and discussed the Islamic world's affairs, the *abangan* watched *wayang* performances and other entertainments in which indigenous spiritual forces were at work. The two groups mixed with the like-minded. These were worlds far apart from one another and becoming more so. They were distinguished by religious style, social class, income, occupation, dress, education, manners, cultural life and the mode of raising children. Because many of Java's money-lenders were from the *putihan* and many of their debtors were *abangan*, their interactions carried the seeds of conflicting interests. In the early 20th century, this mix would be made more volatile by the addition of political competition.

Yet another important development within the *priyayi* elite contributed to this breaking-up of Javanese society into contending groups. In some ways, what we observe in 19th-century Java is a competition between two forms of globalisation and modernisation: on the one hand, international Islamic purification movements and, on the other, European colonialism and its attendant baggage of scientific and technological advances. As the *priyayi* elite became more familiar with their Dutch overlords, more literate (because of limited but expanding educational opportunities for the elite), more familiar with the outside world of Asia, Europe and North America and more clear about what sorts of conduct would most promote their careers in the colonial context, most opted for European-style modernity over Islamic reform. For many this meant continuing their adherence to

¹⁶ C. Poensen, 'Iets over den Javāan als mensch', Kediri, July 1884, in Archief Raad voor de Zending (het Utrechts Archief) 261; also in *Mededeelingen van wege het Nederlandsche Zendelinggenootschap*, vol. 29 (1885), p. 49.

¹⁷ P. 102.

the Mystic Synthesis style of Islam. It was extremely rare for *priyayi* to convert to Christianity: that was something that happened mainly among commoners. Around 1870, a *Bupati* put his continuing commitment to remaining a Muslim in notably more instrumentalist than spiritual terms. He had expressed enthusiasm for all things Dutch. His European interlocutor therefore asked whether this meant that he would convert to Christianity. He replied, 'Ah, ... to tell the truth, I would rather have four wives and a single God, than one wife and three Gods'.¹⁸ There were, it seems, some things upon which the Europeans could not improve.

In Java's larger towns and cities, a rather hybrid society grew up, consisting of *priyayi* Javanese, Europeans and wealthier Chinese, all self-consciously modern, with Javanese (or sometimes Malay but never Dutch) as their common language. Their dress, their houses and their entertainments reflected this hybridity: Javanese *priyayi* wearing military jackets or formal European cutaway tuxedo jackets (without tails), with Dutch decorations on the chest if they had them, and fine *batik* wraps below. They read about the new discoveries of science and about events outside Java. They hung family photographs on their walls and chandeliers from their ceilings, and joined Europeans and elite Chinese at *thé dansant* and book-reading clubs. Their distance from both pious Muslim Javanese and the heavily burdened *abangan* peasantry grew. They were fascinated by the discoveries of European archaeology and philology, which tended to depict pre-Islamic Java as a 'classical' age (implying an analogy with views of European history).

Among some of these *priyayi* there even grew a specifically anti-Islamic idea — that the conversion to Islam had been a civilisational mistake and that the key to true modernity was to combine modern knowledge à la Europe with a restoration of Hindu-Javanese culture. Islam was seen as the cause of the fall of the greatest expression of that culture, the kingdom of Majapahit. In the 1870s, writers in Kediri encapsulated these ideas in three remarkable works of literature, *Babad Kedhiri*, *Suluk Gatholoco* and *Serat Dermagandhul*, which denounced and ridiculed Islam. The last of these prophesied that rejection of Islam would happen four centuries after the fall of Majapahit — this perhaps having been written to commemorate the establishment of a government school for the elite at Probolinggo in 1878, 400 years after the traditional date for the fall of Majapahit — and even that the Javanese would then become Christians.

¹⁸ Quoted in [C.E. van Keesteren] v.K, 'De Koran en de driekleur', *Stemmen uit Indie* no. 1 (1870), p. 46.

In the early 20th century the Islamic reform movement was strengthened by Modernism, which added another layer to the polarised devout community. Modernism denied that the four Sunni Schools of Law were authoritative guides to understanding Islam, seeing them more as sources of medieval obscurantism, and sought to return directly to the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* to understand God's revelation, mobilising human reason in this task. Modernism was thus open to modern social styles and, above all, to modern forms of education. The *haji* numbers by now were considerable, with the number of pilgrims from Javanese-speaking areas and Madura at the level of 8,000–15,000 per annum in most years from 1912 to 1930. The pilgrimage and a range of publications together constituted major vehicles for the spreading of Modernist ideas. Modernism was almost entirely an urban phenomenon. In 1912 Muhammadiyah was founded in Yogyakarta. It grew to become the foremost Modernist Islamic organisation in Indonesia, with schools and welfare organisations across the archipelago. It was active in advocating its reforming views and resisting Christian missions (whose methods it often copied). We will see much of Muhammadiyah in this book. Muhammadiyah eschewed political involvement, but many Modernist individuals did not. The Traditionalist *kyais* of the countryside wanted little or nothing to do with Modernism. In 1926 they founded their own organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), to defend the interests of Traditionalism, another organisation about which we will have much to say in this volume.

Now the categories within this increasingly polarised society became politicised, and thus deeper and more socially dangerous. From 1901 the Dutch adopted the so-called Ethical Policy, which was meant to put the interests of Indonesians higher on the colonial agenda. This meant *inter alia* more education and even encouragement for local organisations to develop — if, of course, they were not a threat to the colonial regime. *Priyayi* who doubted that Islamisation had been a good idea took the lead in creating the first modern political organisation, Budi Utomo, in 1908. It was soon eclipsed by more active, less conservative organisations. Sarekat Islam was founded in 1912. Its evocation of Islam in its name was really little more than a notification that its members were Indonesians (and thus Muslims) while the colonial authority was not, but over time it came to be dominated more by Modernist politicians. Its followers were often more motivated by their animosity towards the *priyayi* elite and Chinese than by any other issues.

A radical organisation initially led mainly by Europeans developed into an Indonesian- (in fact mainly Javanese-) led Communist organisation in 1920; in 1924 it adopted the name Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI,

the Indonesian Communist Party). Its constituency was found among the *abangan*, both among the growing proletariat in Java's cities and among the peasantry. The Communists were very aware of the Javanese heritage which they wanted to attach themselves to. On the walls at PKI's Semarang congress in 1921 hung portraits of Dipanagara and of his lieutenants Kyai Maja and Sentot, alongside those of Marx, Lenin, Trotsky and Rosa Luxemburg. PKI was, however, an organisation with inadequate coherence and internal discipline and was subject to government surveillance and infiltration. In 1926–7 it stumbled into an uprising against the colonial regime that was an utter failure and led to the party being crushed — the first of three such devastating episodes in its history (we will later see those of 1948 and 1965–6).

In the wake of PKI's destruction, a young charismatic leader named Sukarno — later to become the first president of independent Indonesia — founded a new nationalist party in 1927, which in 1928 became the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI). Its constituency, too, was mainly *abangan*. But the failed PKI uprising rattled the Europeans. The colonial government stepped back from the degree of liberality previously displayed under the Ethical Policy. Political organisations were closely watched and shut down at will. Sukarno and others were in and out of jail and internal exile. The government — with the support of most of the *priyayi* administrators — did all they could to prevent anti-colonial agitators gaining access to the masses in the cities or countryside. Meanwhile internecine squabbles amongst the tiny anti-colonial elite remained frequent and bitter.

This was Javanese society polarised as it entered the hard years of the Great Depression.

CHAPTER 2

Under colonial rule: Javanese society and Islam in the 1930s

It is rare for significant redirections in history to be associated with a particular year, not just as a convenient metaphor of historians, but as something that was actually visible in events. It is even more unusual for two such turning-point years to occur neatly one hundred years apart. Yet so it was for the Javanese. I observed in the preceding book in this series that, ‘In Java, 1830 was one of those remarkable years that truly mark a historical watershed.’¹ The changes which followed 1830 are the subject matter of that book and their consequences are captured in its title, *Polarising Javanese society*. A century later, 1930 also stands as a watershed time, for it saw the sudden and dramatic commencement of the hard years of the Great Depression, the Japanese occupation and the Indonesian Revolution, which would together convulse Javanese society for 20 years.

Social parameters: The census of 1930

We have a reasonably comprehensive statistical picture of the Javanese in 1930 because the Dutch colonial authorities carried out a census in that year, their first — and last — census covering all of what was to become Indonesia. The data is not entirely reliable but it nevertheless captures important information about Javanese society after a century of intrusive colonial rule, dramatic population growth, intensifying Islamisation and the reactions — not always welcoming — to that Islamisation. Unfortunately for the theme of this book, however, the census data does not include

¹ Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese society*, p. 12.

information about the social division between the devout sector of Javanese society — the *putiban* or, as they are more commonly called now, the *santri* — and the *abangan*, for whom Islam was little more, and sometimes even less, than a nominal commitment.

The population of Central and East Java, including the royal Principalities (*Vorstenlanden*) of Central Java, totaled 30.4 million in 1930, of whom about 30 million were indigenous people. The vast majority of these lived in rural areas. The percentage of the indigenous population living in towns and cities was only 6.4 per cent in East Java, 7.4 per cent in Central Java, 9.1 per cent in the Principality of Yogyakarta and 7.2 per cent in the Principality of Surakarta. Very few of these lived in cities of any real size: less than 3 per cent of Central Javanese lived in Semarang, Yogyakarta or Surakarta, the only cities with populations over 100,000 there. Less than 2 per cent of the indigenous people of East Java lived in Surabaya, the only city there with a population over 100,000.²

Central and East Java were already heavily populated by 1930, the result of rapid population growth that had begun in the 18th century and was still continuing. The census commented on ‘the enormous population density of Java’.³ The overall density of Central Java was 395.6 persons/km², while that of East Java was 314.2. In some regencies very high figures were reached: 860.5 persons/km² in Yogyakarta, 900.2 in Kota Gede, 749.2 in Surabaya, 1051.6 in Tegal outside the town. In some other areas, particularly mountainous regions, the figures were significantly lower. For comparison, in the same period, the population density of the Netherlands was 232.2 persons/km², while in British India, that of Bengal was 223 and Madras 114.⁴ By later standards, the Java figures may seem tolerable, for by the time of the 2000 census, the population density of Central Java was 904 persons/km² and that of East Java was 726 persons/km². Some areas had by then reached a density of 2,000 persons/km² or even higher.⁵ But already in 1930

² Departement van Landbouw, Nijverheid en Handel & Departement van Economische Zaken, *Volkstelling 1930 / Census of 1930 in Netherlands India* (8 vols; Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1933–6), vol. 2, pp. 4–5; vol. 3, pp. 2–4. Surabaya was then the second-largest city in the Netherlands East Indies, with a population around 342,000, the largest being Batavia/Jakarta with 533,000; H. W. Dick, *Surabaya, city of work: A socioeconomic history, 1900–2000* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies Research in International Studies Southeast Asia Series No. 106, Ohio University Press, 2002), p. 121.

³ *Volkstelling 1930*, vol. 2, p. 9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 7–10; vol. 3, p. 5.

⁵ Information provided by Prof. Gavin Jones, based on the 2000 Indonesia census.

these were seriously heavy population densities, with population growth rates remaining at a high level. Over 1920–30, population grew at an annual rate of 1.81 per cent in East Java, 1.16 per cent in Central Java, 2.25 per cent in the Principality of Surakarta and 1.93 per cent in that of Yogyakarta. The rate for all of Java and Madura was 1.73 per cent.⁶ Such rates of growth — if they were maintained — would double the population in about 40 years.

Central and East Java were populated largely by ethnic Javanese. There were significant European and Chinese communities in some of the larger towns and cities, but even there the indigenous population constituted the vast majority, in Surakarta and Yogyakarta for example exceeding 96 per cent of the total.⁷ These indigenous residents were overwhelmingly ethnic Javanese, who formed 98.2 per cent of the indigenous population across Central Java and nearly 100 per cent in Surakarta and Yogyakarta.⁸

In East Java, however, the ethnic picture was different as other ethnic groups, particularly Madurese, moved into previously sparsely settled areas. Overall, Javanese constituted 69.4 per cent of the population of East Java while the Madurese amounted to 29 per cent. Some areas — such as Bojonegoro, Madiun and Kediri — remained almost entirely Javanese in ethnic composition. Elsewhere there was significant immigration, particularly into the easterly regencies of Banyuwangi, Jember, Lumajang, Malang and Blitar. By 1930, Bondowoso, Panarukan and Kraksaan had become almost totally Madurese regencies. In Banyuwangi, Probolinggo and Jember, ethnic Javanese had become a minority.⁹

This ethnic diversity in East Java highlights the significant degree of mobility among the population. There were population movements across Java, and particularly from rural areas into towns and cities. The 1930 census recorded that people who lived in major urban areas but were not born there amounted to 40.8 per cent of the population of Semarang, 35.5 per cent of Surakarta, 33 per cent of Yogyakarta and 51.4 per cent of Surabaya, in the last case being similar to the levels reached in the major West Java metropolises of Batavia (51.2 per cent) and Bandung (55.1 per cent).¹⁰

By 1930 the Javanese had been undergoing a process of Islamisation for over five hundred years, but polygamy (polygyny) was at a low level. Its practice was largely confined to aristocratic circles, which were, in general,

⁶ *Volkstelling 1930*, vol. 2, p. 12; vol. 3, p. 11.

⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 136–7, 142–3.

⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 17–8.

⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. 3, pp. 12–3, 15–6.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 23; vol. 3, p. 29.

among the least piously Muslim in style. In Central Java, the Principalities and East Java, the proportion of men with more than one wife varied from 1.6 per cent to 2.4 per cent. In some regencies figures were slightly higher, but nowhere did the percentage exceed 3.4. The vast majority (about 95 per cent) of polygynous marriages involved only two wives. We should note that the lowest figures (below 1 per cent) for polygynous marriages in East Java were found in the regencies of Tuban, Lamongan, Gresik, Surabaya and Sidoarjo, while figures just over 1 per cent were found in Nganjuk and Jombang. These areas with low levels of polygyny are usually thought of as quite *santri* in religious and cultural style, suggesting that even a strong sense of Islamic identity in Java did not involve significant levels of polygyny. Only 0.01 per cent of marriages in East Java involved four wives, the maximum allowed by Islamic law.¹¹

One of the most striking features of Javanese society in 1930 — which would prevail well into the period of Indonesian independence — was a low level of literacy. In such a society, prejudices, stereotypes, symbols, slogans and rumours can be more powerful than more modern kinds of mass communication and persuasion. The overall figures clearly reflect how little had been achieved by the Dutch colonial government's commitment to education in its post-1901 Ethical Policy. The overall literacy rate (in any language or script) in Central Java was 5.9 per cent, in the Principality of Yogyakarta 4.4 per cent, in that of Surakarta 3.6 per cent and in East Java 4.4 per cent. At regency level in the Principalities of Central Java, the Pakualaman regency had a literacy rate of 22.2 per cent, but from that isolated high figure literacy dropped to 7.5 per cent in Yogyakarta regency, 6.9 per cent in Semarang and so on down to very low levels in the mountainous regencies Gunung Kidul (1.6 per cent) and Wonogiri (1.5 per cent), 'where the need for education is low or difficult to fulfill'. In the Principalities, the literacy figures were generated largely by the capital cities and their immediate environs; outside such areas, figures never exceeded 5 per cent. Similar patterns were found around the towns and cities throughout Central and East Java. The highest literacy rate at regency level in East Java was in Trenggalek with 8.4 per cent (and 16.5 per cent in the town), whence it dropped to 7.8 per cent in Surabaya (but 12.2 per cent in the city), down to 4 per cent in Malang (15.5 per cent in the town) and thence to a mere 2.4 per cent in overwhelmingly Madurese Kraksaan. It is noteworthy that these overall figures conceal great gender disparity. For example, in the

¹¹ Ibid., vol. 2, p. 49; vol. 3, pp. 50–1.

regency of Surakarta, the overall level of literacy was 9.2 per cent, but for men it was 17.1 per cent while for women it was only 2.4 per cent. In the Mangkunagaran principality, it was 11.4 per cent for men but 1.5 per cent for women. In Trenggalek regency it was 17.3 per cent for men but only 1.1 per cent for women. In other words, in many parts of Java it would have been nearly impossible to find a literate woman.¹²

Literacy was increasing, but from very low levels, and the coming Great Depression would put a halt to the expansion of government schools in Java. A significant element within the small proportion of the population who were literate, however — varying from about one-sixth to one-quarter in different regions — gained their reading and writing skills outside of any school.¹³ Anticipating the dramatic social changes which will emerge in the course of this book, we may note here that after 1949 the independent Republic of Indonesia would give high priority to increasing literacy and, particularly from the 1970s, had the resources to make a major impact. By the mid-1990s, literacy rates for the population over the age of ten were 84.5 per cent in Central Java and 79.4 per cent in East Java, with the rate for the whole of Indonesia standing at 87.4 per cent.¹⁴

Turning from literacy to occupation data, we can observe that Java in the 1930s was still a largely agrarian society, but that some areas of indigenous industry were well developed. It is noteworthy that, if few women were gaining literacy skills, many were nevertheless active in employment. In Central Java 24.9 per cent of all women were classified as exercising an occupation (*beroepsbeoefenaars*), in Surakarta 42.1 per cent, in Yogyakarta 45.9 per cent, in East Java 23.7 per cent. Women particularly played a role in the *batik* industry, notably in the towns of Banyumas, Sukaraja, Purbalingga, Pemalang, Kedungwuni, Lasem, Blora, Wates, Surakarta and the municipality of Pekalongan. In the industrial town of Kota Gede — still famous today as a source of fine silver handicrafts — there were many women involved in trade. Nevertheless, among occupied persons agriculture was still a major area of activity. In Central Java 56.5 per cent of all occupied persons were agriculturalists, in Yogyakarta 41.8 per cent, in Surakarta 54.4 per cent. Plantation agriculture — especially tobacco, coffee, rubber and sugar — absorbed significant mounts of labour, particularly in East Java, and day

¹² Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 67–74 (quotation from p. 68); vol. 3, pp. 68–75.

¹³ Ibid., vol. 3, p. 75.

¹⁴ Information provided by Prof. Gavin Jones. See also M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of modern Indonesia since c. 1200* (4th ed. Basingstoke, Hants: Palgrave Macmillan; Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 348.

labourers represented a major employment category (up to 22.6 per cent of employed persons) in some East Javanese regencies.¹⁵

The 1930 census provides an interesting snapshot of indigenous employment in the city of Surabaya in 1930:

Table 1 Indigenous employment in Surabaya city, 1930¹⁶

Occupation	% of all employed	Males employed	Females employed	Total employed
Agriculture	1.9	1,949	223	2,172
Industry	21.0	19,696	4,111	23,807
Transportation	10.5	11,656	177	11,830
Trade	11.7	9,114	4,109	13,223
Liberal professions ¹⁷	1.8	1,673	334	2,007
Public administration	10.8	11,998	169	12,167
Domestic service	24.0	7,888	19,259	27,143
Others ¹⁸	15.8	15,208	2,608	17,816
Total	97.5	79,182	30,990	110,165

At this time, Surabaya was one of the leading cities of the archipelago, with a population of 342,000, the second largest city after Jakarta/Batavia. It was a hub of trade and industry with a total indigenous population of 271,275, of whom 40.6 per cent were occupied as set out in the table above. Of those Indonesians, 84 per cent were reckoned to be ethnic Javanese and 13 per cent ethnic Madurese.¹⁹ Table 1 shows a significant level of indigenous male employment in industry, transportation, trade and public administration and the large, more feminised work force in domestic service. The ‘other’ category showed substantial numbers — a majority male — employed largely as day labourers in various industries, as dock workers

¹⁵ *Volkstelling 1930*, vol. 2, pp. 84–98; vol. 3, pp. 86–91.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 90. There is a minor discrepancy of seven persons visible among the various totals, which I have not attempted to correct.

¹⁷ For example, religion, medicine, law, journalism, i.e., the educated professionals.

¹⁸ In the census listed as ‘inadequately described’, meaning mainly miscellaneous day-labourers (*kuli rupa-rupa*); *Volkstelling 1930*, vol. 3, p. 91.

¹⁹ Of the roughly 20 per cent of the population that was not reckoned as Indonesian, 7.6 per cent were classified as Europeans (a classification which by then included Japanese), 11.4 per cent as Chinese and 1.6 per cent as other Asians; Dick, *Surabaya*, pp. 121, 125.

and so on. Here was an urban proletariat in the making. All of these sectors would be hard hit when the Great Depression came. That episode, combined with the Japanese occupation and the Indonesian Revolutionary war that followed, would so damage Surabaya that it would not recover its former dynamism until the 1970s and 1980s.²⁰

The impact of the Great Depression

The Depression had a major impact upon the people living in Central and East Java, but its effects varied significantly from group to group and place to place.²¹ In general, as industrial production collapsed in developed countries — where the majority of Indonesian exports went — so that international markets shriveled up, trade went into decline, protectionism spread and the world prices for tropical produce fell, many Javanese saw their incomes, standards of living and future prospects decline precipitously. Although before 1930 there had been some signs that the expansion of Java's economy was reaching its limits, it was the Great Depression that propelled Java and its citizens dramatically into crisis. This was a crisis from which the Dutch colonial state never fully recovered, for it was to be overtaken by the Second World War and Indonesian Revolution before it could do so.

The colonial budget was cut back dramatically in order to contain ballooning deficits.²² Colonial civil servants and school teachers — whether European or indigenous — found their prospects either reduced or indeed at an end. Private enterprise was in no position to offer alternative employment to such people. New graduates coming out of schools and (in extraordinarily tiny numbers) from the few university-level institutions in Indonesia had hardly any prospects of employment. As O'Malley observes, 'The increased clamor for more education that had been so determinedly stirred up was to go largely unheard, and the effort that had already been put into education was to go largely unrewarded, throughout the 1930s.'²³

²⁰ On Surabaya's 20th-century history, see Dick, *Surabaya*, e.g., pp. 464–5.

²¹ A brief overview of the impact of the Depression on Indonesia may be found in Ricklefs, *History of modern Indonesia*, pp. 222–4.

²² William J. O'Malley, 'Indonesia in the Great Depression: A study of East Sumatra and Jogjakarta in the 1930's' (PhD thesis, Cornell University; Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1977), p. 73.

²³ O'Malley, 'Indonesia in the Depression', pp. 80–1. In 1930–1, there were only 178 Indonesians in university-level education in the entire Netherlands East Indies. For a general survey of education policy in this period, see Ricklefs, *History of modern Indonesia*, pp. 189–93.

Rural living standards fell. As plantation agriculture was cut back, more land again became available for rice agriculture. Nevertheless, with the population continuing to grow, per capita consumption of rice fell. People compensated for this with lower-quality foodstuffs such as cassava, corn (maize) and sweet potatoes.²⁴ Such hardship was also common in towns and cities among the vast majority of Indonesians who were poorly educated and worked as coolies, small-time traders and industrial labourers. The government's response to hardship was to attempt to save money by cutting back such welfare services as existed. The government tried to create employment by expanding labour-intensive public works programmes, encouraging the use of what little uncultivated land remained, and supporting emigration (dubbed 'transmigration') from Java to the outer islands,²⁵ but such measures only had a marginal impact on the hardship suffered by most of the Javanese population. I have pointed out elsewhere how futile the transmigration programme was: between its inception in 1905 and 1930, several thousand Javanese moved out of Java, the total population of such transmigrants being about 36,000 in 1930. At the same time, far larger numbers left Java to work as coolie labourers on plantations, mainly in Sumatra; these totaled over 306,000 in 1930. Meanwhile, between 1905 and 1930 the population of Java grew by some 11 million.²⁶ As outer island plantations cut back production and employment in the Depression, Javanese plantation coolies indeed began to flow back to Java, where there was no work for them.²⁷

In many places in Java, the great employer had been the sugar industry. Java had exported some 3 million tonnes of sugar before the Depression but by 1936 was exporting a mere 1 million. East Java's area planted to sugar was cut by 81 per cent over three years. Sugar had so dominated the economy of Surabaya that that city was particularly hard hit.²⁸ Payments to Indonesians from the sugar industry for wages, rents and compensation fell from D.fl. 129.6 million in 1929 to a low of 10.9 million in 1936, a reduction of over 90 per cent. In Yogyakarta, in a normal pre-Depression year the sugar industry planted about 17,600 hectares. In 1931 that fell to 13,697, in 1932

²⁴ P. Boomgaard, 'The welfare services in Indonesia, 1900–1942', *Itinerario* vol. 10 (1986), no. 1, p. 70.

²⁵ John Ingleson, 'Urban Java during the Depression', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* vol. 19, no. 2 (Sept. 1988), p. 302.

²⁶ Ricklefs, *History of modern Indonesia*, p. 188.

²⁷ Ingleson, 'Urban Java during the Depression', p. 305.

²⁸ Dick, *Surabaya*, p. 65.

to 6,449 and in 1933 to only 1,110, by which time there were only two sugar plantations still operating in Yogyakarta. Before the Depression, people in the sugar areas of Yogyakarta normally earned a total of about D.fl. 8.3 million in wages, rent and compensation from the sugar industry. In 1933 the figure was barely 2.3 million. Of course there was more land available for rice cultivation as sugar cultivation was cut back, but this was of no assistance to the cash income of farmers because the prices of crops tumbled.²⁹ The money supply contracted sharply, with serious consequences for trade and welfare across Javanese society.³⁰

It was not only agriculturalists who suffered in places like Yogyakarta. The silver artisans of Kota Gede survived and even expanded their trade in the later 1930s, but elsewhere the picture was gloomy. *Batik* production — a major form of local industry — was cut to a third of its former capacity by 1935. Some small cottage industries such as hand-rolling of cigars and cigarettes and local production of textiles and soaps did, however, find that opportunities were created by the cutting back of foreign imports and the fall in money incomes.³¹

In Surakarta, the story in the *batik* industry was somewhat different. Among the most famous *batik* entrepreneurs of Java are those of Laweyan, Surakarta. Contrary to some interpretations of entrepreneurship in Java, these manufacturers (as opposed to many of the *batik* traders in the town) were mostly not from the pious *santri* community but were rather *abangan* nominal Muslims. Nor did they have much interest in local Javanese arts and traditions: they were interested in making money. They did, however, engage in various Javanese mystical and ascetic practices in the hope that they would bring good fortune. Women played a leading role as organisers of the Laweyan *batik* industry. Not surprisingly, there was therefore strong opposition in Laweyan to the polygyny commonly seen in Surakarta aristocratic circles. These *abangan* entrepreneurs modernised *batik* production from the early years of the 20th century and turned it into a mass-marketing industry by adopting print (*cap*) rather than hand-crafted techniques. Their markets were reduced during the Depression years but they survived reasonably well and by 1936 were as wealthy and technically proficient, and had marketing networks that were as good, as their Chinese

²⁹ O'Malley, 'Indonesia in the Depression', pp. 82, 98 n56, 188, 190, 216 n107.

³⁰ Petrus Bakker, *Eenige beschouwingen over het geldverkeer in de inheemse samenleving van Nederlandsch-Indië* (Groningen and Batavia: J.B. Wolters' Uitgevers-Maatschappij, 1936), pp. 121, 133.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 191–2

and Arab (and very few European) competitors. In that year these Javanese entrepreneurs organised themselves into the Persatuan Perusahaan Batik Bumiputra Surakarta (Union of Indigenous Batik Enterprises of Surakarta), 'strengthening their position as the Javanese middle class' as Soedarmono puts it. But this organisation was opposed by the Chinese entrepreneurs and the Dutch regime would not give it sole authority to manage the *batik* industry, so it collapsed.³²

Most indigenous wage-earners in urban Java — people who, for example, worked as clerks and typists in public administration and private businesses — found their work opportunities shrinking or disappearing altogether. They sought various remedies, taking lower-standard employment or having their wives set up small trading *warungs*.³³ For some, however, there were new opportunities. European, Eurasian and Chinese employees, who were paid higher salaries, were often the first to be fired. Sometimes this meant that lower-paid Indonesians were able to move into those positions.³⁴ Urban labourers were hard hit. When the British American Tobacco Company shut its factory in Surabaya in 1932, for example, two thousand Indonesians were dismissed with a single week's pay.³⁵

Newly qualified school teachers found few opportunities for employment. In Yogyakarta, however, there was actually an expansion of educational institutions during the 1930s. Both Taman Siswa and Muhammadiyah had their headquarters there and continued to be major providers of education. The government and Christian mission schools also continued. In 1929 a trade school taught in Dutch, the Princess Juliana School, opened there. It was followed by a new Dutch-medium high school in 1932, a normal school in 1934 and a Higher Middle-Class School (HBS: Hoogere Burgerschool) in 1937, all taught in Dutch.³⁶ In this time of crisis, the foundations were thus laid for Yogyakarta's prominence as a centre of education, which it retains today.

³² Soedarmono, *Mbok Mase: Pengusaha batik di Larweyan Solo awal abad 20* (Jakarta: Yayasan Warna Warni Indonesia, 2006), esp. pp. 32, 37, 39, 45, 58, 71, 90–1, 123–5. For a valuable study of *santri batik* entrepreneurs of Central and East Java, see Christine Dobbin, 'Accounting for the failure of the Muslim Javanese business class: Examples from Ponorogo and Tulungagung (c. 1880–1940)', *Archipel* no. 48 (1994), pp. 87–101.

³³ Ingleson, 'Urban Java during the Depression', p. 297.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 296.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 300.

³⁶ O'Malley, 'Indonesia in the Depression', pp. 194–5.

Since prices and hence the cost of living were rapidly falling, those urban Indonesians who managed to retain their jobs probably in fact gained in living standard simply because their salaries were falling less rapidly.³⁷ That drop in the cost of living was dramatic, as set out in Table 2.

Table 2 Cost of Living index, Netherlands Indies, 1929–39³⁸ (1929 = 100)

Year	Index
1929	100
1930	69.5
1931	69.5
1932	54.0
1933	44.5
1934	42.5
1935	43.0
1936	41.0
1937	46.0
1938	47.0
1939	44.0

Thus, for most people of East and Central Java, the 1930s were a time of hardship from which certainly social and probably cultural consequences flowed. From the cities many had to return to rural areas to look for work, food and shelter. So the process of quite rapid urbanisation and proletarianisation that was suggested by the 1930 census data was slowed and for a time perhaps even reversed. For Surabaya, Howard Dick estimates that from 1930 to c. 1935 there was probably a net outflow of population from the city, a trend reversed again in the second half of the 1930s. By 1940 Surabaya had grown to an estimated 403,000 people from the figure of 342,000 a decade before, a much slower rate than for the decade 1920–30.³⁹

The Islamic reform movements and Islamically inspired political organisations associated with those movements were still largely urban-based. The malaise of the Great Depression was felt profoundly in those urban areas at the same time as the colonial government was cracking down on urban-based anti-colonial movements and political leaders in the wake of the failed PKI

³⁷ Ingleson, 'Urban Java during the Depression', p. 306–9.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 307.

³⁹ Dick, *Surabaya*, p. 120.

uprising of 1926–7.⁴⁰ So there was little prospect of new streams of political, cultural or religious ideas spreading widely in Java in the 1930s. Older ideas and styles still dominated much of Javanese life, whether of the aristocrats and elites in the *Vorstenlanden* court (*kraton*) precincts or of villagers in the countryside. While modern political elites contemplated how to liberate Indonesia from colonial rule — a contemplation not infrequently undertaken while in jail or exile on a remote island — and modern Islamic leaders considered how to make Javanese religious life conform more closely to their ideals, the vast majority of Javanese remained beyond their influence.

Javanese life and culture in kraton and countryside

In these hard times, Javanese villagers maintained a rich variety of popular performances, arts and entertainments. In most cases, these reflected a sense of supernatural powers that was only marginally influenced by Islamic orthodoxy. This richness and variety was captured in the monumental study of ‘Javanese popular performances’ by Th. G. Th. Pigeaud, published in 1938.⁴¹ Pigeaud emphasised that he was not intending to cover all such performances. His book of over 500 folio-sized pages described masked dances, masquerades, horse-dances (using model horses of woven bamboo), youth dance performances, male group dances and religious performances in their bewildering variety of styles and names from place to place across Java. He wrote that he would give little or no attention to

the performances of dancing women and female singers or of story-tellers, to combat-play (fencing, etc., various kinds of combat sports and sparring matches), cock-fights and other animal fights, trance performances ... and folk-theatre. Next to these we should mention all sorts of puppet theatre (*wayang*) and all sorts of music, as well as artistic dances by men and women, artistic expressions which are or have been the most influenced by courtly arts or which arose entirely from and developed at the courts. Completely beyond consideration remain the games and entertainments which cannot be regarded as performances or productions, such as children’s games (of boys and girls) and gambling.⁴²

⁴⁰ A brief survey of the politics of the 1927–42 period may be found in Ricklefs, *History of modern Indonesia*, Chapter 16.

⁴¹ Th. Pigeaud, *Javaanse volksvertoningen: Bijdrage tot de beschrijving van land en volk* (Batavia: Volkslectuur, 1938).

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 5.



Illustration 3 Depiction of a Yogyakarta horse-dance (*jaranan*)
(from Pigeaud, *Javaanse volksvertoningen*, 1938, pl. 89)



Illustration 4 Horse-dance (*jaranan*) from Ponorogo (note the female dancer on the right) (from Pigeaud, *Javaanse volksvertoningen*, 1938, pl. 90)

Many of these entertainments not described in Pigeaud's study were discussed in other major works of scholarship of that age, such as Kunst's study of Javanese music, Kats's of the *wayang* and van Lelyveld's of Javanese dance.⁴³ In these art forms, pre-Islamic inspirations, styles and librettos remained dominant.

Nevertheless, Pigeaud covered a very great deal. Some of these forms of performance we will encounter again in this book, such as the dances of Kediri (now commonly called *jaranan*) involving woven model horses and spirit possession, the female dancers and singers of the *gandrung* of Banyuwangi and the burlesque *ludruk* of Surabaya.⁴⁴ Pigeaud was aware that he was recording a changing scene, for older supernatural understandings seemed to be fading. 'The feeling for a (or several) religious significance(s) has not yet entirely disappeared from these performances', he wrote.⁴⁵ Indeed, if one were to begin with Pigeaud and write a full history of popular Javanese folk arts down to the present, it would largely be a story of decline and loss of traditions, as will be suggested by the discussions in this book. This was partly to do with religious reform, but also with modernisation and globalisation: perhaps at least as much a product of education, electrification, televisionisation and Nintendoisation as of Islamisation.

Pigeaud noted performances which were associated with Islamic piety. Foremost among these was *slawatan*, known widely among 'the old-fashioned Islamic religious community', by which he meant the Traditionalist *santri* followers of NU. He commented that 'In some districts more than others, however, [*slawatan* performances] seem also to be held in high regard by the common people [by which he meant the *abangan* majority] and by the *priyayi*.'⁴⁶ In these performances, narratives of the life of the Prophet were sung by men either in Arabic or in Javanese to the sole accompaniment of *terbangs* (tambourines) but in Javanese musical style. Offerings (*sajen*) were prepared just as on other sacral occasions in Java and the performance usually went from around 9pm to about 3am, finishing in time for the pre-dawn prayer. *Slawatan* was performed particularly on the

⁴³ J. Kunst, *Music in Java: Its history, its theory and its techniques* (3rd enlarged ed.; ed. E.L. Heins; 2 vols; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973; first published in Dutch in 1934); J. Kats, *Het Javaansche tooneel*, vol. 1: *Wayang poerwa* (Weltevreden: Volkslectuur, 1923); Th. B. van Lelyveld, *De Javaansche danskunst* (Amsterdam: Van Holkema & Warendorf's Uitgevers-Mij, 1931).

⁴⁴ Pigeaud, *Volksvertoningen*, pp. 194–5, 238, 322–3, 327–9.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 282–3.




Illustration 5 Depiction of a Yogyakarta *slawatan* performance in observation of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad (*Muludan, Maulid Nabi*) (from Pigeaud, *Javaanse volksvertoningen*, 1938, pl. 97)

occasion of marriages, circumcisions, the seventh month of pregnancy, the falling off of the umbilical cord and redeeming of a promise. Remarkably it was sometimes also performed at the annual village cleansing (*bersih desa*) ceremony, which was more commonly the occasion for *wayang* performances and observations little associated with Islamic spirituality. Sometimes also *slawatan* was performed a few days after a performance of *tayuban* — dancing women who were also commonly prostitutes. It seems that on such occasions *slawatan* was a way to expiate the sins acquired at the preceding *tayuban* party.⁴⁷

Most of the performances recorded by Pigeaud, however, were shaped more by concepts older than Islam in Java. Masked dance, like puppet (*wayang*) theatre more generally, performed stories that most commonly derived from the Hindu-Buddhist period classics *Bratayuda* and *Rama* or from the romantic adventures of the pre-Islamic hero Panji. The spiritual

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 282–6.




Illustration 6 *Topeng* (masked dance) performance, 1929, depicting Prabu Klana from the Panji stories (from Pigeaud, *Javaanse volksvertoningen*, 1938, pl. 1)

forces at play in performances were mostly those that Islamic reformers regarded as anathema: the Goddess of the Southern Ocean (Ratu Kidul), the founder and protector spirits of villages, the spectral denizens of caves, forests and other haunted places. Transvestite performances and dancing women who also worked as prostitutes were hardly art forms thought proper by the devout. The popular folk dramas of *kethoprak* and *ludruk* often mocked the values of elites, including relatively prosperous middle-class *santri*.

Most Central Javanese villagers still seem to have accepted the *kraton* elite's claims to cultural, religious and social leadership. This despite that elite's obligatory — if often grudging — collaboration with the colonial authorities. In fact the Javanese aristocracy had only limited room for political manoeuvre in the colonial context, but some of them used that room as far as they could. For many others, however, a louche life of womanising and opium, or of pious retreat into mysticism, offered greater attraction. The values of the knightly aristocrat, the *satriya*, were more often reflected in poses than in day-to-day conduct.

In Yogyakarta, Pangeran (prince) Surjodiningrat was one of those who found room for manoeuvre. He established an organisation called Pakempalan Kawula Ngajogjakarta (Association of the Subjects of Yogyakarta) in

1930.⁴⁸ This sought to represent the demands of ordinary Javanese villagers in the midst of the Depression. The Association became virtually a shadow administration in Yogyakarta's countryside and Surjodiningrat himself was taken by many villagers to be the messianic Just King (*Ratu Adil*) promised by Javanese eschatologies. By 1931 Pakempalan Kawula Ngajogjakarta claimed over 100,000 members in Yogyakarta and by 1941 over 260,000. Such figures made it the largest political organisation in Indonesia (then, of course, still the Netherlands East Indies) in its day. The Pakempalan promoted cooperatives, attempted to spread literacy, supported peasant objections to taxation, and such like. It had been founded with the support of the Yogyakarta Sultan Hamengkubuwana VIII (r. 1921–39), who was the elder half-brother of Surjodiningrat, but as the Association's influence spread in the countryside it aroused the concern of the Sultan and the colonial authorities. In 1933 one local leader of the organisation publicly announced that Surjodiningrat was the king (*ratu*) of all Muslims, thereby directly threatening the standing of the Sultan. Nor was the Association welcomed by the urban-based nationalist elite, for it bypassed and threatened to undermine nationalist figures like Sukarno who aspired to be the leaders of ordinary Indonesians but were unable to do that in conditions of colonial repression. The Sultan even contemplated asking the Dutch to exile Surjodiningrat. He escaped that fate, but from 1934 Surjodiningrat was pressured by the colonial and local authorities into limiting the Pakempalan's activities to less disturbing social and economic initiatives, notably the promotion of cooperatives. The presence of such an organisation, which gave broader social relevance in hard times to princely leadership, may explain in part why in subsequent decades the Yogyakarta Sultanate survived — indeed prospered politically — in the tumult of war and revolution. Such was not to be the fate of the parallel *Vorstenlanden* in Surakarta.

Seemingly analogous organisations were founded in Surakarta, but they were less about building links between the *kraton* elite and ordinary villagers and more about internecine squabbles between the two royal houses there: those of Susuhunan Pakubuwana X (r. 1893–1939) and of the junior princely house of Mangkunagara VII (r. 1916–44).⁴⁹ The Susuhunan's *kraton* still felt

⁴⁸ The following account is based upon William J. O'Malley, 'The Pakempalan Kawulo Ngajogjakarta: An official report on the Jogjakarta People's Party of the 1930s', *Indonesia* no. 26 (Oct. 1978), pp. 111–58; George D. Larson, *Prelude to revolution: Palaces and politics in Surakarta, 1912–1942* (VKI vol. 124; Dordrecht and Providence: Foris Publications, 1987), pp. 155–8.

⁴⁹ The account here rests upon Larson, *Prelude to revolution*, pp. 158–67, 168–70.

aggrieved about the 1790s arrangements that had made the Mangkunagaran principality permanent.⁵⁰ So the *kraton* elite now sought to reabsorb the Mangkunagaran. In 1932 the Surakarta politician Singgih, an activist for the Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia (Union of the Indonesian Race, PBI) headed by Dr Soetomo of Surabaya, led the establishment of a Pakempalan Kawula Surakarta (Association of the Subjects of Surakarta), ostensibly to build links with common villagers for the PBI. But it soon became evident that the main purpose of the organisation was to insinuate Surakarta *kraton* influence into Mangkunagaran domains. This organisation spread quite widely and Singgih — like Surjodiningrat in Yogyakarta — was regarded by some as the *Ratu Adil*. In 1933 Mangkunagara VII responded by establishing a Pakempalan Kawula Mangkunagaran (Association of the Subjects of the Mangkunagaran), but this failed to prosper. It seems that the popular prestige of the Mangkunagaran line was waning, while the Susuhunan still wielded considerable influence. But the main actor here was Singgih.

There were predictions that the Mangkunagaran would be reabsorbed under the Surakarta court and that Singgih would ascend the throne as *Ratu Adil*. He and other leading figures of his Pakempalan were known to be gathering spiritual powers through fasting and meditation. In 1935 they formed a group to engage in *ilmu kebatinan* (the inner mystical sciences). Office walls of the Association's administration had images depicting Singgih as the Hindu god Wisnu (Vishnu), who in Javanese tradition was regarded as the first ruler of Java and the saviour of the world in times of trouble and, in his avatar as Kresna (Krishna), was particularly associated with the warrior class. Pakempalan Kawula Surakarta obviously had the support of the Susuhunan and its propaganda became increasingly radical and sometimes even explicitly anti-colonial. In August 1934 the Dutch Resident of Surakarta warned Singgih to tone down his organisation's activities, which he did. Thereafter administrative problems and financial irregularities contributed to a falling-off of popular support. The organisation had probably never had a following of more than 20,000–50,000 at its peak and fell to 4,000–5,000 by the end of 1936.

In the later 1930s, the Pakempalan Kawula Surakarta revived somewhat but the dominant *leitmotiv* remained hostility between the Susuhunan's court and that of the Mangkunagaran. The organisation's membership may have climbed again to around 25,000, with its leadership very much in *kraton* hands. The more significant development, however, was a closer linking of the

⁵⁰ A brief overview of these events is in Ricklefs, *History of modern Indonesia*, Chapter 10.

anti-colonial leanings of the court elite with the more modern nationalism of Dr Soetomo and his Surabaya-based PBI. In 1935 at a congress held in Surakarta this party was fused with the older Budi Utomo — founded in 1908 by leaders among whom several regarded the Islamisation of the Javanese as having been a mistake⁵¹ — to form a new Partai Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesia Party), led by Dr Soetomo until his death in 1938. This party rested on an alliance of Surakarta aristocratic politicians and the Surabaya activists. Partai Indonesia Raya — usually abbreviated Parindra — was impressed by the warrior culture of Japan, which had many resonances with the aristocratic warrior values of the Javanese elite, values that underpinned the social styles of that elite in just about everything except real battles, given the prevailing *pax neerlandica*.

That the goings-on in Surakarta were more about intra-elite conflicts than about truly building links between the *Vorstenlanden* aristocracy and ordinary villagers may go some way to explaining why — as will be seen later in this book — the princely rulers of Surakarta would become enemies of the Indonesian Revolution rather than forming part of its leadership, as occurred in Yogyakarta. In 1939 a crucial transition occurred in Surakarta that probably guaranteed this outcome. As Pakubuwana X neared the end of his days, there was discussion in Dutch colonial circles about who should be allowed to succeed him. One leading candidate was Pakubuwana X's son Png. Kusumayuda. He had serious marks against him from the Dutch point of view, however, mainly that he was both genuinely able and a member of Parindra. So the choice fell instead upon another prince, Png. Hangabehi, whom the Dutch picked to succeed as Susuhunan Pakubuwana XI (r. 1939–44). He was assessed by the Dutch as a person who would be loyal, but 'not excelling in firmness of purpose and from whom no great deeds may be expected' — which was to say, a safe and malleable choice. A new contract was imposed on this new king which reduced the already circumscribed powers of the Susuhunan and cut his *kraton* budget, changes which produced much critical comment from Indonesian observers. These developments further diminished the prospects of the Surakarta *kraton* standing at the head of any sort of popular movement — prospects that were not great in 1939 in any case.

The Susuhunan's *kraton* elite continued to favour Parindra, with its sympathies for Japanese-style fascism. In late December 1941, as the Japanese advanced on Indonesia, some Parindra activists may even have plotted a

⁵¹ See Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese society*, pp. 217–9.

revolt against the Dutch, which was nipped in the bud. The Mangkunagaran, by contrast, began to lend its support to the leftist, anti-fascist Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian People's Movement), founded in 1937. The Mangkunagaran Legion was the only serious military force raised in the *Vorstenlanden*. It had a military tradition going back to 1808 that rested on service to the colonial regime and this, too, inclined the Mangkunagaran side to an anti-Japanese, therefore pro-Dutch, position. Thus, developments in both the *kraton* and the Mangkunagaran positioned them poorly to be leaders of the mass mobilisation that was to follow.⁵²

The magic-mystical powers that commoners ascribed to Javanese royalty were still, however, widely believed in the 1930s. This was illustrated by the response to epidemic diseases that swept through the old town of Kota Gede, south of Yogyakarta. Here were the graves of the founders of the Mataram dynasty Senapati Ingalaga (d. c. 1601) and Seda ing Krapyak (d. 1613). It was a warren of houses and narrow streets where gold-, silver- and coppersmiths, leather workers, tortoise-shell artisans and diamond traders worked. In 1931 there was so much disease in this town that the more well-to-do abandoned their homes to live elsewhere, while the less favoured stayed awake at nights for fear of being overcome by death in their beds. Holy weapons regarded as supernaturally powerful heirlooms (*pusaka*) were paraded in the streets to ward off illness. Eventually the Sultan of Yogyakarta Hamengkubuwana VIII was asked to allow one of the most holy of all the royal *pusakas*, the banner Kangjeng Kyai Tunggul Wulung, to be paraded. This was said to be made from the cloth that hung around the grave of the Prophet himself. On its tip was a *pusaka* spearhead called Kangjeng Kyai Slamet.

The Sultan agreed to the request, but in fact Ky. Tunggul Wulung and Ky. Slamet were paraded only around the city of Yogyakarta itself, not around Kota Gede. The last time this had been done was during the influenza epidemic of 1918 and the popular belief was that the epidemic had indeed ended as a consequence. Before that Ky. Tunggul Wulung had been paraded in 1892 and 1876, also at times of widespread illness.⁵³ It was decreed that this time the *pusakas* would be paraded on the night of 21–22 January 1932, when the Javanese seven- and five-day week combination was Friday-Kliwon, the best combination from a supernatural point of view for Ky. Tunggul Wulung.

⁵² Larson, *Prelude to revolution*, pp. 181–5.

⁵³ On the 1876 episode, see Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese society*, p. 137.

After appropriate ritual preparations and offerings, a hundred religious officials (*pamethakan*) prepared to escort the *pusakas* out from the court. The call to prayer was jointly sung, followed by prayers. Then a large procession formed up and went out from the *kraton* bearing the holy banners, to be met by a throng of thousands of Javanese. Lest one think this procedure was in some way purely Islamic, however, it should be noted that the next step was to place offerings at the *waringin kurung*, the fenced banyan trees on the great square to the north of the Sultan's *kraton* which were (indeed, often still are) believed to have supernatural powers. The offerings were a female albino water buffalo, tortoises with various kinds of shells, and so on. The entourage — court religious, soldiers, aristocrats, led by the *pangulu* (the head of the *kraton* religious hierarchy) on horseback — and thousands of local Javanese then made a circumambulation of the city of Yogyakarta, stopping at nine prescribed places to pray. At 5 AM the *pusakas* returned to the court, where the Sultan had remained awake throughout the night. The *pangulu* then oversaw the slaughtering of the animal sacrifices on the northern square.

But 1930s Yogyakarta was not 1830s Yogyakarta. Now this city hosted the headquarters of Muhammadiyah and such a parading of a holy *pusaka* provoked controversy. Soedjana Tirtakoesoema reported that 'a group of orthodox [here meaning Modernist] religious types is of the opinion that one must break with this old practice and rely entirely upon medical science in combating illnesses, adhering to the Islamic faith'. Others objected that gathering thousands of people together in this way in fact enhanced the risk of infections spreading. 'A liberal thinking man', however, 'belonging to the older religious [meaning the Traditionalists], was of the opinion that the parading nevertheless in some sense had a religious character. After all, a pious Sultan (he mentioned Sultan Agung) had got this banner from Mecca and at various places the call to prayer was sung and prayers were said.'⁵⁴ In this contrast of opinions we may note the ongoing tensions between followers of Traditionalist Islam and the older Mystic Synthesis of Java on the one hand and those of the new Modernist Islam on the other.

However uncomfortable religious purists may have felt about some older Javanese traditions, courtly ritual life continued both to preserve traditions that conveyed the Javanese Mystic Synthesis and to inspire mass interest and awe. The courts still presented *labuhan* (offerings) to the spirits

⁵⁴ Soedjana Tirtakoesoema. 'De ommegang met den Kangdjeng Kjahi Toenggoel Woeloen te Jogjakarta, Donderdag-Vrijdag 21/22 Januari 1932 (Djoemoeah-Kliwon 13 Päsä, Djé 1862)', *Djāwā* vol. 12 (1932), pp. 41–9.



Illustration 7 Sacred *bedhaya* dance in the Yogyakarta *kraton*, 1969

of Mount Merapi, Mount Lawu and the Southern Ocean, and still do. In Surakarta, offerings were — and still are — made to a site sacred to the pre-Islamic goddess Durga in the forest of Krendawahana north of Surakarta.⁵⁵ In both Surakarta and Yogyakarta, the sacred *bedhaya* dance was performed (as it still is today), invoking the presence of the Goddess of the Southern Ocean.

Yet it is also true that in this overwhelmingly illiterate and poor society, at village level there were many Javanese who genuinely cared about adhering to what they understood the correct Islam to be. Even *abangan* villagers would turn to their more pious fellows for ritual leadership at major rites of passage. Ky. H. Saifuddin Zuhri, a leader of NU who was eventually to become Indonesian Minister of Religion (1962–7), later recalled his own youth in the period before the Second World War. He was sent to a small *pesantren* in Karang Sari (Banyumas) run by one Ky. Dimiati, to whom he was related. There Saifuddin Zuhri observed the simple life of the local peasantry. They were poor in possessions, he recalled, but rich in character and morals. Although they were illiterate in the roman script, they could read and in some cases write in the Arabic script. They made time

⁵⁵ On the Krendawahana ritual, see Stephen C. Headley, *Durga's mosque: Cosmology, conversion and community in Central Javanese Islam* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), esp. pp. 227–30.

to read the *Qur'an* and were strict in observing what was allowed (*halal*) or forbidden (*haram*). At the Friday sermon and at Ky. Dimiati's Qur'anic recitations (*pengajian*) they listened attentively, taking pride in the fact that there was a *kyai* living in their village to give them guidance. Such was the recollection of Saifuddin Zuhri.⁵⁶

Saifuddin Zuhri's memoirs remind us that villagers in 1930s Java did sometimes have connections to more highly educated leaders. But these were rarely connections to nationalist political organisations. The Dutch regime and its repressive structures saw to that. There were links with *kraton* culture and sometimes with *kraton* elites, but this only applied in certain circumstances within the *Vorstenlanden*. More generally, it was the extensive informal networks and large organisations associated with Islam that built such bridges. It is therefore to such networks and organisations that we now turn.

Islam in Java: Reform, local traditions and mysticism

To a large extent, Muhammadiyah held the initiative in Islamic circles in 1930s Java. It was Muhammadiyah that looked at contemporary Javanese religious practice and judged much of it to be in need of reform. But we would be wrong to think of this as mainly a reformist assault on the religious practices and superstitions of the *abangan*. Muhammadiyah's targets were more often the understandings of Islam to be found in the *santri* community of pious Muslims. Muhammadiyah was — to borrow a phrase used by Azyumardi Azra⁵⁷ — 'guarding the faith of the *ummah*', and it was as if many *abangan* were so far beyond the pale that, by Muhammadiyah's standards, they were hardly members of the *ummah* at all.

Muhammadiyah was regarded by G.F. Pijper (1893–1988), one of the leading Dutch experts on Islam who served as Advisor for Native Affairs to

⁵⁶ Saifuddin Zuhri, *Berangkat dari pesantren* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1987), pp. 40, 42. For biographies of Saifuddin Zuhri and Indonesia's other Ministers of Religion, see Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam (eds), *Menteri-menteri Agama RI: Biografi sosial-politik* (Seri Khusus INIS Biografi Sosial-Politik 1. Jakarta: Indonesia-Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies [INIS], Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat [PPIM], Badan Litbang Agama Departemen Agama RI, 1998); Saifuddin's biography is to be found on pp. 201–41.

⁵⁷ Azyumardi Azra, 'Guarding the faith of the *ummah*: Religio-intellectual journey of Mohammad Rasjidi', *SI* vol. 1 (1994), no. 2, pp. 87–119. We will discuss Rasjidi shortly.

the colonial government, as a 'backlash against the Christianisation efforts of the Protestant and Catholic missions'.⁵⁸ That was certainly a major inspiration for the organisation, but its activities were also directed at local religious practices that it regarded as *bid'ā*, unlawful innovations in Islam. By the 1930s the national leadership of Muhammadiyah was more in the hands of Minangkabau from Sumatra than Javanese leaders. These Minangkabau tended to be more intolerant of idiosyncratic practices that were regarded locally as being pious Islam.⁵⁹ But there were also Javanese Muhammadiyah leaders who took a firm line against local practices not sanctioned by Islam. One of the foremost of these was Muhammad Rasjidi (1915–2001).

Rasjidi's life story exemplifies the cultural and religious transitions experienced by many Javanese in the 20th century.⁶⁰ He was born into an *abangan* family in Kota Gede but his father cared sufficiently about Islam to have his children taught to read the *Qur'an*. As Rasjidi's father grew older, he became more pious and began to pray. Upon his death he left money for someone else to undertake the pilgrimage on his behalf. Rasjidi's youthful cultural milieu remained in some ways more characteristic of Javanese traditions than of pious Islam. He could read Javanese script and sing Javanese poetry and was married in Javanese traditional attire. Yet his father sent him to a Muhammadiyah primary school and there Rasjidi's transition to a leader of Modernist Islam began. He went on to a Muhammadiyah teacher-training school. When he learned that a new religious school had been founded in Lawang (East Java) by Ahmad Surkati (1872–1943), the Sudanese leader of the Arab Modernist organisation Al-Irsyad (est. 1915), Rasjidi applied and was accepted as a student there. In 1931 he set off to study in Cairo. Rather than studying at the great university of Al-Azhar, which he found too traditional, Rasjidi went to the University of Cairo. He also met and took private lessons from Sayyid Qutb (1906–66), who was to become one of the most prominent of radical Islamic thinkers and leader of the Muslim Brotherhood until his execution by the government of Gamal Abdel Nasser.⁶¹

⁵⁸ G.F. Pijper, 'Lailat al-Niṣf min Sha'bān op Java', *TBG* vol. 73 (1933), p. 424.

⁵⁹ Ahmad Najib Burhani, 'The Muhammadiyah's attitude to Javanese culture in 1912–30: Appreciation and tension' (MA thesis, Leiden University, 2004).

⁶⁰ The following account rests upon Azra, 'Guarding the faith', pp. 89–96.

⁶¹ For one among the many accounts of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, see John O. Voll, 'Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab world: Egypt and the Sudan', in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appelby (eds), *Fundamentalisms observed* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 360–74.

Although Rasjidi may have displayed some degree of tolerance towards *abangan* — as also did some other Muhammadiyah leaders of Javanese background, notably the founder of Muhammadiyah himself, Ky. H. Ahmad Dahlan — he could be quite intolerant of what he regarded as backward and ignorant practices found among Javanese *santri*. In his 1956 doctoral thesis, defended at the Sorbonne, he held up for ridicule *fatwas* issued by Nahdlatul Ulama in the 1930s, such as the declaration that the production of photographs was *haram*. An NU *fatwa* also declared a purchase made while wearing spectacles invalid in Islamic law, on the grounds that spectacles distorted vision.⁶² For Rasjidi this was just backwardness.

Yet NU, too, was pressing for what we might think of as more modern ways in some respects. Like Muhammadiyah, NU approved giving the Friday sermon in the vernacular rather than in Arabic.⁶³ NU was particularly concerned about the roles of government-appointed *pangulus*. These men were at the same time government bureaucrats and religious leaders, a difficult balancing act. It was certainly not the case that they were all highly regarded for their religious knowledge.⁶⁴ In this respect, the *kyais* of NU were in competition with them for influence and leadership within Javanese society. NU pressed throughout the 1930s for a government-run system of examinations for *pangulus*, but without success.⁶⁵ Similarly, in 1935 the NU Congress resolved that if the government did not create an institution to train Islamic judges adequately — a role exercised by *pangulus* — then NU would feel obliged to do so itself.⁶⁶ This contest was not to be resolved until the Japanese occupation and the subsequent victory of the Indonesian Revolution cemented the *kyais*' dominance of Traditionalist Islam and removed the *kafir* colonial government which supported, and thereby made illegitimate in the eyes of many, the authority of *pangulus*.

Just as the Modernists objected to the parading of royal *pusakas* to ward off epidemic disease, as noted above, they also attacked the widespread

⁶² The thesis was not published until 20 years later: H.M. Rasjidi, *Documents pour servir à l'histoire de l'Islam à Java* (Paris: Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1977), pp. 195, 199.

⁶³ Muhammad Hisyam, *Caught between three fires: The Javanese pangulu under the Dutch colonial administration 1882–1942* (Jakarta: INIS, 2001), pp. 177–80.

⁶⁴ On the *pangulus* in general from the later nineteenth century to 1942, see *ibid.*

⁶⁵ G.F. Pijper, *Studiën over de geschiedenis van de Islam in Indonesia, 1900–1950* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977), p. 89.

⁶⁶ Rasjidi, *Documents*, p. 192. On the more general leadership competition between *pangulus* and *kyais* in the 1930s, see Hisyam, *Caught between three fires*, pp. 182–9.

observance of the middle of the month Saban (in Java often named Ruwah).⁶⁷ There were a variety of beliefs which connected this time with fate, death and the dead. So it was a time to fear wandering spirits, to pray and to seek supernatural protection through communal observances. This night was (and is) observed widely in the Islamic world,⁶⁸ including Mecca, by then under Wahhabi rule. Al-Irsyad's leader Surkati declared, however, that all of the Prophetic traditions (*Hadith*) supporting the observance were weak. The Modernist, Muhammadiyah-led, Yogyakarta newspaper *Bintang Islam* (Star of Islam) also denounced these traditions thoroughly in 1930. What Pijper called 'enlightened orthodox circles', represented above all by Muhammadiyah, sought to stigmatise all the traditions about the middle of Saban as heterodoxy.

Yet these practices were deeply rooted. In Cirebon the pious would read the *Qur'an* in the middle of the night of 15 Saban. It was believed that then the dead were summoned from their graves so that from that night, through the fasting month that followed and until the first of the subsequent month of Sawal, there was no need to visit graves to talk to one's ancestors, for they were empty. Rather, one took the occasion to clean the graves in preparation for the returning spirits. In south Banyumas 'the religious and the irreligious' (i.e., the *santri* and *abangan*) alike observed the occasion. While the *santri* gathered in mosques to pray for divine grace, forgiveness and protection from misfortunes, the *abangan* understood this as a time when God fulfills all of one's wishes, so it was a time for jollity. There were various ideas about water connected with this, so public bathing at several (usually seven) specific places was often part of the celebrations. *Warungs* and *pasars* did a roaring trade from the passing observants.

In Kediri and Bojonegoro, by contrast, Pijper reported that the *abangan* cared nothing at all for this business. Only the 'religiously developed' honoured the night. Wherever *abangan* took part in the observances, not only did pre-Islamic ideas get mixed up in them, 'but also here and there the celebration

⁶⁷ This account of the controversy rests upon Pijper, 'Lailat', pp. 405, 417–25.

⁶⁸ See the article on Sha'ban by A.J. Wensinck in P. Bearman *et al.* (eds), *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (2nd ed.; 13 vols; Leiden: E.J. Brill; London: Luzac & Co., 1960–2008), vol. 9, p. 154. Wensinck writes, *inter alia*, that 'according to popular belief, in the night preceding the 15th, the tree of life on whose leaves are written the names of the living is shaken. The names written on the leaves which fall down, indicate those who are to die in the coming year. ... It is said that in this night God descends to the lowest heaven; from there he calls the mortals in order to grant them forgiveness of sins.'

attains a worldly character, indeed takes on the features of a popular festival.' In Semarang, Kedu and the *Vorstenlanden*, the pious sometimes kept watch in the night and fasted. In Surakarta there was a strong commitment to what was there called *separo* (half, i.e., half-way through Saban) among 'old-fashioned orthodox circles', i.e., Traditionalist *santri* who followed NU-style devotions rather than Modernist Muhammadiyah versions. The Manba' al-'Ulum school in Surakarta, set up on the orders of Pakubuwana X in 1905 and the first modern Islamic school in Java,⁶⁹ was closed on 15 Saban. The Muhammadiyah schools, not surprisingly, remained open. In Yogyakarta, the aristocracy's sense of decorum prevented them from joining in the celebrations at public bathing places so instead they sent servants to collect water from the seven wells traditionally identified for these observances. In the farthest Eastern Salient of Java, where was found 'a simple, pious folk', Pijper reported that 'Islam in this district is not old and the knowledge of the faith is often still scanty', but Javanese, Madurese and 'Osingers' (local indigenous Javanese) mostly regarded the night of 15 Saban as holy.

So the Modernist Islamic reformers faced formidable challenges in reforming Javanese society. Given low levels of literacy, widespread hardship, and the ongoing beliefs in all sorts of spiritual powers — usually connected with indigenous occult forces and agricultural cycles but sometimes of more clearly Islamic inspiration — it is hardly surprising that the influence of Muhammadiyah and like-minded groups remained almost exclusively limited to urban areas.

Nor did the Islamic reformers have a monopoly of influence in urban areas, for there they were challenged by other ideas and organisations, such as the Taman Siswa schools. These sought to produce a modern educational and intellectual style that was specifically rooted in Javanese culture, and particularly in 'high' Javanese culture: the world of *wayang*, *gamelan* and classical dance. In 1935, Taman Siswa's founder, Ki Hadjar Dewantara (1889–1959), spoke about national education and the role of Taman Siswa. He made it clear that the central cultural or national question for him was about Javanese identity on the one hand and Dutch on the other. He ignored Islam and Islamic elites: they did not apparently offer a third alternative. Dewantara criticised those members of the aristocratic elite (*priyayi*) who were attracted to Dutch styles of doing things.

Dissatisfaction has ... befallen us, and worse: slowly but surely we have become alienated from our own people and our own environment.

⁶⁹ See Hisyam, *Caught between three fires*, pp. 141–6.

...Because of the great inferiority complex which we derived from our particular governmental experience, we were easily satisfied with anything that made us look a bit Dutch. ...⁷⁰

In 1941 Dewantara gave another speech that was directed specifically towards Islam and, particularly given its venue, bluntly dismissive of narrow understandings of that faith. He was speaking to a gathering of the Lahore branch of the Ahmadiyya movement held in Yogyakarta. Ahmadiyya is an idiosyncratic development of Islam rather like Mormonism in Christianity since its founder, the Punjabi Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1839–1908), claimed to have experienced divine revelations.⁷¹ Half a century later, Ahmadiyya would be declared deviant by the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Islamic Scholars' Council), a government-appointed body of Islamic scholars. But in the 1930s, Ahmadiyya was still fairly new in Indonesia and was not yet the subject of such objections. In Java as elsewhere, Ahmadis were noted for their commitment to education and intellectualism.⁷²

At the 1941 Ahmadi meeting in Yogyakarta, Ki Hadjar Dewantara spoke directly of 'Islam and culture'. His comments would have been quite unwelcome to many of Islam's leaders in Java at that time. Speaking Indonesian and tossing in Dutch words both to explain concepts and to confirm his intellectual standing, Dewantara observed,

Although in principle all religions are the same, because there is a *stelsel* [system] or specific forms, therefore over time inner faith (*religi*) becomes a regularised religion (*godsdiens*). And because of that, over time special regulations arise that differentiate religions one from another. ... Indeed, even within a single religion there are differences of understanding, so that *sekten* [sects] or variants arise. ...

⁷⁰ Ki Hadjar Dewantara, 'Some aspects of national education and the Taman Siswa Institute at Jogjakarta', *Indonesia* no. 4 (Oct. 1967), pp. 150–68. Discussed further in Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese society*, pp. 224–5.

⁷¹ The Lahore branch regards Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a renewer of Islam rather than a new prophet. Ahmadiyya's other branch — the Qadian — sees him as a new prophet, an idea that is clearly heretical in conventional Islamic terms. See Wilfred Cantwell Smith, 'Ahmadiyya', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (2nd ed.), vol. 1, p. 301. The further story of Ahmadiyya in Java is considered below in this book (consult the index for relevant passages). The history of this movement in Indonesia is the subject of Iskandar Zulkarnain, *Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2005).

⁷² Ahmadiyya had only arrived in Java in the mid-1920s and did not establish its first mosque until the late 1930s. As a part of its intellectual activities, it produced translations of the *Qur'an* in both Dutch and Indonesian.

Thus it is that Islam is not pure, but is mixed with Arab, Indian, Persian, Sumatran, Javanese, and suchlike cultures. And don't forget as well that the influence from society is very strong, as is also true of the circumstances of the time, so that the nature of Islam in a country in previous times is genuinely different from its nature nowadays. ...

This means:

- (a) That Islamic culture always had the character of 'people's culture', not '*kraton* culture' like Javanese culture down to the present, for example. In the present age, '*kraton* culture' in Java is beginning to develop so as to become 'people's culture'.
- (b) That Islamic culture in general is always about the religious life, social life and state life. Thus, art, for instance, is insufficiently or not at all considered.

Because Islam came to our country via Persia and India, therefore the nature of Islam in Java naturally is a mix of various religious and social influences from those places. ...⁷³

Thus, here was a relativistic view that looked upon religion generally and Islam specifically as culturally and historically contingent. This was an idea that would have resonated in those circles still committed to the Javanese Mystic Synthesis and among those who were uncomfortable with fundamentalism in any faith. But to the more puritanical of Islamic reformers it would have been anathema. It is doubtful that Ahmad Surkati, many Muhammadiyah leaders or the activists of Persatuan Islam⁷⁴ would have been at all happy with such views. The published version of this talk does not, however, give any indication of what the Ahmadis thought about it.

⁷³ Originally published in *Pusara*, May 1941. Reprinted in Ki Hadjar Dewantara, *Karya*, vol. 2: *Kebudayaan* (Yogyakarta: Majelis Luhur Persatuan Tamansiswa, 1994), pp. 40–3.

⁷⁴ Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union) was founded in Bandung in 1923 and was one of the most puritan of Modernist organisations. Its foremost leader in this period was A. Hassan (b. 1887), a Singapore-born Tamil with a Javanese mother. The organisation's name was conventionally shortened to 'Persis', a pun on the Dutch word *precies* (precise, punctilious). Hassan established a *pesantren* in Bandung in 1936 but transferred it to Bangil in East Java when he moved there in 1940. See Howard M. Federspiel, *Islam and ideology in the emerging Indonesian state: The Persatuan Islam (PERSIS), 1923 to 1957* (Leiden, etc.: Brill, 2001); Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim movement in Indonesia, 1900–1942* (Singapore, etc.: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 85–92.

Islam in Java was still much influenced by mysticism and in this realm, too, there were controversies in the 1930s. In Java, the Traditionalist *kyais* who were adherents of the Shafi'i school of law and were involved in NU were also supporters and leaders of Islamic mysticism. The various Sufi *tarekats* (orders; from Arabic *tariqa*, literally 'way' or 'path') were inherently in at least some degree of competition with one another for followers and to assert the superiority of their own understandings and devotional practices (*wirid*, Arabic *wird*). The principal *tarekats* in Java in this period were still the Naqshabandiyya (of the Khalidiyya branch), the Qadiriyya, the composite Indonesian order Qadiriyya wa Naqshabandiyya, the Khalwatiyya, the Shadhiliyya and the Shattariyya.⁷⁵ The main controversy in Java in the 1930s, however, concerned a newly arrived order, the Tijaniyya, which provoked conflict within NU circles.

Tijaniyya was controversial for several reasons.⁷⁶ All Sufi *tarekats* should have a spiritual genealogy (*salsilah*; Arabic *silsila*, literally 'chain') which connects the current head of the order in a direct line back to the *tarekat's* founder and thence to the Prophet, thereby confirming the authenticity of the teachings and devotions. Tijaniyya, however, lacked such a conventional genealogy. Its founder was the Algerian Ahmad bin Muhammad al-Tijani (1738–1815), who said that while in a fully awakened condition he met the Prophet Muhammad, first in 1782 and subsequently again, and received from him the teachings and practices of the order. Moreover, Tijaniyya practices were simpler than those of other orders — although the number of litanies to be repeated was too much for many — and promised sure entry to heaven for anyone who practiced its *wirid* until death, along with the devotee's parents, spouses and children. Tijaniyya declared itself superior to all other Sufi orders. With such ideas, Tijaniyya attracted large numbers of adherents.

In 1928 Tijaniyya began to spread in Java. A respected elderly *kyai* in Cirebon, Ky. Madrais (Muhammad Rais) began to teach it after having been initiated into its devotions by the Arab scholar 'Ali bin 'Abdallah al-Tayyib al-Azhari. At about the same time the young and influential Ky. Anas of the

⁷⁵ On these, see Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese society*, pp. 74–8.

⁷⁶ The following account is taken from G.F. Pijper, *Fragmenta Islamica: Studiën over het Islamisme in Nederlandsch-Indië* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1934), pp. 97–121. See also Martin van Bruinessen, 'Controversies and polemics involving the Sufi orders in twentieth-century Indonesia', in F. de Jong and B. Radtke (eds), *Islamic mysticism contested: Thirteen centuries of controversies and polemics* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1999), pp. 705–28.

pesantren Buntet in Cirebon also began to teach Tijaniyya after returning from Arabia. From this time on, the order spread rapidly in West Java and along the north coast, with Buntet as its main centre. Tijaniyya's exclusivity was a major issue. Its devotees were forbidden to follow other *tarekats*, so its growth was at the expense of existing orders. *Shaykhs* of the other *tarekats* denounced Tijaniyya. They accused it of being the worst of all things to non-Modernist Islamic circles in Java in this time: they said it was Wahhabi. The opponents of Tijaniyya were not actually accusing it of introducing the austere practices of the Wahhabi leadership of Saudi Arabia.⁷⁷ Rather, 'Wahhabi' had become a derogatory term for all reforming movements that denied the traditionally accepted authority of the Shafi'i school of law and the established Sufi orders. In this sense only was Tijaniyya a 'Wahhabi' innovation. The denunciations had an effect and stemmed Tijaniyya's growth in some places. Tijaniyya's defenders replied with assertions of the superiority and authenticity of its teachings.

In 1931, NU's annual meeting took place in Cirebon and one of the major topics of discussion among these Traditionalist scholars was the orthodoxy or otherwise of Tijaniyya. In a classically equivocal, hair-splitting judgment, NU concluded that Tijaniyya was good with regard to its devotional practices and that those of its views that were consistent with the law (*shari'a*) were good. But those that seemed to be in conflict with the *shari'a* were to be left to the knowledgeable leaders of the *tarekat* insofar as they were susceptible to metaphorical explanations; if they were not susceptible to such explanations and were clearly in conflict with *shari'a*, then they were declared to be in error. On the basis of this tangled decision, Tijaniyya devotees dared to claim that NU had pronounced their *tarekat* to be acceptable. Rather than dampening the controversy, the NU decision thus reignited it. Tijaniyya's fiercest opponent was a respected figure from Kracak, Ky. Muhammad Ismail, who taught the Qadiriyya and Naqshabandiyya *wirids*. In 1932 he published a pamphlet that denounced Tijaniyya as heresy: 'The *tariqa* of the Tijaniyya people is *bid'a* [unlawful innovation], their *shari'a* is unbelief and their Reality (*haqiqa*) is Hell.'⁷⁸ A year later the *kyai* died. His opponents claimed that the body swelled up in an unnatural fashion as none other than al-Tijani himself took his revenge upon him.

Today Tijaniyya is found throughout Indonesia, but its main strengths remain in West, Central and East Java. In the 1980s it was accepted as a fully

⁷⁷ In fact, the Saudis were opposed to all Sufi orders.

⁷⁸ Cited in Pijper, *Fragmenta*, p. 119.

respectable, orthodox *tarekat* by NU. But even that did not prevent further polemics from breaking out.⁷⁹

For many of the learned leaders of Modernist Islam, 'Traditionalists' disputes about Tijaniyya — indeed the whole business of Sufism — must have been just further evidence of the backwardness of Indonesian Islam. Yet the more austere, legalistic, intellectualized version of Islam that seemed to represent the ideals of many Muhammadiyah leaders — and certainly those of Persis and Al-Irsyad — had little likelihood of winning mass support in Java. Even among Modernist intellectuals there seems to have been some awareness that Sufism and more indigenous forms of mysticism flourished in Java because they fulfilled the spiritual needs of many Javanese.

But what could Modernism offer to fulfill such spiritual needs? There were several barriers in the way of such an offering. Modernist reliance on the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* as the true foundations of faith — in preference to the vast library of interpretative literature by centuries of learned scholars — left little room for the mystics and their ideas. Moreover, the devotion and loyalty that Sufis accorded to their spiritual guides, their *shaykhs*, represented two profound faults from the Modernist point of view. Firstly, insofar as Sufi *shaykhs* — in Java called *kyais* — were regarded by their followers as unchallengeable authorities on belief and practice, then the deference thereby accorded to them plainly conflicted with the fundamental and unequalled guidance to be found only in the *Qur'an* and *Hadith*. Secondly, in competition for leadership of the Islamic community, Javanese *kyais* were the direct competitors of the more intellectually sophisticated leaders of Modernist Islam — and, worse still, had far greater influence than they among the masses of Javanese. So quite apart from questions of the doctrine, the standing of the *shaykhs* or *kyais* in Sufism was a fundamental problem for most Modernists.

In 1937–9 a possible solution to the dilemmatic relationship between Islamic Modernism and Sufism was provided, not by a Javanese Sufi, but (somewhat surprisingly) by a Modernist Minangkabau intellectual — a solution that continues to be powerful in Java and elsewhere in Indonesia seven decades after its initial publication. The writer in question was Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah (1908–81), commonly called Hamka on the basis of his initials. Hamka's background is of interest, for he was the son of one of Minangkabau's early Modernist Islamic thinkers, *Shaykh* Dr Haji

⁷⁹ Sri Mulyati *et al.*, *Mengenai dan memahami tarekat-tarekat muktabarab di Indonesia* (Jakarta; Kencana, 2004), p. 231.

Abdul Karim Amrullah (1879–1945), better known as ‘Haji Rasul’. He studied for some years in Mecca and on his return to Sumatra in the early 20th century took a leading role in educational reform in Minangkabau, building a modern religious school called *Sumatra Thawalib* (1918). Haji Rasul was expelled from this, his own school in the early 1920s by proponents of Islamic Communism. In 1925 he introduced Muhammadiyah to West Sumatra and it soon came to be the biggest Islamic organisation in the region. Haji Rasul was a prolific writer. Among the targets of his polemics was the Naqshabandiyya Sufi order. As Taufik Abdullah puts it, ‘Although acknowledging the importance of *tasawwuf* [mysticism], [Haji Rasul] denied that the Naqshabandiyya order was doctrinally pure. He condemned the concept of *rabita*, mediation between creature and the Creator, as taught by the order’.⁸⁰

Thus, Hamka came from a Sumatran background strong in Modernist Islamic intellectualism and socio-political engagement. Hamka himself became known as one of Indonesia’s leading writers as well as a major Modernist *ulama*. In 1937–8 he was editing the Islamic magazine *Pedoman Masyarakat* (the compass of the community) and, in response to requests from others, there wrote a series on *bahagia* (bliss, happiness, well-being).⁸¹ In 1939 these articles were republished as a book entitled *Tasauf⁸² moderen* (modern mysticism) which is still readily available in Indonesia.⁸³

In *Tasauf moderen*, the still-young Hamka said that he was not presenting his own ideas, but rather views based on the writings of great *ulamas* of the past along with the *Qur’an* and *Hadith*. He cited not only medieval thinkers such as al-Mawardi (974–1058), Ibn Sina (Avicenna) (980–1037) and al-Ghazali (1058–1111) but also the Modernist pioneers Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905) and Jamal ad-din al-Afghani (1838–97), among others. He also referred to Western thinkers whose works he knew through Arabic translations: Aristotle and Tolstoy made appearances. There were, said

⁸⁰ See the entry by Taufik Abdullah, ‘Abdul Karim Amrullah (Haji Rasul)’, in Gudrun Krämer *et al.* (eds), *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (3rd ed.; Leiden: E.J. Brill; available in print as fascicules appear).

⁸¹ In his book *Perkembangan tasauf dari abad ke abad* (Jakarta: Pustaka Islam, 1952), p. 129, Hamka gives Indonesian *bahagia* as the equivalent of Arabic *sa’ada*; on the range of meanings of the latter in Islamic philosophy, see H. Daiber, ‘Sa’ada’, in P. Bearman *et al.*, *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (2nd ed.), vol. 8, p. 657.

⁸² From Arabic *tasawwuf* (mysticism).

⁸³ The edition now commonly sold in Indonesia is Hamka, *Tasauf moderen* (Singapore: Pustaka Nasional Pte Ltd, 1997).

Hamka, many secrets of Islam that it was proper to discuss and to make accessible to people who could not read Arabic. 'I present an explanation that is modern, although its origins are found in books of mysticism. So this is Modern Mysticism, I mean an explanation of mystical sciences that is modernised', he said in the introduction to the first edition.⁸⁴

Hamka explained to his readers that the intentions of the early Sufis were good but later unacceptable things came to be added: 'They wanted to resist carnal urges, the world and the devil, but sometimes they embarked upon ways that were not bounded by religion'.⁸⁵ His purpose, said Hamka, was to return to the original Sufism. In search of this *bahagia* and the original Sufism, Hamka presented chapters on 'opinions about *bahagia*, '*bahagia* and religion', '*bahagia* and spiritual accomplishment', 'spiritual and physical health', 'possessions and *bahagia*', 'pious contentment with little',⁸⁶ 'deep trust (in God)',⁸⁷ 'the *bahagia* experienced by the Prophet', 'the connection between contentment'⁸⁸ and the beauty of the world', 'the ladder of *bahagia*', 'misfortune' and, finally, (supererogatory) prayers.

The important — indeed crucial — distinction between Hamka's 'Modern Sufism' and the Sufism practised by Javanese mystics of his time was that 'Modern Sufism' was about personal spirituality and did not require a guru or *shaykh*. Nor did it require membership of a mystical order (*tarekat*).

With all of these explanations it is clear what my purpose is with this book. I call it *tasauf*, that is, to follow the intention of the original mysticism, as in the words of al-Junayd:⁸⁹ 'To leave behind a shameful way of life and embrace a praiseworthy way of life' — with a modern explanation.

I will reestablish the original intention of *tasauf*, that is, to purify the soul, to educate and to elevate the level of character; to suppress all greed

⁸⁴ Ibid., pp. 2–3.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 14.

⁸⁶ *Qana'ah*, Arabic *qana'a*: see Geneviève Gobillot, 'Zuhd', in P. Bearman *et al.*, *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (2nd ed.), vol. 11, p. 559.

⁸⁷ *Tawakkal*, Arabic *tawakkul*. On the uses of this crucial term in Islam, see L. Lewisohn, 'Tawakkul (a.)', in P. Bearman *et al.*, *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (2nd ed.), vol. 10, p. 376.

⁸⁸ *Redha*, from Arabic *riḍa*, a term found in Sufism; see Ed., 'Riḍa' in *ibid.*, vol. 8, p. 509.

⁸⁹ Abu 'l-Qasim b. Muhammad b. al-Junayd (d. 910) a leading proponent of what is known as 'sober Sufism'.

and voraciousness; to fight against lust that is beyond what is needed for personal tranquility.⁹⁰

None of Hamka's purposes required formal adherence to an order or initiation by a *shaykh*. It was the authority of those *shaykhs*, the pledges of allegiance to them, and the ritualised practices associated with repetitive litanies (*dhikr*) that much concerned Modernists. Hamka assured his readers that they could embrace the spirituality of mystical experience without the need to embrace any of those *tarekat* practices, all of which smacked of pre-modernity in his eyes.

Hamka's *Tasauf moderen* of 1937–9 was thus emblematic of two important developments within Javanese Islam visible by the 1930s. Firstly, even something as fundamental to Javanese Islam as mysticism was open to new influences and ideas generated by the Modernist urge to return to the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* as a means of rediscovering the pristine truths of Islam. Secondly, profound new influences could come from other parts of what was soon to be the independent Republic of Indonesia. Javanese had never been isolated from the rest of the archipelago or the world. But the level of interconnectedness between Javanese and other societies was now increasing by virtue of modern communications, colonial unification of the islands, the consequent growth of archipelago-wide political and economic interactions and the national-level aspirations of religious and political organisations. The Javanese were well on their way to becoming a subset of the peoples who were soon to be known as Indonesians. It needs also to be borne in mind, however, that — as noted earlier in this chapter — the vast majority of Javanese were still illiterate in this period. So the impact of a publication such as Hamka's book was necessarily still limited to the small literate elite. Within a few decades that, too, would change.

Abangan and santri

Regardless of how 'Indonesian' they were on their way to becoming, Javanese retained idiosyncratic cultural and social arrangements that are of central interest in this book. Notably, in the 1930s Javanese society was — so far as we can know on the basis of surviving evidence — structured along lines of religious identity as well as along the more usual lines of social class. On the one hand were the *santri*, the pious, self-consciously practising Muslims. They were themselves divided by a primary distinction between Traditionalists

⁹⁰ Hamka, *Tasauf moderen*, p. 17.

(represented mainly by NU) and Modernists (represented by multiple groups, by far the largest being Muhammadiyah), but beyond this there were multiple other categories of *santri*: the contending Sufi orders including the much-contested Tijaniyya, the Ahmadiyya and various shades of Modernism. On the other hand were the *abangan*: nominal Muslims for whom Islam was largely a source of ritual practice at certain stages of life. An *abangan* rarely or never prayed, indeed normally did not know the ritual movements associated with prayer, could not recite the confession of faith or the *Qur'an*, rarely or never fasted in Ramadan and would almost certainly not contemplate the expenditure of resources necessary for the pilgrimage to Mecca. But at birth and burial, *abangan* would expect Islamic rituals to be carried out. And some version might be wanted at a circumcision or wedding.

Although we have no widespread social surveys from this period, a useful report from the area of Bagelen in western Central Java captures both the generality of the *abangan-santri* categorisation and the local idiosyncrasies found across Java. There the term for the aristocratic-bureaucratic elite was not the more general *priyayi* but rather *kenthol*. One such *kenthol* gave a ritual communal meal (*slametan*) in 1939 to which all were invited. But the seating was far from random. The *pendhapa* (open public hall) in which the occasion was celebrated was divided into three spaces. On the left sat commoners who were *abangan*. Away from them, on the right sat the *santri* — and it is interesting to note that Bagelen was one area where *santri* was indeed the local term at this time, rather than the more common *putihan*. In a middle section between them were seated the elite *kenthols*. This categorisation reflected the cross-cutting distinctions of social class and religious identity later to be made famous in the 1950s research of Clifford Geertz and his team in East Java: *santri* and *abangan* representing the two main categories of Islamic identity while, sitting between them, the upper-class *priyayi* represented the continuing salience of distinctions of social class.⁹¹

Polarised on the precipice

In 1930 the Javanese were predominantly rural dwellers, but there was also a growing urban proletariat as well as a tiny urban-based educated elite. Population growth already placed serious pressure on resources, which was

⁹¹ Soekardan Prānāhadikoesoemā, 'De kénjol der desa Kréndétan', *Djāwā* vol. 19 (1939), p. 159.

heightened significantly with the onset of the Depression of 1930. That growing urban proletariat was particularly hard hit by the Depression. A process of Islamisation had been going on amongst the Javanese since the 14th century, but in the eyes of Islamic reformers there was still a long way to go. Indeed the process of Islamisation had been halted, in some ways perhaps even reversed, by developments since the middle years of the 19th century. Then there had emerged in Javanese society a group — in fact the majority of Javanese — known as the *abangan*, the nominal Muslims, in contrast to the pious *santri*. These social distinctions had been politicised and thereby made sharper by the growth in the early 20th century of political movements whose constituencies followed those social lines. But by 1930 this politicisation was being halted and probably reversed, as the Dutch crushed the main political movements responsible for the politicisation of social divisions.

Javanese society was, for the most part, not only impoverished but also ill-educated. Literacy rates were low and close to zero in the case of women. But Javanese were not culturally impoverished. A rich cultural life gave meaning to most Javanese, from hard-pressed peasants to kraton aristocrats and urban 'moderns'. Little of this cultural life was yet influenced by reformist Islamic norms. Women were neither secluded in their houses nor did they wear all-enveloping clothes in public — rarely even headscarves, so far as we know. Islam was a presence in Javanese life, but it was only partly the Islam of urban-based Modernist intellectuals. To a much greater degree it remained the Islam of the rural *kyais*, of mystical *tarekats* and of a majority of Javanese who constituted the otherwise-uninterested *abangan* seeking Islamic ritual embellishment for a birth, circumcision, wedding or funeral. Even pious communities in the countryside clung to beliefs and rituals which the Modernist reformers regarded as ignorant superstition at best and heresy at worst. These Modernists were challenged not only by prevailing norms in the countryside but also by other urban moderns for whom purified Islam did not seem the appropriate key to the future. Such leaders were found in the Taman Siswa organization and in various 'secular' (i.e., not religiously Islamic) political parties.

Urban nationalist leaders wished to mobilise a mass following to overthrow Dutch colonial rule. Given the repressive nature of that regime in the 1930s, however, such dreams were frequently dreamt behind bars. Such nationalist movements as were able to survive under the conditions of the 1930s were split among themselves by ideological and personal differences.

Insofar as significant numbers of Javanese followed formal organizations in the 1930s, they were more likely to be led by the few Javanese *kraton*

nobles who were prepared to act on their sense of *noblesse oblige*, by the *kyais* of NU or by other religious organizations. The politically caged rulers of Central Java's *Vorstenlanden* and their *kraton* aristocracies were mostly, however, more interested in preserving their social standing and the associated rituals that entailed supernatural powers and thereby attracted superstitious commoners to them. That aristocratic social standing and those rituals were also useful to the Dutch regime as a means of preserving as far as possible popular acquiescence with the status quo.

Thus stood Javanese society and its Islamic faith on the precipice of the cataclysmic years from 1942 through 1949. Impoverished, illiterate, socially polarised but depoliticised by colonial repression, Javanese society was about to become repoliticised by the devastating — but in the end politically liberating — experience of the Japanese occupation and the Indonesian Revolution. It would still be impoverished, illiterate and socially polarised, but repoliticised and freed of the colonial police-state which had prevented domestic Javanese conflicts from breaking out into violence. The result would be both the achievement of independence, with Java as a central part of the new Republic of Indonesia, and — tragically — the first significant bloodshed between Javanese *santri* and *abangan*.

CHAPTER 3

War and Revolution, 1942–9: The hardening of boundaries

Sandwiched between the 1930s and 1950s lies the chaos of the Japanese occupation and the Indonesian Revolution. This was a time of intense upheaval and hardship, of political and social conflict that was immensely influential in shaping the future social, cultural, political and religious experiences of the Javanese. Oppression, violence, suffering, disease, malnutrition, starvation and death became common. This was the only time in the period covered by this book when the population of Java appears hardly to have grown at all and may even have declined. While this period has been intensely studied, the socio-religious aspects that are of primary interest to us in this book are, unfortunately, poorly documented.

The Japanese occupation¹

The earliest serious study of Islamic aspects of the occupation period was Harry Benda's doctoral dissertation, published as *The crescent and the rising*

¹ There are many works covering the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, most of which give emphasis to Java. A particularly important study is Shigeru Sato, *War, nationalism and peasants: Java under the Japanese occupation, 1942–1945* (St. Leonards, NSW: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin, 1994). On the hardships of the period, see also Sato's article "Economic soldiers" in Java: Indonesian laborers mobilized for agricultural projects' in Paul H. Kratoska (ed.), *Asian labor in the wartime Japanese empire* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006), esp. pp. 131, 373 n7.

sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese occupation 1942–1945.² The sources available to Benda enabled him to write about national-level political issues but gave little insight into grass-roots developments during this period. The overriding question of interest to Benda in 1955, when he completed his dissertation at Cornell, was which side of Indonesian politics was strengthened or weakened by Japanese divide-and-rule policies. The main players in his analysis were defined largely by the emerging tripartite analysis of Clifford Geertz, who saw Javanese society as consisting of the elite (and rather ‘secular’) *priyayi*, the pious *santri* and the nominally Muslim peasant *abangan*. Indonesian politics of the mid-1950s — as we will see in the next chapter — indeed suggested that these were important distinctions. Benda’s attempt to make sense of the multiple directions and redirections, of the wartime exigencies and chaos that inevitably attended the Japanese occupation, however, produced a rather confusing picture. His analysis was disputed persuasively by, among others, L. Sluimers,³ who argued that the primary distinction to be observed in Japanese policy was not between *santri* politicians and secular nationalists, but rather between conservative and non-conservative elites of all socio-religious orientations. Islam in itself was not, he argued, a central category in Japanese policy. The Japanese did not think that there was just one sort of Islam in Java. The dreaded Japanese military police (Kenpeitai) observed that ‘there were considerable regional differences in degrees of faith among the Javanese Muslims’.⁴ Kurasawa, too, rejected Benda’s analytical scheme on the basis of her analysis of Japanese sources for the occupation period.⁵ Our primary interest here, however, is less in what Japanese policies were intended to do than in the actual impact of the occupation upon the varieties of Islam lived in Java.

One of the most important departures traceable to the Japanese period was the political education and involvement of Traditionalist NU *kyais*. Prior to the Japanese occupation, it was urban-based Modernists who were most

² Harry J. Benda, *The crescent and the rising sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese occupation 1942–1945* (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd, 1958).

³ L. Sluimers, “‘Nieuwe orde’ op Java: De Japanse bezettingspolitiek en de Indonésische elites 1942–1943’, *BKI* vol. 124 (1968), no. 3, pp. 336–67.

⁴ Barbara Gifford Shimer and Guy Hobbs (transl.), *The Kenpeitai in Java and Sumatra (Selections from Nihon Kenpei Seishi)* (intro. Theodore Friend. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Translation Series Publication no. 65, 1986), p. 41.

⁵ Aiko Kurasawa, *Mobilisasi dan kontrol: Studi tentang perubahan sosial di pedesaan Jawa 1942–1945* (Jakarta: Yayasan Karti Sarana and Penerbit PT Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 1993), especially p. 329.

likely to be politically active, although Muhammadiyah itself studiously avoided anti-colonial politics and continued to cooperate with the colonial regime in its educational and welfare work. In the countryside, Traditionalist *kyais* were mainly involved in their *pesantren* schools. They were regarded with considerable respect by their surrounding societies, even (it seems) by many of the nominally Muslim *abangan* majority. As noted in the previous chapter, NU was pressing the colonial government with regard to certain policy matters, but this was not a matter of anti-colonial agitation, no matter how much the *kyais* may have wished privately for a non-*kafir* government.

With the Japanese in charge, the *kyais* still faced a *kafir* government, but one that took a very different view of them. As the Japanese took over from the Dutch in Java, their first priority was to control the population, restrict all political activity, put down disorder and get the society under control. When they felt that had been achieved, their priority turned towards the mobilisation of the Javanese population, so as to bolster Japan's defences against a possible Allied counterattack (which did not, in the end, materialise). At each stage of this policy evolution, the *kyais* were of importance to the Japanese: the *kyais* did not have radical political demands of their own (unlike some of the urban Modernist politicians) and they did have extensive social networks and high prestige among the rural majority (again, unlike the Modernists). Moreover, the Japanese expected them to be rather naïve and manipulable, unlike the Modernists who were better educated in the ways of the modern world. Suddenly the Traditionalist *kyais* — usually regarded as social curiosities or poorly educated religious atavisms by both the Dutch colonial regime and the Modernist Muslims — thus found themselves at the centre of government attention. There began a politicisation that would eventually turn NU into a potent political party. All analysts agree on the significance of this development. As Benda put it, 'The politicization of the *ulama* was the most important aspect of Japanese Islamic policy in 1943'.⁶

The Japanese sought to unite Modernist and Traditionalist Islam under moderate leaders from mid-1942 onwards.⁷ The occupiers decreed 'Principles governing the military administration of Java' in February 1943, which included the following two provisions, the first of which was a continuation of Dutch policy and the second a significant departure.

[1] Special care must be taken to respect local customs and practices in the execution of government. ... Therefore, of the various items to

⁶ Benda, *Crescent and the rising sun*, p. 135.

⁷ See M.A. Aziz, *Japan's colonialism and Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), pp. 204–5.

which attention has been called, the most important is the respect for local customs. ... Further, every effort is being made to respect practices based upon religion and thereby contribute to reassuring and holding the hearts of the people.

[2] Secondly, there is the matter of the treatment accorded Islamic religious leaders who hold positions of social, religious, and, in some places, political importance. Special care has been taken in their treatment, and acts such as casting scorn on them with pretentious exhibitions of Japanese superiority, or interfering in their private lives, are being avoided.⁸

The Japanese desire to see the contending wings of Islam brought together culminated in the formation of Masyumi (Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) in late 1943. Masyumi contained both Modernists and Traditionalists. Its leadership reflected the Japanese wish to avoid religious activists with established political agendas: rather than being given to the urban Modernist politicians whom the Japanese distrusted, it went to leading figures of Muhammadiyah and NU. The nominal head was Ky. H. Hasyim Asy'ari, one of the most senior *kyais* of East Java and — along with Ky. H. Wahab Chasbullah — a founding father of NU. The Japanese had foolishly arrested Hasyim Asy'ari early in their occupation but now turned to him for leadership; in fact he remained in Jombang in charge of his *pesantren* Tebuireng, probably the foremost Traditionalist school in Java for much of the 20th century. Actual leadership in Masyumi was exercised by his son Ky. H. Wachid Hasyim, then just 30 years old, who later occupied cabinet positions during the Revolution and eventually became Minister of Religion (1949–52).⁹ Masyumi branches were set up in every residency across Java. In August 1944 Hoesein Djajadiningrat — one of the most distinguished *priyais* of West Java — was replaced as head of the Office of Religious Affairs (Kantor Urusan Agama, Shūmubu) by Hasyim Asy'ari, but again he rarely in fact acted in this role. As deputy head of the Office a Muhammadiyah figure, H. Abdul Kahar Muzakir, was appointed and it was he who in practice led the organisation. Hasyim Asy'ari's son Wachid Hasyim was appointed as advisor (*Sanyo*) to the Office.¹⁰

⁸ Harry J. Benda, James K. Irikura and Kōichi Kishi (eds), *Japanese military administration in Indonesia: Selected documents* ([New Haven, CT:] Yale University Southeast Asia Studies Translation Series no. 6, 1965), p. 73.

⁹ For a biography of Wachid Hasyim, see Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam, *Menteri-menteri Agama RI*, pp. 81–113.

¹⁰ Kurasawa, *Mobilisasi dan kontrol*, pp. 282–4.



Illustration 8 Tebuireng *pesantren*, Jombang, in 1987:
the oldest building, a dormitory for *santris*

To their lives centring on piety and *pesantren*, Java's *kyais* now increasingly added politics. Following in the footsteps of earlier Modernist activists, from the time of the Japanese occupation onwards many among Java's Traditionalist leaders embraced political leadership roles. The changes brought by the Japanese also gave the *kyais* final and irreversible victory over their main competitors for control of rural Islam, the formerly Dutch-appointed *pangulus*. The Japanese recognised how little influence these government appointees had among Muslims and therefore how little use they were to the occupation forces. The *kyais* were henceforth unchallenged by any other religious leadership group in the Javanese countryside for many decades.

From mid-1943 to mid-1945, the Japanese ran political indoctrination courses for *kyais* in Jakarta (as Batavia was now renamed); over a thousand attended the 17 one-month courses that were held.¹¹ This of course represented a tiny percentage — perhaps some 5 per cent — of Java's *kyais*

¹¹ The most authoritative account of Japanese indoctrination of village *kyais* is in Aiko Kurasawa's 1987 PhD thesis (Cornell University), published as *Mobilisasi dan kontrol*; see especially pp. 273–340. The account here relies upon Kurasawa's work, unless otherwise noted.

but this group was significant for the future. Kurasawa's analysis shows that not all of the attendees were in fact *kyais*, although they represented the largest single group. Religious officials such as *pangulus* and subordinate officers also attended, as did some secular school teachers and others. Most were under the age of 40. Kurasawa speculates that this may have reflected Japanese policy, but that it is also possible that senior *kyais* who were ordered to attend these courses sent younger representatives in their places. The courses for *kyais* were offered in the Indonesian language rather than Javanese — the latter being a demanding language that few (if any) Japanese mastered. This undoubtedly contributed to the spread of Indonesian and of the roman script among Traditionalist leaders, which was crucial to their expanding political horizons; it may also explain the preponderance of younger attendees, for both the Western alphabet and the Indonesian language would have presented difficulties for many older *kyais*. Nearly 40 per cent of attendees were affiliated with NU, while some 12 per cent were of Muhammadiyah background. Some had studied in Mecca or Cairo but only very few had studied in Dutch schools. There were also some three-month courses held from April 1944 for teachers of Modernist *madrasahs*, but little is known about their content. The training courses for *kyais* covered Japanese history and politics, including justifications for the war against the Western colonial powers. Indonesian and Japanese interests were depicted as being consistent. To this were added practical means of assisting the occupation, including ways of improving peasant agriculture, and physical exercises.

The courses changed as they developed and became more Java- (or Indonesia-)centric. In September 1944 the Japanese Prime Minister General Koiso Kuniaki promised that independence would be granted — at a future date not yet declared — to what he still called the 'East Indies' (*To-Indo*, the term the Japanese employed officially until April 1945). In Java, the Japanese now gave emphasis to encouraging nationalist forces. Consequently, from November 1944 the training courses for *kyais* dropped the lessons about the Greater East Asian War and replaced them with indoctrination about defence of the Indonesian motherland. Japanese history was dropped at some point and more time was given to the history of Java, which seems to have been particularly popular. It was taught by Dr Prijono, who later served as independent Indonesia's Minister of Education and Culture. Other prominent Indonesian intellectuals were reportedly also involved in teaching these courses, including the Modernist leaders Haji Rasul and H. Agus Salim,¹² but Japanese instructors taught about half of the subjects.

¹² Benda, *Crescent and the rising sun*, p. 248 n10.

The politicisation of Islamic leaders was also visible in other ways. In January 1944 the colonial ban on political matters being raised in religious teachings was abolished. Now any teacher who wanted to explain the purpose of the Greater East Asia War or to encourage the masses to support the Japanese military as a part of religious teaching was free to do so. At the same time, the Jawa Hokokai (Java Service Association) was established for everyone over the age of 14. Prominent among its leaders were the foremost ‘secular’ nationalist leaders Sukarno and Hatta, along with Ky. H. Hasyim Asy’ari of NU and Ky. H. Mas Mansur, a pre-war chairman of Muhammadiyah.

Thus it was that the Islamic leadership groups thought by the Japanese to be the least political — NU and Muhammadiyah — were becoming involved in political leadership. We should not, however, assume that this development was without risks for Islamic leaders. Kurasawa suggests that *kyais* who were pro-Japanese were suspected of being Japanese spies by the rural populace. For example, Ky. Abas, the senior *kyai* of *pesantren* Buntet in Cirebon and elder brother of the Ky. Anas mentioned in the previous chapter, appears to have lost much (or all) of his social influence through his support of the Japanese; this is discussed further below. In Kurasawa’s view, even if rural *santris* continued to hold *kyais* in high regard, the *abangan* majority are unlikely to have done so.¹³ Thus, the politicisation of the *kyais* may have contributed to greater *santri-abangan* animosities.

We should note a significant difference between Modernist and Traditionalist leadership, which persists to the present day. The largely urban Modernists, seeking to change society and its observation of Islam, thought religious, social, cultural and political activism to be natural and proper. Muhammadiyah avoided overt political stances as a tactic to survive in the changing political contexts of Indonesia, but never declared political action itself to be improper for Muslim leaders. Many Modernist figures were politically active from the early 20th century into the 21st and — whether individuals agreed or disagreed with their particular programmes and activities — there was no significant questioning of their right to be so. The Traditionalist *kyais* of the countryside, however, faced a different social calculation. Popular respect for them rested then — as now — in large measure on a view of them as pious, other-worldly men, mostly gifted with extraordinary spiritual capacities, who stood above the grubby economic and political competitions of the day. The more obviously they entered the world of politics, the more ordinary they seemed, the less other-worldly, the less

¹³ Kurasawa, *Mobilisasi dan kontrol*, pp. 326–8.

immune to the complexities of daily life. And, thus, the less worthy of respect they seemed. The Japanese occupation's political empowerment of the *kyais* thus commenced a dilemmatic relationship between their socio-religious standing and their political activism. And, in the desperately difficult circumstances of the occupation, their collaboration with the Japanese probably heightened *abangan* animosity towards *kyais* and the overtly pious *santris* in general. As for the purpose of Japanese policy, Kurasawa argues persuasively that the Japanese intended to use *kyais* to mobilise the rural population, but never trusted Islamic leaders enough to contemplate actually freeing them from the control of the Japanese-directed state bureaucracy.¹⁴

We need also to understand the mode of thought and inherited political traditions of Traditionalists. Whereas Modernists denied that the four Sunni Schools of Islam were authoritative guides to faith and practice and invoked the powers of human reason, Traditionalists accepted the authority of those Schools and of the centuries of legal traditions that arose from them. In the political realm, the dominant Traditionalist idea was that any form of government was better than no government; that even imperfect authority was preferable to anarchy, and merited loyalty. Their principal point of reference was *Qur'an* 4:59, which admonished believers to 'obey God and obey His Messenger and those who are in authority over you'.¹⁵ So long as the Japanese administration did not actually oppress Islam or prevent Muslims from worshipping — and it sought not to do such things — then the Traditionalist *kyais* were inclined to accept its authority, just as they had accepted that of the Dutch colonial regime. Traditionalist thought thus gave *kyais* a means of justifying an approach that served the welfare of their schools, their students and themselves. Over the coming decades of independent Indonesia, NU would often be accused of political opportunism, of not taking a stand on principle. Readers therefore need to bear in mind the ironic truth that — so long as the observation of Islam was not actually threatened — in political matters it was a principle of Traditionalist scholarship not to stand on principle.

The general hardship and chaos of the occupation period tended to radicalise and politicise the entire population and religious leaders were not immune to this effect. This did not always lead them in directions supportive of the Japanese. In Tasikmalaya — in West Java, outside the Javanese-

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 329–31.

¹⁵ An overview of this issue is to be found in Gregory John Fealy, 'Ulama and politics in Indonesia: A history of the Nahdlatul Ulama, 1952–1967' (PhD thesis, Monash University, 1998), pp. 50 et seqq.

speaking heartland — an anti-Japanese rebellion broke out at a *pesantren*, led by its *kyai*. The uprising was, of course, crushed by the Japanese and the head of the *pesantren*, Ky. Zainal Mustafa, was executed with 22 others.¹⁶ The Japanese authorities were shocked by this episode. The Kenpeitai called this ‘the greatest purely civilian rebellion in the history of the military government of Java’, which ‘clearly brought home to us the fearsome nature of religious rebellion’.¹⁷

In Indramayu — on the boundaries of the Javanese and Sundanese cultural areas — several similar episodes of resistance occurred that almost totally disrupted local government from April to August 1944.¹⁸ This was an area noted for high levels of Islamic observance, many *pesantrens* and large numbers of locals who had accumulated sufficient wealth to undertake the *hajj*. Here, as in many parts of Java, peasant farmers hated the Japanese administration’s increasingly heavy rice requisitioning. Low-level resistance was no doubt common throughout Java, but in Indramayu it became overt village-level rebellion. The farmers were in most cases led by *hajis* who were usually also the foremost land-owners and patrons. Several local officials were murdered by the insurgents and Chinese shops were attacked. In some cases *kyais* offered support in the form of sanctified water that was thought to convey invulnerability. But *kyais* were also employed by the Japanese to attempt to calm the uprisings; when this failed, the Japanese used force to arrest protesters, execute many and send others into flight and hiding. The Japanese sent Ky. Abas (mentioned above) to invite rebels at the village of Kaplongan to a meeting in Cirebon, with guarantees of their personal safety. A dozen came, were arrested and were never seen again. Ky. Abas was reputedly so enthusiastic in his support of the Japanese that locals said of him, ‘Kyai Abas is finished (*abis*), a *kyai* of Japanese stamp’.

Despite the terrible hardships of the occupation, the Japanese *bushido* style, with its emphasis on martial and spiritual values, honour and loyalty, struck a responsive chord in many young rural Javanese men, whose *pesantren* milieu also emphasised spiritual disciplines, obedience to the *kyai* and martial arts.¹⁹ The Japanese veneration of violence and creation of indigenous armed forces encouraged such ideas further. Peta (Pembela Tanah Air, Protectors of

¹⁶ Kurasawa, *Mobilisasi dan kontrol*, pp. 457–71.

¹⁷ Shimer and Hobbs, *Kenpeitai in Java and Sumatra*, p. 41.

¹⁸ The account here is based on Kurasawa, *Mobilisasi dan kontrol*, pp. 471–88.

¹⁹ Similar observations are made in Benedict R. O’G. Anderson, *Java in a time of revolution: Occupation and resistance, 1944–1946* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 31–4.

the Fatherland) was established in 1943. Its officer corps included officials, teachers, *kyais* and Indonesian soldiers of the former Dutch colonial army. By the end of the war it had some 37,000 men in Java. Jawa Hokokai had a youth organisation called Barisan Pelopor (Vanguard Column), which began guerilla training in May 1945. By the end of the war it reportedly had 80,000 members. In December 1944 Masyumi acquired its own armed group called Barisan Hizbullah (God's Forces) which was said to have 50,000 members at the end of the war. An important element in Hizbullah was NU's paramilitary arm, later known as Banser (Barisan Ansor Serba Guna, Ansor All-Purpose Forces).²⁰

By mid-1945, *kyais* as well as urban Modernists were accustomed to political leadership roles. In some circumstances this enhanced these figures' social leadership; in others it undermined it. In either case, all of Javanese society was thoroughly churned up by the occupation experience and religious leaders were as affected as anyone else. With religious leadership available, with the masses of Java mobilised and politicised both by Japanese propaganda and by the extreme hardship of the occupation, with indoctrinated armed groups trained to resist an Allied reconquest, Java was ripe for a revolution in which Islam would play a major role; it should not surprise readers by this stage to learn that this role was not always a unifying one.

The Revolution

The Indonesian Revolution has been intensively studied and is covered in many fine works of scholarship; we need not review its general history here.²¹ This was a time of confusion in which — in common with many another revolution — violence was often among Indonesians themselves as much as between Indonesians and the colonial forces that sought to reconquer the archipelago. As the nationalist elite and the national armed forces struggled to win independence — and eventually succeeded in doing so — in the countryside of Java the pent-up animosities of the Japanese occupation era, the competition for resources and influence inspired by the Revolution, the by-now deeply rooted social differences between *santri* and

²⁰ On the history of Banser, see Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, 'Religion, politics and violence in Indonesia: Learning from Banser's experience', *SI* vol. 15 (2008), no. 3, pp. 417–42.

²¹ The best overview is to be found in Anthony Reid, *The Indonesian national revolution, 1945–1950* (Hawthorn, Vic: Longman, 1974). A briefer overview is in Ricklefs, *History of modern Indonesia*, Chapter 18.

abangan and the rapid re-politicisation of those differences produced social violence that affected Javanese life for several decades to come. This was the start of a time of overt violence and bloodshed that would build to a horrific climax in the mid-1960s.

Sukarno and Hatta read the declaration of independence on 17 August 1945 but political parties were only formed after Sutan Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin (both Sumatrans, the former from Minangkabau, the latter a Batak Christian, and neither of whom had collaborated with the Japanese) carried out a peaceful takeover within the Revolutionary government that created responsible cabinet government in October 1945. Five political parties are of particular interest to us here. The first is Masyumi, which still included both Modernist and Traditionalist Muslims. In November 1945, the Muhammadiyah and NU leaders whom the Japanese had favoured as leaders of Masyumi lost out to urban Modernist politicians, among whom the most prominent were the Javanese Sukiman Wirjosandjojo and the Minangkabau intellectual Mohammad Natsir, a leading figure in the quite puritanical Modernist organisation Persatuan Islam. On the left of Indonesian politics, reflecting secularist and socialist leanings, were found Amir Sjarifuddin and his Pesindo (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Youth). Sjahrir formed the Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis), which Amir's group joined for a time. On the far left was a revived Communist Party (PKI). In January 1946 the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) was revived. As President of the new nation, Sukarno was supposed to be above politics so PNI was now in principle detached from his influence, but of course it continued to carry the air of being the Sukarnoist political vehicle, with many pre-war PNI figures still among its leaders.

For our purposes, it is important to understand the socio-religious categories in Java to which these political parties related, and which they further politicised. Their constituencies may be understood roughly as given below:

- Masyumi: Both Modernist and Traditionalist *santri*, the former mainly in urban areas and the latter mainly in the countryside. Given the predominantly rural character of Java's population, our principal interest here is in the rural Traditionalist *santri* followers of NU within Masyumi. This included fighters in Hizbullah.
- Pesindo: Leftist *abangan* youth militia, soon to be connected with the People's Democratic Front (FDR, Front Demokrasi Rakyat) coalition and then PKI.
- Partai Sosialis: Leftist and *abangan*, but not PKI-affiliated and in fact with little following in the countryside.

- PKI: *abangan* villagers and urban proletariat.
- PNI: *priyayi* bureaucrats with an *abangan* following as well.

There was a history of animosity between PKI and Islamic organisations going back to the 1920s and it was about to get worse. According to Saifuddin Zuhri, Hizbullah fighters (among whom he was a leader) — and no doubt many other Traditionalists — interpreted the political spectrum that now emerged in the light of *Qur'an* 56: 27–56.²² This passage distinguishes between ‘those on the right’ and ‘those on the left’. On the Day of Judgement, those on the right are promised the pleasures of paradise: gold and jeweled couches under shade trees, with virgins as companions. Those on the left, however, will find only scorching winds, thick black smoke and boiling water. Thus, for Traditionalists who relied on Qur’anic sources, the leftists of the emerging Indonesian political scene represented not just a contending political ideology and competing faction, but people in rebellion against God who were destined for hell.

Islamic organisations gave full support to the Revolution. In October and November 1945 conflicts between British-commanded — mostly Indian — South East Asia Command (SEAC) forces and the Revolutionaries grew, particularly in Surabaya. *Kyais* and their *pesantren* students flooded into the city to fight. NU held a massive meeting there on 21–2 October at which it declared that defence of the independence of the Republic of Indonesia and simultaneously of Islam had the character of *Sabilullah* (Holy War). Resistance against renewed colonial conquest was a personal obligation for all Muslims.²³ The Surabaya violence culminated in a bloody sweep in November in which SEAC regained control of the city at a cost of at least 6,000 Indonesian lives. On the eve of the SEAC advance, the fiery Sutomo (‘Bung Tomo’) used his revolutionary radio broadcasts to encourage resistance:

Our slogan remains the same: Independence or death! And we know, brothers, that victory will be ours, because God is on the side of the righteous. You can believe that, brothers: God will protect us all. *Allahu akbar* [God is great]! *Allahu akbar! Allahu akbar!*²⁴

The Indonesian fighters’ sacrificial heroism provided a rallying-cry for the Revolutionaries thereafter. This was also one of the episodes that persuaded

²² Saifuddin Zuhri, *Berangkat dari pesantren*, p. 322.

²³ Anderson, *Java in a time of revolution*, p. 157; Fealy, ‘Ulama and politics’, p. 42.

²⁴ Quoted in William H. Frederick, *Visions and heat: The making of the Indonesian Revolution* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989), p. 266.

the British to remain neutral in the Indonesian conflict and leave it to the Dutch to try to reconquer their colony for themselves.

A characteristic phenomenon of the early revolutionary period, from late 1945 into 1946, was a series of ‘social revolutions’ in the name of the ‘people’s sovereignty’. In these episodes, local people took action against officials and others who had collaborated with the Japanese, engaged in black marketeering to the detriment of their fellows, or in other ways were regarded as enemies. Such figures were humiliated, deposed, beaten, imprisoned and/or killed. In some cases *abangan* or *santri* villagers overthrew headmen who were from the other faction. In Pare — the East Java research site later studied by Clifford Geertz and his colleagues — evidently it was mostly *santri* village headmen (*lurahs*) who were overthrown and replaced by *abangan* figures.²⁵ In the Javanese-speaking enclave of Banten in West Java, *santris* (many of them enlisted in Hizbullah) led by *kyais* effectively overthrew ‘the entire ruling class of Banten ... in a matter of weeks’.²⁶ At this early stage, however, there were still episodes in which PKI activists and *santri* activists cooperated.²⁷

Abangan-santri violence

The year 1948 was crucial in entrenching leftist vs Islamic — which is to say also *abangan* vs *santri* — tensions and taking them to a higher, bloody level. This ended episodes of cooperation across these lines, of the kind seen in some circumstances early in the Revolution. In general, that year was crucial in a more general sense in the Indonesian Revolution’s history. It saw the return of Musso, the PKI leader of the 1920s who had not been in Indonesia since the failed Communist uprising of 1926–7, except for a clandestine visit in 1935. He was an orthodox Stalinist in outlook and had little understanding of how much Indonesian dynamics had changed in his absence — in which he was like the Dutch who were then attempting to

²⁵ Robert R. Jay, *Religion and politics in rural Central Java* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies Cultural Report Series no. 12, 1963), p. 68.

²⁶ Anderson, *Java in a time of revolution*, pp. 336–7.

²⁷ See, for example, Michael C. Williams, ‘Banten: “Rice debts will be repaid with rice, blood debts with blood”’, pp. 55–81 in Audrey R. Kahin (ed.), *Regional dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution: Unity from diversity* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1985); Anton Lucas, *One soul, one struggle: Region and revolution in Indonesia* (Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin, 1991).

reconquer the archipelago. He believed that there should be only one party of the proletariat, so ordered other leftists to unite under the leadership of the PKI. The leftists had formed themselves into a coalition called the People's Democratic Front (Front Demokrasi Rakyat) led by Amir Sjarifuddin, who announced that he had been a secret Communist since 1935; his followers now came under the Communist umbrella.

In September 1948, PKI activists seized power in Madiun, announced the creation of a new 'National Front' government and began killing their opponents, including PNI and Masyumi people. Sukarno called upon Indonesians to reject Musso's Soviet-style rebel government and to unite behind himself and Hatta. The army followed his orders and in a series of bloody encounters drove the Communists out of Madiun, killing Musso in the process. Amir Sjarifuddin was captured and later executed. Some 35,000 supporters of the Madiun uprising were imprisoned. The death toll is not known with confidence, but was probably of the order of 8,000. The army carried out anti-PKI actions widely throughout Java in the wake of Madiun, entrenching a tradition of army-Communist hostility. It was this armed destruction of a Communist *putsch* that finally impelled the United States — by then convinced that the world was caught in a struggle between a 'Soviet bloc' and a 'free world' — into fully fledged support of the manifestly anti-Communist Indonesian revolutionaries. This galvanised international support and, along with the resistance of the Indonesians themselves, ultimately brought the Revolution to a successful conclusion in 1949. Here, however, we need to delve below the level of these grand politics to see what we can of socio-religious dynamics on the ground in Java.

In the months before the Madiun uprising, tensions were rising in Central Java.²⁸ A strike led by PKI's workers' union SOBSI (Sentral

²⁸ The general account of the Madiun affair here rests upon Ann Swift, *The road to Madiun: The Indonesian Communist uprising of 1948* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Monograph Series, 1989); A.H. Nasution, *Sekitar perang kemerdekaan Indonesia* (11 vols; Bandung: Penerbit Angkasa, 1977–9), vol. 8; Himawan Soetanto, *Madiun dari republik ke republik: Aspek militer pemberontakan PKI di Madiun 1948* (Jakarta: Penerbit Kata, 2006); and George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952), Chapters 9–10. On Surakarta specifically, see Julianto Ibrahim, *Bandit dan pejuang di simpang Bengawan: Kriminalitas dan kekerasan masa revolusi di Surakarta* (Wonogiri: Penerbit Bina Citra Pustaka, 2004), esp. pp. 172–7. See also Kuntowidjojo (ed.), *Sejarah perjuangan Hizbullah Sabillillah Divisi Sunan Bonang* (Surakarta: Yayasan Bhakti Utama and Masyarakat Sejarawan Indonesia Cabang Yogyakarta, 1997), pp. 132–6.

Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, All-Indonesia Workers' Organisation Central) and its peasant union BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia, Indonesian Peasants' Front) broke out in June 1948 at Delanggu. This involved workers at seven cotton plantations and over 15,500 laborers at a gunny-sack factory. They initially demanded better conditions, such as clothing and rice to be supplied to workers, but the strike soon acquired the shape of political action against the Republican government based in Yogyakarta. The Communist constituency was from the *abangan* peasantry, while *santri* peasants were in Masyumi's Sarekat Tani Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Peasants' Union).²⁹ The latter continued working in the cotton fields, and were attacked by SOBSI activists. Houses were burned and people were kidnapped. On 10 July opponents of the strikers who said that they were Hizbullah fired on demonstrating strikers. The conflict lasted 1.5 hours and left two strikers and seven Hizbullah wounded. The leftist coalition FDR issued a statement in support of the strikers, signed by (among others) Amir Sjarifuddin for the Socialist Party, the PKI's D.N. Aidit (just 25 years old, one of the new leadership group emerging in the Party) and the Pesindo leader Sudisman (another of the new PKI Politburo members, only three years older than Aidit). The army sent troops into Surakarta to quell the violence. The strike itself was settled on 18 July with the assistance of Vice-President Hatta, largely on terms demanded by BTI and SOBSI. The army commander Sudirman ordered the military units on the two sides — the pro-government Siliwangi Division and the leftist, FDR-sympathising and heavily Pesindo-derived Panembahan Senopati Division — to cease fire. Indonesian navy troops were also on the Communist side.

Radicalism and conflict continued in Surakarta, creating what A.H. Nasution (both a senior military commander and, later, a writer of the history of the Revolution) and others called a 'Wild West atmosphere'³⁰ on the eve of the Madiun uprising. On 15 September Sukarno declared martial law in Surakarta. Heavy fighting erupted thereafter but within two days the Siliwangi Division had expelled the leftist fighters from Surakarta. Pro-PKI forces thus lost this battle in the streets of Surakarta so that, as Henri Alers observed, 'the Communist uprising was in fact militarily defeated

²⁹ See Soejatno, 'Revolution and social tensions in Surakarta, 1945–1950' (transl. Benedict Anderson), *Indonesia* no. 17 (Apr. 1974), p. 106. Masyumi established Sarekat Tani Islam Indonesia in 1946 initially for the purpose of collecting *zakat*; Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, pp. 307–8.

³⁰ Nasution, *Sekitar perang kemerdekaan*, vol. 8, p. 222.

before it began'.³¹ Driven from Surakarta, the leftist forces led by Pesindo fighters retreated to Madiun. Tensions had also been rising there. Already in March 1948 the influential 'national Communist' (i.e., non-PKI) Tan Malaka observed tensions between Hizbullah fighters and Pesindo forces surrounding the town.³²

Another prologue to the Madiun uprising occurred in the area of Ngawi. There Communist-led peasants unilaterally seized formerly Dutch-owned lands that were now government plantations. The lands of rich peasants and the holdings of *pesantrens* and prominent Muslims were also targeted. Hizbullah's leaders in the region — including Munawir Syadzali, later Minister of Religion³³ — ordered 50 Hizbullah fighters to intervene to protect *santris* and the *pesantrens*. On 17 September 1948, the day before the Madiun uprising, the Communist side attacked *pesantrens* at Tempureja and Walikukun in large numbers and forced the Hizbullah fighters to withdraw. While they held the area, the Communists — that is, FDR activists, Pesindo fighters and pro-PKI military — reportedly carried out widespread slaughter of 'kyais, members of the [*santri*] Muslim community, nationalists [i.e., PNI members] and anti-Communist civil servants'. Among the victims were Ky. H. Dimiyati, the head of Masyumi and Sabilillah³⁴ there, and Suwandi, the local head of Muhammadiyah.³⁵

Then, on 18 September 1948, the Communists in Madiun declared their rebellion against the government of the Republic. Musso and other PKI leaders hastened to Madiun to try to gain control of this uprising. The pro-government forces that marched on Madiun were mostly regular *Tentara Republik Indonesia* (Indonesian Republican Army) troops of the Siliwangi Division, but also included some Hizbullah and other irregular units.³⁶

³¹ Henri J.H. Alers, *Om een rode of groene merdeka: 10 jaren binnenlandse politiek Indonesië, 1943–1953* (Eindhoven: Vulkaan, 1956), p. 187.

³² Tan Malaka, *Dari penjara ke penjara* (3 vols; Jakarta: TePLOK Press, 2000), vol. 3, pp. 319–21.

³³ Munawir was a graduate of the first modern Islamic school in Java, Manba' al-'Ulum in Surakarta. For a biography, see Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam, *Menteri-menteri Agama RI*, pp. 369–412.

³⁴ Anderson, *Java in a time of Revolution*, p. 222 n40, observes that Sabilillah 'had no formal antecedents in the Japanese period, had no formal military training, and was not organised in regular formations. It seems never to have become an integral organization, but was rather a generic name for the myriad rural *kyai*-led armed bands that sprang up during the period of the takeovers from the Japanese.'

³⁵ Kuntowidjojo, *Hizbullah*, pp. 133–6.

³⁶ Nasution, *Sekitar perang kemerdekaan*, vol. 8, pp. 260, 319, 339.

The Communists killed many PNI and Masyumi figures, including several notable *kyais*. Saifuddin Zuhri recalled that

The PKI rebellion at Madiun began with lootings, burnings and kidnappings targeted mainly at the *kyais*, Islamic proselytisers (*para mubaligh*), Masyumi leaders, and government officials, particularly civil servants who were mostly PNI members.³⁷

Eye-witness accounts collected much later emphasised the killing of religious leaders in Madiun and elsewhere. According to such memories, the Communists took over Madiun, Magetan, Ponorogo, Pacitan, Trenggalek, Ngawi, Purwantoro, Sukoharjo, Wonogiri, Blora, Pati, Cepu, Kudus and other towns. They carried out widespread attacks on *pesantrens* where their main enemies were found, and killed many militant young Muslims and *kyais*. They also attacked local officials, police and military. The 28-year-old Ky. Imam Mursyid Muttaqien, who was a leader of the Shattariyya *tarekat*, was among their victims but his body, like others', was never found. His *pesantren*, Takeran, was burned down. In Magetan one of Ky. H. Sulaiman Zuhdi Effendi's own *pesantren* students was a PKI follower and ordered the *kyai's* capture. There the Communists burned 72 houses in the *Kauman* and took away all the men; before they could be killed, however, they were rescued by the Siliwangi Division.³⁸ Not surprisingly, given the mystical and supernatural traditions of rural Javanese Islam, magical legends arose from these bloody events. According to one informant, who was in his mid-20s at the time of the events and was interviewed 40 years later, near Magetan one Ky. H. Imam Sofwan and his two sons, who were also *kyais*, were murdered and their bodies thrown into a well (a common motif in these memoirs). From within the well resonated the voice of Ky. H. Imam Sofwan singing the call to prayer, 'which was heard by the Muslims'.³⁹

Recollections from the East Java village of Madukoro collected over 40 years after the events are similar. There political parties were introduced in 1947. People living in the low areas of the village were 'fanatical' NU and Masyumi supporters, while those on higher ground supported PKI and PNI, which reflected conflict between *santri* and *abangan* respectively. In September 1948, violence across these lines occurred for the first time.

³⁷ Saifuddin Zuhri, *Berangkat dari pesantren*, p. 360.

³⁸ Agus Sunyoto Maksum and A. Zainuddin, *Lubang lubang pembantaian: Petualangan PKI di Madiun* (Jakarta: Grafiti untuk Jawa Pos, 1990), pp. 15–20, 31–4, 40–3. See also Kuntowidjojo, *Hizbullah*, pp. 134–6.

³⁹ Maksum and Zainuddin, *Lubang lubang pembantaian*, pp. 55–9.

Santri armed themselves against the Communists not only with firearms and grenades but also with 'spiritual weapons' such as sharpened bamboo lances (*bamboo runcing*) that had been blessed by *kyais*. For the older generation of Madukoro's inhabitants, the Madiun affair was an unforgettable demonstration of Communist brutality. For the younger generation, it would prove to be a precedent for their own offensive against the PKI two decades later.⁴⁰ Similarly, memories of the Madiun killings of 1948 were also revived in the minds of *santri* anti-PKI activists in the Semarang and Salatiga areas at the time of the 1965–6 violence, according to later oral evidence.⁴¹

We would be wrong to think that the Communist side had a monopoly of aggression. Militant Muslim activists who joined Hizbullah, Sabilillah and other 'struggle groups' to resist the Dutch reconquest were not reluctant to take up arms against their Communist opponents. Five years after the Madiun uprising, it was claimed (but hardly believable) that in Ponorogo about half of the male population died in the fighting. The leftists slaughtered *kyais* and *santris*, then became the target of *santri* counter-attacks themselves. In Pare, later accounts said that Hizbullah units were prepared to move against Pesindo forces but the police intervened and prevented violence.⁴² The rebels also held Kudus for a time and killed some *santri* there, but the foremost religious leaders managed to escape the town, to return with Hizbullah forces for its recapture, whereupon PKI activists were murdered.⁴³

By the time many of the memoirs of Madiun were being collected decades after the events, Java's social environment had changed in a more Islamised direction, which no doubt influenced depictions of the past, portraying the *santri* side as the main victims of the violence. Furthermore, during the Soeharto era it would have been difficult to find a surviving Communist at all — or at least anyone who would admit to having been a Communist — to tell that side of the story. After the fall of Soeharto in 1998, things changed. Then it became possible to publish the self-justificatory recollections of Soemarsono, PKI's military governor of Madiun

⁴⁰ Imam Tholikhah, *Anatomi konflik politik di Indonesia: Belajar dari ketegangan politik varian di Madukoro* (Jakarta: PT RajaGrafindo Persada, 2001), pp. 119–29.

⁴¹ Singgih Nugroho, *Menyintas dan menyeberang: Perpindahan massal keagamaan pasca 1965 di pedesaan Jawa* (Yogyakarta: Syarikat, 2008), pp. 78–9.

⁴² Jay, *Religion and politics*, pp. 28–9, 74–5.

⁴³ Lance Castles, *Religion, politics and economic behavior in Java: The Kudus cigarette industry* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies Cultural Report Series no. 15, 1967), p. 67.

at the time of the uprising. By the time his memories were assembled, he was an Australian resident in his late 80s. In his book *Revolusi Agustus*, published in 2008, he essentially retails the PKI line of the 1950s that the Party was the victim of Hatta's counter-revolutionary plotting with the Americans, whereas Sukarno was an innocent dupe. Even the documents cited by Soemarsono himself undermine his version of events. He observes — rather bizarrely — that anti-Communists sought to kill Communists but rejects the claim that 'thousands of *kyais*' were killed at Madiun, 'because there was no point in Communists killing anti-Communists'.⁴⁴ Soemarsono's book is most significant not for what it says about Madiun but for the angry reaction it inspired after publication, which is covered in Chapter 7 below.

On the Islamic side, the concept of *jihad* (Holy War) would certainly have been in the minds of many activists. Saifuddin Zuhri recalled that the great *pesantrens* of Central and East Java became centres of military training during the Revolution — schools such as Tebuireng, Tambakberas, Denanyar and Peterongan near Jombang; Lirboyo, Jampes and Bendo in Kediri; and Jamsaren, Jenengan, Krapyak, Tegalreja and others in Central Java. Surrounded by PKI forces, he wrote, 'the *pesantrens* Gontor and Tremas ... were forced to set out on the path of Holy War (*berjihad*)'.⁴⁵ The Minister of Religion at the time of the Madiun uprising, the NU leader Ky. H. Masykur, gave a speech in Yogyakarta in which he denounced the uprising as being against religion.⁴⁶ Masyumi as an organisation shared this view and called for Holy War. Ann Swift observes,

While the PKI 'terror' was well reported in the press, Masyumi counter-terror was not, although the existence of this 'terror and counter-terror' as he termed it, was admitted by Hatta in a radio broadcast on November 17. ... It appears that some indiscriminate anti-*abangan* killing may have taken place, although most seems to have taken the form of rounding up PKI leaders, giving them a summary trial, and executing them. ... Most PKI members, however, were simply imprisoned. Killings on the scale of 1965 [to be discussed later in this book] do not seem to have

⁴⁴ Soemarsono, *Revolusi Agustus: Kesaksian seorang pelaku sejarah* (ed. and translit. Komisi Tulisan Soemarsono di Eropa; intro. Wilson. [Jakarta:] Hasta Mitra, 2008); quotation from p. 263. See also Hersri Setiawan, *Negara Madiun? Kesaksian Soemarsono pelaku perjuangan* ([Jakarta?] Forum Studi Perubahan dan Peradaban, 2002).

⁴⁵ Saifuddin Zuhri, *Berangkat dari pesantren*, p. 358.

⁴⁶ Nasution, *Sekitar perang kemerdekaan*, vol. 8, p. 258.

taken place on either side, perhaps because Madiun did, on the whole, remain a confrontation between opposing troops rather than the civilian population.⁴⁷

Madiun left a legacy of enhanced *santri-abangan* antipathy that was now reified and intensified by political party competition. The Islamic Communism seen in Java in the 1920s was inconceivable after the Revolution. Communism and Islam were now seen as utterly incompatible. In the political competition of the coming years, parties inspired by Islam and representing a *santri* constituency were implacably opposed to PKI and its *abangan* constituency. As a legacy of Madiun, the army was also now utterly opposed to PKI, which it saw as having attempted to stab the Revolution in the back just when it was most at risk of being reconquered by the Dutch. PNI was left in an ambiguous position in this contest. Its leaders and *abangan* constituents found little that was attractive in Masyumi's presumably Islamising agendas but they had also been targets of PKI violence. The following years would find PNI tacking in changing winds, as did the other parties, but with less clarity in terms of either ideology or ultimate objectives.

Madiun did not, however, bring the army and Masyumi closer together, even though both were enemies of PKI. For 1948 also saw the outbreak of the West Java-based rebellion known as *Darul Islam*, led by the Javanese mystic and Hizbullah leader S.M. Kartosoewirjo. He was angry at the withdrawal of the Republican Siliwangi Division from West Java in February 1948 as a consequence of the *Renville* agreement with the Dutch of the previous month, so in May 1948 Kartosoewirjo declared the foundation of the *Negara Islam Indonesia* (the Indonesian Islamic State), commonly referred to as the *Darul Islam* rebellion (from Arabic *dar al-Islam*, territory or house of Islam). *Darul Islam* continued in West Java — and later won support elsewhere in the archipelago as well — until Kartosoewirjo's capture and execution in 1962, by which time it had become an exercise as much in brigandage as Islamist piety. To the military and other leaders of the Republic, this was the Islamist equivalent to PKI's uprising at Madiun. As Ruth McVey has pointed out, *Darul Islam* and other conflicts between Islamic irregular forces and the Indonesian army 'encouraged a tradition of army distrust of militant Islam'⁴⁸ — a distrust that was to remain powerful

⁴⁷ Swift, *Road to Madiun*, p. 76 n130.

⁴⁸ McVey, Ruth. 'The post-revolutionary transformation of the Indonesian army', *Indonesia*, no. 11 (Apr. 1971), pp. 138–9.

for nearly half-a-century until, as we will see in Chapter 6, elements in the military and Islamist militants found that they had some shared interests. At the point of independence, the army stood as a player in its own right, opposed both to Islamists and Communists, shorn of most of its Islamist elements after *Darul Islam* and of its leftist elements after Madiun, distrustful of civilian politicians in general and above all committed to itself as the embodiment and sole guarantor of the Republic of Indonesia.

The Revolution came to a successful end in 1949 with the independence of Indonesia, accepted by the Dutch and recognised internationally. For ethnic Javanese as for all Indonesians, this was a great triumph. The social consequences of the war and Revolution period, however, were pregnant with risks for the future. For all its gaps and inadequacies, the surviving evidence suggests strongly that Javanese society was more polarised than ever in 1949. *Santri* and *abangan* were more divided from each other than before and this division was again politicised as it had been earlier in the century. Now, however, that polarisation and politicisation had an even greater impact for having been inscribed in blood. The Japanese occupation and the Revolution left bitter memories of social conflicts, which would soon be further enhanced by the increasingly polarised and volatile politics of the early years of independence.

CHAPTER 4

The first freedom experiment: *Aliran* politics and Communist opposition to Islamisation, 1950–66

The period of liberal democracy and the subsequent ‘Guided Democracy’ period (from the late 1950s to 1965) were characterised by what is known as *aliran* politics. The term *aliran* is found in both Javanese and Indonesian in closely related meanings. In Javanese it means a channel for diverting water, which also acts as a sort of boundary marker in a rice-field; in Indonesian, it means more generally a current or stream. Ruth McVey’s authoritative account of *aliran* is as follows:

a ‘current’ or ‘stream’ of ideological-cultural identification, [which] was an important concept in Indonesian politics from 1945 to 1965. The term refers to divisions in Javanese society, principally along the lines of observant Muslim *santri* and Javanist *abangan*, groups that were mobilised around political parties and their satellite mass organisations. These associations provided an environment for their adherents’ social activities and segregated them from competing communities. The distinctions on which the *aliran* rested were not those of formal religion, language, or territory but rather degrees of Islamic observance, and so their boundaries were fixed by custom and organisational affiliation rather than more permanent markers. ...

The parliamentary period of 1950–9 saw the full flowering of communal identification as the basis of politics. The *abangan* position was represented primarily by the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), which reflected the aristocratic *priyayi* values of *abangan* high culture and its conservative following, and the Communist PKI, whose lower-class appeal ate away increasingly at the PNI’s peasant base. The *santri*

were shared between the Masyumi, which was Modernist ... and the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which represented the pious of rural Java. ... Among the *abangan* Javanese, political stalemate and economic privation led to a steady advance of the Communists.¹

These politicised *aliran* inflamed *santri*-*abangan* relationships and made PKI and (to a lesser extent) PNI into formidable opponents to the Islamisation projects of the *santri* side.

The *santri*-*abangan* balance

Before considering the history of *aliran* politics in the 1950s and early 1960s, however, we should try to assess the balance of numbers between the two sides of Javanese society. This is a difficult task, for even though Javanese villagers might have been confident about whether they or their neighbours should be classified as *santri* or *abangan*, for outside analysts there are many grey areas and absolutely no social surveys that tell us anything reliable on the matter. So we must make some educated guesses. We may note the data cited by B.J. Boland suggesting very low levels of *santri* observance in the 1960s: that in Central Javanese villages 0–15 per cent of the people prayed; in 1967 only 14 per cent of the people of Yogyakarta paid *zakat* and in Central Java only 2 per cent observed the fast.² But these are just snapshots and the actual basis of the statistics is not clear.

We may employ data from Central and East Java to support very rough estimates of what percentage of the population should be regarded as *santris* in the early 1950s. Of the five pillars of Islamic orthopraxy — reciting the confession of faith (*Shahada*), praying in the direction of Mecca five times a day, giving alms (*zakat*), fasting in the month of Ramadan and undertaking the pilgrimage to Mecca (*hajj*) for those who were able to do so — it is only *zakat* that is useful to us in assessing how many people were *santris* in the 1950s. We cannot know whether someone who recites the *Shahada* is truly devout, cannot know whether a person who claims to pray or to fast really does so, and know that going on the *hajj* is a function of financial resources as well as of piety. Since, however, most people can pay the modest amounts of rice expected of them as *zakat*, these payments are an indicator of how many observant *santris* there were. There is, however, a complication to be

¹ R.T. McVey, 'Aliran', in Gudrun Krämer *et al.* (eds), *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (3rd ed.; Leiden: E.J. Brill; appearing in fascicules).

² B.J. Boland, *The struggle of Islam in modern Indonesia* (VKI vol. 59; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 186.

noted in that evidently many *abangan* villagers also paid *zakat* — not out of piety, but from a sense of village solidarity and sympathy for the deserving poor, and often as a part of the whole village's observation of the festivities at the end of the fasting month. So we must regard the number who paid *zakat* as a kind of maximum figure for the number of *santris*, recognising that *abangan*, too, were amongst *zakat* payers.

We have two sets of figures that are of some use. From the Ministry of Religion we have data on the number of people who paid *zakat fitrah* (the alms due at the end of the fasting month) in 1954 across Central and East Java and Yogyakarta (an administratively separate Special District). *Zakat fitrah* would have been paid by the head of a household, but a family's *fitrah* obligation is based on the number of people in the entire household, including babies. It is evident that the figures for donors listed in the 1954 *zakat fitrah* payment figures reflect such a calculation and thus represent the total population of *fitrah*-paying households, rather than just the number of household heads who paid.³ We do not really know, however, how comprehensive the Ministry's figures are. From a survey taken in Indonesia in 2004, we learn that at that time 45 per cent of Muslims claimed that they paid *zakat fitrah* directly to beneficiaries (which could include, for example, needy family members, neighbours or *kyais*) rather than through more formal organisations.⁴ So if we guess — and it can only be a guess — that a similar portion paid *fitrah* directly in 1954 and that such payments were not captured by the Ministry figures, then we should multiply the reported figures by 1.8 to get an estimate of the total *fitrah*-paying population. We must accept, as noted above, that many *abangan* Javanese also paid *zakat fitrah*; on the other hand, *santris* were probably more aware of correct Islamic practice and were thus more likely to pay their *fitrah* through mosques and prayer houses rather than giving it out individually — and because of this, their donations are more likely to appear in the Ministry figures. If that is so, then the *fitrah*-payers who were not captured in the Ministry of Religion figures used below are more likely to have been *abangan* than *santri*. Thus, we may proceed cautiously with this data.⁵

³ Comparing the number of donors listed in the *Daftar statistik Zakat Fitrah* sources in n8 below with the amount of rice which was given shows that the rice donations were just over 2 kg per head, approximately the *fitrah* amount expected for each member of a family.

⁴ Amelia Fauzia, 'Faith and the state: A history of Islamic philanthropy in Indonesia' (PhD thesis, University of Melbourne, 2008), p. 221.

⁵ I am grateful to Dr Amelia Fauzia for her help in trying to unravel what this *fitrah* data may be able to tell us.

To understand this as a percentage of the population, we also need Java population data for the time, but there are none. There was no census in Indonesia between 1930 and 1961. If, however, we assume that population growth in Java between 1954 and 1961 returned to the level of the 1920s for all of Java and Madura (1.73 per cent per annum),⁶ then working backwards from the 1961 figure we can arrive at a population estimate for 1954 of 90 per cent of the 1961 figure.⁷ All of these assumptions and guesses yield the following calculations.

Table 3 Population, payment of *zakat fitrah* and estimate of *santri* percentage of the population, mid-1950s⁸

Region	A Population (1961)	B A x 0.9 (= estimated population 1954)	C No. of <i>zakat fitrah</i> contributors (1954)	D C/B (%)	E D x 1.8 (= estimated maximum % of <i>santris</i> in population)
Central Java	7,753,570	6,987,213	374,896	5.4	9.7
Yogyakarta	2,231,062	2,007,986	70,399	3.5	6.3
East Java	11,177,595	10,059,835	359,637	3.6	6.5
TOTAL	21,162,227	19,046,004	804,932	4.2	7.6

For comparison, we can look ahead to the outcome of the 1955 elections in Central and East Java. By this time — as will be seen below — NU stood as a separate party, having split bitterly from Masyumi in 1952. The latter thus became a Modernist and largely urban-based party, with most of its strength in non-Javanese parts of Indonesia. The 1955 national elections were free and fair, the first such national elections in Indonesian history, and

⁶ *Volkstelling 1930*, vol. 2, p. 12.

⁷ This is consistent with — and probably rests on the same calculation as — the estimates reported in Widjojo Nitiasastro, *Population trends in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 126.

⁸ Based on *Sensus penduduk 1961: Penduduk desa Jawa*, vols 2–3 (Yogyakarta: Pusat Penelitian dan Studi Kependudukan, Universitas Gadjah Mada, and Biro Pusat Statistik, 1980); Djawatan Urusan Agama, Bagian ‘D’ (Ibadah Sosial), *Daftar statistik Zakat Fitrah Propinsi Djawa Tengah th. 1954*; idem, *Daftar statistik Zakat Fitrah Propinsi Djawa Timur th. 1954*; idem, *Daftar statistik Zakat Fitrah D.I. Jogjakarta dan Prop. Sum. Selatan th. 1954* (these latter documents all in typescript).

the last for 44 years. In assessing the results, we again must accept that some — perhaps, in fact, many — *abangan* Javanese still voted for NU in 1955, probably out of respect for the *kyais* who led it, even though they themselves were no *santris*. This is confirmed by the several hundred thousand voters, particularly in East Java, who — as will be seen below — switched support from *santri* parties to *abangan* parties (especially PKI) in the 1957 regional elections, as *aliran* boundaries were hardening. So again, seeing these 1955 election outcomes in terms of *aliran* can give us a rough estimate of a theoretical maximum percentage of Javanese who might have been *santris*.

Table 4 1955 national election outcomes for the ‘big four’ parties in Central and East Java⁹

Party	<i>Aliran</i> identity	% of total vote
NU	<i>Santri</i>	30
Masyumi	<i>Santri</i>	12
<i>Santri</i> party sub-total		42
PKI	<i>Abangan</i>	27
PNI	<i>Abangan</i>	32
<i>Abangan</i> party sub-total		59

Such data cannot give us very robust results, but it seems reasonable enough to conclude that *santris* were in a minority among Javanese in the 1950s. Tables 6 and 7 below include the breakdown of the 1955 voting patterns across Central and East Java. It will be seen there that the *santri* parties won only 33 per cent of the ‘big four’ vote in Central Java and Yogyakarta in 1955, and 49 per cent in East Java. If we were to guess that perhaps 10 per cent of NU’s 1955 vote came from people who were themselves *abangan* in their personal life, then NU’s vote across Central and East Java would drop to around 25 per cent and the *santri* voter total would be reduced to under 40 per cent. As we will see in the outcomes of the 1957 provincial elections below, these are not unreasonable guesses. Taking the *zakat* figures and assuming that a portion of NU’s vote in 1955 came from people who were in fact *abangan*, we might think that something between 10 and 40 per cent of Javanese were pious, observant *santris* in the mid-1950s

⁹ See the sources in n55 below.

and about 60–90 per cent were *abangans*. By the time we get to the end of this book, we will still not have any really reliable social surveys, but we will see those percentages evidently reversed, and *aliran* itself largely dead and buried as a political phenomenon.

Given the minority status of *santri* Javanese, it is not surprising that when Clifford Geertz and his colleagues worked at Pare (near Kediri) in the early 1950s, it was possible for Geertz to make an extraordinary observation that, only a few decades later, would become inconceivably wrong-headed:

It is very hard, given his tradition and his social structure, for a Javanese to be a ‘real Moslem’. ... The otherness, awfulness and majesty of God, the intense moralism, the rigorous concern with doctrine, and the intolerant exclusivism which are so much a part of Islam are very foreign to the traditional outlook of the Javanese.¹⁰

It is one of the aims of this book to assess why judgments such as that — which were consistent with observed social phenomena of the time — were so rapidly rendered untrue by social change. Politics is an important part of that story.

The pilgrimage to Mecca (the *hajj*) continued to be an important way of maintaining one’s sense of Islamic identity and was observed by Javanese *santris* and other Indonesian Muslims, but it is notable that the number of people going on the *hajj* in the 1950s from Javanese-speaking areas — as seen in Table 5 below — was significantly lower than before World War II. In 1914 there were 10,006 pilgrims departing from Javanese-speaking areas and Madura,¹¹ and in 1921 there were 15,036, although those were atypically large numbers. More generally, in the years for which we have data over 1913–30, the number of pilgrims from Javanese-speaking areas and Madura averaged about 8,400 per year and never fell below about 5,000.¹² Although the 1950s were times of little prosperity in Java, it is difficult to explain the post-war drop in *hajj* departures on the basis of declining prosperity among *santris*, for the 1920s and 1930s were probably even worse in this respect. We may therefore wonder whether these numbers reflect an actual diminution in the number of Javanese who were sufficiently devout to undertake the *hajj*,

¹⁰ Clifford Geertz, *The religion of Java* (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, Collier-Macmillan Ltd, 1960), p. 160.

¹¹ Madura was included with Javanese-speaking areas in the colonial-era data, but was usually not included after independence. The data quoted here is thus not strictly comparable, but the general pattern remains significant.

¹² Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese society*, p. 215.

that is, a sort of ‘*abanganisation*’ or even ‘de-Islamisation’, to use Wertheim’s term quoted below. It is, however, true that the all-Indonesia figures were also lower than before the war, which might support an explanation based on lower incomes across Indonesia.

Table 5 *Haji* departures from Javanese-speaking areas, 1950–8¹³

Year	C. Java	E. Java	Yogyakarta	Javanese TOTAL	(All-Indonesia total)
1950	1148	1281	35	2464	5132
1951	1146	262	N/A		2647
1952	N/A	2022	94		8706
1953	1903	2129	99	4131	11,803
1954	1606	1647	60	3313	8993
1955	1573	1584	54	3211	8777
1956	1706	2133	50	3889	9114
1957	1771	1655	N/A		11,507
1958	786	1220	31	2037	6874

***Aliran* in politics and culture and the elections of 1955–7**

We have seen how NU’s *kyais* had become politically active during the Japanese occupation and Revolution and had thus finally and completely displaced the *pangulus* as the leaders of Traditionalist Islam. But NU in the early 1950s was not a strong organisation. At heart it was a network of *kyais* and their families, linked by experiences as each others’ students or teachers, connected through marriage, centred on a few famous *pesantrens*, particularly in East Java, and — at the top of this informal hierarchy — led by the families of NU’s founding fathers from Jombang, Ky. H. Hasyim

¹³ ‘Rekapitulasi statistik djemaah haji musim haji’ (typescript document in George McT. Kahin papers, Kahin Center, Cornell University), presumably compiled from Ministry of Religion data. Different figures for 1950 and 1951 are given in Vredenburg’s analysis of the *haji*, but it should be noted that those are (as Vredenburg explains) merely the quotas approved by the Indonesian government, not the actual number of departures. See Jacob Vredenburg, ‘The haddj: Some of its features and functions in Indonesia’, *BKI* vol. 118 (1964), no. 1, pp. 111, 145 n1.

Asy'ari and Ky. H. Wahab Chasbullah.¹⁴ These families represented the 'blue bloods' of NU — a term used in the network itself. NU held up the semi-legendary 'nine saints' (*wali sanga*), who are said to have brought Islam to Java, as model bridgers of cultural boundaries. They were thought to have operated in ways that accommodated pre-Islamic Javanese ideas, whereas the Modernists of the 20th century were regarded by NU as enemies of Javanese culture. Similarly, Sufism was accepted as an orthodox aspect of Islam in NU, whereas it faced many opponents on the Modernist side. But the Modernists had been much better organisers than the Traditionalists. Whereas Muhammadiyah was a massive nation-wide organisation with several hundred thousand followers, NU had only some 51,000 followers — it is inaccurate to speak of 'members' in such a loosely structured network — and 87 branches in 1952.¹⁵

NU's *kyais* were dissatisfied with the Modernist and urban political domination of Masyumi. Ky. H. Wachid Hasyim drew a distinction between the 'clever', Western-educated Modernists and the religious experts found amongst the *kyais* in 1951:

Within the Islamic community there are two kinds of leadership groups. There is the group of political leaders who use the brand or stamp of Islam: they usually consist of clever people with Western education. The second group consists of the religious experts who really master Islamic religious knowledge widely and are called *ulama*. These have great influence among the populace and occupy greatly honoured positions.¹⁶

NU members had occupied the position of Minister of Religion almost from the beginning of the Revolution. As the ministry expanded in the early 1950s, NU followers were given most of the positions. When a new cabinet was formed in 1952, however, a Modernist was given the post of Minister of Religion. Traditionalists now saw even this treasured possession falling to their competitors for Islamic leadership, and decided that they had had

¹⁴ The lives of Hasyim Asy'ari and Wahab Chasbullah are described in Jajat Burhanudin, 'Traditional Islam and modernity: Some notes on the changing role of the *ulama* in early twentieth century Indonesia', in Azyumardi Azra, Kees van Dijk and Nico J.G. Kaptein (eds), *Varieties of religious authority: Changes and challenges in 20th century Indonesian Islam* (Singapore: International Institute for Asian Studies and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), pp. 61–6.

¹⁵ Fealy, 'Ulama and politics', pp. 107, 109.

¹⁶ Quoted in Choiratun Chisaan, *Lesbumi: Strategi politik kebudayaan* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2008), p. 99.

enough. NU withdrew from Masyumi and formed itself into a separate political party, which Wachid Hasyim led until his death in an automobile accident in 1953, at the age of only 38.¹⁷ His loss was a major blow to NU. His impeccable 'blue blood' ancestry had given him unquestioned leadership, yet he was also more modern in lifestyle than many *kyais* and thus had been more able than many of them to deal with the better-educated Modernists.¹⁸ The Masyumi-NU split left an enduring legacy, a thick layer of political animosity added to the long-standing differences in religious understandings.

The Traditionalists of NU now set about more modern activities like setting up branches and creating subsidiary organisations. In 1952 NU had only its young men's wing Ansor, the women's branch Muslimat NU (including the young women's organisation Fatayat), and the farmer's organisation Pertanu (Pertanian Nahdlatul Ulama, NU Farming). After splitting with Masyumi, NU added trade unions and organisations for veterans (both of which former Hizbullah and Sabilillah fighters joined), set up groups for male and female students and began producing its own publications, including the newspaper *Duta Masyarakat* (The People's Messenger). By the time it held its congress in 1954, it had grown to 200 branches.¹⁹ By the 1950s, young women were becoming *pesantren* students in greater numbers. It was only in 1934 that NU had formally approved education for women, although in fact there had been some initiatives taken before then. Women were far from equals to men in NU, however, for as late as 1959 they had to sit behind curtains at meetings where both men and women were present. Muhammadiyah had abandoned such a policy in 1944.²⁰

This organisational activity was a significant step in strengthening NU as an actively Islamising organisation, supporting the communal identity

¹⁷ Fealy, 'Ulama and politics', Chapter 3, covers NU's secession from Masyumi in detail.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 119.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 109, 114–5. There were some pre-war NU publications of a fairly amateur standard, but *Duta Masyarakat* was something new: a daily with significant political content. On the earlier 'embryonic' publications, see Andrée Feillard, 'From handling water in a glass to coping with an ocean: Shifts in religious authority in Indonesia', in Azyumardi Azra, Kees van Dijk and Nico J.G. Kaptein (eds). *Varieties of religious authority: Changes and challenges in 20th century Indonesian Islam* (Singapore: International Institute for Asian Studies and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), pp. 159–60.

²⁰ Pieternella van Doorn-Harder, *Women shaping Islam: Indonesian women reading the Qur'an* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006), pp. 173–4, 208.

of the *santris*. This was not without contest from the Modernist side, of course. In Kudus, for example, the *santri* community split between Masyumi supporters and NU supporters. Modernist ideas continued to be spread there through Qur'anic study groups (*pengajian*) and were successful particularly among business people. The main entrepreneurial families of the town were mostly Modernists and Muhammadiyah supporters. The town also, of course, split on political *aliran* lines: West Kudus, where the grave of the local *wali* is found, was dominated by Masyumi whereas in East Kudus, PKI was strongest. Traditionalism was stronger among the peasantry and public servants.²¹

Islamisation of both the Modernist and Traditionalist style, however, encountered heightened opposition as *aliran* politics strengthened. Especially in Central and East Java, Feith observed,

party and party-related organisational activity ... spread from small towns to surrounding villages. ... Each major party was the centre of an interrelated set of voluntary organizations — women's, youth, veterans', labor, peasant, religious, educational, cultural and sporting organizations — with the whole complex forming an *aliran* or political stream.²²

A process of polarisation that can be traced from about the middle of the 19th century thus became sharper and potentially more violent. Writing in the mid-1950s, Wertheim commented,

If there is a process of de-Islamisation going on in the urban and rural society of Java there would on the other hand seem to be a deepening Islamic consciousness among those who take their religious duties to heart. Undoubtedly this polarization process, reinforced by the political party system, has been disruptive for the village community in large parts of Java.²³

The most active and successful political party was PKI, which adopted practices that it dubbed 'small but effective' to win grass-roots support among the *abangan*. Farmers were supported through the distribution of agricultural implements, seeds and fertilisers; village festivities were assisted; irrigation works, wells, roads, bridges and other public facilities

²¹ Castles, *Religion, politics and economic behavior*, pp. 45, 57, 67–8.

²² Herbert Feith, *The decline of constitutional democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 125.

²³ W.F. Wertheim, *Indonesian society in transition: A study of social change* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve Ltd, 1964), p. 230. The first edition of this book was published in 1956.

were improved; basic education and literacy were promoted; village sporting teams were supported; those who had suffered from natural disasters were helped and so on. As the election campaigning heated up from about 1953, such actions and associated political mobilisation intensified.²⁴ PKI worked particularly hard to develop the Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI, Indonesian Peasants' Front) as a PKI organisation.²⁵ By 1957 nearly 70 per cent of BTI's membership was in Central and East Java, where it claimed 2.3 million members.²⁶ Hindley noted,

Because PNI has largely relied for winning popular support on the elite of government officials, village officials, and schoolteachers, and, despite much talk to the contrary, is clearly a party of 'haves', PKI and its mass organizations have had a virtual monopoly in channeling whatever social protest or aspirations there have been among the poorer *abangan* population. PKI has gone further and, in many *abangan* areas, deliberately exploited the *abangan* fear and dislike of the *santris* in order to win support.²⁷

This animosity was of course reciprocated, with some *santris* denouncing their political opponents as *kafirs* and a group of religious teachers in West Java even saying that PKI members should be denied burial as Muslims.²⁸

Campaigning for the elections of the mid-1950s was second only to the Madiun incident of 1948 in deepening *santri-abangan* animosities. It was just at this time that Clifford Geertz, Robert Jay and their colleagues did their field work in 'Modjokuto', a pseudonym for Pare (near Kediri). Their publications give us invaluable insights into this area of East Java in 1953–4,

²⁴ See Feith, *Decline of constitutional democracy*, esp. pp. 353–4; Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951–1963* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), p. 174.

²⁵ In the early years of independence PNI also sought to control BTI at local level, but lost out to the Communists; see Soegijanto Padmo's introduction to Fadjar Pratikno, *Gerakan rakyat kelaparan: Gagalnya politik radikalisisasi petani* (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Media Pressindo, Yayasan Adikarya Ikapi and The Ford Foundation, 2000), p. xix.

²⁶ Hindley, *Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 167.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 12. It may be noted that Hindley's research covered the period discussed here and his fieldwork was done in 1959–60, i.e., before the chaos of Guided Democracy, the subsequent Soeharto era and the latter's attendant re-rememberings of the past.

²⁸ Feith, *Decline of constitutional democracy*, p. 357.

when they observed hardening *santri*–*abangan* identities and animosities. Jay noted ‘a religious schism that cuts straight through local society’²⁹ and the rapidly advancing nature of that schism over the months of his fieldwork. He saw how each side was progressively ridding itself of the styles and rituals of the other. Where *santri* women had usually but not always worn the headscarf (*kerudung*) and *abangan* women had sometimes but usually not worn it, progressively the *kerudung* was becoming an essential symbol of *santri* identity, always worn by *santris* and never by *abangan* women. Stories about the Madiun episode were part of the hardening boundaries, as *santri* communities saw the PKI reviving and feared that they would again become the targets of Communist violence. As the 1955 elections approached, the most important consideration in voters casting their ballot was whether a candidate was *santri* or *abangan*.³⁰ The *santris* in Jay’s area opposed the veneration of village-founder and guardian spirits adhered to by the *abangan* side, and indeed these cults were reduced or suppressed in *santri* villages. The boundaries hardened so much that, by the end of their fieldwork, even Jay and his wife were finding it difficult to move between the two communities, being suspected by each side of sympathy towards the other.³¹

Clifford Geertz also described Pare in the pre-election period. He noted *inter alia* the presence of Permai, a ‘vigorously anti-Moslem politico-religious cult, ... a fusion of Marxist politics with *abangan* religious patterns’ in a village where the *santris* mostly supported Masyumi and the *abangans* followed Permai.³² The organisation’s name means beautiful or charming, and was an acronym derived from the full name Persatuan Rakyat Marhaen Indonesia (roughly, Indonesian Proletarian Union).³³ Permai not only promoted leftist politics, but provided rituals for ordinary *abangan* villagers, divination, mystical doctrines, supernatural healing, and so on. ‘Charging that Islam is a foreign import, unsuited to the needs and values of the Javanese,

²⁹ Robert R. Jay, *Javanese villagers: Social relations in rural Modjokuto* (Cambridge, MA, and London: The RMIT Press, 1969), pp. 4–5.

³⁰ Jay, *Religion and politics*, pp. 28–9, 55, 71, 74–5, 79, 85.

³¹ Jay, *Javanese villagers*, pp. 17–9, 324, 329.

³² The following account rests on the essay ‘Ritual and social change: A Javanese example’ in Clifford Geertz, *The interpretation of cultures: Selected essays* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1973), pp. 151–69.

³³ *Marhaen* is a piece of Sukarnoist rhetoric, representing the ordinary, naturally wise rural proletarian; a turgid explication by Sajuti Melik in 1963 is available in Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (eds), *Indonesian political thinking, 1945–1965* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 174–7.

the cult [urged] a return to “pure” and “original” Javanese beliefs’ — an echo of the anti-Islamic ideas mentioned in Chapter 1 above, which appeared from the 1870s particularly in the Kediri area, where Geertz was working. A crisis erupted in mid-1954, however, when a Permai leader’s nephew died and the religious leader (the *modin*) refused to officiate at the funeral on the grounds that a follower of Permai was not a Muslim. If, however, the Permai leader were to sign a statement saying that he was a believing Muslim and wanted the boy buried as a Muslim, the *modin* would then officiate — which produced rage on the part of the Permai leader. In the midst of this crisis, ‘an old, traditionalistic man of about eighty’ muttered to Geertz, ‘Everything these days is a political problem; you can’t even die any more but what it becomes a political problem’. Eventually the dead boy’s father asked for a Muslim burial and ‘the *santris*, somewhat gleefully, now chanted their prayers over the corpse’. By the time Geertz left his fieldwork site some four months later, ‘the tensions between the *santris* and *abangans* had increased, and everyone wondered what would happen the next time a death occurred in a Permai family’.

When a Permai leader was quoted in the press as having claimed that Muhammad was a false prophet, a Masyumi leader prophetically said to a meeting in Kediri,

Muslims are patient, but they won’t be patient forever. You had better realise that they will take only so much and then they will fight. You must consider that your actions may bring about the flow of blood, that if you allow these insults to Islam to continue we may end up in civil war.³⁴

Permai was, however, an idiosyncratic local-level phenomenon; the more important representative of anti-*santri* politics was PKI.

We should remember that the bitter election campaigning of the mid-1950s took place in a society where most people were still illiterate. The government and non-government organisations were investing in education and achieving great advances over the lamentable record of the colonial period, but there was a long way to go. By the time of the 1961 census, 59.2 per cent of males over the age of 10 in Java were literate (in any character) but only 32.6 per cent of females, for an overall literacy figure of 45.5 per cent.³⁵ In such an environment, newspapers and other publications had

³⁴ Quoted in Geertz, *Religion of Java*, p. 364.

³⁵ Widjojo Nitisastro, *Population trends*, p. 191.

increasing influence, but many voters were more motivated by rumours, superstitions, slogans and demagoguery. There was plenty of the latter.

Brawls, threats, slander, kidnappings and some killings occurred during the campaigning. There were false rumours that food and wells had been poisoned. *Santri-abangan* fears were manipulated both in the countryside and in the towns: the *abangan* feared that a Masyumi victory — which many people expected — would lead to them being persecuted, while on the *santri* side it was rumoured that a PKI victory would bring with it the murder of *kyais*. There were predictions of supernatural events and there was good business in selling amulets and potions to provide invulnerability. Issues such as the acceptability of gambling or of various forms of popular theatre divided the *santri* and *abangan* sides of politics.³⁶ NU persuaded young women students that the 1955 campaign was a life-or-death struggle. One was told, as she later recalled, 'If you do not help NU win ... the Communist Party will win, and you will end up being hacked to death'.³⁷

NU used Friday sermons for political propaganda, while PKI used popular theatre for this purpose. One of Bambang Pranowo's informants from a village near Mount Merbabu recalled how PKI put on *kethoprak* performances in which *kyais* and *hajis* were insulted and equated with landlords.³⁸ Similarly, Surabaya's famous *ludruk* theatre attracted a basically pro-PKI proletarian audience, portraying the life of the poor and mocking the elite in a style that Peacock describes as 'wildly comical and often gross', featuring 'aging transvestites and hare-lipped clowns' before an audience including 'whores, thieves and gamblers'. But *ludruk* was 'no pure Marxist trumpet' — it was too bawdy and ribald, too iconoclastic for that.³⁹

A valuable source on the campaign period is a 1956 book mainly by one Soekirno, then Acting Head of the Information Service of Semarang city, about whom we know nothing other than that he was evidently of a leftist political persuasion, perhaps PKI. He wrote that social conditions in Semarang — and, of course, more widely in Java — were poor, as an

³⁶ Feith, *Decline of constitutional democracy*, pp. 360–2, 427–9; idem, *The Indonesian elections of 1955* (Ithaca, NY: Interim Reports Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1957), pp. 16, 46–8.

³⁷ Quoted in van Doorn-Harder, *Women shaping Islam*, p. 219.

³⁸ Bambang Pranowo, *Islam factual: Antara tradisi dan relasi kuasa* (Yogyakarta: Adicita Karya Nusa, 1998), p. 30.

³⁹ James L. Peacock, *Rites of modernization: Symbolic and social aspects of Indonesian proletarian drama* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 25, 28.

imperialist and capitalist bloc opposed Communism. He wrote of social conflicts, economic problems for the masses, corruption, unstable prices, falling currency values and shortages of housing. Soekirno went on,

A moral crisis raged everywhere. ... At the level of the masses it was clear that they had lost hold of their spiritual compass (*pegangan jiwa*): *Kebatinan* [indigenous Javanese spiritual cults] and black magic teachings arose widely among the populace Evils such as banditry, robbery, deceit, gambling, prostitution and murder were difficult to combat. The same was true of armed gangs that caused great losses to the people and the nation. Banditry, killings and burning people's houses still just carried on in the villages. Fanaticism — especially regarding Islam — increased dreadfully.⁴⁰

Parties were identified by their symbols on posters, billboards and banners: PKI's hammer and sickle, PNI's buffalo in a triangle, Masyumi's crescent moon and star, and NU's globe surrounded by a looped cord and stars. These were frequently defaced by opponents. They also inspired claims, counter-claims and political jokes that were easy for illiterates to grasp. In voting, party symbols on the ballot paper were to be punctured. Masyumi urged voters to puncture its crescent moon and star, for that was what illuminated all of the *ummah* (the Islamic community); opponents countered with the accusation that punching the crescent moon and star would plunge the world into darkness. NU supporters said to voters that they lived in the world and the world was round, and thus if not tied it could wobble, so they should choose the picture of the globe secured with the cord around it. Or that NU's symbol was not a human creation, but was received in the form of a divine inspiration. In the case of PKI, poor voters were urged to pierce the hammer-and-sickle because they needed or hoped to pierce (i.e., plow) a piece of land.⁴¹ Soekirno's account of the campaigning in Semarang no doubt reflected developments more widely in Java in 1954–5. Parties created slogans and songs to remind supporters how to vote.⁴² A simple question-and-response PNI song in Javanese went as follows:

⁴⁰ Soekirno *et al.*, '*Semarang*' (Semarang: Djawatan Penerangan Kota Besar Semarang [1956]), pp. 138–40.

⁴¹ Soekirno, '*Semarang*', pp. 144–5. Some of the material in the Soekirno book is repeated in Soetomo (ed.), *Biografi R.M.T.P. Mangunnegoro, Gubernur Jawa Tengah periode 1954–1958* ([Semarang: Pemerintah Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I Jawa Tengah, Proyek Inventarisasi Sejarah dan Peninggalan Purbakala Daerah Jawa Tengah 1991/1992), pp. 47–51.

⁴² The following songs are from Soekirno, '*Semarang*', pp. 176–80.

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. <i>Pilihanmu apa</i>
<i>Aku kandhana</i>
<i>Pilihanku siji</i>
<i>Ora liya mung PNI</i> | ‘What is your vote?
Do tell me.’
‘My choice is just one,
None other than PNI.’ |
| 2. <i>Aku apa kena</i>
<i>Melu milih kurwi</i>
<i>Ya lurwih utama</i>
<i>Yen kok pilih siji iki</i> | ‘Can I
Follow in that vote?’
‘Yes, that would be the very best,
If you vote for that one.’ |
| 3. <i>Tengerane apa</i>
<i>Aku durung ngerti</i>
<i>Banteng segi tiga</i>
<i>Ngujung drajad bangsa</i>
<i>Partai kang sejati</i>
<i>Pembela Ibu Pertiwi</i> | ‘What is its symbol?
I do not yet know.’
‘It is the buffalo in the triangle
That builds up the standing of the people.
The party that truly
Defends the Motherland.’ |

Masyumi of course emphasised its Islamic character in its campaign ditties, the following one being in Indonesian (reflecting Masyumi’s Modernism, its urban base and its appeal to non-Javanese voters):

<i>Bismillah sudah mari memilih</i> <i>Gambar bulan bintang putih</i> <i>Atas dasar hitam nan bersih</i> <i>Tanda gambar Masyumi</i> <i>Partai berjasa nusa dan bangsa</i> <i>Demi setia agama</i>	In the name of God we are about to vote For the crescent moon and star of white On a base that is black and clean: The symbol of Masyumi, The party that serves nation and people In the name of religious faithfulness.
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NU repeated stock Islamic phrases in their Javanese version and employed the Javanese calendrical system in appealing to its Traditionalist flock:

<i>Allah huma sali salim alla</i> <i>Sayidina wa maulana</i> <i>Muhammadin</i> ⁴³	O God, give blessings and salvation to Our Lord and Master Muhammad.
<i>Tanggal 13 Sapar tahun ngajeng</i> <i>Kemis Legi aja lali nyoblos</i> <i>jagad-gad</i>	On the 13 th of Sapar next year, On the day Kemis-Legi, ⁴⁴ don’t forget to pierce the globe.

Platforms were clear enough, but it is doubtful whether they actually had much resonance among voters whose choices in many cases were based on whether a candidate was *santri* or *abangan*. NU presented itself as the

⁴³ A slightly Javanised spelling of the Arabic *Allahumma Salli wa Sallam ‘ala Sayyidina wa Mawлана Mubammadin*.

⁴⁴ The days of the Javanese seven- and five-day weeks respectively.

party of Sunni Muslims — the *ahlu sunnah wal-jamaah*.⁴⁵ Its platform as recorded in Semarang was Islamist: ‘to implement *shari’a* law with reference to one of the four Sunni Schools of Law ...; to implement Islamic law among the people’.⁴⁶ Masyumi was just as blunt: it wanted to ‘carry out the teachings and laws of Islam in life for the blessings of God, based upon the Islamic nature of an Islamic state’. PKI’s platform was predictable: ‘to go in the direction of a Communist society, on the theories of Marx, Lenin and Mao Zedong; to unite the working class, peasants, lower bourgeoisie and democratic elements to oppose imperialism and capitalism’. PNI, less flamboyantly, sought ‘to perfect the sovereignty’ of Indonesia, bring about social justice, and suchlike.⁴⁷

More important than official platforms amongst less sophisticated voters were claims such as NU’s that a vote for it meant a path to heaven, that it was like going on Holy War. At the Friday sermon, some *kyais* told their audiences that it was compulsory for Muslims to vote for NU.⁴⁸ Public meetings were held to which sympathisers were trucked in large numbers. There opposing parties were denounced and followers were promised prosperity, portions of land for farmers, a better life for workers, lower prices for necessities, and so on.⁴⁹ Village headmen pressured people to vote for PNI while PKI village guards urged support for the Communist Party.⁵⁰ At village level, PKI and its peasant front BTI emphasised that the Communists would distribute land to the landless and even sometimes promised land to everyone who voted for PKI. Such ‘sweeping general promises’ led to ‘acute

⁴⁵ Arabic *ahl al-sunna wa’l-jama’a*: the followers of the Prophetic Tradition and the Community, i.e., the Sunnis.

⁴⁶ NU’s national-level ‘Struggle program’ (*Program perjuangan*), developed c. 1954–5, was a bit more ambiguous. It said that the party ‘upholds (*menegakkan*) Islamic *shari’a* in a principled and consistent fashion following one of the four Schools of Law ... and struggles for its implementation as the living law (*Hukum-Hidup*) that develops within society. ... The Nahdlatul Ulama party endeavours to bring into being a national state based on Islam that guarantees and protects basic human rights in the freedom to embrace a religion.’ See Aboebakar Atjeh (ed.), *Sedjarah hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim dan karangan tersiar* (Djakarta: Panitya Buku Peringatan Alm. KHA Wahid Hasjim, 1957), pp. 494–5. I am grateful to Dr Greg Fealy for locating this document and advising me about its date.

⁴⁷ Soekirno, ‘Semarang’, pp. 187–8.

⁴⁸ Fealy, ‘Ulama and politics’, pp. 143–5.

⁴⁹ Soekirno, ‘Semarang’, pp. 149–51.

⁵⁰ Feith, *Decline of Constitutional democracy*, pp. 432–3.

social tensions, ... particularly in Java as election day approached'. According to PKI propaganda, PNI was the party of the elite *priyayi*, Masyumi and NU were parties of the *santri* but PKI was the party of the people.⁵¹ The Party tried to avoid seeming completely anti-religious while positioning itself as the party of the *abangan*, but the *santri* side emphasised the atheistic nature of Communism.⁵²

PKI was also denounced by PNI and NU as *Partai Kriminal Indonesia*: the Criminal Party of Indonesia, which would steal your land. NU supporters called PKI followers *kafirs*. Communists denounced NU people as *wong Nadhab Udan*: people standing with their hands held palms upward to catch the rain, both an accusation of passivity and a mocking of one of the prayer positions. Masyumi said that it faced two enemies, both called PKI: the Partai Komunis Indonesia (i.e., the real PKI) and the Partai Kyai Indonesia (i.e., NU).⁵³ Villages split. As in the Kediri area studied by Jay, Geertz and their colleagues, so also in the *pasisir* area of Pemalang, for example, relatively well-off *santri* farmers and traders in one hamlet supported NU, relatively poor *abangan* villagers in the adjacent hamlet supported PKI and in a third, mixed, hamlet PNI was dominant.⁵⁴

Despite this social, religious, cultural and political polarisation, however, when polling finally took place in September 1955, it was peaceful. There were no significant episodes of conflict; nor did the sky darken or black magic prevail. To this surprise were added other and more significant ones. We have already noted above in Table 4 that in the Javanese heartland of Central and East Java, and looking only at the 'big four' party outcomes,

⁵¹ Feith, *Indonesian elections*, p. 15. See also Bambang Pranowo, *Islam factual*, pp. 24–6; Imam Tholkhah, *Anatomi konflik politik*, p. 130.

⁵² Feith, *Decline of Constitutional democracy*, pp. 359–60. In a Yogyakarta village, Kim was later told that PKI had said that it, too, was religious, but that it supported what it called 'Javanese religion' (*agama Jawa*), while Masyumi 'equated affiliation to the PKI with a straight path to Hell'; this *agama Jawa*, however, appeared not to differ much from Traditionalist practices; Hyung-Jun Kim, *Reformist Muslims in a Yogyakarta village: The Islamic transformation of contemporary socio-religious life* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2007), pp. 60–1.

⁵³ Bambang Pranowo, *Islam factual*, pp. 28, 33, 35; this material is based on interviews from 1987 onwards.

⁵⁴ Frans Hüsken, 'Living by the sugar-mill: The people of Comal in the early twentieth century', in Hiroyoshi Kani, Frans Hüsken and Djoko Suryo (eds), *Beneath the smoke of the sugar-mill: Javanese coastal communities during the twentieth century* (Yogyakarta: AKATIGA and Gadjah Mada University Press, 2001), p. 257.

PNI was the strongest with 32 per cent of the vote.⁵⁵ Given its Sukarnoist and *priyayi* character, PNI had been expected to do well. The major surprises from this election for Javanese were three. The first was that Masyumi did so poorly in these provinces — only 12 per cent of the vote in contrast to its national share of 21 per cent and its predominance in most non-Javanese parts of Indonesia. The second was that PNI was so closely trailed by NU with 30 per cent in Central and East Java — and 18 per cent nation-wide. This dramatically increased NU's national parliamentary representation from only 8 seats to 45 and confirmed that NU was a major political player. The third surprise was that PKI did so very well, with 27 per cent of the vote in Central and East Java — and 16 per cent across all of Indonesia, giving it 39 parliamentary seats. PNI and PKI together, with their combined 59 per cent of the votes in Central and East Java, appeared to have created a serious political barrier to *santri* aspirations for further Islamisation of Javanese society through the ballot box.

Below national and provincial levels, there were many local areas in Java, particularly in East Java, where either PKI or NU was the largest party. Overall, in Central Java PNI was the largest (with 33.5 per cent of the vote) and in East Java NU was the largest (with 34.1 per cent). In both provinces, PKI was the second-largest party, with 25.8 per cent of the vote in Central Java and 23.3 per cent in East Java, but lower-level *aliran* realities were more complex. Among the 37 *Kabupaten* (regencies) and cities in Central Java, PNI gained the largest vote in 21, NU in 4 and PKI in 12, in the last case including the largest cities of Surakarta, Yogyakarta and Semarang. Among East Java's 29 *Kabupaten* and cities, PNI was the largest vote-winner in only four. NU took 11 and PKI 14, including all of the major cities: Surabaya, Madiun, Malang and Kediri. The discrepancies in votes were sometimes large. In *Kabupaten* Madiun, for example, the centre of the PKI rebellion of 1948, PNI gained 57,632 votes, Masyumi 16,518, NU 44,114, but PKI swept into the lead with 101,477. In the city of Madiun itself, PNI got 8,713 votes, Masyumi 1849, NU only 1261, and PKI the most at 18,133. In Kediri city — half a century later regarded as a great NU stronghold — the 1955 vote outcome was PNI 14,998, Masyumi 4521, NU 11,803 and another PKI victory with 23,252. In Surakarta, PNI was supported by

⁵⁵ A brief overview of the election results is in Ricklefs, *History of modern Indonesia*, pp. 286–7. Detailed analyses are available in Feith, *Decline of constitutional democracy*, pp. 434–7; Alfian, *Hasil pemilihan umum 1955 untuk Dewan perwakilan Rakjat (D.P.R.)* (Jakarta: LEKNAS, 1971; mimeo).

32,870 voters, Masyumi by 15,364, NU by a mere 1462, but PKI by 76,283, half again as much as the other three combined. In Yogyakarta — a major centre of Modernist Islam, where the headquarters of Muhammadiyah were found — the vote for PNI was 21,839, for Masyumi 18,027, for NU a paltry 2387, and for PKI 43,842. NU's domination was as great as PKI's in other places. It took a third of all the votes in Magelang and 39 per cent of the total in *Kabupaten* (not the city) of Surabaya. Madurese in East Java were solid supporters of NU. Thus, NU took 48 per cent of the total vote in heavily Madurese Probolinggo and 45 per cent of the total vote in Situbondo. In the former, PKI won only 23,583 votes against NU's 183,084 and in the latter only 8157 against NU's 109,751. In Probolinggo, NU's vote was half again as much as the other 'big four' votes combined and in Situbondo it was nearly 30 per cent more. The party completely swept the *Kabupatens* of Madura itself. Since Christianity will become a major issue later in this book, it is worth noting that in 1955 it was of next-to-no political significance. Christian-based parties won only one parliamentary seat from each of Central and East Java.⁵⁶

In the Javanese countryside, the stage was set for a period of increasing polarisation and conflict, with PKI and NU as the main political contenders. In the highly politicised *aliran* environment of the day, winners of elections can hardly be expected to have been modest in victory. And success bred more success. In some places politicians switched to parties that had done better in the polls, especially in the case of Masyumi people who crossed over to NU. This was not, however, true of PKI, whose activists were loyal and confident of ever-increasing influence. PKI was particularly successful in attracting PNI supporters and continued to build its influence among the rural poor and urban labourers.⁵⁷ The Constituent Assembly elections in December 1955 were an anticlimax but the same was not true of the subsequent regional elections.

By the time the regional elections were held in 1957–8, the national political context was in flux. Sukarno was expressing — and thus further promoting — widespread dissatisfaction with the corruption and broken promises of the parliamentary system. Regionally based rebellions were challenging the authority of the central government and the army was increasing its role in national life. The parties themselves were, in some

⁵⁶ Alfian, *Hasil Hasil pemilihan umum 1955*, pp. 12, 21–2, 80–1, 90–1.

⁵⁷ Soetomo, *Biografi Mangunnegoro*, pp. 53–4, refers to such events in the context of Pekalongan.

cases, uncertain to what extent they should defend the party system, seek to reform it or side with Sukarno in some new political structure. Nor were they certain how they should deal with the army, which no party dominated. PKI's strength in the 1955 elections was an important element in this flux, for it was now reasonable to suspect that a continuation of parliamentary democracy could end in a Communist-dominated government. At village level in Java, *aliran*-defined political, religious and social conflicts continued. In this delicate, indeed potentially explosive, environment, elections were held in nine provinces across the country in 1957–8.

In the July 1957 Central Java and Yogyakarta elections, PKI registered major gains. The results were as follows.

Table 6 1957 provincial election outcome for the 'big four' parties in Central Java and Yogyakarta compared with 1955 outcome⁵⁸

Party	<i>Aliran</i> identity	% of total vote, 1957	(% of total vote, 1955)
NU	<i>Santri</i>	23	(22)
Masyumi	<i>Santri</i>	10	(11)
<i>Santri</i> party sub-total		33	(33)
PKI	<i>Abangan</i>	37	(29)
PNI	<i>Abangan</i>	30	(38)
<i>Abangan</i> party sub-total		67	(67)

Thus, PKI was the great winner here, for it increased its vote by nearly 30 per cent over its 1955 figure (from 1,772,306 to 1,865,568, in a period when the number of voters increased by only 1.1 per cent) and gained a larger percentage of the overall vote, evidently entirely at PNI's cost. The latter shed over 20 per cent of the number of votes it had won in 1955. For its part, NU increased its vote roughly in line with the increase in voter numbers. Like PNI, Masyumi fell, with nearly 8 per cent fewer votes than in 1955. The percentage which we can regard as *santri* or *abangan* in *aliran* orientation remained stable overall.

The provincial elections in East Java also showed that PKI was increasing in strength, as can be seen in the following table.

⁵⁸ Based on Lev, *Transition to guided democracy*, pp. 92–3.

Table 7 1957 provincial election outcome for the ‘big four’ parties in East Java compared with 1955 outcome⁵⁹

Party	<i>Aliran</i> identity	% of total vote, 1957	(% of total vote, 1955)
NU	<i>Santri</i>	35	(37)
Masyumi	<i>Santri</i>	11	(12)
<i>Santri</i> party sub-total		46	(49)
PKI	<i>Abangan</i>	32	(25)
PNI	<i>Abangan</i>	22	(25)
<i>Abangan</i> party sub-total		54	(50)

Here PKI increased its vote by nearly 18 per cent over its 1955 figure: from 2,299,602 to 2,704,523, a gain of over 400,000 voters, whereas the total number who turned out to vote actually declined by nearly 5 per cent. This growth was at all other parties’ cost, for the total number of votes and the percentage share of the votes of all the other ‘big four’ parties declined, but it was mainly a case of voters shifting allegiance from NU to PKI. The percentage which we might think to have been *santri* or *abangan* in *aliran* orientation thus shifted in the *abangan* direction, with half a million more voters choosing *abangan* parties — that is to say, voting mainly for PKI — than two years before. This shift also shows us that NU’s vote in 1955 did not rest upon a solid *santri* constituency, for votes were flowing from it to PKI — 3,370,554 having voted for NU in 1955 but only 2,999,785 in 1957, a loss of over 370,000 voters. The fears of a PKI march to power were further exacerbated by the August 1957 election in mainly Sundanese West Java, where PKI rose to 24 per cent of the vote from 16 per cent in 1955.⁶⁰

Both in the national-level squabbles between political parties and in the social realities at grass-roots level, those who hoped for deeper Islamisation of Javanese society now faced a formidable opponent in the Communist Party. PKI support was increasing, PNI was losing ground to it and even NU was challenged by it — and that even in the NU heartland of East Java. In 1960 Masyumi was banned for involvement in regional rebellions, further weakening the political structures supporting the *santri* side of politics.

⁵⁹ Based on *ibid.*, pp. 94–5.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

PKI's leader D.N. Aidit (a Sumatran Malay by ethnic origin) reiterated the historical revisionism that had been part of the challenge by some Javanese to Islam for nearly a century: the idea that the last and greatest pre-Islamic kingdom of Java, Majapahit — depicted as the standard of what was truly Javanese — was destroyed in the early 16th century by the unscrupulous perfidy of the first Muslims.⁶¹ Of course he now gave this idea a veneer of Communist jargon, injecting feudalism, capitalism and contradiction. 'Moslem traders from Persia and India', he wrote, converted local Hindu lords to Islam and encouraged them to abandon their loyalty to Majapahit. The *wali sanga* then overthrew Majapahit. 'This was the result of the contradiction which had arisen between the Moslem feudal kingdoms who had become at one with commercial capital (the merchants) and the Hindu feudal kingdoms that were still completely agrarian.'⁶² We may be confident that this same theme — that the best of what was truly Javanese was destroyed by Islam, of Islamisation as a civilisational mistake — was reiterated in multiple propaganda sessions at grass-roots level.

NU sought to meet the PKI presence in all fields. To challenge PKI's women's movement Gerwani, NU sought to build up Muslimat NU and Fatayat. PKI's youth activists in Pemuda Rakyat were balanced by NU's Ansor and its uniformed militia wing Banser (from Barisan Ansor Serba Guna: Ansor All-purpose Forces) which was established in 1962. Banser combined spiritual disciplines with martial arts and a dose of beliefs in supernatural powers. NU already had its farmer's union Pertanu to counter the Communist BTI and (from 1954) Sarbumusi (Sarekat Buruh Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Labour Union) to counter PKI's union SOBSI. For higher education students, NU set up PMII (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Students' Movement), for fishermen Sernemi (Serikat Nelayan Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Fishermen's Union) and for businessmen HPMI (Himpunan Pengusaha Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Entrepreneurs' Association). A missionary organisation was set up, borrowing the Christian (originally Dutch) terminology for proselytism: Missi Islam.

Others also opposed PKI initiatives. The Party established a People's University (UNRA: Universitas Rakyat) in 1958 in Jakarta and Yogyakarta, where Party cadres, public servants and others were taught. UNRA soon

⁶¹ See Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese society*, Chapter 7 and pp. 232–3.

⁶² D.N. Aidit, *Indonesian society and the Indonesian Revolution* (Djakarta: Jajasan 'Pembinaan', 1958), pp. 23–4.

had branches in other cities, including Surakarta, Semarang and Surabaya in Javanese-speaking areas.⁶³ In response, Islamic activists established Pendidikan Tinggi Da'wah Islam (PTDI: Islamic Proselytism Higher Education) in Surakarta, which was moved to Jakarta in 1965. Military officers played a role in its leadership.⁶⁴

The arts became politicised as well. PKI's Lekra (Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat, People's Cultural Institute, established 1950) was becoming an effective tool for intellectual repression, spearheaded by Indonesia's greatest writer, Pramoedya Ananta Toer. To compete with this, in 1962 NU established Lesbumi (Lembaga Seniman Budayawan Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Culture-Bearers' and Artists' Institute), which, however, struggled somewhat in the absence of any figure of the stature of Pramoedya.⁶⁵ This artistic world was, in any case, a more modern one in which many *kyais* felt uncomfortable; indeed, some evidently felt that Lesbumi was not really consistent with NU values.⁶⁶

A political war was fought around popular theater across Java. In Banyuwangi for example, PKI, BTI and other Communist-affiliated organisations set up groups to perform *angklung* while NU supported Islamic-style arts such as *rebana* and *badrah*.⁶⁷ The iconic *reyog* dance of

⁶³ Hindley, *Communist Party of Indonesia*, p. 94.

⁶⁴ Boland, *Struggle of Islam*, pp. 194–5, lists Generals Sarbini and Sudirman from the army, General Sutjipto Judodihardjo from the police, and Commander Sukmadi from the navy as leading figures. M. Rachmat Djatnika, 'Les biens de mainmorte (*wakaf*) à Java-Est' (Doctoral thesis, Ecole des Haute Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 1982), p. 51, says that PTDI was established in 1961, but Boland gives 1963.

⁶⁵ On these various NU organizational initiatives, see Saifuddin Zuhri, *Berangkat dari pesantren*, p. 186; Fealy, 'Ulama and politics', pp. 228, 237–8; Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, 'Religion, politics and violence'. See also Choiratun Chisaan, *Lesbumi*. According to Saifuddin, Banser's name was chosen also because if its two syllables are read in reverse order, they say *serban* (turban). Lesbumi was founded by Djamaludin Malik, Usman Ismail and Asrul Sani. On the *abangan* side, Lekra was often supported by the PNI intellectuals' front LKN (Lembaga Kebudayaan Nasional, National Cultural Institute), which was led by the writer Sitor Situmorang.

⁶⁶ Choiratun Chisaan, *Lesbumi*, pp. 117–8.

⁶⁷ Chintya Novi Anoeграjekti, 'Kesenian Using: Resistensi budaya komunitas pinggir' in *Kebijakan kebudayaan di masa orde baru: Laporan penelitian* (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kemasyarakatan LIPI and The Ford Foundation, 2001), pp. 813–4. *Angklung* is an indigenous instrument using bamboo tubes held in a frame, which are shaken to produce musical tones. *Rebana* is a tambourine and *badrah* a chant in praise of God done to *rebana* accompaniment.

Ponorogo was used as a political propaganda vehicle by PKI and PNI and, to a lesser extent, by NU, for the *santri* side of politics was often uncomfortable with performances that involved trance (feared as a form of spirit-possession and black magic). Transvestite performers were sometimes employed in these performances, although both PKI and PNI evidently felt some discomfort with that, since transvestitism seemed inconsistent with the modernisation these parties sought to convey. In 1965, more than 300 villages around Ponorogo had their own *reyog* groups, but in the conflagration of that year — discussed below — many PKI-linked performers were arrested or disappeared.⁶⁸ This happened in many other places as well, such as among *tayuban* performers in Kediri.⁶⁹ In Surabaya, *ludruk* continued to burlesque the ills of a socially divided society to an audience of the poor. But by the time that Peacock did his fieldwork there in 1962–3, *ludruk*'s leftist, iconoclastic message was diluted, for the army had banned explicitly ideological messages other than Sukarno's idiosyncratic doctrine of Nasakom.⁷⁰ Elsewhere in East Java, too, *ludruk* and other cultural performances were highly politicised.⁷¹ In 1961 Lekra claimed that large numbers of *kethoprak* groups in Central Java and *ludruk* companies in East Java were affiliated with it.⁷²

NU and PKI both knew that religion was the key issue between them, that whatever class issues there might be as well, it was faith and *aliran* that mattered most. PKI went through various public ideological contortions to avoid seeming anti-religious, to no avail.⁷³ At local levels, the conflict was

⁶⁸ Margaret J. Kartomi, 'Performance, music and meaning of réyog Ponorogo', *Indonesia* no. 22 (Oct. 1976), pp. 116–7.

⁶⁹ Robert W. Hefner, 'The politics of popular art: Tayuban dance and culture change in East Java', *Indonesia* no. 43 (Apr. 1987), p. 91.

⁷⁰ Peacock, *Rites of modernization*, p. 31. NASAKOM stood for *nasionalisme, agama, Komunisme*, i.e., the unity of nationalism, religion and Communism — something conceivable only in Sukarno's revolutionary humbug and unattainable in the realities of early 1960s Indonesia.

⁷¹ Hermawan Sulisty, *Palu arit di lading tebu: Sejarah pembantaian massal yang terlupakan* (Jombang-Kediri 1965–1966) (Jogyakarta: KPG [Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia], Yayasan Adikarya IKAPI and The Ford Foundation, 2000), pp. 128, 235–6.

⁷² Keith Foulcher, *Social commitment in literature and the arts: The Indonesian 'Institute of People's Culture', 1950–1965* (Clayton, Vic: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), p. 112.

⁷³ Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and politics, 1959–1965* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 92–5. Mortimer's book is the best account of PKI in these years.

quite clear. One *kyai* recalled later that in the area of Klaten, in the 1960s the Party put on performances of *Kethoprak PKI* with a script entitled *Patine Gusti Allah* (The death of God).⁷⁴ As the parliamentary system staggered to its end, to be replaced by Sukarno's so-called Guided Democracy,⁷⁵ PKI adjusted its ideological positions to support Sukarno's successive ideological pronouncements. The Party was seeking protection from the hostile forces that faced it and believed that Sukarno represented its best hope of gaining power. By the early 1960s there was hardly any difference to be seen between Communist ideology and Sukarnoism. NU meanwhile made its own accommodation with the chaotic political realities of Indonesia, based on the ideas of accepting the existing political authority and of seeking benefit and avoiding harm.

A new leadership style was, however, emerging within NU. *Kyais* still dominated the organisation, but now there were younger leaders who had gone through Indonesia's expanding public education system and more modern kinds of Islamic education as well as Traditionalist *pesantrens*. Some of these younger figures had professional qualifications and had even been in Western countries for higher education. As Fealy puts it, now there were NU cadres who were 'just as likely to speak English as Arabic'. Among the new figures was M. Subchan Z.E., a 'flamboyant and charismatic figure' who would wield significant influence until his early death in 1973. He was from a Yogyakarta Muhammadiyah family and went to a Muhammadiyah primary school but spent his youth with a wealthy merchant uncle in Kudus who was active in NU circles, and had then gone on himself to become a successful entrepreneur. He was adept at managing the politics of Jakarta: 'A debonair and popular figure among Jakarta's social set, he often spent his evenings dancing with glamorous women at the city's elite nightspots.'⁷⁶

NU was thus developing a politically active wing which was often far from the lifestyle and values of the *kyais*, but which nevertheless gave it new opportunities. This produced tensions within NU, of course, but also gave Traditionalist Islam influence in modern political life to go along with

⁷⁴ Discussion with Ky. H. Muslim Imampura (Mbah Lim), at Pondok Pesantren al-Muttaqien *Pancasila* Sakti, Karang Anom, Klaten, 27 March 2006.

⁷⁵ An overview of the Guided Democracy period, with references to the main secondary sources, is to be found in Ricklefs, *History of modern Indonesia*, Chapter 20.

⁷⁶ Fealy, 'Ulama and politics', pp. 226, 229. For a brief biography, see Andrée Feillard, *Islam et armée dans l'Indonésie contemporaine: Les pionniers de la tradition* (Cahier d'Archipel 28; Paris: Editions L'Harmatan, Association Archipel, 1995), pp. 334–7.

its influence at grass-roots level.⁷⁷ This combination of influences could be found in only two organisations in Indonesia in the early 1960s: NU and PKI. Less well-supported among the populace, but also powerful, was the army. All turned to Sukarno for legitimacy as they prepared for a contest for power among themselves. Given that PKI was evidently the rising power, it is not surprising that an anti-PKI coalition of interests grew between NU and the military. A group of 'hard-line' anti-PKI militants was strengthening among younger NU followers in Ansor and other NU groups at this time. Their leaders included Ky. H. Bisri Syansuri (a respected elder figure, by then in his late 70s),⁷⁸ Subchan and two former army officers M. Munasir and Jusuf Hasjim.⁷⁹ It should be noted, however, that in Central and East Java, Communist infiltration of the military was also advanced, so that the upper echelons of the military could not be confident of the loyalty of their own forces.

The violent conflicts of 1963–6

In 1963 and 1964 the wobbly radicalism of Guided Democracy began to tip into social violence in the countryside of Central and East Java. PKI seems to have become confident that, while its enemies were strengthening, the massive following that it claimed gave it capacity for independent action. It is also possible that Aidit was urged during a visit to Beijing in September 1963 to begin direct revolutionary action in the countryside. Whatever the case, the events suggest, as Mortimer put it, that the Communists felt 'that the time was approaching when their political fate would be decided one way or the other'.⁸⁰ In a speech that Aidit gave in Beijing, published the following year in Indonesian, he made the following observation, capturing the central social, religious and political dichotomy (he of course called it a 'contradiction') faced by PKI.

The Indonesian situation is indeed complex and filled with many contradictions. On the one hand, according to the statistics, over 90 per

⁷⁷ Involvement in politics also brought an increasing number of accusations of corruption and mismanagement against NU leaders, and the feeling that the social standing of *kyais* was declining because of involvement in politics. See Fealy, 'Ulama and politics', pp. 192 et seq., 232.

⁷⁸ For a brief biography, see Feillard, *Islam et armée*, pp. 326–9.

⁷⁹ Fealy, 'Ulama and politics', pp. 235–6.

⁸⁰ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, p. 278.

cent of Indonesia's populace is Muslim. On the other hand, the influence of Communism is constantly expanding.⁸¹

While the precise motivation of the PKI leadership is not entirely clear, early in 1964 the Communists launched a 'unilateral action' (*aksi sepihak*) campaign to carry out land reform laws that had been passed in 1959–60 but had hardly begun to be implemented. The membership numbers being quoted by PKI in the mid-1960s — claiming a total of perhaps 20 million in the Party and its affiliated organisations, the large majority being in Java⁸² — were certainly grossly exaggerated. Whether the Party leadership knew this and was engaged in massive bluff and brinkmanship, or actually believed the figures themselves, is not knowable. Whatever the case, PKI activists — especially BTI and Pemuda Rakyat — and their landless or land-poor followers began taking over 'excess' lands in Central and East Java. This pitted the Communist side against many wealthy *hajis* and *kyais*, the landholdings of *pesantrens*, other *santri* landowners and military officers.

Ironically, PKI's 'unilateral actions' worked to the benefit of some Islamic institutions, for there were *santri* landowners who preferred to give their land to *pesantrens*, mosques, prayer-houses (*langgar*) or other institutions as pious endowments (*wakaf*) rather than to see it fall into the hands of Communists. The most famous of all the modernised *pesantrens* of Java, Pondok Modern at Gontor, saw its landholdings rise from a mere 25 ha of rice land to over 260 in this way. BTI tried but failed to prevent the school getting these lands.⁸³

Santri activists — especially NU's Ansor and Banser — fought back.⁸⁴ Brawls, kidnappings, beatings, arson attacks on houses, destruction of cane-fields and other crops and the killing of opponents spread. PKI declared that 'true revolutionaries' must place themselves on the side of the peasants

⁸¹ D.N. Aidit, *Kibarkan tinggi panji revolusi!* (Jakarta: Jajasan 'Pembaruan', 1964), p. 48.

⁸² Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, pp. 366–7.

⁸³ Lance Castles, 'Notes on the Islamic school at Gontor', *Indonesia* no. 1 (Apr. 1966), pp. 36–7; Djatnika, 'Biens de mainmorte', pp. 147–8, 150–1, 287.

⁸⁴ There is considerable literature on this violence. For the account here, I have relied upon Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, pp. 309–27; Fealy, 'Ulama and politics', pp. 239–44; Soegijanto Padmo, *Landreform dan gerakan protes petani Klaten, 1959–1965* (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Media Pressindo and Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria, 2000), pp. 109–55; Sulistyono, *Palu arit di lading tebu*, pp. 91–156; and Aminuddin Kasdi, *Kaum merah menjarah: Aksi sepihak PKI/BTI di Jawa Timur 1960–1965* (Yogyakarta: Jendela, 2001). See also Arbi Sanit, *Badai revolusi: Sketsa*

and presented the cause as if it were class-based, but of course these actions were not supported by all peasants. Rather, it was the *abangan* peasant followers of PKI and BTI who were claiming land, not the *santri* peasantry. The latter — led mainly by NU's Ansor youth militia — saw it as a religious act to resist the 'atheistic' Communists. The police often became involved, BTI cadres were arrested, and before long serious losses of life were being reported. Chinese — often assumed by the *santri* side to be both atheists and Communists by definition — were also attacked in some places, and defended by PKI. Some *santri* activists believed that the Communists were using black magic to curse their opponents, while *kyais* gave supernatural protection, powerful prayers and amulets to NU activists. *Kyais* declared that anyone killed in action against the Communists would go directly to heaven, as was true of martyrs who fell in Holy War.

In this spreading violence, PKI soon found itself on the defensive, particularly in NU's heartland of East Java. When the Party was put to the test, the millions of militants it claimed were not to be seen and aliran had clearly trumped class as a format for political mobilisation. By November 1964, BTI admitted that a 'counter-revolution' was gaining ascendancy in East Java. NU and other anti-PKI forces were winning. PKI tried to back off from the *aksi sepihak* campaign but this could not be ordered immediately, for fear of demoralising Party cadres and losing altogether whatever peasant base it really had. Thousands of BTI members were already abandoning the organisation — for membership was a passport to trouble — and declaring themselves members of PNI instead, thereby maintaining their *abangan* political identity but getting out of the firing-line of *santri* violence. While the Communist side tried to restrain its activists, the *santri* side could smell victory. Mortimer observes, 'All anti-Communists who became aware of what was happening were greatly encouraged. That PKI strength was preponderant in the villages of East and Central Java was no longer accepted as an axiom

kekuatan politik PKI di Jawa Tengah dan Jawa Timur (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2000). Van Doorn-Harder, *Women shaping Islam*, p. 220, writes of Muslimat NU participating in 'the military preparation' and having 'joined the fight', but this seems an exaggeration; there is no evidence of women being involved in the killings (my thanks to Prof. Robert Cribb for confirming my impressions in this regard).

There were some variations to the pattern of *abangan* followers of PKI clashing with *santri* followers of NU. In Gunung Kidul, most 'excess' land was held not by *kyais* but rather by the local *priyayi* who were supporters of PNI; Fadjat Pratikno, *Gerakan rakyat kelaparan*, pp. 87, 112–4, 138–44. Although this book does not cover Bali, it should be noted that serious violence also occurred there, where of course Islam was not a factor.

of Jakarta politics'.⁸⁵ Conflict was not confined to rural villages. In Surabaya, for example, Chinese-owned land was taken over and was quickly covered with hundreds of houses. BTI demanded that the mayor — himself a PKI member — give land titles to these squatters, but in fact the city government failed to do so. Pemuda Rakyat and Ansor confronted each other violently in several neighbourhoods of Surabaya, and in other towns and cities.

The air of radicalism at both national and local levels continued as the months of 1965 passed. The creation — over Indonesian objections — of Malaysia in September 1963, the consequent declaration of the Indonesian-Malaysian conflict known as 'Confrontation' and the escalation of the American war in Vietnam during 1964 and 1965 also provided international fodder for Indonesia's increasing domestic radicalism. In August 1965, Sukarno suddenly vomited and collapsed in public. Although he soon recovered, both national-level political actors and people in towns and villages across the country began to consider the possibility of an Indonesia without Sukarno. Many domestic observers as well as foreigners thought that PKI was poised to gain power. Now that Masyumi was banned, NU remained as the only significant *santri* political party. Its leaders and activists, along with other *santris* and leading military figures, were determined to prevent a PKI takeover. In towns and villages across Java, people believed that violence loomed and that the other side had lists of those to be killed when it erupted.⁸⁶

At the end of September 1965, the chaotic, radical, corrupt and violent Guided Democracy period came to an end in Jakarta. The events in the capital may be briefly told here, even if many details are obscure and, we may suppose, will always remain so.⁸⁷ A poorly organised military coup group removed the top leadership of the army by kidnapping and murdering six senior generals and an aide, in the name of forestalling what was claimed to be an American-sponsored coup by a secret council of generals. PKI's women's organisation Gerwani and its youth wing Pemuda Rakyat were also involved. It is not clear how much of this adventure was really attributable to PKI plotting, how much arose from intra-military issues, and how clear the distinction between PKI and the coup's military activists was anyway, given

⁸⁵ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno*, p. 327.

⁸⁶ For example, see the account of rising social conflict in 1965 and the emerging alliance between the military and the *kyais* of the Jombang-Kediri area in Sulistyono, *Palu arit di lading tebu*, pp. 129–31.

⁸⁷ A brief overview of the 1965 coup attempt is available in Ricklefs, *History of modern Indonesia*, pp. 318–21, with references to relevant literature listed under the readings for Chapter 20.

the mutual infiltration, influence and clandestine contacts that had been developing for years. Whatever the case, the coup attempt quickly collapsed, Major-General (soon-to-be-President) Soeharto, then commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), took charge of the military and commenced — cautiously and methodically — to lay the foundations for the removal of Sukarno as President and the implementation of his own ‘New Order’ regime.

The crucial consequence of the 1965 coup attempt for the history of Islamisation in Java was that it allowed *santri-abangan* differences over degrees of commitment to Islam now to lurch into widespread, still almost-inconceivable, slaughter. Mutual suspicions and stereotyping across hardening *aliran* boundaries, bitter political party animosities with *aliran* roots, politicised tensions over folk rituals and arts, the part-class and part-*aliran* conflict in the countryside of Java that had already turned violent — all of this now gave birth to the worst domestic bloodletting in the history of Indonesia.⁸⁸ PKI was blamed for the events in Jakarta by the military and by its many enemies on the *santri* side of politics. In Jakarta and other cities, young activists of various backgrounds (including Christians) with military support formed action groups to attack PKI people and property. Chinese were also targeted.

In the Javanese-speaking heartland, social violence on an unprecedented scale broke out. The role of the military in Central and East Java varied from place to place. There was a major complication there, for the army’s Central Java Diponegoro Division and East Java Brawijaya Division were among those most successfully infiltrated and influenced by PKI; some elements were clearly on the side of the military coup leaders in Jakarta. The loyalty of precisely these two crucial divisions was therefore doubtful. It was some time before Soeharto and his colleagues could be confident that an order

⁸⁸ The killings of 1965–6 continue to attract serious research and to produce valuable studies. Most of this research is handicapped by its heavy reliance on later memories and, of course, the almost total absence of sources from the PKI side. The most important study so far published is Sulistyono, *Palu arit di lading tebu*, covering the area of Jombang and Kediri. In the account of the killings here, important items of information will be footnoted. Otherwise, the general narrative relies upon Sulistyono, *Palu arit di lading tebu*; Fealy, ‘Ulama and politics’, pp. 248–56; Robert Cribb (ed.), *The Indonesian killings of 1965–1966: Studies from Java and Bali* (Monash Papers on Southeast Asia no. 21. Clayton, Vic: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990); and Imam Tholikhah, *Anatomi konflik politik di Indonesia*, pp. 134–41. See also the November 1965 Indonesian intelligence report translated in ‘Report from East Java’, *Indonesia* no. 41 (Apr. 1986), pp. 135–49.

given to either Diponegoro or Brawijaya forces would be followed. So the main mobilisers of the killing squads in most rural areas were not military men. Nor were they university students, for the number of higher-education institutions with networks into the countryside was still small. Rather, and not surprisingly, it was Ansor and the *kyais* of the countryside, who mobilised their *pesantren* students in ways seen previously in the Revolution and at the time of the 1948 Madiun incident.

Across Central and East Java, as well as elsewhere in Indonesia, there flowed together a potent conjunction of piety, profound faith, mystical doctrines, superstition, hatred, ignorance, magical mumbo-jumbo, villainy and primitive bloodlust. Pamphlets, rumours and stereotyped accusations abounded. It was widely believed that the Communists had prepared instruments to gouge out the eyes of their enemies and wells into which they would throw the bodies of murdered *kyais*.⁸⁹ It was thought that the houses of NU and PNI people in Yogyakarta (and no doubt elsewhere) would be identified by secret marks for attack by Communists, so families inspected the perimeter of their houses each morning for the tell-tale signs of impending assault.⁹⁰ For the *santri* side, it appeared to be a matter of kill or be killed.

An NU Banser activist in the Salatiga area later recalled,

At that time ‘in-group feeling’ was very strong. So the issue of *santri* vs. *abangan*, or NU and Masyumi against the Communists, was very strong. This feeling was accompanied by very strong inter-group conflicts at local level. At that time, conflict at the national level encountered sentiments flowing at the local level. In fact, even more than that, two choices appeared: to kill or be killed.⁹¹

NU’s Ansor and its militia wing Banser took leading roles in the killings, although other Islamic organisations, notably Muhammadiyah, also proclaimed the extermination of the PKI a religious duty tantamount to Holy War.⁹² *Kyais* were not unanimous in their own *fatwas* about the fate that awaited the Communists, but most judged that killing them was

⁸⁹ Sulistyono, *Palu arit di lading tebu*, p. 175.

⁹⁰ Rumeckso Setyadi and Saiful H. Shodiq, ‘Dari ksatria menjadi paria: Degradasi peran dan pembunuhan politik sistematis; Catatan awal peristiwa ‘65/’66 di Jogjakarta’, *Tashwirul Afkar: Jurnal refleksi pemikiran keagamaan & kebudayaan* no. 15 (2003), pp. 117–20. When I first lived in Yogyakarta in 1969, such stories were still in the minds of local people.

⁹¹ Interview of 2006 quoted in Singgih Nugroho, *Menyintas dan menyeberang*, p. 77.

⁹² See Boland, *Struggle of Islam*, p. 146, for a Muhammadiyah declaration of November 1965.

allowed, even a religious duty. The Communist enemies were seen as rebels against a legitimate government and atheistic *kafirs*. This had the consequence that some escaped being murdered by pronouncing the *Shahada*, thereby 'converting' to Islam from their previously *abangan* nominal Muslim status and making it more difficult for *santris* to proceed with murdering them, confirming that this was essentially a religious conflict in the eyes of the *santri* activists. But this did not always work. Some *abangan* were in fact able to recite the *Shahada*, just as nominal adherents of other religious systems can often mumble the basic ritual phrases of their cultural community, so people accused of association with PKI who pronounced the *Shahada* were often killed anyway. At least one *kyai* said that faith was a private matter between the believer and God: Communists who were rebels against the legitimate Indonesian government could be killed whether or not they were Muslims, but anyone who had not rebelled, whether or not a *kafir*, should be left alone.⁹³ we should not imagine that many lives were saved through this subtle distinction. There were, however, some *kyais* who tried to stop the killing or offered protection to Communists, but they were few and they had little overall impact.⁹⁴ There were even a few cases of Ansor leaders trying to protect people associated with PKI,⁹⁵ but this was far from the norm. *Abangan* areas in Gunung Kidul came under much suspicion at this stage. In the village of Kajar, studied by Ann Dunham, the headman later recalled how an army sergeant and Ansor activists repeatedly visited and demanded the names of Communists to be taken away for killing, but they were assured that there were no PKI villagers there and 'there was relatively little loss of life'.⁹⁶ Near Pemalang on the north coast, the bloody *santri-abangan* violence of 1965–6 gave the people of one village an opportunity to carry out an unrelated act of revenge, killing a hated headman in a manner reminiscent of the 'people's sovereignty' actions of the Revolution. But PKI was of course the main target of an alliance there between the local military and two *pesantrens*, with the killing again spearheaded by Ansor. Before this

⁹³ Sulistyono, *Palu arit di lading tebu*, p. 184.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 176; Fealy, 'Ulama and politics', p. 255; discussion with Ky. H. Muslim Imampura (Mbah Lim), at Pondok Pesantren al-Muttaqien *Pancasila* Sakti, Karang Anom, Klaten, 27 March 2006.

⁹⁵ Kenneth R. Young, 'Local and national influences in the violence of 1965', in Cribb, *Indonesian killings*, p. 83; Feillard, *Islam et armée*, p. 66; 'Report from East Java', p. 145.

⁹⁶ S. Ann Dunham, *Surviving against the odds: Village industry in Indonesia* (ed. and preface Alice G. Dewey and Nancy I. Cooper; foreword Maya Soetoro-Ng; afterword Robert W. Hefner; Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 2009), p. 117.

time, PNI and PKI had been the prominent political forces in the area, but by the time the killings subsided in 1966 NU was — and would long remain — the dominant political force.⁹⁷

In their *pesantrens*, *kyais* had long taught a combination of martial arts and spiritual disciplines — including progressively deeper initiation into the mysteries of the Sufi *tarekats* — two aspects that came together in *ilmu kanuragan*, the science of invulnerability. This *ilmu* was — and still is — widely believed. Amulets (*jimat*) and magically powerful formulae were given out by spiritually advanced *kyais* to their followers. Again, some declared that anyone who died in killing Communists would go straight to heaven, as happens with a martyr who falls in Holy War.

The killing in most cases was an easy affair. In a way that we may find incredible, PKI activists rarely resisted their fate. A side of politics that had taken the offensive in the *aksi sepihak* campaign now seemed to accept that it was defeated and that death awaited its followers. Only a few PKI figures or followers were able to escape, for in village Java it was (and is) almost impossible to move into a new area without being known. The killers had little need for firearms. They preferred their own weapons: *krisses*, swords, sickles and other farming implements. And, of course, their supernaturally confirmed invulnerability. In one of the few cases of PKI resistance, the Communists sought to defend themselves with bows and arrows.⁹⁸ PKI activists and followers — and undoubtedly many people who just found themselves in the wrong group at the wrong time — were hacked, stabbed and beaten to death. Beheading became a common practice. In Kediri, many victims were beheaded on the banks of the Brantas River and their bodies then thrown into the water. Banser members were also injured and killed in some clashes,⁹⁹ but there is no doubt that the deaths were overwhelmingly on the *abangan* PKI-affiliated side.

General Soemitro later reflected on what he saw when he arrived in Surabaya to take command of the Brawijaya Division in mid-1966 with orders, *inter alia*, to see to the destruction of PKI but to stop the insane mass slaughter. As the Brantas flowed through the city towards its mouth, Soemitro saw it ‘so full of bodies floating along, with others caught in the

⁹⁷ Frans Hüsken, ‘Continuity and change in local politics: The village administration and control of land and labor’, in Hiroyoshi Kani, Frans Hüsken and Djoko Suryo (eds), *Beneath the smoke of the sugar-mill: Javanese coastal communities during the twentieth century* (Yogyakarta: AKATIGA and Gadjah Mada University Press, 2001), pp. 240–1, 250.

⁹⁸ Sulisty, *Palu arit di lading tebu*, pp. 181–2.

⁹⁹ Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, ‘Religion, politics and violence’; see also ‘Report from East Java’.

branches of trees that had fallen in at the river's edge'.¹⁰⁰ A November 1965 Indonesian intelligence report also tells of 'many headless corpses ... sprawling in the rivers and along the river banks' in Mojokerto. 'The Indonesian Red Cross took them away. On Sunday there were approximately 162 corpses, and on Monday, 102.'¹⁰¹

Soemitro, like everyone else so far as we can know, saw supernatural powers involved in these dreadful events. But his supernatural reference-points were not those of the *santris*. Instead he thought in terms of indigenous Javanese ideas centring on the figure after whom the Brawijaya Division was named — the last pre-Islamic king of Java, Brawijaya of Majapahit, who was overthrown by Muslim conquerors but then reappeared (according to many Javanese) as the powerful and anti-Islamic spirit Sunan Lawu. Although he was at that time 'not deeply knowledgeable of the Javanese *kebatinan* (mystical faith)' and 'was still raw', Soemitro went to the 'Brawijaya ruins' to meditate 'and to seek protection and direction from Almighty God. ... [and] permission from Brawijaya to serve him.'¹⁰² Such *kebatinan* ideas were widely spread among Javanese military men, portending differences with *santris* that would only become manifest after 1966. Soemitro wanted to serve God and Brawijaya and the *santris* wanted to serve God and their *kyais* but, for the time being, both were mainly interested in slaughtering Communists.

Young *santri* killers perceived supernatural forces at work in the bloodletting and some evidently regarded these murders as a *rite de passage* to manhood. They sometimes dismembered bodies and carried off fingers, ears, or genitals as tokens of their manly courage, or engaged in other ritual practices including tasting the blood of the dead as a means of ensuring that they would not be pursued by their victims' ghosts. *Kyais* condemned such practices, for they were all contrary to Islamic teachings.¹⁰³ Ky. H. Mahrus Aly, the senior *kyai* of *pesantren* Lirboyo in Kediri, reportedly ruled that respect should be shown to Communists who were being killed. Thus, their

¹⁰⁰ Ramadhan K.H., *Soemitro, former commander of Indonesian security apparatus: Best selling memoirs* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1996), p. 114. See also *ibid.*, p. 101: 'Every day large numbers of bodies were spotted floating in the local waterways.'

¹⁰¹ 'Report from East Java', p. 141

¹⁰² Ramadhan, *Soemitro*, pp. 102–3. The term 'Brawijaya ruins' evidently refers to the old Majapahit site at Trawulan. For further discussion of the Brawijaya legends, see Ricklefs, *Mystic Synthesis in Java*, p. 134; and *idem*, *Polarising Javanese society* (see the indexed references to Brawijaya).

¹⁰³ Sulistyio, *Palu arit di lading tebu*, p. 205, citing later interviews.

deaths should be delivered with a sharp knife or sword, his reasoning resting on analogy with Islamic rules for the slaughtering of animals.¹⁰⁴

No one knows how many people were slaughtered in this orgy of murder, which continued to August 1966, for no one counted. Only as the killings began to subside in mid-1966 was it more likely that bodies would even be buried. Some scholars have tried to come up with a total number for the dead, but they lack the information on which a reliable calculation must rest. There is a general consensus that the dead across Indonesia — and that means mostly in Central Java, East Java and Bali — amounted to somewhere between half a million and two million. Most analysts probably regard the half-million figure as more likely simply because it is lower, but there is in fact no data to give this consensus any real substance. While such a number is below the scale of the murderous Pol Pot regime in Cambodia and far below that of the Holocaust of Nazi Germany, Indonesia's killings still rank as one of the worst cases of mass slaughter of the 20th century. This bloodletting took a toll across Javanese society — the dead themselves; the distress, poverty, disempowerment and discrimination suffered by survivors and victims' descendants; the tens of thousands who were imprisoned without trial for many years; the burden of guilt on the part of many killers — and the sanguinary pride on the part of many others. The legacies of this killing still resonate amongst Javanese.¹⁰⁵

Among many *santris* at the time, there was a belief that the utter physical annihilation of the Communists was a decisive watershed. *Santris* found themselves cooperating and sharing interests with the military and the emerging New Order regime led by Soeharto. PKI's destruction, they imagined, meant the removal of the main barrier to ongoing Islamisation. At last Islam would take its proper place among Javanese and in Indonesian society more broadly. At last its beliefs and practices could dominate society, Indonesia could become a society shaped by God's book and his Messenger, and nothing would now stand in the way of progress towards an Islamic state and society. They were wrong.

¹⁰⁴ Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, 'Religion, politics and violence', pp. 431–2. For a more detailed account of 'the central role of Lirboyo in the annihilation of PKI', see Tim Pengelola Majalah Misykat, *Gus Maksum: Sosok & kiprahnya* (prologue Ali Maschan Moesa; Kediri: Pondok Pesantren Lirboyo Kediri, 2004), pp. 57–68.

¹⁰⁵ In 2000, the leadership of Ansor and Banser in Yogyakarta apologised to the families of victims of the killings, saying that 'at that time, the people of NU, in particular Banser, were just used by and made instruments of the military'. Banser then assisted in the reopening of a mass grave of victims in Boyolali. Hairus Salim, *Kelompok paramiliter NU* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2004), pp. 62–3.

CHAPTER 5

The totalitarian experiment (I): *Kebatinan*, Christian and government competition and the end of *aliran* politics, 1966–80s

The political regime that developed in the second half of the 1960s was dubbed the ‘New Order’ by its leader, General Soeharto.¹ It aspired to totalitarian control through condominium by a dominant military — above all the army — and a collaborating civilian bureaucracy, which together would control the society to its very roots. In aspiring to control rather than to mobilise the populace, the New Order resembled the colonial order, but the latter had never attempted the degree of social control that Soeharto and his colleagues eventually sought. Through such control, they hoped, the threat of Communism could be completely uprooted. Looking back from the early 21st century, we may be tempted to think of Soeharto’s New Order as a monolithic authoritarian state, but it was not that, except in aspiration. In its first years, it was quite unstable and many an observer (notably political scientists) expected it not to last long. This was paralleled by those (notably economists) who, in its last years, expected it to go on forever.

The regime faced enormous challenges at its start. Indonesia was a regional pariah because of its previous radicalism and armed hostility against

¹ An overview of the period may be found in Ricklefs, *History of modern Indonesia*, with references to the major scholarly works in the readings listed for Chapters 21–2.

Malaysia, and an economic ‘basket case’. There were real possibilities of a violent political backlash by Sukarno supporters. Runaway inflation, political uncertainty, military brutality and social instability were part of the common daily experiences of Indonesians. Soeharto’s government quickly brought ‘Confrontation’ with Malaysia to an end and restored relations with the ‘Free World’ side of international politics. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was created in August 1967, its main initial purpose being the rehabilitation of Indonesia as a responsible regional neighbour. Purges of the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly, the military and the bureaucracy tossed out — and frequently imprisoned without trial — anyone who might be suspected of pro-PKI sympathies. ‘Left PNI’ persons also came under suspicion. Over many months, a more loyal military and bureaucracy were thus constructed. The Soeharto regime achieved a remarkably rapid turnaround in the nation’s affairs. Inflation was brought down from over 600 per cent in 1966 to about 10 per cent in 1969. The government could then begin its programme of economic development.

Muslim Modernist politicians soon learned that the destruction of PKI and the army-Islamic alliance that had played a central role in that destruction would not, in fact, make it possible to revive Masyumi, even under another name. A party led by Modernists called Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslims’ Party) was created in 1968. In that year’s Consultative Assembly session, Parmusi and NU both urged that a curiosity of constitutional history called the Jakarta Charter — which in the eyes of some obliged the state to impose Islamic law on all confessed Muslims — should be recognised as having the force of law.² The proposal was defeated. The government spotted the reviving potential for Modernist Islamist trouble-making, which for the regime revived the spectres of *Darul Islam* and Masyumi’s support for the late 1950s Sumatran rebellion. When former Masyumi leaders — but not Natsir — were elected to the leadership

² The Jakarta Charter was a compromise proposed during the drafting of the 1945 constitution. It declared that the state was based upon belief in God, but ‘with the obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law (*syari’at*)’. This was not adopted in 1945 and became irrelevant with the adoption of the interim constitution of 1950. But it again arose as an issue surrounding the reintroduction of the 1945 constitution in 1959 as the constitutional basis of Guided Democracy. On this, see Daniel S. Lev, *The transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian politics, 1957–1959* (Ithaca, NY: Monograph Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1966), pp. 263–77. The 1945 constitution has remained in force ever since, unchanged until it underwent a series of amendments after the fall of Soeharto.

of the party later that year, the government intervened and left Parmusi effectively leaderless for two years. The regime would in fact shortly act to emasculate all surviving political parties.

Islamic political activists' frustrations with the regime thus arose early and were well-founded. In no small part this frustration arose from their recognition that Soeharto's growing personal domination of the political scene brought with it a style of spirituality greatly at variance with their own.

Soeharto's spirituality

General Soeharto — who was declared Acting President of Indonesia in 1967 and substantive President in 1968 — was truly a son of rural Java. He was born in 1921 in Central Java,³ but there is uncertainty about his parentage. Various romantic rumours arose, including that he was secretly descended from Yogyakarta royalty. Elson concludes that 'he was the illegitimate child of a well-placed villager ... or someone of some means who might come in continuing contact with villagers. ... From the age of about 8 ... he joined the family of a lower Javanese official living in a town',⁴ the latter being Wuryantoro in the area of Wonogiri, in the mountainous area south of Surakarta. Soeharto also came to know and was much influenced by a local mystic and healer named Kyai Daryatmo. Here Soeharto encountered that village world thick with secret doctrines and supernatural powers, allied to Traditionalist Islam. He went on to formal schooling in a Muhammadiyah junior high school⁵ in Yogyakarta, which he left in 1939.

After 1965, any Islamic activists not already aware of Soeharto's personal beliefs soon learned that they were a long way from Islamic orthodoxy. Among his spiritual gurus in adulthood, two were of particular importance: his former Diponegoro Division comrade General Soedjono Hoemardani⁶ and Soediyat Prawirokoesoemo, known with the Javanese titles

³ The best biography published so far is R.E. Elson, *Subarto: A political biography*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). This does not, however, give much attention to Soeharto's spirituality.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁵ This was at the level of MULO, which stood for *Meer uitgebreid lager onderwijs* (more extended lower education), a sort of junior high.

⁶ Soedjono Hoemardani was also the founder of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, a major New Order think-tank. He was slightly older than Soeharto, having been born in Surakarta in 1919; O.G. Roeder, *Who's who in Indonesia: Biographies of prominent Indonesian personalities in all fields* (Djakarta: Gunung Agung, 1971), p. 143.

for a spiritually advanced person as Empu Rama Diyat. In his quite arrogant, but dull, memoirs written in the late 1980s, Soeharto dismissed Soedjono's spiritual influence on him, saying that he knew more about *kebatinan* (i.e., Javanese spiritualism) than Soedjono.

Regarding Soedjono Hoemardani, people have been heard to speak as if he knows more than I about *kebatinan*. Even though Djono himself usually *sungkem* [paid obeisance] to me. He regarded me as the elder and more knowledgeable in the science of *kebatinan*. So anyone who reckons that Djono was my *kebatinan* guru is nuts. Such an allegation is false. Soedjono more often asked me than I asked him about the science of *kebatinan*. He himself once said, 'I am a student of Pak Harto'.⁷

Rama Diyat presided over an annual ritual at the site called Jambe Pitu, on Mount Selok near Cilacap on the south coast of Java. There is conflicting evidence as to whether, after becoming President, Soeharto continued to attend these ceremonies or merely sent emissaries on his behalf.⁸ These occasions took place in the first month of the Javanese lunisolar year, beginning with a ritual raising of the national flag and then proceeding to an all-night session in which Rama Diyat gave spiritual teachings and predictions for the coming year. The language throughout was Javanese, but with the occasional Indonesian key word, such as *pembangunan* (development) and *kebudayaan* (culture). Rama Diyat described his teachings as '*Ilmu Kebatinan Tanggap-Warso saha Napak-Tilas*' (the inward science of attending to the year and the traces of the past) and wrote, 'Based on understanding of *Tanggap-Warso* we will always remember especially the

⁷ Soeharto, *Pikiran, ucapan dan tindakan saya: Otobiografi* (as told to G. Dwipayana and Ramadhan K.H.; Jakarta: PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989), pp. 441–2.

⁸ See George Quinn, 'National legitimacy through a regional prism: Local pilgrimage and Indonesia's Javanese Presidents', in Minako Sakai, Glenn Banks and J.H. Walker (eds), *The politics of the periphery in Indonesia* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), pp. 181–4. According to Arwan Tuti Artha, *Dunia spiritual Soeharto: Menelusuri laku ritual, tempat-tempat dan guru spiritualnya* (Yogyakarta: Galang Press, 2007), p. 114, at Jambe Pitu there is displayed a photograph of Soeharto with Rama Diyat. This book depicts Soeharto as a product and at the same time a master of Javanese mysticism, but unfortunately the foundations of this discussion are rather thin. The author, a journalist and creative writer, relies largely on secondary sources and did not interview Soeharto (who was still alive at the time). He did, however, speak to some relevant guardians (*juru kunci*) of sacred sites and the book has useful photographs of several of the spiritual sites associated with Soeharto.

originality of Javanese culture'.⁹ Talk of an original Javanese culture was, at this time, code clearly implying the non-originality of Islam.

We may take the Jambe Pitu ritual on 24–25 November 1979 as an example. It opened with a pre-Islamic invocation in 'Kawi' using the Hindu sacred syllable 'Om', and then proceeded to a more Islamic invocation that posited an identification of Rama Diyat with the Prophet Muhammad, the kind of idea that is found in Javanese mystical traditions¹⁰ but anathema to orthodox Muslims:

Exalted thoughts and deeds serve as the foundation to restore culture,
in the midst of Development, both outer and inner.

OM! Let us analyse the origins of being, applying the one place of
spells [?].

I act in the role of the Bloom of God's emissary; my nature is that of
Muhammad; my actions are the doings of Faith.¹¹

The teachings that followed emphasised the originality of Javanese culture and the need to preserve those 'exalted thoughts and deeds' upon which it rested. The followers of [world] religions and the influence of 'foreign culture' were blamed for causing conflict among Indonesians.¹²

Soeharto's own spiritual maxims were gathered together in a privately printed and distributed book, the dedication of which is in his hand and

⁹ The proceedings at Jambe Pitu were recorded in privately printed booklets of around 50–60 pages, of which I have photocopies of the versions for 1979 and 1980. I do not know how widely these booklets were distributed. The quotation here is from the preface (p. 9) in the 1979 booklet, dated 25 November 1979 and signed 'Sesepuh/Pengayom R.P. Soediyat Prawirokoesoemo'. The 1980 booklet has the same text, dated 10 November 1980.

¹⁰ On these traditions, see P.J. Zoemulder, *Pantheism and monism in Javanese suluk literature: Islamic and Indian mysticism in an Indonesian setting* (ed. and transl. M.C. Ricklefs; KITLV translation series 24; Leiden: KITLV Press, 1995), esp. pp. 209 et seqq.

¹¹ This quote is from p. 17 of the 1979 Jambe Pitu booklet. The translation is conjectural in parts. Such invocations were meant as much to create an atmosphere of mysterious powers as to convey specific meanings. *Kawi* is a term used for language meant to be Old Javanese, but in modern practice this is often a self-consciously literary style of Javanese which is in fact not — or not wholly — Old Javanese. The original text (in its non-scholarly spellings) reads, *Budi pakarti luhur pinongko dasar mulyakaken kebudayaan, salebeting Pembangunan lahir soho batin. Hong wilabeng purwaning sido, matek sawiji dunung aji. Ingsun makarti pakartining Sari utusaning Pangeran, sipatku Mohammad, pakartiku lakuning Iman.*

¹² 1979 Jambe Pitu booklet, pp. 19–20.

dated 1986. In this dedication, he said, 'I give this book to my children as a guide in life'. Despite its Indonesian title *Butir-butir budaya Jawa* (seeds of Javanese culture), the text is in Javanese (in Javanese script) accompanied by an Indonesian translation and a (frequently poor) English translation.¹³ The sources for the aphorisms are listed at the back of the volume; these are Javanese works mainly associated with the great literati of Surakarta of the 18th and 19th centuries. These books teach the old Mystic Synthesis of Islamic Java: *Serat Centhini* (written at the behest of the Crown Prince of Surakarta in the early 19th century), *Serat Cipta Ening* (taken from the *Arjunawiwaha*), *Serat Dewa Ruci*, works by Ronggowarsita (the most famous of the 19th-century Surakarta writers) including *Serat Jaka Lodhang* and *Serat Kalatidha*, the prophecies of Jayabaya (regarded as the thoughts of a 12th-century king of Kediri), *Serat Nitisastra*, *Serat Tridharma* ascribed to Mangkunagara I, *Serat Wedhatama* by Mangkunagara IV, and *Serat Wulangreh* by Pakubuwana IV.

The maxims chosen by Soeharto as 'a guide in life' for his children included ideas entirely unacceptable to orthodox Muslims. For example:

Where is the location of God? God is also within you, but do not dare to admit that you are God.

God can take shape, but the shape God takes is not God.

Humankind is from the being (*dat*) of God and thus has also the qualities (*sipat*) of God.¹⁴

Stones and wood have the being (*dat*) of God but are not God.

Humankind can be occupied by the being (*dat*) of God, but do not embrace the idea that humankind can be called God.

Whosoever dares to change things as they are, that is not just any person, but is to be regarded as an emissary (*utusan*) of God.¹⁵

¹³ This work is a bibliographic nightmare with regard to its date. The photocopy that I have (205 pp.) is of a version put together by Soeharto's daughter Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (commonly known as Tutut) on the occasion of the Soehartos' 40th wedding anniversary in December 1987, but with the original dedication by Soeharto of June 1986 and a further handwritten dedication (with a signature that is not clear to me, but is not Soeharto's) dated 1993. A note on p. 197 says that its compilation was completed in 1983 on the occasion of eight *windus* (eight-year cycles) in the Javanese calendar (since Soeharto's birth in 1921). I am grateful to Dr Syafi'i Anwar for providing me with this copy.

¹⁴ From Arabic *dhat* (being, essence) and *sifa* (attribute). Along with the Arabic term *asma* (names), these are crucial terms in Javanese Islamic mysticism, which is full of speculations about the essence, attributes and names of God.

¹⁵ These examples are from pp. 2, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16 of the book described in n13.

The aphorisms quoted above contradicted central Sunni Islamic doctrines. Islam posits that God created the world but does not enter into it; his transcendence and unity are absolute. It also states that Muhammad was the last of the Prophets sent to humankind. For orthodox Muslims, therefore, there is no room for the idea that God might be ‘within you’, whether or not it was a secret doctrine that one should not admit to. Nor can humankind ‘be occupied by the being of God’, or can there be an ‘emissary of God’ subsequent to the Prophet Muhammad, however much such a person might ‘dare to change things’ (as, indeed, Soeharto himself could be said to have done). Yet such ideas are unremarkable within the traditions of Javanese mysticism of both the pre-Islamic and Islamic periods. They were — and are — also common among adherents of modern *kebatinan* movements, which we will consider below.

Despite pushing the boundaries of orthodoxy, however, such ideas did have resonance in the Traditionalist community with its commitment to Sufism. In the mid-1960s, *kyais* were — as indeed they often are now — regarded as having superhuman powers. They may master *ilmu laduni*, that mystical knowledge that God can impart directly to a Sufi practitioner. *Kyais* may thus directly master various Islamic sciences without the need actually to study them, have the gift of prophecy, and be able to cure the sick and confer invulnerability. The powers of a *kyai* indeed extend beyond his death and thus constitute a crucial element in the continuity of Sufi orders and the cults of saints.¹⁶ In 2008, the new NU museum in Surabaya was displaying an armband and a carved stone used to confer invulnerability when fighting PKI in 1966.¹⁷ In Banyuwangi, the very ability to read the *Qur'an* is thought to be associated with supernatural powers, sometimes with negative results if the person is thought to be a sorcerer and on those

¹⁶ See Zamakhsyari Dhofier, *Tradisi pesantren: Studi tentang pandangan hidup kyai* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982), p. 69; Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Pesantren and kitab kuning: Continuity and change in a tradition of religious learning’, in *Ethnologica Bernensia* 4/1994: *Texts from the islands* (Bern: Institut für Ethnologie, 1994), p. 124; Suzaina Abdul Kadir, ‘Traditional Islamic society and the state in Indonesia: The Nahdlatul Ulama, political accommodation and the preservation of autonomy’ (PhD thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1999), pp. 95–7.

¹⁷ I visited the museum on 23 October 2008. On a previous visit, the museum was also displaying a stone in which indentations in the shape of splayed fingers could be seen, where a particularly powerful *kyai* was said to have touched it. I was told that it was no longer displayed because the owner of the stone had fallen ill in its absence and had therefore taken it back, implying that it was the absence of this powerful stone that had caused his illness.

grounds is attacked, even killed, by other villagers.¹⁸ These are not just ideas held by rustics unfamiliar with the urban and modern worlds. In 1995, NU's leader Ky. H. Abdurrahman Wahid — a man deeply imbued with esoteric spiritual ideas as well as a well-travelled and sophisticated thinker and political operator — introduced me to his brother Hasyim Wahid as a Sufi with gifts of prophecy.¹⁹

In 1977, Abdurrahman Wahid asserted that many *kyais* believed in the reality of the Goddess of the Southern Ocean (Ratu Kidul or Ni Lara Kidul). She is a major figure in Javanese legends, one of the most powerful spiritual forces in the minds of believers in old-fashioned Javanese spiritualism, and certainly not of Islamic origin. 'There are', Abdurrahman said, 'many legends about successful *kyais* that were married to Ni Lara Kidul, not just princes'. He claimed that many *kyais* accepted that the Goddess was a divine being who lived in the Indian Ocean. Was this not heresy, I asked? He responded,

OK, it's heresy and it's clearly in opposition to Islamic teachings, but according to the *ulama*, including my grandfather [Ky. H. Hasyim Asy'ari], certain rules are not applied to those extraordinary beings, like the Imam Mahdi or the *Ratu Adil*: those people are not bound by ordinary rules. So they don't want to reject those figures while in the meantime they just say that for us ordinary beings, human beings, we have to follow not them, but the rule of law.²⁰

Abdurrahman also provided a veneer of orthodoxy with regard to supernatural amulets by saying that one could believe in them so long as one regarded them as tools by which God's grace flowed to the Prophet, then to the saints, then to the gurus and thence to oneself.²¹

Such Traditionalist ideas were, and remain, as unacceptable to most Modernists as Soeharto's quotations from classics of the Mystic Synthesis would have been. And for political reasons, as we will see below, NU found that even if its spirituality had overlaps with Soeharto's, its relationship with the regime in its early years was hardly less problematic than that of the Modernists.

¹⁸ Andrew Beatty, *Varieties of Javanese religion: An anthropological account* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 123 (Beatty's fieldwork was done in 1991–3, 1996–7).

¹⁹ Discussion with Abdurrahman Wahid and Hasyim Wahid, Jakarta, 14 Nov. 1995.

²⁰ Discussion with Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 7 Aug. 1977.

²¹ Ibid.

Soeharto's choice of spiritual maxims was not of course distributed publicly, but there could hardly have been anyone who doubted that the new President was more sympathetic to *kebatinan* than to orthodox Islam. It was also notable that, in the early years of the New Order, several senior figures in the military, bureaucracy and elsewhere were Christians to a degree that overrepresented the Christian proportion of the population. While this mainly reflected the legacy of better education enjoyed by Christians across Indonesia, it supported Islamic leaders' suspicions that the new regime was fundamentally unsympathetic to Islam. And NU, with its extensive networks in the rural countryside, represented a potential source of political competition for the regime, so it came under suspicion from the beginning, as we will see below.

Soeharto led a regime whose style reflected his own. It was, as Ruth McVey depicted it, *abangan*, secularist, modernising, corrupt, amoral and materialist. It thus distanced itself at the beginning from Islamic piety.²² One should not, however, imagine that this regime was either stable at the start or consistent in its policies.²³ There were many twists and turns as the New Order sought its goal of dominating Indonesia. Its totalitarian aspirations were tempered at all times by the vast scale of the nation, its social complexity, the generally low level of competence of its administrative machinery, and bureaucratic and military discipline that had significant limits. Jakarta's policy was often interpreted in some village in Java's countryside not quite as Jakarta intended but rather as seemed appropriate to a local headman, a provincial governor, a military commander or the army sergeant who lived there. Indonesia was, in other words, saved from genuinely totalitarian rule by general incapacity and pervasive incompetence.

One might imagine that the regime's sympathetic view of Javanese mystical ideas and its general *abangan* style would also incline it to favour old-fashioned Javanese art forms and local cults. Yet this was not at first the case in the New Order, for those art forms and cults were tainted with Communism.

²² Ruth McVey, 'Faith as the outsider: Islam in Indonesian politics', in James P. Piscatori (ed.), *Islam in the political process* (Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge University Press in association with the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1983), pp. 203, 207–11, 219–21.

²³ Cf. the observations by Robert Hefner in his *Civil Islam: Muslims and democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton, NJ, and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 71.

Abangan folk arts and cults in the early New Order

PKI had been quite successful in influencing folk art and using performances such as *kethoprak*, *ludruk* and *reyog* for propaganda purposes. We noted above Lekra's 1961 claim that large numbers of *kethoprak* groups in Central Java and *ludruk* companies in East Java were affiliated with it. Because of this affiliation with PKI, many of these performing troupes suffered heavily in the arrests and killings of 1965–6. Thereafter, regime suspicions of these essentially lower-class art forms continued, for fear that they could facilitate a Communist revival. In this, the regime was at one with many religious leaders, who saw in these performances not only latent Communism but also hostile forces such as spirit possession and immoral conduct.

Reyog performances in Ponorogo reportedly came to a halt for nearly seven years and thereafter were subjected to a process of Islamisation.²⁴ The art form had been heavily used by PKI — even though the Communists at times felt uncomfortable with the presence of transvestite performers, which seemed inconsistent with the Party's claim to be an agent of modernity. In the mid-1970s PNI- and NU-affiliated *reyog* groups still existed but the form was in decline and transvestites were no longer acceptable, being inconsistent with the 'present-day official concept of law and order'. They were banned from performing by some local governments in East Java, partly under pressure from *santri* activists. As the 1971 elections approached, however, *reyog* was used by Golkar (the regime's political vehicle) to gain popularity.²⁵ In Banyuwangi, the leaders of the local *barong* dance troupe in Beatty's village 'Bayu' were arrested because of their leftist sympathies but then released. The troupe was, however, under suspicion and tainted with the charge of leftism, so was disbanded.²⁶ In the same area, *gandrung* dancers inserted Islam-influenced tunes into their performances and thus fended off religious objections: saving their art from being abolished by Islamising it.²⁷ Based on his fieldwork in the Pasuruan highlands in 1978–80 and 1985, Hefner observed that *tayuban* dancing was 'everywhere in decline'.²⁸ Around

²⁴ Bisri Effendy, 'Pengantar: Kesenian Indonesia, pertarungan antar kekuasaan', in *Kebijakan kebudayaan di masa orde baru: Laporan penelitian* (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kemasyarakatan LIPI and The Ford Foundation, 2001), pp. 663–5.

²⁵ Kartomi, 'Performance, music and meaning', pp. 116–8.

²⁶ Beatty, *Varieties*, pp. 80–1.

²⁷ Chintya Novi Anoeграjekti, 'Kesenian Using', p. 815.

²⁸ Robert W. Hefner, 'Islamizing Java? Religion and politics in rural East Java', *Journal of Asian Studies* vol. 46, no. 3 (Aug. 1987), p. 547.

Blora, *tayuban* had flourished until 1965–6, but thereafter local authorities and Muslim activists pressed for its prohibition. This was usually on the grounds that it was an expensive extravagance and a venue for immorality, for drunkenness and prostitution were common. In Yogyakarta, *tayuban* was banned except for certain occasions, such as the annual *bersih desa* observances.²⁹ Across Central and East Java one still encounters memories of such folk arts coming under combined political and religious pressure early in the New Order period. In some places, local Golkar officials or the military took over performing troupes, purged them of leftist actors and influences, and then employed them themselves. This was, for example, true of both *kethoprak* in East Java and *ludruk* in Yogyakarta.³⁰



Illustration 9 Performance stage at the village Tutup Ngisor, 2005

²⁹ Amrih Widodo, 'The stages of the state: Arts of the people and rites of hegemonization', *RIMA* vol. 29 (Winter and Summer 1995), pp. 10–1.

³⁰ Barbara Hatley, *Javanese performances on an Indonesian stage: Contesting culture, embracing change* (Singapore: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with NUS Press, 2008), pp. 31–2. In the case of the Sapta Mandala *kethoprak* group set up by the Diponegoro Division in Yogyakarta, some actors who had been imprisoned because of links with PKI were allowed to perform again.

On the slopes of Central Java's Mount Merapi, the village of Tutup Ngisor had avoided involvement with political parties and thereby managed to escape the unwelcome attentions of either religious or regime zealots. Artistic performances began there in the 1920s under the leadership of the village ancestor Rama Yasasudarma, once a court servant of the Mangkunagaran. Performing arts became central to village life. Various idiosyncratic taboos were observed, confirming the essentially spiritual grounding of these arts. The villagers would make no images of Semar, Dewa Ruci, Sang Hyang Wenang or Batara Guru because these are too elevated above humankind, for example; nor would they make the *gunungan* puppet in the *wayang*. During violence associated with the Madiun uprising of 1948, while there were killings in surrounding villages, Tutup Ngisor remained peaceful and the performances went on. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Tutup Ngisor put on its *wayang topeng* based on Panji stories, its *wayang wong*, *ande-ande lumut*, and *Maulid Nabi* performances but stayed resolutely clear of political parties. Thus the villagers escaped repression under the New Order. They were under scrutiny like all the rest of society and needed police permits to perform, but were given them. In the nearby village Sengi, however, the local arts had been dominated by Lekra and the village was unable to revive its arts during the whole of the New Order period.³¹

Local cults led by charismatic figures were a common phenomenon in Javanese history, but now these, too, came under suspicious scrutiny from a young, nervous, muscle-flexing New Order. The bloodiest suppression of such a movement took place in the mountainous region on the boundaries of Blora and Ngawi in 1966. A local holy man calling himself Mbah Suro gathered a large peasant following there. This appears to have been a revival of Saminist movement led in the early 20th century by Surantiko Samin, which rested on indigenous peasant ideas in which Islam played little or no role, and general resistance to any forms of outside authority.³²

³¹ Hairus Salim, 'Pergumulan politik seni: Pengalaman komunitas Tutup Ngisor', in *Kebijakan kebudayaan di masa orde baru: Laporan penelitian* (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kemasyarakatan LIPI and The Ford Foundation, 2001), pp. 821–30. Yasasudarma's dates are given as 1865–1990, making him an improbable 125 years old at death.

³² The Saminist movement, which led to the colonial government arresting and exiling Surantiko Samin (?1859–1914) from Java, rested on a nativist Javanese religion that its adherents called *elmu nabi Adam* (the science of the prophet Adam). This stressed the importance of agricultural labour and sexuality, passive

The government, however, regarded this as a covert Communist revival, so sent in the army para-commandos. Mbah Suro and an uncertain number — evidently around 80 — of his followers were killed.³³

A happier fate awaited a local cult in the area of Blitar although it, too, came under hostile scrutiny early in the New Order. This region was predominantly populated by poor *abangan* — classic recruiting ground for the PKI. In the 1955 elections in Blitar, 46.5 per cent of voters backed PKI and 17.3 per cent voted for PNI, with another 4.8 per cent backing other small *abangan*-oriented parties, for an *abangan* proportion of 68.5 per cent of the vote. The largest *santri* party was — it need hardly be said, in this predominantly rural area — NU, which won 26.8 per cent of Blitar votes, whereas Masyumi picked up a mere 2.3 per cent. Along with some votes for minor *santri*-oriented contestants, this made for a *santri* percentage of just 29.5 per cent of the vote.³⁴ In 1968 there was discovered a genuine PKI underground remnant in southern Blitar. Some surviving leaders of PKI had gone into hiding there, but lost control of their clandestine followers and sympathisers, who began killing NU figures. After about 60 of these had been murdered, the government realised that it was facing a serious PKI remnant. The military crushed this organisation and arrested its leaders along with some 800 followers and then, on the basis of the intelligence gathered, proceeded to purge more PKI sympathisers from the military.³⁵ Intensive Islamisation efforts followed in this region.

The movement of particular interest to us, centred on the village of Tugurejo in South Blitar, escaped accusations of Communism. Its history is emblematic of much else in village Java in the New Order period, and the

resistance and the primacy of the nuclear family, and rejected the money economy, non-Saminist village structures and any form of external authority. It is discussed in Harry J. Benda and Lance Castles, 'The Samin movement', *BKI* vol. 125 (1969), no. 2, pp. 207–40; J. Bijleveld, 'De Saminbeweging', *Koloniale Tijdschrift* vol. 12 (1923), pp. 10–24; and Takashi Shiraishi, 'Dangir's testimony: Saminism reconsidered', *Indonesia* no. 50 (Oct. 1990), pp. 95–120.

³³ K.E. Ward, *The 1971 election in Indonesia: An East Java case study* (Clayton, Vic: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Papers on Southeast Asia no. 2, 1974), p. 147. Soeharto. *Pikiran, ucapan dan tindakan saya*, p. 193, simply calls this 'an attempted PKI revival'.

³⁴ Raharjo Suwandi, *A quest for justice: The millenary aspirations of a contemporary Javanese wali* (*VKI* 182; Leiden: KITLV Press, 2000), p. 38.

³⁵ Harold Crouch, *The army and politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 227.

superb study by Raharjo Suwandi enables us to observe the cult closely.³⁶ Here the *wayang* became a folk dance performance involving the people of Tugurejo and others from surrounding villages. The founder and leader was a local peasant called Embah Wali. In this area, near the south coast of Java, the Goddess of the Southern Ocean was a powerful spiritual force in the minds of villagers. Also powerful was the search for the just king (*Ratu Adil*), an idea that we have encountered above and one that has resonated throughout much of Javanese history. Embah Wali was probably born sometime in the early 1910s.³⁷ In 1935 he began a series of wanderings around Java, followed by a time of ascetic disciplines back in his village. In 1940, he and his wife began living almost entirely naked. Such oddities of behavior, which might invite accusations of mental instability in other societies, in Java marked a person in touch with extraordinary powers.

Late in the Revolution, Embah Wali had a dream and thereupon asked the villagers to perform a *wayang* play. Imitating the sounds of *gamelan* instruments — for they had none — and with no actual puppets to work with, they proceeded to do so mimetically. Soon the villagers were making *gamelan* instruments of whatever they had to hand and performing *wayang wong* dances every night, which continued until 1954. The librettos all had to do with the search for the *Ratu Adil*. In 1955, Embah Wali suddenly reappeared fully dressed in black garb like an ordinary peasant — a mysterious event confirming in the eyes of villagers that he was anything but an ordinary peasant. His following, however, began to dwindle in the 1960s.

Embah Wali was thoroughly ordinary in his demeanor but was widely recognised by his followers as an extraordinary person — a *kerene ratu*, ‘king’s beggar’, who was unlike those who acted as if they were great but lacked true greatness. The movement focused on Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX (r. 1939–88) of Yogyakarta as the true *Ratu Adil* of which Embah Wali declared himself the witness. His further ideas rested on *wayang* analogies — that humans relate to the divine as *wayang* puppets relate to the *dbalang*, that is, with no control of their lives themselves. Sexuality was also a key concept.

³⁶ This account rests on Raharjo Suwandi, *Quest for justice*. Raharjo calls the village ‘Lively Rock’, a pseudonym for Tugurejo, in the Lodoyo district of Blitar. There are also two ethnographic films about this cult made by Raharjo Suwandi, James Fox and Patsy Asch, entitled *In the play of life* and *Consulting Embah Wali*.

³⁷ See Raharjo Suwandi, *Quest for justice*, p. 59 n6, for a discussion of the probable date of birth. Like many Javanese, Embah Wali thought the conjunction of seven- and five-week days at his birth (which is essential information for divination) to be important, but not the year.

Embah Wali divided reality into male and female, the former synonymous with life and giving, the latter with death and taking. He reinterpreted the phrase *Gusti Allah* (the lord God) 'into a composition of two contradictory entities, namely *Gusti*, "Lord" which was understandably male, and *Allah*, which was reinterpreted as *kalah*, or "losing", which was a female quality'. So *Gusti Allah* did not even refer to God in Embah Wali's teachings.³⁸ 'The nature of the male was reducible to the nature of the male sexual organ,' he taught, and 'the vagina (female, earth) was only a place of origin and destination.'³⁹ Such ideas rested on peasant concepts and experiences of life. They had no foundation in Islamic thought and were characteristic of many idiosyncratic cults that could be found across Java — and which would, in coming years, become the targets of Islamising movements.

Embah Wali behaved oddly in the weeks before the coup attempt of 30 September 1965 in Jakarta, digging massive rubbish holes in the village, later interpreted by villagers as a prediction of the killings to come. On the night of the coup attempt he left his house and retired (he used the term *ngungsi*, to take refuge) to a small hut in the rice fields. Such oddities again confirmed his extraordinary status in the minds of villagers. He then suffered a stroke and was completely paralysed for two years. It was his isolation from society in this most troubled of times that probably saved Embah Wali from the fate of Mbah Suro in 1966. Because it was a strong base for PKI, southern Blitar indeed saw some of the worst bloodshed in 1965–6. Raharjo points out⁴⁰ that Islamic activists put heavy pressure on locals to conform to more orthodox standards. The result was, *inter alia*, a backlash that produced widespread conversion to Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism (matters that we will consider below).

In 1970, Embah Wali had recovered from his paralysis and returned to the village, where his followers constructed a new house for him. He began to hold sessions on the veranda, in Javanese called the *emper*. This invited comparison with the sessions of the People's Consultative Assembly in Jakarta, the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR, pronounced *em-pe-er*. So now Tugurejo was the national capital in microcosm and Embah Wali was its master. In the 1971 election campaign, he supported the government party Golkar. This was after he had gone to Jakarta where he stayed with one of his sons who was in the para-commandos. He visited the Jakarta office of

³⁸ Ibid., p. 90.

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 87, 92.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 110–1.

Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX and was given an election leaflet bearing the Sultan's photo, which Embah Wali took as a charter from the *Ratu Adil* to support Golkar.

In 1978 when the government cracked down on student dissent and press criticism (discussed below), Embah Wali's *emper* sessions were ordered to end lest they become a cover for PKI remnants to reassemble. Thereupon Embah Wali declared that one scenario (*lakon*, a term from the *wayang*) had ended and now life must determine the next. Some of his female followers, distressed at this, turned to the *gamelan*, which had not been used since 1954, and again began to play and to dance. 'From the outset, people sensed that this dancing was not normal dancing. Very soon symbolic meanings, as defined by Embah, were attached to the dancing. ... Most saw Embah Wali as a prophet currently engaged in the great work of preparing the coming of a new era of justice, and they wanted to be party to that great work of preparation.'⁴¹ Within six months, some 600 people were attending the weekly dancing session, with the highest recorded attendance being over 900.

Also in 1978, Embah Wali led over 2,000 followers on a 50-bus joint pilgrimage to Yogyakarta to demonstrate their loyalty to their *Ratu Adil*, the Sultan. Embah Wali was also said to be consulting the Goddess of the Southern Ocean regarding a bridge that he was building in Tugurejo, to which messianic expectations were attached. It was opened in 1980 with hundreds of followers dancing *wayang*-style across it. Thereafter more dancing sessions were added to the weekly schedule, so that this curious dancing cult peaked in the early 1980s. One of the major contingents among the dancers came from a neighbouring village and followed an evidently anti-Islamic local faith, which they called *agami Budha Jarwi Wisnu* (the Vishnuite Javanese Buddhist religion). They liked eating dog meat in part because Islamic law declared it *haram*.

In October 1988, Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX died.⁴² Embah Wali just closed the door of his house and marked the Sultan's death in no other way. When Hamengkubuwana X (r. 1988–present) went on the *hajj* to Mecca shortly after his accession, Embah Wali announced that the *Ratu Adil* had gone. In May 1990, Embah Wali himself died. The dancing continued, but the decline that is inevitable when such a figure is lost soon became visible. His third son, the one who had been in the para-commandos, came home and

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 123.

⁴² Ibid., pp. 175–6. Note that Raharjo wrongly gives 1987 as the year of the Sultan's death.

was elected head of the village, but he brought with him a formal bureaucratic style that did not suit everyone, and there was discord within the family.

Raharjo makes a crucial point which we will see applying more broadly to *abangan* affairs after 1965:

As a reaction to the doctrinal trend of the prevailing religious systems, there is a strong feeling in the group against formalized teachings. ... Therefore, the chance for Embah's philosophy and ideology to be systematized for propagation to a wider audience is slight. There are no cadres who can regenerate the ideology; all looked to Embah as the only source of understanding.⁴³

Such an absence of institutionalisation was, and is, a cherished feature of *abangan* village life. We will see, however, that when the few institutions which supported *abangan* life — mainly the political parties PKI and PNI — were removed from the scene, the *abangan* side of Javanese society was left vulnerable and disadvantaged in the face of Islamisation projects.

Kebatinan under the early New Order

Soeharto's personal inclinations towards *kebatinan* did not mean that *kebatinan* groups prospered under the New Order, for they, too, were suspected of PKI sympathies. There were multiple *kebatinan* groups that had become more formalised and organised through the 1950s and 1960s. In his hostile account of *kebatinan* published in 1973, Rahmat Subagya — a pseudonym for the Dutch Jesuit Jan Bakker — lists approximately 280 such groups across Indonesia.⁴⁴ Some were quite large, such as Sumarah, Sapta Darma, Pangestu (all of them founded in the Surakarta and Yogyakarta area of Central Java) and — the most widespread of all — Subud.⁴⁵ But most movements were

⁴³ Ibid., p. 204.

⁴⁴ Rahmat Subagya (pseud. for Jan Bakker), *Kepercayaan, kebatinan, kerohanian, kejiwaan dan agama* (Yogyakarta: Penerbitan Yayasan Kanisius, 1976 [first published in 1973]), pp. 130–8.

⁴⁵ On such movements, see especially Antoon Geels, *Subud and the Javanese mystical tradition* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1997); Harun Hadiwijono, *Man in the present Javanese mysticism* (Baarn: Bosch & Keuning, 1967); Suffridus de Jong, *Een Javaanse levenshouding* (Wageningen: H. Veenman & Zonen B.V., 1973); Paul Stange, "Legitimate" mysticism in Indonesia', *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* vol. 20 (Summer 1986), pp. 76–117; Niels Mulder, *Mysticism and everyday life in contemporary Java* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1978); and the work cited in the previous note. Subud is the only Javanese *kebatinan* movement that has become international; see its website at <http://www.subud.org/>.

quite small and local. In 1955 seventy of these groups founded the All-Indonesia Kebatinan Congress Body (Badan Kongres Kebatinan Seluruh Indonesia, BKKI) in Semarang. After 1965, however, many *kebatinan* groups were banned. According to de Jong, among 286 known groups in Central Java — of whom 177 were small and local — 54 were banned.⁴⁶

In the tense atmosphere of the early New Order, many followers of *kebatinan* converted to major world religions to defend themselves against the charge of lacking a religion, which was tantamount to being accused of Communism. According to official statistics, in Surakarta in 1970 there were 13 *kebatinan* groups registered with a total following of 15,068. The largest groups were Sapta Darma and Jiwa Hayu, each said to have 5,000 followers — the very roundness of the figure demonstrating it to be no more than an estimate. Pangestu was listed with 3582 members. The rest had between 30 and 300 adherents.⁴⁷ Other religious affiliation data from Surakarta, however, gives a different picture, suggesting much larger adherence to *kebatinan* or at least non-affiliation to recognised religious groups. These figures also suggest the scale of conversions to recognised world religions, as people sought refuge there.

Table 8 Religious affiliations in Surakarta, 1974–5⁴⁸

Year	Muslim	Catholic	Protestant	Hindu	Buddhist	Confucian	Other	Total
1974	334,889	38,688	42,552	2395	3398	5980	39,396	467,298
1975	340,496	40,548	45,668	2178	3288	3960	19,879	456,032

Let us assume that the New Order's statistical capacity by 1974–5 was reasonably reliable, a function both of the improvement of its bureaucracy and the intensity of its surveillance of the society. Let us also assume that the 'other' category in Table 8 (for which the census volumes offer no definition) can only mean *kebatinan* or other non-orthodox forms of belief.⁴⁹ These Surakarta figures thus give us a snapshot of extraordinary religious change. Between 1974 and 1975, 19,517 people disappeared from the 'other'

⁴⁶ De Jong, *Javaanse levenshouding*, pp. 11–2. See also Donald J. Porter, *Managing politics and Islam in Indonesia* (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), p. 64.

⁴⁷ *Sala dalam angka 1970: Terbatas* (14 vols [Surakarta, 1972]; mimeo), vol. 6, p. 2.

⁴⁸ Kantor Sensus dan Statistik Kotamadya Dati II Surakarta, *Statistik Kotamadya Daerah Tingkat II Surakarta 1974–1975* ([Surakarta, 1977] mimeo), p. 60.

⁴⁹ The number of Jews, Sikhs, Jains, Baha'is or followers of other minority faiths in Java is insignificant.

category: 49.5 per cent of those listed in 1974. The figures suggest that they went roughly equally to Christianity and Islam. The Catholic and Protestant numbers together for 1974 are 81,240 and for 1975 they are 86,216, an increase of 4,976. The Muslim numbers rose from 334,889 to 340,496, an increase of 5,607. Nearly 9,000 more of the ‘others’ just disappear from the statistics. Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism all declined, the last by 2,020 people. The total population accounted for in 1975 was 11,266 less than in 1974, so the decline in the number of Hindus and Buddhists may not be significant, but the decline in Confucianism (an exclusively Chinese faith) probably is. The drop in ‘others’ certainly is. Seen as percentages, the significance of those changes is clear.

Table 9 Major religious affiliations in Surakarta as percentages of total population, 1974–5⁵⁰

Year	Muslim	Christian (Catholic + Protestant)	Other	Total
1974	71.7	17.4	8.4	97.5
1975	74.7	18.9	4.4	98.0

Thus, a city that had once had a wide variety of religious affiliations with a strong *kebatinan* presence was, by 1975, becoming a city largely divided between Muslims and Christians. The latter already represented nearly 19 per cent of the population, a figure reflecting the growth of Christianity among the Javanese after 1965 — a topic we will turn to shortly. Our immediate interest here, however, is in the decline of *kebatinan*.

It is possible that, as well as government suspicion and suppression and Islamic antipathy, there may have been internal psychological causes for the decline of *kebatinan* early in the New Order. The occult doctrines of *kebatinan* movements commonly include the idea that advanced practitioners acquire superhuman abilities, but not always for positive purposes. Niels Mulder observed in 1969–70 that ‘it is hard to draw the line between magical mysticism and the practice of pure *kebatinan* ... Man can penetrate the cosmos and acquire power and inspiration from higher forces; he may also consciously relate to any of the lower cosmic beings ... [and] ... may

⁵⁰ Source as for Table 8.

be led astray on his mystical journey'.⁵¹ Pangestu taught that practitioners represented God: 'Outer and inner perfection are what enable us to carry out our task as people who are sent by God, to create prosperous tranquility in the society which needs this world to be well-ordered, calm, prosperous, and so on'.⁵² One of the country's foremost experts and practitioners of Javanese-style mysticism, Dr Abdullah Ciptoprawiro, commented in 1977, 'In the Javanese community there are many persons who can come into contact with the spirits.... the spirit of Mount Lawu, the spirit of Mount Merapi, the spirit of the Southern Ocean which is a queen, the queen of the southern seas'. I asked whether someone who achieved ultimate insight (*makrifat*) thereby acquired supernatural powers. 'Yes, indeed yes', he replied. 'He may heal persons, see the future, he may rise upwards, he may go to Mecca within one moment, he may walk on air, he may walk on water, and so on. Many miracles can be done.'⁵³

In the wake of the horrific murders and arbitrary arrests of hundreds of thousands of Javanese — in a situation in which the world was manifestly not 'well-ordered, calm, prosperous' and *kebatinan*'s practitioners were demonstrating no miracles — *kebatinan*'s claim to be a true understanding of the temporal and spiritual worlds may simply have lost much of its credibility, and with it many followers. If one were seeking supernatural powers and spiritual protection in 1965–6, *kebatinan* simply did not look like a credible direction in which to turn. Based on research done 30 years later, Mudjahirin Thohir noted in the area of Jepara that after 1965 *abangan* people washed their hands of politics and 'the Javanist experts (*ahli kejawen*) no longer dared serve the community'.⁵⁴ This was not, of course, true everywhere and at all levels of Javanese society. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many youths in Surakarta were still studying with *gurus* who promised to confer both invulnerability and ultimate mystical insights.⁵⁵ Undoubtedly the same was true across the Javanese-speaking world. It was so in Yogyakarta *kampung* life at that time. But there, youths' claims to have mastered various forms of *ngelmu* — invulnerability, magic to attract women, and so on — were

⁵¹ Mulder, *Mysticism and everyday life*, pp. 24, 33.

⁵² Quoted in de Jong, *Javaanse levenshouding*, p. 34

⁵³ Interview with Dr Abdullah Ciptoprawiro, Jakarta, Aug. 1977. He was a psychiatrist by training and the former head of the navy's medical service.

⁵⁴ Mudjahirin Thohir, *Orang Islam Jawa pesisiran* (Semarang: FASindo, 2006), p. 254. His fieldwork was conducted in 1999–2002.

⁵⁵ James T. Siegel, *Solo in the New Order: Language and hierarchy in an Indonesian city* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 139.

dismissed by the older generation. The latter said that the young lacked the self-control required really to master such supernatural capacities.⁵⁶ However much young fellows sought the old *ngelmu*, in the face of government and religious pressure to follow a recognised world religion, the influence of a whole body of such indigenous speculation and spiritual practice was diminishing. Never again would nearly 40,000 people in Surakarta declare themselves to belong to some faith other than a major world religion.

One should not imagine, however, that *kebatinan* entirely lost its influence within the New Order context or that the initial regime hostility persisted. After the suppression of *kebatinan* groups regarded as Communist or sympathetic to Communism — a suppression welcomed by *santri* activists — the dominant *kebatinan* style of Soeharto and other senior Javanese in the regime had a predictable impact. In fact, in his book of 1978 — resting on fieldwork in 1969–70 in Yogyakarta — Niels Mulder already observed that ‘politically, mysticism appears to advance steadily with much of the current military and administrative leadership firmly rooted in an *abangan* Javanese background’.⁵⁷ Muslim leaders regarded *kebatinan* with loathing and by the early 1970s feared that the regime would accord it the official status of a religion (*agama*) under the Constitution — something which *kebatinan* movements had sought since 1957 — and thus encourage *kebatinan*’s growth and protect it from persecution.⁵⁸ The village arts that had suffered so much in the immediate wake of 1965 also revived in some areas, as the New Order government found them useful as a tool of political propaganda, just as PKI had done. Muhammadiyah people in Kota Gede regarded *kethoprak* as a source of immorality, with its obscenities and its stories of — as Nakamura describes it — ‘rapes, abductions, conspiracies, betrayals, assassinations, sorceries [and] massacres’, with prostitution and gambling going on around the performances. Muhammadiyah leaders thus welcomed *kethoprak*’s precipitate decline with the destruction of PKI and Lekra, but were dismayed to discover that as the 1971 elections approached, Golkar was encouraging it again.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Patrick Guinness, *Kampung, Islam and state in urban Java* (Singapore: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with NUS Press, 2009), pp. 124–5.

⁵⁷ Mulder, *Mysticism and everyday life*, p. 7.

⁵⁸ See Hefner, *Civil Islam*, pp. 169–71.

⁵⁹ Mitsuo Nakamura, *The crescent arises over the banyan tree: A study of the Muhammadiyah movement in a Central Javanese town* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1983), pp. 169–71.

Many *santris* therefore continued to regard *kebatinan* as a serious threat to their Islamising agenda. In the case of many Modernists, this was also an agenda for greater rationality. The former Masyumi politician and Modernist thinker H. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara said in 1977 that,

kebatinan in reality doesn't believe in the real God, but they believe in a god which is created by their own thinking. ... And so not only do they form a clear danger for true religious thinking and feeling, but they form also a danger for scientific development.... I fear especially the influence of the so-called *kebatinan*, because *kebatinan* members are people who are ... far from scientific thinking.⁶⁰

The fear of Communism masquerading as *kebatinan* was also in the minds of Modernists long after even many New Order regime leaders thought that risk to have been dealt with.⁶¹

Kebatinan's social and political position was finally regulated in 1973. Islamic leaders resisted any idea of the government recognising these indigenous faiths as religions (*agama*), which would give them support and protection through the Ministry of Religion. In the face of implacable Islamic hostility, the government was obliged to compromise. The 1945 constitution guarantees the right of all citizens to worship according to their 'religions' (*agama*) and 'beliefs' (*kepercayaan*). The regime used this distinction to say that *kebatinan* groups should be regarded as 'beliefs' rather than 'religions' and thus belonged under the Ministry of Culture rather than that of Religion. This was an arrangement that Islamic leaders could live with, if grumpily. *Kebatinan* sects were watched over by a surveillance body called PAKEM, originally set up in 1954 under the Ministry of Religion. This name was an abbreviation for *Peninjauan Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat*⁶² (Observation of People's Belief Streams) but it was also a Javanese pun, for a *pakem* is a kind of handbook, particularly for briefly noting the content of *wayang* stories. In 1960 PAKEM was moved from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Religion to the Attorney General's department. After 1973, *kebatinan* groups were thus not abolished, but they were not accepted as religions either, and they were subject to government surveillance. Soeharto's own *kebatinan* style

⁶⁰ Interview with H. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Jakarta, 3 Aug. 1977.

⁶¹ Interview with H. Ir. Basit Wahid, Yogyakarta, 9 Aug. 1977. He was from the Faculty of Exact Sciences at Gadjah Mada University and a prominent local Modernist figure.

⁶² This and related matters are set out in a chronology of *kebatinan* in Rahmat Subagya, *Kepercayaan*, pp. 115–27.

was a mixed blessing, for as the quotes from him above suggest, it is unlikely that Soeharto thought anyone else's versions of *kebatinan* to be of comparable merit to his own.

The threat of *kebatinan* was a major issue for Islamic activists, but it was an old issue. The new issue was Christianisation, the scale of which startled *santris* in the wake of the violence of 1965–6. Just when they thought that Islam might at last have got rid of its major opponent — the Communist Party — Islamic organisations found themselves facing one of the highest rates — some claimed the highest rate — of conversion to Christianity in the world. Thus, to political frustration was added profound religio-social frustration.

Christianisation and other conversions away from Islam

Conversions by *abangan* away from nominal Muslim status were widespread in the early New Order and compounded the frustration and anger of many Islamic activists. For a time it even seemed possible that Java might become the only major area of the contemporary Islamic world where Islamisation was brought to a halt, perhaps even reversed. As Boland observed in the late 1960s, 'After 1965 Muslims have more and more realised that the Islamisation of Indonesia would in fact mean the Islamisation of Java, and this was a question of now or never'.⁶³

Conversions to Hinduism and Buddhism were significant in some areas, but of less significance overall than Christianisation and in some places not enduring, as Hindus and Buddhists later reconverted to Islam. Conversions to Christianity, on the other hand, produced a major and ongoing transformation of Javanese society. One of the driving forces in these conversions was animosity towards Islam among *abangan* who had previously supported or been sympathetic to PKI. Connected with this was widespread revulsion at the role of Islamic activists in the slaughters of 1965–6. There was a long-standing pattern of whole families, hamlets and villages being either Muslim or Christian, with the latter in a small minority. After 1965, it was still true that conversions were often communal, but sometimes they were individual, so that villages, hamlets and even families became multi-religious. In 1969 an elderly court servant in Yogyakarta whom I worked with in the court library for many months — an elegant traditional gentleman beyond the squabbles of the young — told me that one of his sons was a Catholic and tried to

⁶³ Boland, *Struggle of Islam*, p. 191.

persuade him to go to mass, while another was a devout Muslim and pressed him to join in ritual prayer; his response was to say to both that he was Javanese and, therefore, would they please not bother him about such matters.

We will briefly consider some examples of the Hinduisation story before discussing Christianisation. In turning to Hinduism, of course *abangan* Javanese could think of themselves as returning to something older, perhaps more authentically Javanese, than Islam. For *kebatinan* devotees, it was the easiest way to move to a recognised world religion. Moreover, the neighbouring island of Bali was almost entirely Hindu and thus a source of inspiration and support. The Parisada Hindu Dharma (Council for the Hindu Religion, est. 1959) was active in promoting more orthodox forms of Hinduism not only in Bali itself, but also where Hinduism was spreading; from 1968 it was affiliated with the regime party Golkar and thus insulated against attack.⁶⁴ Early impressions were that conversion to Hinduism was, as Mulder put it, ‘phenomenal and sustained’.⁶⁵ And indeed Hindu communities were reestablished among Javanese for the first time in several centuries. Yet this was not to prove as widespread or abiding as many observers expected at the time. In the 1971 census, some 168,000 Hindus were counted across Central and East Java and Yogyakarta — a significant figure in itself, but not even half of 1 per cent of the population of those areas. This increase was, however, concentrated in particular areas, particularly Gunung Kidul, Klaten, Boyolali and Banyuwangi.⁶⁶

In southern Banyuwangi, just across the narrow straits from Bali, heavy pressure for deeper Islamisation after 1965 led to a backlash and large-scale conversions to Hinduism. A Hindu priest was brought in from Bali to serve these new believers. But by the 1990s reconversion to Islam was occurring. By 1992, reports Beatty, only a ‘handful’ of Hindus were left in one village; when one of them died, he was given a Muslim burial. Nevertheless, in a

⁶⁴ M.L. Lyon, ‘The Hindu revival in Java: Politics and religious identity’, in James J. Fox *et al.* (eds), *Indonesia: Australian perspectives* (Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, 1980), pp. 205–20; Freek L. Bakker, ‘Balinese Hinduism and the Indonesian state: Recent developments’, *BKI* vol. 153 (1997), no. 1, pp. 15–41. There is some confusion over the name of the national Hindu organisation: Bakker explains that it called itself Parisada Dharma Hindu Bali when set up in 1959, but in 1964 adopted Parisada Hindu Dharma to reflect the idea that Hinduism was not restricted to Bali.

⁶⁵ Mulder, *Mysticism and everyday life*, p. 7.

⁶⁶ Gavin W. Jones, ‘Religion and education in Indonesia’, *Indonesia* no. 22 (Oct. 1976), p. 35 n35.

sense there was a return to a pre-Islamic past in this area, with Balinese and East Javanese Hindus again in touch with each other. A grand new Hindu temple was opened on Mount Sumeru in 1992.⁶⁷ North of Kediri, the period after 1965 saw the first conversions to Hinduism. A local person had gone to study Hinduism in Bali and brought the faith back to the village of Tanon, whose inhabitants were mostly peasant labourers. Christianity also came, not as a process of conversion, but rather as new people moved into the village. In 2004, 30 per cent of the village was Hindu, compared with 10 per cent Christian (mostly Catholics) and 60 per cent Muslim, plus one person who was Buddhist. Because of interreligious marriage there, many families had several religions within themselves.⁶⁸

On the slopes of Mount Lawu near Surakarta, where are located the famous 15th-century Hindu temples Candhi Cetha and Candhi Sukuh, the village Milir had a head known for his supernatural abilities and contact with local spirits. He pressed for his beliefs to be recognised by the government as part of Hinduism so as to defend this local faith from pressure for greater Islamisation coming from the lowlands. At the time of his fieldwork in the mid-1980s, Joseph Errington observed how the electronically amplified call to prayer emanating from a government-sponsored mosque downhill could be heard clearly in Milir, and how Islamic activists were trying to abolish local spirit cults. Having successfully won government recognition as Hindus, however, the Milir people found themselves obliged to become orthodox Hindus. A Hindu teacher was introduced into the local school and the religion was taught on the basis of Education Ministry textbooks. Old Javanese — seen as the sacred language of Javanese and Balinese Hindus — was also taught. In 1991 the Hindus of Milir opened their own temple built with Parisada Hindu Dharma support.⁶⁹

Thus Hinduisation was significant, but it had nothing like the impact of Christianisation. Nor did it evoke the anxiety — indeed frequently the rage — of *santri* Muslims as Christianisation did.

The increase in conversions of *abangan* Javanese to Christianity appears to have begun already in 1964 in some areas, but massive growth took place beginning in 1965. A major study was done near the time by the Baptist

⁶⁷ Beatty, *Varieties*, pp. 150, 217–9, 223–4.

⁶⁸ *RK*, 13 Dec. 2004.

⁶⁹ J. Joseph Errington, *Shifting languages: Interaction and identity in Javanese Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 29–34. The village is identified, *à la* anthropology, with the pseudonym ‘Mulih’; I am grateful to Prof. Errington for giving me the correct name of the village.

missionary Avery Willis Jr., provocatively (to Muslims) entitled *Indonesian revival: Why two million came to Christ*. The author worked as a missionary in Bogor (West Java) and Jember (East Java) from 1964 and moved to the Baptist Theological Seminary in Semarang in 1970.⁷⁰ The research is not quite as authoritative as it seems at first sight. It implies at times that it rests on interviews with 500 recent converts, but in fact among the 515 people interviewed, there were only 270 converts. The rest were Christian leaders of five Protestant denominations in Java and older Christians, people who were thought to be well-informed about the conversions. The interviews were done by Baptist Seminary students or by Willis himself, which — we may presume — would have had some impact on the responses received.⁷¹ Nevertheless, the patterns uncovered by Willis are consistent with other evidence.

Willis found that converts were consistently from the *abangan* community, where PKI had found its support. Politics was clearly central to this wave of conversions — it was not entirely the fruit of ambitious proselytising by the Protestants. As Willis commented, ‘The sickle of political turbulence reaped a harvest of Indonesians for Christianity’.⁷² His respondents cited the government requirement (formalised in 1966) that all Indonesians must adhere to one of the five recognised religions as being among the main reasons for their conversion. As *abangan*, they found themselves accused of not really having a religion, and thus were at risk of being labeled Communist. They also cited the role of Islamic activists in the killings of 1965–6 as a major reason for turning away from their nominal allegiance to Islam. The support that Christian churches offered to the families of those who had been murdered or arrested also attracted them. And, Willis believed, the Christian denominations’ greater openness to local culture made Christianity an attractive choice.⁷³ He did not assess the role of Christianity’s

⁷⁰ Avery T. Willis, Jr, *Indonesian revival: Why two million came to Christ* (South Pasadena, CA: William Carey Library, 1977). This was originally a D.Theol. thesis at the Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, Fort Worth, Texas.

⁷¹ Ibid., pp. 221–2. The denominations were the Gereja Kristen Jawi Wetan, Gereja-Gereja Kristen Jawi, Gereja Kristen Jawa Tengah Utara, Gereja Injili di Tanah Jawa, and Gabungan Gereja-Gereja Baptis Indonesia.

⁷² Willis, *Indonesian revival*, p. 14.

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 13, 14, 21, 24, 50, 63–4, 196. ‘Spiritual need’ was also given as a reason for conversion, which, says Willis (p. 14), was often depicted as ‘inner need, emptiness of soul, not at peace’. But the meaning of this is vague and we need to remember that converts were conversing either with the missionary Willis himself or with his seminary students.

less onerous ritual obligations — weekly church attendance rather than five daily prayers, permission to eat pork and so on — in conversions. These may not, in any case, have been aspects that new converts would have emphasised to the seminary students interviewing them.

The growth in the five Protestant denominations in Java that Willis studied was truly remarkable. Total membership rose from around 60,000 in 1945 to 90,000 in 1955 and 95,000 in 1960 — a rate of growth somewhat ahead of general population growth.⁷⁴ In 1965, however, it exploded to around 200,000. Willis describes the challenge that these unexpected conversions posed for the Christian churches:

Pastors soon found that they could not possibly minister to all of those requesting their counsel, so they turned to elders and other church leaders for assistance. Teams were organised by some churches to go into the surrounding countryside, teach the catechism or new members' classes, and conduct services. ... In many cases local leaders took over the day-by-day ministry in their villages, with only occasional visits by representatives from the mother church.

Calls often came from surrounding villages, requesting these new groups of Christians to come tell about their new faith; thus some new churches were responsible for as many as nine or ten more village congregations. The mother churches and their pastors sought to control the situation through occasional visits, administration of baptisms and the Lord's Supper, and training classes for new leaders.⁷⁵

Between 1960 and 1971, the membership of the five denominations studied by Willis grew phenomenally from 96,871 to 311,778, an increase of over 220 per cent. In 1965–7 the annual rate of growth was 27.6 per cent; in 1968–71, 13.7 per cent.⁷⁶ Most conversions in his study were of groups. 'Individuals, often village leaders, talked to their "in-groups" about the possibility of their becoming Christians together. Occasionally all of them did so together, but more frequently one group would be followed by related groups over a period of months or years.'⁷⁷

Across Central and East Java and Yogyakarta, in the 1971 census nearly 1,024,000 Christians were recorded. While this was of the order of 2 per

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 7; Widjojo Nitisastro, *Population trends*, p. 161, estimates Java's population in 1960 to have been 1.25 times the population of 1945. The growth in church figures here shows a growth of approximately 1.6 times.

⁷⁵ Willis, *Indonesian revival*, p. 20.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 110.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 128.

cent of the total population, it was largely concentrated in urban areas and thus more visible — particularly to the Modernists whose own base was overwhelmingly urban. The urban population of all of Java other than Jakarta was 9.5 per cent Christian; in Central Java and Yogyakarta it was 11.6 per cent Christian. Conversions were particularly notable among young adults. Of the urban population between the ages of 20 and 29, 15.8 per cent of those in Central Java and Yogyakarta were Christian in 1971 and 9.3 per cent of those in East Java. Only 0.8 per cent of rural dwellers across Java were Christian.⁷⁸ As will be seen in Table 10, the 1980 census showed that Christianity was still spreading, but — except in Yogyakarta — at a slower pace than in 1965–71.

Table 10 Muslim and Christian religious affiliations as percentages of total population, 1971 and 1980⁷⁹

Area	Islam		Christian (Catholic + Protestant)		Total	
	1971	1980	1971	1980	1971	1980
Central Java	96.4	96.1	2.1	2.6	98.5	98.7
Yogyakarta	93.5	92.4	4.6	6.8	98.1	99.2
East Java	96.9	96.6	1.7	2.0	98.6	98.6

In Surakarta — one of the most polarised urban societies in polarised Java — the trend towards Christianisation continued. We noted above (Table 9) that by 1975 the Christian (Catholic and Protestant) population of Surakarta had already reached 18.9 per cent. Christianisation continued through the 1970s until the city of Surakarta was about one-quarter Christian, and then remained at that level through the 1980s, as the following table shows.

⁷⁸ Jones, 'Religion and education', pp. 28, 31–2, 34–5.

⁷⁹ *Beberapa ciri pemeluk agama di Indonesia 1980* (Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik [1984] (mimeo), p. 4. The data in this source also reflects the educational differences between Christians and Muslims, with the latter being less likely to be literate, less likely to command Bahasa Indonesia and more likely to be agricultural workers.

Table 11 Christian population in Surakarta as percentage of total population, 1977–90⁸⁰

Year	Christian population (Catholic + Protestant)
1977	21.7
1979	24.2
1980	24.5
1981	24.1
1982	23.8
1983	24.0
1984	24.2
1985	24.6
1986	24.5
1987	24.6
1988	24.9
1989	24.5
1990	25.0

In other cities the Christian population also grew, but less dramatically, and it tended to stabilise, even decline slightly, in the 1980s. In Yogyakarta, for example, the Christian population in 1980 was 18.1 per cent of the total population, but in 1990 a lower proportion at 16.6 per cent.⁸¹ We will see below that in the 1970s Surakarta was also the birth place of several of the most puritanical Modernist and Revivalist movements, suggesting that there developed a dialectical relationship there between vigorous Dakwahism and Christianisation, each feeding the other.

Boland observed that the wave of conversions attracted the attention of some of Christianity's 'most fanatical representatives', including Jehovah's Witnesses and the Seventh Day Adventists.⁸² But more established Protestant denominations such as those represented in Willis's study and the

⁸⁰ Based on relevant volumes of the *Statistik Kotamadya Surakarta* series: see the bibliography. Note that the figures for 1978 were not locatable.

⁸¹ Statistical data gathered on my behalf by Arif Maftuhin from Yogyakarta statistics.

⁸² Boland, *Struggle of Islam*, p. 233.

Catholic church also faced a deluge of aspirant converts. The Catholic church was said at the time to be more cautious about baptising new members until it was confident of the genuineness of their new faith. Growth was nevertheless significant. In the diocese of Semarang, for example, the Catholic church more than doubled in membership in only a decade. It grew from some 103,000 members in 1964 to 234,000 in 1973, increasing by a factor of 2.27.⁸³

Several case studies have captured the grass-roots dynamics of this religious change. In 1999–2002, Mudjahirin Thohir gathered memories of these events in the north coastal villages of Bondo and Bangsri, near Jepara. There, many *abangan* — accused of not actually having a religion — were suspected of pro-PKI attitudes and were thus threatened by Ansor and other youth groups. Many were killed or jailed. Churches already existed in the area, and now *abangan* flocked to them. One informant reported that he had been a Muslim, but seeing many of his friends murdered led him to become a Christian in order to be safe. A few locals also embraced Buddhism. In 2001, Bangsri's population was 7.2 per cent Christian (96.9 per cent of them Protestants); in Bondo the figure was fully 48.8 per cent (entirely Protestant).⁸⁴

Singgih Nugroho also gathered memories of these events in the region of Salatiga, in an *abangan* area where PKI had been strong.⁸⁵ In the 1960s, the Islam of many local people was so nominal that a former village secretary in the years 1961–74 recalled that 'at that time many people, like me, said they followed Islam but never carried out the practices that it taught. In fact the *modin* [religious leader] never prayed. In fact he was a seeker of Javanist *ilmu*.'⁸⁶ In Singgih Nugroho's field site, which he calls 'Ngampel', Christian proselytism had begun as early as 1963, as rural politics heated up during the PKI's 'unilateral action' campaign. The Protestant pastor who was invited to come there employed songs in Javanese and *kethoprak* performances, reinforcing the idea that Christianity was consistent with Javanese identity. In December 1963, Christmas was observed in 'Ngampel' and baptisms were held in May 1964. *Santri-abangan* differences in the village now began

⁸³ Singgih Nugroho, *Menyintas dan menyeberang*, p. 8.

⁸⁴ Mudjahirin Thohir, *Orang Islam Jawa pesisiran*, pp. 149, 223, 252–3.

⁸⁵ The following account concerning 'Ngampel' rests on Singgih Nugroho, *Menyintas dan menyeberang*, particularly pp. 97 et seqq. His interviews were gathered over 2001–8.

⁸⁶ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 149.

to transform into Muslim-Christian distinctions. There were initially some difficulties between the new converts and church authorities over non-Christian Javanese practices, however, for the new Christians maintained circumcision and *slametans* in the interest of village solidarity. Eventually, however, they abandoned these practices.

When the killings began in surrounding villages in 1965–6, many *abangan* asked the local Christians to be allowed to join them. In July 1966, 106 new Christians were baptised in ‘Ngampel’ (a village of only some 200 people); by then over 80 per cent of the village was Christian. When Singgih Nugroho conducted his interviews over 40 years later, he gained the impression that most of these people had converted for political reasons, i.e., as *abangan* accused of being Communists, they sought protection in Christianity, and were driven away from Islam by the role of Islamic activists in the killings. But the cultural and, we might say, comfort factors also played a role. One respondent commented that ‘the reason I converted to Christianity ... was entirely because that religion uses Javanese so that I could study and follow it. That is very different from Islam that uses Arabic and has many prohibitions.’⁸⁷ As time passed and politics became less violent, however, some Christian converts did return to Islam or turn to Buddhism. Islam was sometimes thought more appropriate for ordinary villagers than Christianity, with its more affluent and better educated followers, while Buddhism was thought by some to be more authentically Javanese.

Many who had been held without trial as political prisoners after 1965 also embraced Christianity, either during their captivity or after their release. Factors in their decision were the support shown by Christian churches to their families and the Christian proselytism they encountered while in captivity. Some priests and pastors active in this work — politically courageous as it was in the early New Order period — were indeed detained and interrogated by a suspicious military. This contrasted strongly with the approach of Islamic organisations in some areas. The animosity between PKI and Islamic organisations — particularly NU at grass-roots level — was so profound that when prisoners were released, rather than launching proselytism programmes among them, Muslim organisations sometimes monitored them like enemies about to arise again. These new Christians sometimes faced discrimination from more established Christians, who doubted the sincerity of their faith, or who feared that their presence would

⁸⁷ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 177.

make the Church suspect in the eyes of the New Order regime. But for former political prisoners, Islam was still far less welcoming.⁸⁸

The reaction of Islamic leaders — particularly Modernists — to this wave of Christianisation was dismay and fury. There appeared, as Boland puts it, an ‘endless stream of apologetic and polemic publications’ by Muslim activists attacking Christianity.⁸⁹ In 1968 the Muhammadiyah newspaper *Mertju Suar* wrote,

Now when Sukarno and the Communist Party have disappeared from the scene, it should not be thought that attempts to strike at the Muslims have vanished, too. There are new enemies who are no less ‘fierce’ against the Muslims. They belong to a group known in Islamic literature as ‘the Book Disciples’ [Christians], who have grown big by virtue of the tolerance of the Muslims.⁹⁰

This tolerance had its limits. The foremost Modernist leader, Mohamad Natsir, said the following in 1977:

Let us start with the principle that Islam teaches tolerance, religious tolerance. That means that there should be co-existence between religious communities; that is one thing. The second thing is that does not mean that a Muslim should be idle and look with crossed arms at the activities of the [Christian] missionaries — and most of them are missionaries from outside Indonesia — to practice their proselytism, to convert the Muslims into Christians. Now this is becoming a problem in Indonesia. ... What is very strange, according to my opinion, is the

⁸⁸ In Kim’s research site near Yogyakarta, too, seven ex-PKI households converted to Protestantism; Kim, *Reformist Muslims*, pp. 62, 185.

⁸⁹ Boland, *Struggle of Islam*, pp. 225–9. Boland summarises several of these publications. An authoritative study of Muslim-Christian relations in the New Order is provided by Mujiburrahman, *Feeling threatened: Muslim-Christian relations in Indonesia’s New Order* (Leiden: ISIM; Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006).

⁹⁰ Translation by Alan A. Samson in his article ‘Islam in Indonesian politics’, *Asian Survey* vol. 8, no. 12 (Dec. 1968), pp. 1014. His term ‘the Book Disciples’ is undoubtedly what is more usually translated as ‘the people of the book’ (Arabic *ahl al-kitāb*), a Qur’anic term used to describe both Jews and Christians as prior recipients of books of divine revelation. Sharon comments, ‘Most references to *ahl al-kitāb* in the *Qur’an* are polemical. These peoples (or, frequently, the “disbelievers” from among them) are basically the enemies of the Muslims, who wish that the former accept their revelation in the *Qur’an*. ... On the other hand, the *Qur’an* also seeks common ground between Muslims and *ahl al-kitāb*’; M. Sharon, ‘People of the Book’, in Jane Dammen McAuliffe (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān* (6 vols; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2001–6), vol. 4, p. 36.

missionary organisations, especially from Europe and America and so on, are very much [more] concerned with the de-Islamisation of Islamic countries than the de-Christianisation of the Christian communities in Europe.⁹¹

Muslim leaders frequently quoted *Qur'an* 109 to explain their tolerance towards other religions: 'Disbelievers: I do not worship what you worship, you do not worship what I worship, I will never worship what you worship, you will never worship what I worship: you have your religion and I have mine.'⁹² This evident license for religious difference did not, however, embrace the idea of religious change. Islam — like many another faith — has an abhorrence of apostasy. The punishment for apostasy conventionally approved by the medieval jurists, on the basis of several *Hadiths*, was death.⁹³ In independent Indonesia, such punishment was and is inapplicable, but it reflects the depths of Muslim animosity to conversion from Islam. So when the principle of tolerance ran into the fact of apostasy in the early New Order, the patience of Muslim leaders wore thin.

Prof. Rasjidi, whom we have already met above, commented after attending a Christian-Muslim conference in Spain that, 'Mutual respect is alright and this is what we have to do, all of us and especially Islam. ... But mutual recognition is something which is contrary to religion itself because everything has its own teaching and its own dogma.'⁹⁴ The Muhammadiyah leader Djarnawi Hadikusuma struggled somewhat to balance the imperatives of each-one-to-his-own-religion and abhorrence of apostasy. After first citing *Qur'an* 109, he said, 'So we have the opinion that the followers of a certain religion should not be the target of the propagation of another religion'. Specifically, he said that the building of churches in Muslim communities constituted 'an act of intolerance'. He went on, rather remarkably in the light of conventional Islamic jurisprudence, 'Every man has the right to change his religion with his own will and conscience, beyond any compulsion and persuasion'. But the abhorrence of apostasy soon emerged: 'Although every Muslim has the right to do so, but in doing so he has condemned himself

⁹¹ Interview with H. Dr Mohammad Natsir, Jakarta, 14 Aug. 1977.

⁹² Abdel Haleem's translation: *The Qur'an: A new translation* by M.A.S. Abdel Haleem (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 441.

⁹³ An authoritative study of this issue is to be found in Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed, *Freedom of religion, apostasy and Islam* (Aldershot, Hants, and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004).

⁹⁴ Interview with Prof. Dr H.M. Rasjidi, Jakarta, Aug. 1977.

to the wrong path. I think every religion abhors this act.’ He nevertheless asserted that ‘Islam can work together with the followers of other religions and Islam does not attack any other religion’. What if Islam is attacked itself, I asked? ‘In case Islam itself is attacked, of course, the Muslims will — you know — take the necessary steps,’ he said, slamming his fist on the table before him.⁹⁵

Although there were Muslims in Java at all levels who were unhappy with the rampant Christianisation going on, the level of distress at these conversions was rather less on the Traditionalist side of Islam. This was no doubt in part because Christianisation was more prominent in urban than in rural contexts. Furthermore, in rural villages it was occurring among *abangan* who had formerly supported or sympathised with PKI and were thus already thought of as NU’s enemies. Abdurrahman Wahid said that ‘Not all of us are feeling threatened’ and himself often took part in church gatherings, explaining Islam to Christian pastors. Differentiating NU from Modernists, he said that he saw no need actively to campaign against Christianity. Instead, ‘we try to improve our followers’, he said.⁹⁶ When the World Council of Churches insensitively proposed to hold its fifth international assembly in Jakarta in 1975, Modernist leaders were incensed. ‘What is the use of that?’ Mohamad Roem asked himself. ‘Is it not something of a show of force? ... There are not so many Christians here. So I think that is the limit.’⁹⁷ The Modernist magazine *Panji Masyarakat* also used the term ‘show of force’ in denouncing the idea. Rasjidi denounced it in a book published by the Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, about which, more below) in 1974. Yet, when the head of the Indonesian Council of Churches, the retired senior army figure T.B. Simatupang, had first explored the possibility of holding the assembly in Indonesia, the idea was welcomed by the NU leader Idham Chalid. In the end, however, Muslim opposition led to the assembly being held in Nairobi instead.⁹⁸

If Traditionalist NU, with its networks of *kyais* and *pesantrens* across rural Java, felt less threatened by Christianisation than did the urban-based Modernists, it was more threatened by the New Order regime itself. For there began a competition in the countryside that pitted NU’s dominance

⁹⁵ Interview with H. Djarnawi Hadikusuma, Yogyakarta, 11 Aug. 1977. At this time Djarnawi was Secretary-General of the Muhammadiyah Executive Board.

⁹⁶ Interview with Ky. H. Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 7 Aug. 1977.

⁹⁷ Interview with Dr Mohamad Roem, Jakarta, 3 Aug. 1977.

⁹⁸ Mujiburrahman, *Feeling threatened*, pp. 65–71.

of religious life against the regime's totalitarian aspirations to control every aspect of society, including Islam at village level.

Government competition

From its inception, Soeharto's New Order regime was determined to root out Communism and to control how people from the top of society to the bottom behaved and thought. Clearly religion — above all Islam — was a useful tool to this end. There was nothing peculiarly Indonesian, Javanese or Islamic about this. As Isaiah Berlin observed more generally from his understanding mainly of Western history, 'Some unscrupulous managers of men have, in the course of history, used religious teachings to make men less discontented with brutal and iniquitous treatment'.⁹⁹ But there were local peculiarities to be dealt with, above all that rural Islam was dominated by NU, for Soeharto's was not a regime that wished to share its hoped-for control of society with an organisation it could not itself control. Indeed, NU had shown itself nearly impervious to control by any regime. Its foundation was a network of personal and familial relations among *kyais* and its institutional base was its *pesantrens*, which operated as independent educational institutions teaching the classic works of Traditionalist Islam — the so-called 'yellow books' (*kitab kuning*)¹⁰⁰ — with funding from the students, their families, business activities of the *kyais* and endowments. It was not easy for any government to take control of such a network, so the New Order decided instead that it would compete.

It was one of the political ironies of New Order history that the polarisation between *abangan* and *santri* was, at its start, still so strong that *abangan* were unlikely to lend political support to any Islamic party and thus ended up supporting the new regime — even though it was that regime that had so convincingly weakened or destroyed the main *abangan* political institutions, PNI and PKI. Christian converts of course frequently shifted allegiance to the small Indonesian Christian (that is, Protestant) Party (Parkindo: Partai Kristen Indonesia) or to the Catholic Party (Partai Katholik). But when the regime turned Golkar into an electoral vehicle — which it claimed was not really a party, but the alternative to parties — the

⁹⁹ From his essay 'From hope and fear set free', first published in 1978, to be found in Isaiah Berlin, *The proper study of mankind: An anthology of essays* (ed. Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer. London: Pimlico, 1998), p. 112.

¹⁰⁰ See van Bruinessen, '*Pesantren* and *kitab kuning*'.

abangan constituency supported it heavily as a bulwark against Islam. Thus the New Order regime inherited the constituency of the PKI, along with many others who did not wish to support a religious party. In his study of the 1971 election in East Java, Ward observed that 'The core Golkar constituency ... consisted of the two *aliran* and the two parties of East Java most affected by the military-bureaucratic power: the *abangan* peasantry of the PKI and the *abangan* population still under the sway of the *priyayi* civil service of the PNI.'¹⁰¹ Inheriting an *abangan* constituency and intending to dominate the *santri* constituency as well, the New Order regime embarked on processes that would, in the end, make *aliran* politics a thing of the past in Java.

At the level of national politics, NU fell into some disfavour with the regime in its early years. The author of the authoritative study of NU's political relations with the New Order, Andrée Feillard, writes of the estrangement between NU and the regime in this period.¹⁰² In 1971, NU lost the post of Minister of Religion, for the first time since 1953, when the government appointed Prof. Mukti Ali, who had studied at McGill University under the noted scholar Wilfred Cantwell Smith. Mukti Ali was to become a crucial figure in the modernisation of Islamic education in Indonesia,¹⁰³ but when he first visited East Java in 1971, the *kyais* there were unsure what to make of him and were concerned that regime programmes would interfere with their influence in village societies.¹⁰⁴

At local level, the early effects of the regime's determined depoliticisation and demobilisation of the countryside could be seen. The New Order's emphasis was on economic development and security, not on mobilising the masses. A comfortable quiescence, indeed political boredom, was the goal, and anyone watching the excruciatingly dull discussions of development on Indonesian television in those years would be confident that this goal was achievable. In this environment, Hermawan Sulistya reports that in the Jombang-Kediri area, *pesantrens* began to lose their influence.¹⁰⁵ Ward noted the ambivalence of NU's views of the government, which combined 'a self-

¹⁰¹ K.E. Ward, *The 1971 election in Indonesia: an East Java case study* ([Clayton, Vic:] Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Papers on Southeast Asia no. 2, 1974), p. 172.

¹⁰² Feillard, *Islam et armée*, p. 119 et seqq.

¹⁰³ For a biography of Mukti Ali, see Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam, *Menteri-menteri Agama RI*, pp. 271–319. He was born in Cepu, Central Java, in 1923, and served as Minister of Religion from 1971 to 1978. He died in 2004.

¹⁰⁴ Ward, *1971 election*, p. 113.

¹⁰⁵ Sulistyo, *Palu arit di lading tebu*, pp. 224–5.

satisfying conviction that it is still struggling for an Islamic state' with what others regarded as opportunism in trying to work with the regime.¹⁰⁶

We have already noted how senior military figures were involved in establishing Pendidikan Tinggi Da'wah Islam (PTDI: Islamic Proselytism Higher Education) in Surakarta during the Guided Democracy period, which was moved to Jakarta in 1965. This was a proselytism body that intended to have branches down to village level.¹⁰⁷ Other regime initiatives followed in the early New Order. Ky. H. Anwar Iskandar (Gus War) of the Jamsaren *pesantren* in Kediri spoke of government sponsorship of religious education in surrounding, ex-PKI areas after 1966. Both *kyais* and Christian pastors were sent by the government to promote religion, he recalled.¹⁰⁸

The first Five-Year Development Plan allocated funds for mosque-building, which grew in subsequent Plans. This state funding contributed to a major expansion in the number of mosques and prayer-houses, although of course there was pious private funding committed as well.¹⁰⁹ In East Java, the number of mosques grew as seen in Table 12. It will also be seen there

Table 12 Number of mosques in East Java and mosque density, 1973–90¹¹⁰

Year	Number of mosques	% increase over 1973	Mosque density (av. population/mosque)
1973	15,574		1639 (based on 1971 pop.)
1979	17,750	14.0	1644 (based on 1980 pop.)
1984	20,648	32.6	1503 (based on 1985 pop.)
1990	25,655	64.7	1267

¹⁰⁶ Ward, *1971 election*, p. 95.

¹⁰⁷ Boland, *Struggle of Islam*, pp. 194–5.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Ky. H. Anwar Iskandar (Gus War), Jamsaren *pesantren*, Kediri, 28 Aug. 2003.

¹⁰⁹ Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the state in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), p. 168.

¹¹⁰ Mosque numbers from Hefner, *Civil Islam*, p. 121. Population figures from Graeme J. Hugo *et al.*, *The demographic dimension in Indonesian development* (Singapore, etc.: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 42; and Statistics Indonesia Table 1.1.1. Jumlah Penduduk menurut Provinsi, at http://www.datastatistik-indonesia.com/component/option,com_tabel/kat,1/Itemid,165. Readers will notice that the year for the population figures and for the mosque numbers sometimes vary slightly, but they are close enough for our purposes here.

that the density of mosques available — measured by the average number of people per available mosque — increased. In the early 1970s there was approximately one mosque for every 1639 persons (of all ages) in East Java, but by 1990 that had increased to one mosque for every 1267 persons, representing a rise of nearly a quarter in the mean availability of mosques per capita. In Central Java, the number of mosques rose from 15,685 in 1980 to 28,748 in 1992, an increase of 83.3 per cent over that period. This represented an increase in density from one mosque for every 1618 persons in Central Java in 1980 to one for approximately every 1,000 in the early 1990s.¹¹¹

Such figures reflect increasing piety in the society in general — that deepening Islamisation that is the central topic of this book — but it is important to emphasise that in the early New Order this arose from a degree of competition between government and pious private interests to reshape and control the spirituality of Javanese. Both sides of this competition were driving increasing Islamic piety. In 1982 Soeharto established his own Yayasan Amal Bakti Muslim *Pancasila* (*Pancasila* Muslim Charitable Foundation), which collected money from public servants. By 1991 it had funded the construction of 449 mosques and funded a thousand Islamic teachers to go to areas of the outer islands of Indonesia to which transmigrants (mostly from Java) were sent. In 1991, the regime also assisted in the establishment of the first Islamic bank in Indonesia, the Bank Muamalat Indonesia.¹¹² Boland, whose research in Indonesia extended to 1969, depicted the government's promotion of religious activities through the Ministry of Religion as 'not only social control within the community of a Muslim *kampung* or *desa*, but also something like a "religious *dirigisme*" by the government'.¹¹³

We should not, however, imagine that ordinary Javanese villagers were without agency in this Islamisation, that they were the passive objects of governmental and other Islamising agendas. It can hardly be doubted that for many villagers, greater Islamisation was appealing because it offered more certainty and much-needed solace after a traumatic time. *Aliran* politics with its politicisation and polarisation of village society had led to terrible

¹¹¹ Sources as in the preceding note. I am unable to find a figure for Central Java population in 1992. If one uses the figure for 1990, then the density is 1/992; using the figure for 1995 it is 1/1031.

¹¹² Effendy, *Islam and the state*, pp. 168–9.

¹¹³ Boland, *Struggle of Islam*, p. 189.

violence. Even if there were villages and families that escaped significant conflict, they would have known of the dreadful events that surrounded them. Above we looked at Christianisation and other conversions away from Islam, a significant phenomenon of the early New Order period. But the vast majority of Javanese remained Muslims and operated within an Islamic frame of reference. For that majority, deeper Islamisation offered a template to define the parameters of restored village harmony — one sanctioned by supra-village authorities, both governmental and religious, and associated with modernity and development. Thus, we can reasonably presume that when deeper Islamisation was promoted by religious organisations in the interest of their pious agendas and by the government in the interest of its social-control agenda, many Javanese villagers willingly embraced it in the interest of restoring village harmony.

Government initiatives in education were decisive, particularly as the government's increasing revenue in the 1970s — the fruit of the world revolution in oil prices — made possible a massive increase in the provision of public education. Over 100,000 schools were built across Indonesia, especially in rural areas, and over 500,000 extra teachers employed. By 1980, 71.3 per cent of the 5–12 age group in Central Java was attending school, 78 per cent in Yogyakarta and 72.1 per cent in East Java.¹¹⁴ This supported a rapid rise in literacy across Indonesia, which reached 89.9 per cent for males over the age of ten and 78.7 per cent for females in this age group in the 1990 census. Along with this rise in education and literacy went increasing command of the national Indonesian language. In the 1971 census literacy in Indonesian was still a minority affair, but the spread of education along with the mass communications media transformed that situation. The 1980 census reported that the vast majority — from 95 to 98 per cent — of the people in the Javanese heartlands spoke Javanese at home. But in Central Java 50.6 per cent, in Yogyakarta 55.4 per cent, and in East Java 48.5 per cent of the population could also speak Indonesian.¹¹⁵ The spread of Indonesian was not without a cost. Many older Javanese began to lament that the young were losing command of the subtle (and quite difficult) hierarchical levels of the Javanese language, and with them the courtesies and *politesse* of the past.¹¹⁶ Command of Javanese script was almost unknown among the young already in the 1960s.

¹¹⁴ Hugo *et al.*, *Demographic dimension*, p. 67.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

¹¹⁶ See Guinness, *Kampung, Islam and state*, p. 127.

In the state schools, two or three hours of religious instruction a week were required from 1967 onward. This meant, of course, orthodox forms of religions acceptable to the government. Consequently, unorthodox beliefs such as *kebatinan* — which, as we have seen, was defined as a ‘belief’ and not a ‘religion’ — began to lose their hold on the minds of the young. Orthodox religion was thus associated with modern schooling, literacy, modernity and all the trappings of the government’s obsession with ‘development’. The Modernist *madrasahs* were also brought into the broader national education system. In 1975 the government decreed that 70 per cent of *madrasah* curricula must consist of standard ‘secular’ subjects as in the state schools and only 30 per cent of religious studies. This meant that students could move from the *madrasah* system across into the state system and that *madrasah* certificates were equivalent to state school certificates.¹¹⁷

In the midst of this educational revolution, the Traditionalist *pesantrens* lost the centrality they once had in rural education. In 1977, across Central and East Java, there were 355,870 students reported to be studying in Traditionalist *pesantrens*.¹¹⁸ In public schools there were 5,691,827 — 16 times as many. There were far more students in the modern *madrasahs* as well: 1,394,990. If one takes religious schools of all kinds (i.e., both Traditionalist *pesantrens* and Modernist *madrasahs*), there were 1,750,860 students reported. State schools still had over three times as many pupils.¹¹⁹ As Siegel observed in Surakarta in the late 1970s, ‘The real heirs of the religious schools are the public schools; it is there that youths today acquire a moral education’.¹²⁰ NU having lost control of the Ministry of Religion in 1971, later in the decade government subsidies to *pesantrens* were cut off if they taught only religious subjects. So Traditionalist schools began to introduce the state curriculum, thereby regaining state subsidies.¹²¹ This was a significant step in the modernisation of *pesantrens* and upgrading the intellectual range and formal qualifications of their graduates. By the late 1970s and early 1980s,

¹¹⁷ Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam, *Menteri-menteri Agama RI*, pp. 313–4.

¹¹⁸ Given that in 1893 there were reported to be some 272,000 student in religious schools in Java and Madura (Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese society*, p. 70), the 1977 figure suggests that enrolments had not even kept up with the growth of population over the previous eight decades.

¹¹⁹ Zamakhsyari Dhofier, *Tradisi pesantren*, p. 43. Some public-school pupils also attended *pesantrens*, so there is probably some degree of double-counting in these figures.

¹²⁰ Siegel, *Solo in the New Order*, p. 139.

¹²¹ Abdul Kadir, ‘Traditional Islamic society and the state’, p. 106.

Traditionalism was looking less backward than it had once seemed; in fact some observers were beginning to think it more progressive than Modernism, which by comparison appeared 'disunited, politically cowed, and absorbed in legalistic debate'.¹²²

Because of the expansion of government schools, Traditionalist *pesantrens* were no longer the only, or even the main, way in which the rural young learned about Islam. Nor was the government-approved curriculum for teaching Islam sympathetic to ideas such as *kyais* having supernatural powers. For their part, Modernists already had extensive school networks that were modern in style and curriculum, had always worked with governments, and were therefore less challenged by the regime's educational revolution. Traditionalists also faced a decline in pious donations (*wakaf*) of land, which were important to the growth and financial survival of *pesantrens*. Over 1966–79, the area of land given as *wakaf* in the NU heartland of East Java plummeted. Whereas 71 ha of *wakaf* land were registered in East Java during 1961–5, that figure fell to under 20 ha during 1976–9. Population growth meant that more land was needed for agriculture and housing, and land values rose. Pious Muslims therefore preferred to sell land to the highest bidder and then make a donation in cash.¹²³

Some government-sponsored Islamisation programmes at grass-roots level did offer opportunities for *kyais* to play a role, but they were few. In 1971 Jakarta set up a Proyek Pembinaan Mental Agama (P2A, Religious Mentality Promotion Project) which reached down to village level, aiming to increase general religiosity. Both Muhammadiyah and NU figures were brought in to assist. In East Java, well-known *kyais* were invited by village P2A committees to take part. Djatnika even perceives a '*petite renaissance*' of Islam in 1971, despite the drop in *wakaf* donations noted above.¹²⁴ But other initiatives directly competed with the Traditionalists.

Majlis Dakwah Islamiyah (MDI, Islamic Mission Council) was set up by the regime in the early 1970s as a youth organisation to promote deeper Islamisation at village level. To NU this was a threat to the standing of *kyais*. MDI was linked to Golkar and campaigned for the government side while promoting Islamisation. GUPPI (Gabungan Usaha Pembinaan Pendidikan Islam, Federation of Islamic Education Promotion Efforts, originally established in 1950) was encouraged unofficially by the government, which

¹²² McVey, 'Faith as the outsider', p. 210.

¹²³ Djatnika, 'Biens de mainmorte', pp. 156, 160–3.

¹²⁴ Ibid., pp. 254–5.

made sure that reliable clerics were in charge of it, and was seen by NU as a direct competitor to the *pesantrens*. In the early New Order period, GUPPI affiliated with Golkar.¹²⁵

Some of the most dramatic government innovations were at the tertiary level, particularly beginning during Mukti Ali's time as Minister of Religion. The New Order inherited a system of Islamic tertiary teaching institutions called IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, State Institute for Islamic Studies). Mukti Ali himself had been a teacher at the IAIN in Yogyakarta, where he had introduced the revolutionary subject of comparative religion. Most IAINs, however, were of a low standard, so the government took decisive steps. Of 112 IAINs, in 1975 all but 13 were shut down. The remaining IAINs were then turned into serious tertiary institutions. Under the guidance of Mukti Ali, later Ministers of Religion and a series of highly able leaders of IAINs, this system developed into a powerful intellectual force in support of what has been called 'enlightened' or 'liberal' Islam.¹²⁶ By the early 21st century there were 14 IAINs across Indonesia and 38 lower-order STAINs (Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri, State Colleges of Islamic Studies). The foremost IAINs played major educational and intellectual roles in national life, and several — notably those of Yogyakarta and Jakarta, and subsequently others — were converted into fully fledged universities as UINs (Universitas Islam Negeri, State Islamic Universities) beginning in 2002.

As the IAIN system developed during the New Order, many of its academic staff were sent to Western universities for higher study, particularly to the Netherlands, Canada, the United States and Australia.¹²⁷ There they added modern social science and humanities disciplines to their mastery of Islamic sciences. Their postgraduate theses constitute a major contribution to the study of Islam, with (naturally) particular reference to Indonesia. A

¹²⁵ Abdul Kadir, 'Traditional Islamic society and the state', pp. 183–4; Andrée Feillard and Rémy Madinier, *La fin de l'innocence? L'Islam indonésien face à la tentation radicale de 1967 à nos jours* (Paris: Les Indes Savants & IRASEC, 2006), pp. 38–9. See also Mudjahirin Thohir, *Orang Islam Jawa pesisiran*, p. 217.

¹²⁶ Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam, *Menteri-menteri Agama RI*, pp. 285–319. 'Enlightened' and 'liberal' are the terms used in Luthfi Assyaukanie, *Islam and the secular state in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 143–6.

¹²⁷ This developed particular during the time of Munawir Syadzali as Minister of Religion (1983–93); he had an MA from Georgetown and had pursued a career in the foreign service; for a biography, see Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam, *Menteri-menteri Agama RI*, pp. 369–412.

large proportion of these young academics were of Traditionalist background. IAINs thus also functioned as an effective ladder of social mobility for young men and women, mainly from *pesantren* pre-tertiary educational backgrounds, to become members of the national intellectual elite.¹²⁸

We should not think, however, that everything the New Order did in higher education had the desired effect of controlling Islam or achieved the regime's objectives in more general terms. In the late 1970s, the government was concerned about the potential for university student activism to threaten stability. This was in response to rising student criticism of the corruption and oppression of the New Order as it approached and entered its second decade in power. Student activists and Soeharto's government undoubtedly noted how a student-led popular uprising overthrew the Thai government of Thanom Kittikachorn in October 1973 — the former being further inspired by these events and the latter being made more apprehensive. Students were prominent in protests against a proposed marriage law in 1973, even invading a sitting of the national parliament in September.

Urban protests culminated in the so-called Malari¹²⁹ riots of January 1974, when a state visit by the Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei precipitated the worst mob violence in Jakarta since the fall of Sukarno. Student activists and poor urban youths joined to condemn what they saw as the corrupt connivance of the government and the Japanese in looting Indonesia's resources. At one point, some 20,000 demonstrators were surrounding Tanaka's guest house and 5,000 were at the presidential palace. The government's security apparatus only intervened on the second day, and then cracked down decisively. Eleven people died, some 200 were seriously injured, 8,000 cars and 100 buildings were burned, shops selling Japanese goods were looted and 770 people were arrested, some being held for over two years. Three student activists were imprisoned. This time, instead of blaming clandestine Communists for the violence, the regime denounced former Masyumi and Socialist Party activists, thus reviving the image of political Islam as a threat to the nation. In the 1977 national elections, Golkar still triumphed with 62.8 per cent of the votes, but the new fusion of Islamic parties within PPP (discussed below) — which had NU within it and thus garnered NU's relatively reliable constituency — won 29.3 per cent of the vote, reflecting a potential for organised Islam to challenge the regime's

¹²⁸ See further the essays in Fuad Jabali and Jamhari (eds), *IAIN dan modernisasi Islam di Indonesia* (Ciputat: Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2002).

¹²⁹ A contraction of *Malapetaka Januari*, January Disaster.

supremacy. So the government saw a potential for Islamic organisations and student activists to destabilise itself. Further student demonstrations took place on campuses in 1977–8.

The government decided that it must reign in the students — who were inspired, as students often are, by a degree of morality and principle that the government found unwelcome. This meant in the first place shutting down the activist-dominated student councils at major universities. This was dubbed ‘campus normalisation’, but its consequences were hardly what the government intended. Government security forces invaded the troublesome campuses — among which Yogyakarta’s Universitas Gadjah Mada was prominent — and arrested both students and academic staff. Then student councils were replaced by bodies controlled by the university administrations. The effect of this, however, was to relocate student activism underground and to the area of the university where the regime was reluctant to intervene with force — the mosque. At Gadjah Mada, for example, the Salahuddin mosque became a centre of student piety and political discussion. Campus mosques — among which the Salman mosque at the Institute of Technology in Bandung was also prominent — spawned Muslim Brotherhood-style study circles that fostered general student piety as well as Dakwahist and Islamist groups, some of which later embraced extremist actions.¹³⁰

The New Order sought further institutions to control and direct Islam. One of the most important was the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Islamic Scholars’ Council), established in 1975. At that time, this was intended as a means for the government to direct Islam and in some Islamic circles it was stigmatised for this reason. Only after the fall of Soeharto would MUI become a means for Islamic interests — mainly from the most conservative, Islamist and Dakwahist quarters — to direct the government. Although he initially criticised the idea of such a council, Hamka accepted appointment as its first chairman, but then resigned in 1981 in protest at MUI’s lack of independence from government influence.¹³¹

¹³⁰ See Guinness, *Kampung, Islam and state*, pp. 128–9; Nancy J. Smith-Hefner, ‘Javanese women and the veil in post-Soeharto Indonesia’, *Journal of Asian Studies* vol. 66, no. 2 (May 2007), p. 396; Porter, *Managing politics and Islam*, p. 58. Guinness points out that there were parallel developments among Christians in this period.

¹³¹ See Mohammad Atho Mudzhar, *Fatwa-fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia: Sebuah studi tentang pemikiran hukum Islam di Indonesia, 1975–1988* (Jakarta: INIS, 1993), p. 56 et seqq. The immediate issue prompting Hamka’s resignation was his view that it was *haram* for Muslims to join in Christmas celebrations, quite a common practice in

Government initiatives in promoting what it regarded as acceptable forms of Islam competed not only with NU at grass-roots level, but also with the newly established Dewan Da'wah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, Indonesian Islamic Mission Council). This was set up in May, 1967 by Natsir, to whom is frequently ascribed the saying, 'Before, we conducted *dakwah* through politics; now, we pursue politics through *dakwah*.'¹³² He was utterly excluded from any form of political activity but the regime allowed him to create this crucially important proselytism body. Why it should have done so remains unclear. Natsir was a man of broad learning who was attracted to the more puritanical versions of Islam from his early years, when he became an important figure in Persatuan Islam. In the 1950s he had his first experience of an international Islamic gathering when he attended a conference in Damascus and there met major Muslim figures including the Pakistani Islamist thinker Sayyid Abu 'l-a'la Mawdudi and the Indian scholar Syed Abu Hasan an-Nadwi.¹³³ Natsir developed close relations with Saudi Arabian leaders and thus became a founding member and vice-president of the Saudi-sponsored Rabitat al-'Alam al-Islami (Muslim World League), established in 1962. This organisation benefited from the Saudi kingdom's vastly increased income in the wake of the oil price rises of the 1970s; it thus became a major vehicle for promoting Wahhabi thought in the Islamic world.¹³⁴ DDII became the Rabitat's main channel in Indonesia. DDII trained preachers, supported the building of mosques, distributed free copies of the *Qur'an*, sponsored and distributed translations of Wahhabi works and

Indonesia at the time. The government, however, approved of such joint celebrations as vehicles for multi-religious harmony. Discussions of MUI can be found in multiple sources. See, for example, Noorhaidi Hasan, 'Reformasi, religious diversity and Islamic radicalism after Suharto', *Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities* vol. 1 (2008), p. 26 (<http://www.kitlv-journals.nl/index.php/jissh/index>); Porter, *Managing politics and Islam*, pp. 78–9.

¹³² R. Michael Feener, *Muslim legal thought in modern Indonesia* (Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 103.

¹³³ Interview with Dr Mohammad Natsir, Jakarta, 14 Aug. 1977.

¹³⁴ When I asked Mohammad Roem in 1977 whether the rise in oil prices in the Middle East was contributing to increasing Islamic activism in Indonesia, he replied, 'Oh certainly, certainly. It is at least beginning. But I think it's increasing because we have no idea how rich they are' (interview, 3 Aug. 1977). On the establishment of the Rabitat, see also Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The trail of political Islam* (transl. Anthony F. Roberts. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 52, 72.

the writings of others, including Mawdudi¹³⁵ and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood thinker Sayyid Qutb. It was particularly influential among students at state universities, where it promoted Muslim Brotherhood-style religious study circles; it had much less success in penetrating IAINs. In future years, many of the most puritanical and, indeed, extremist of Indonesia's Dakwahists and Islamists would be associated with DDII at some stage in their lives.¹³⁶

Natsir and his DDII were motivated by a perceived need to purify Islam from local corruptions and to defend the Islamic community against what was seen as a pervasive threat of Christianisation. Opposition to local traditions was deeply rooted in Natsir's mind, as the following comments about *slametans* — a central ritual of Javanese *abangan* life — show:

Wayang and *gamelan* are not forbidden in Islam. But it is just a tool to propagate Islam if you wanted to use it. It was also a tool during the old days. ... But all the *slametans*, for instance: it is uneconomic and when you have to develop the country economically, you have to get rid of all this nonsense. ... The people in the villages ... have their tradition. ... We cannot leave them in that superstition. For instance, when somebody dies, their tradition is that the family should slaughter a buffalo or a cow and there is quite a feast [i.e., a *slametan*]. Why [are they] having a feast when somebody has died? You are in sorrow. ... Now all these things which came into Islam during all the ages we have to purify.¹³⁷

Between the thinking of Natsir and those who agreed with him on the one hand and the dancing followers of Embah Wali in Tugurejo on the other yawned an immense religious, cultural, social and educational chasm, the source of much dissent and tension as Islamisation deepened in Java.

¹³⁵ Ahmad Syafii Maarif, later renowned as a progressive and pluralist leader of Muhammadiyah, reports in his autobiography how in his younger years, in the 1950s–70s, he was 'one of the strong supporters of the idea of an Indonesian Islamic state. The thinking of Masyumi figures and Mawdudi were my primary references'; Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Titik-titik kisar di perjalanananku: Otobiografi Ahmad Syafii Maarif* (Jogjakarta: Ombak and Maarif Institute, 2006), p. 195.

¹³⁶ Further on DDII, see, *inter alia*, Assyaukanie, *Islam and the secular state*, p. 183; Martin van Bruinessen, 'Traditionalist and Islamist pesantrens in contemporary Indonesia', in Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand and Martin van Bruinessen (eds), *The madrasa in Asia: Political activism and transnational linkages* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), pp. 230–1; Noorhaidi Hasan, 'The Salafi madrasas of Indonesia', in *ibid.*, pp. 250–1; Hefner, *Civil Islam*, pp. 107, 109.

¹³⁷ Interview with Dr Mohammad Natsir, Jakarta, 14 Aug. 1977.

Thus it was that by the 1970s there was established a clear pattern of competition between the government on the one hand and private pious individuals and organisations on the other, each pursuing and trying to direct its own version of the deeper Islamisation of Java, and of Indonesia more generally. Unlike the pattern in the 1950s and early 1960s, there was no element in this competition that was seeking to resist Islamisation. Except, of course, for Christian churches and those still defending *kebatinan* — both of them targets of much animosity from the private Islamisers. At grass roots level, the push for a more exacting compliance with the demands of Islam was tangible. It was also audible, for the electronic amplification of the five-times-daily call to prayer became a standard part of life in the course of the New Order, promoted not only by the increasing number of mosques we noted above but also by the spreading supply of electricity to urban areas and, much more slowly, to rural villages.¹³⁸

The death of *aliran* politics and Islamisation from below

The destruction of PKI was clearly instrumental in facilitating the Islamisation surge, for thereby one of the pillars of *aliran* politics was demolished. The government took a crucial further step in this direction in the wake of the 1971 election. New Order elections were neither free nor fair, but they allowed a degree of public political competition; for the purposes of its own legitimacy the regime sought big Golkar victories. Its success in the New Order's first elections in 1971 exceeded even its own expectations, with Golkar winning 62.8 per cent of the national vote. PNI still existed, but its glory days were over: Golkar had taken over much of its previous constituency of *priyayi* bureaucrats and *abangan* followers. PNI won just 6.9 per cent of the national vote. NU was the strongest of the surviving parties from the past, winning 18.7 per cent nationally. The Central and East Java voting patterns confirmed the dominance of Golkar, but PNI's vote in Central Java remained significant and NU's was even more so, especially

¹³⁸ As late as 1984, only 15 per cent of Indonesian households had electricity, and the figure was even that high mainly because of superior electricity supply to urban areas, the figure for Jakarta being over 40 per cent. In rural areas, barely 10 per cent of homes had electricity and, at national level, only about one-quarter of villages had effective electrical supply. The government planned major expansion in the 1984–9 five-year plan. See Mohan Munasinghe, 'Rural electrification: International experience and policy in Indonesia', *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* vol. 24, no. 2 (Aug. 1988), p. 94.

Table 13 Percentage of valid votes won by major parties in Central and East Java, 1971¹³⁹

Region	Golkar	PNI	NU	Parmusi	Others
Central Java	50.3	19.4	23.1	4.5	2.3
East Java	54.9	4.9	35.1	2.7	2.2

in its heartland of East Java, where it took 35.1 per cent of the vote. The Modernist Parmusi, however, was clearly of little significance.

The government took this result as grounds for finally eliminating the old parties altogether. It decreed that all political parties — which did not, of course, include Golkar since it was claimed to be an alternative to parties rather than a party itself — were to be fused into two party coalitions from January 1973. Thus was born the Islamic-based PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party), which brought together NU and Parmusi with some minor parties; for the first time since the bitter split of 1952, Traditionalists and Modernists were to be in the same political party. Their marriage would last a little longer but be just as difficult this time around. Out of non-Islamic parties — of which the most important was PNI, but also including the Catholic and Protestant parties — was born PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democracy Party). Except during election campaigns, these parties were not allowed to have organisations below *Kabupaten* (regency) level. So the idea of the populace as a depoliticised ‘floating mass’ — an idea first suggested by the Islamic intellectual Nurcholish Madjid (about whom more below)¹⁴⁰ — was adopted as government policy. This did not, again, apply to Golkar, which was represented all the way down to village society by its minions, the bureaucracy and the military.

It is difficult to emphasise enough the significance for the Islamisation of the Javanese of this final destruction of the old political parties. *Abangan* villagers generally distrusted and avoided institutions. Village harmony was the most valued objective in their society, and it was for this that *slametans* were so important, for they symbolised, enacted and reinforced the solidarity

¹³⁹ Masashi Nishihara, *Golkar and the Indonesian elections of 1971* (Ithaca, NY: Monograph Series no. 56, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1972), p. [69].

¹⁴⁰ Ward, *1971 election*, pp. 188–9.

of village society at important times. Of village institutions — beyond those imposed by supra-village authorities in the name of administration — there were hardly any. Except, that is, for the political parties that had rested upon *abangan* constituencies. In the post-independence period, the most important of these were PKI and PNI. The earlier chapters of this book and my study of the 1830–1930 period, *Polarising Javanese society*, have depicted how the existence of these political parties and their competition with *santri*-based parties politically reified and socially reinforced the tension between *abangan* and *santri*. This worsening conflict became bloody at Madiun and reached a murderous peak in 1965–6, with echoes that reverberated for decades thereafter.

Now, with PKI annihilated and PNI swept into a cumbersome political amalgam without village branches, there were no significant institutions remaining to defend and promote *abangan* social, cultural and spiritual styles. De-institutionalisation of *abangan* village life was virtually complete. The *santri* side of Javanese life also suffered a loss of political institutions under the New Order, of course. But *santris* had many other institutions that promoted, reinforced and defended their more pious styles. Mosques and prayer-houses, *pesantrens* and *madrasahs*, universities, clinics and hospitals, orphanages, books, magazines, sermons, Muhammadiyah, NU, DDII, Persatuan Islam, a host of other organisations that we will meet below in this book, government programmes promoting Islam — all these institutionally strengthened the *santri* side of Javanese life. There were no *abangan* equivalents of any of them of any consequence. Pious Islam was identified with progress, modernity and development. *Abangan* were regarded as backward, ignorant peasants. The advanced philosophical speculations of the Mystic Synthesis style that were so influential among *priyayi* Javanese in the past — not to mention the anti-Islamic works of the 19th century — were likely now only to be studied in private by the older generation. Meanwhile, their children and grandchildren were increasingly learning more standard forms of religion in school. *Kebatinan* challenged Islamisation, but was itself in most cases poorly institutionalised. The institutional weight was utterly overwhelmingly on the *santri* side — that is, on the side of deeper Islamisation, against which there were now no significant institutionalised religious barriers other than Christianity and no significant political barriers at all.¹⁴¹

¹⁴¹ See also the comments in Affan Gaffar, *Javanese voters: A case study of election under a hegemonic party system* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1992), pp. 190, 195.

Muslim leaders knew that there was no real prospect of them claiming political power, so their attention turned decisively towards Islamisation from below. In a situation in which Islamism had no hope of success, Dakwahism came to dominate the agenda, exemplified by Natsir's DDII, as we noted above. This turn to *dakwah* had the effect of diminishing Islamic organisations as potential political threats in the eyes of Soeharto and his circle: Communism was exterminated and political Islam was cowed. 'We have become wiser', said Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. 'We have seen the experience of Pakistan. We have seen the efforts of the so-called *Darul Islam* in Indonesia and ... I think it's not necessary to try to obtain an Islamic state.' Rather, people should be led to understand Islam as it truly is, he believed. 'If they understand Islam, and are willing to live according to Muslim rules then necessarily, automatically, we will get a Muslim state in the long run.'¹⁴² For Natsir and many others, the 'long run' was always about political power. I asked him whether he thought it necessary for Islam to exert influence at the very centre of government. 'Oh yes. Oh yes,' he replied. 'Not only for Islam, for every ideology.'¹⁴³ The influential Islamic broadcaster Osman Raliby (of Acehnese descent) also took the view that emphasis on *dakwah* was simply a necessary interim measure. Islam had not failed politically: 'It is not ripe yet, that is why we start with this *dakwah*,' he said. 'Every teaching should have coercive power; otherwise what is the use of the teaching if there is no power for it?'¹⁴⁴

Nurcholish Madjid (1939–2005) played an important part in developing a more accommodating attitude on the part of Islamic activists towards the increasingly dominant — but also authoritarian and increasingly corrupt — Soeharto regime. Nurcholish was born in Jombang in East Java, was educated at the famous modern Islamic boarding school at Gontor,¹⁴⁵ and emerged as an original thinker in the early New Order. In the 1980s he went to the University of Chicago where he gained his doctorate under the Pakistani scholar Fazlur Rahman. Nurcholish's 1984 thesis on the medieval thinker Ibn Taimiyya established him as the foremost proponent in Indonesia of a Historicalist approach to Islam. Even before this, however, in the early

¹⁴² Interview, Jakarta, 3 Aug. 1977.

¹⁴³ Interview, Jakarta, 14 Aug. 1977.

¹⁴⁴ Interview, Jakarta, 14 Aug. 1977.

¹⁴⁵ On Gontor in the early New Order period, see Castles, 'Notes on the Islamic school at Gontor'. Nurcholish described his time at Gontor in 1955–61 as 'one of the most valuable phases of my life'; interview, Jakarta, 6 Aug. 1977.

1970s Nurcholish provoked much controversy by proclaiming that there was no need for an Islamic political party and the idea of an Islamic state was dead. Rather, Islamisation from below should be the objective. 'I would say that the older generation emphasise too much politicising Islam', he said, 'making Islam a political weapon to gain power. ... The younger generation, especially represented by my friends and I, emphasise the ethics and not the political ideology of Islam.'¹⁴⁶

Nurcholish's dismissal of Islamic politics and call to distinguish between what was truly sacred and what was secular enraged some ex-Masyumi politicians and older-generation thinkers, among them Natsir, Rasjidi and Hamka. Nurcholish came to be regarded as one of the foremost new, moderate Islamic intellectuals along with a few others, most notably NU's Abdurrahman Wahid.¹⁴⁷ Nurcholish was driven by a sense that Islam needed a major reformation, not unlike the Protestant Reformation in Christian history. To him, the modernisation brought about by the great Modernist icons of the 19th and 20th centuries, Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh and Muhammad Rashid Rida, was 'very incomplete'.¹⁴⁸ But there was no need to pursue an Islamic state, he insisted. This was one of the first steps towards what would eventually become a coalition of some leading Islamic — eventually even Islamist — activists and New Order power-holders in the period to be discussed in the next chapter.

The increasing Islamisation of Javanese society was already becoming obvious by the 1970s; there was much variety in how this happened from place to place, but the general trend was consistent. Islamisation was facilitated not only by the developments already discussed in this chapter, but by the fact that, in some places, Islamic leaders at grass-roots level were not as doctrinaire as national-level Modernists were. During his fieldwork in 1970–2, Nakamura found Muhammadiyah in Kota Gede — regarded as

¹⁴⁶ Interview, Jakarta, 6 Aug. 1977.

¹⁴⁷ There is a great deal of literature on the ideas of Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid. See particularly Effendy, *Islam and the state*, pp. 65–101; Hefner, *Civil Islam*, pp. 115–8; Greg Barton, 'Neo-Modernism: A vital synthesis of traditionalist and Modernist Islamic thought in Indonesia', *SI* vol. 2 (1995), no. 3, pp. 1–75; Fauzan Saleh, *Modern trends in Islamic theological discourse in 20th century Indonesia: A critical survey* (Leiden, etc.: Brill, 2001), pp. 246–78. A broad account of Muslim intellectuals' relations with the New Order regime, especially in the 1980s, is in M. Syafi'i Anwar, *Pemikiran dan aksi Islam Indonesia: Sebuah kajian politik tentang cendekiawan Muslim Orde Baru* (Jakarta: Penerbit Paramadina, 1995).

¹⁴⁸ Interview with Nurcholish Madjid, Jakarta, 6 Aug. 1977.

a Muhammadiyah stronghold — to be so. ‘It looks aggressive and fanatic, but in fact its ways of propagation are gradual and tolerant,’ he concluded. ‘It may appear anti-Javanese’, but it was not in fact so in his view.¹⁴⁹ Mohamad Roem was also of the view that Modernism had become more flexible and tolerant than in the pre-independence days.¹⁵⁰ But, as we will see shortly, and as Modernist responses to Christianisation described above have already suggested, there was still plenty of anger and doctrinaire thought on the Modernist side in the early New Order.

The increase in those going on the *hajj* to Mecca was an indicator of both increasing piety and increasing wealth as Indonesia’s economy began to improve. I have only been able to locate evidently reliable figures for the early New Order period with regard to Central Java, as seen in Table 14.¹⁵¹ There was thus nearly a six-fold increase in pilgrimage traffic from Central Java in just five years. This is consistent with what Nakamura observed in his

Table 14 *Hajj* departures from Central Java, 1969–74¹⁵²

Year	Departures
1969/70	805 ¹⁵³
1970/71	702
1972	1336
1973	2121
1974	4024

¹⁴⁹ Nakamura, *Crescent arises over the banyan tree*, pp. 182–3.

¹⁵⁰ Interview, Jakarta, 3 Aug. 1977.

¹⁵¹ An ongoing problem was corruption within the Ministry of Religion, particularly with regard to the administration of the pilgrimage. So too much reliance should not be placed on these figures.

¹⁵² Nazir Djalal, ‘Djumlah djemaah hadji Indonesia tahun 1970/71’ (unpublished typescript based on Dep. Agama data, in papers of George McT. Kahin at Cornell University); idem, ‘Perintjian djemaah hadji tiap propinsi tahun 1969–70’ (unpublished typescript based on data from Direktorat Urusan Hadji, Dep. Agama, in papers of George McT. Kahin at Cornell University); Tim Penyusun Monografi Daerah Jawa Tengah, *Monografi daerah Jawa Tengah* ([Jakarta:] Proyek Pengembangan Media Kebudayaan, Ditjen Kebudayaan Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan RI, n.d. [1976?]), p. 53.

¹⁵³ The figure for this year includes Yogyakarta, which is excluded from the later figures.

study in Kota Gede (Yogyakarta area) in the early 1970s, where increasing numbers of *abangan* were 'moving towards the category of *santri*, becoming more orthodox in their thought and deed as Muslims'.¹⁵⁴ And going on the pilgrimage.

Mudjahirin Thohir's study of Bangsri, in the Jepara area, exemplifies the connection between educational reform and Islamisation.¹⁵⁵ This was an area where, in the past, *abangan* had only rarely prayed. The key activists in the Islamisation that commenced in the New Order arrived from Jepara, Klaten and Yogyakarta to teach in the primary school. By 1977 Bangsri had a Muhammadiyah junior high school. Across the whole *Kabupaten* (regency) of Jepara, the number of local people going on the *haji* grew rapidly. In 1971, 59 people went. Thereafter there were some fluctuations, but the pattern was one of growth. In 1980, 256 departed. In 1990, the number was 404. From 1984 onwards, over a thousand went on the pilgrimage each year, reaching 2474 in the year 2000. A notable development is that down to 1978 the majority of aspirant *hajjis* were male; from that year onwards, women were usually in the majority.

It is notable that this Islamisation in Bangsri took place in the early years of the New Order, when NU was still so distrusted by the regime in Jakarta and thus by local government that its grass-roots networks in that area were hardly mobilised for this purpose. According to Mudjahirin Thohir's sources, local schools that had NU in their names dropped them. When NU people became public servants, they had to distance themselves from NU activities and establish links with Golkar, which generated further tension between them and NU activists who were not in public employment. NU's large public religious lectures (*pengajian akbar*), often conducted to audiences in the hundreds, had to be curtailed. *Pesantrens* carried on, but political subjects had to be avoided.

In Kediri, too, the early New Order is remembered as a time of Islamisation, looked back upon from an NU perspective.¹⁵⁶ The senior *kyai* of the great *pesantren* at Lirboyo, Ky. H. Mahrus Aly, already had contacts with the cigarette company Gudang Garam, which during Guided Democracy

¹⁵⁴ Nakamura, *Crescent arises over the banyan tree*, p. 13.

¹⁵⁵ The following discussion of Bangsri rests upon Mudjahirin Thohir, *Orang Islam Jawa pesisiran*, pp. 48, 108–11, 159, 215–6, 218–9, 254–5.

¹⁵⁶ The following is from a discussion with Ky. H. Imam Yahya Mahrus (Ky. Imam), the son of Mahrus Aly, Lirboyo, Kediri, 29 Nov. 2007. Ky. H. Anwar Iskandar (Gus War) of the Jamsaren *pesantren* in Kediri (discussion of 28 Aug. 2003) spoke of government sponsorship of religious education in former PKI areas.

had faced many difficulties from PKI unions. According to Mahrus Aly's son Ky. Imam, Mahrus Aly also had close links with the Brawijaya Division of the army and was a senior confidant of the local police. In 1966 Gudang Garam asked his help in getting rid of the PKI and, with his instructions, Ansor played the role already described in the previous chapter. Thereafter, Gudang Garam's business developed rapidly and its alliance with the *kyais* of Kediri remained firm. The local people around Lirboyo had been overwhelmingly *abangan* and supporters of PKI, but as time passed they responded to Islamic proselytism and became loyal Muslims. *Kebatinan* declined. *Abangan* practices such as the annual ritual cleansing of the village (*bersih desa*), veneration of the grave of the village founder, the holding of *slametans* and making of offerings (*sajen*) to spiritually powerful beings and places came to an end. They were replaced with Traditionalist devotional practices such as *tablilan*¹⁵⁷ and *yasinan*.¹⁵⁸

As was true of new converts to Christianity in their relations with established Christians, *abangan* who became newly committed Muslims were sometimes suspected of lacking real sincerity in their faith. The north coast village of Kajen, which is famous for its numerous Traditionalist *pesantrens* and the grave of a local saint, also experienced conversions of previous *abangan* to more committed Islamic life after 1965–6. But they were not admitted to the status of *santri*. Rather, these newly practicing Muslims were called *tangklukan*. This term comes from Javanese *taklukan* (those who have submitted), but it was, in effect, re-Arabised by inserting the *ng* — the way the Arabic *ain* appears in Javanese — thereby invoking its Arabic root *ta'alluq* (attachment, devotion), to produce *tangklukan*. Arabising of course makes something seem more properly Islamic. These *tangklukan* were kept separate from *santri* in certain circumstances, for example during Ramadan prayers. 'We pray separately', one *tangklukan* informant told Ahmad Syafi'i Mufid during his fieldwork in 1989, 'because we have to repay our debt for

¹⁵⁷ Group repetitive chanting of the first part of the confession of faith, that there is no God but God (*La ilaha illa 'llah*).

¹⁵⁸ Group repetitive chanting of *Qur'an* *sura* 36. This is, as Abdel Haleem puts it, 'A Meccan *sura* that emphasises the divine source of the *Qur'an* and defends it from the charge of being poetry made by man It warns of the fate of men who are stubborn and always mock God's revelations. They are reminded of the punishment that befell earlier generations, and of God's power as shown in His Creation. The end of the *sura* gives strong arguments for the reality of the Resurrection'; in *Qur'an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem*, p. 281. It is particularly used at funerals and other commemorations of deaths.

the prayers that we omitted in the past'. They also tended to follow different *tarekats*, the *tangklukan* favouring Qadiriyya wa Naqshabandiyya and *santri* joining Naqshabandiyya of the Khalidiyya branch, which was regarded as being more elite in religious terms.¹⁵⁹

Modernists' laments at national level

The changes described above in this chapter were profound, and many of them profoundly angered senior figures of Modernist Islam. The advancing Islamisation of society was welcome to them, but they did not find themselves in control of it and indeed felt threatened by the competing advance of Christianity. The government had sidelined them politically, competed with their institutional tools for Islamising the society, failed to outlaw *kebatinan* — indeed after initial hostility to *kebatinan*, the government was becoming sympathetic to it — and had not halted Christianisation. It was clear that, under the New Order regime, Islam was not a tool for modernising and liberating the society in the ways that senior Modernists thought it should be; rather, it was meant to be a tool for government social control. Younger Islamic leaders like Nurcholish Madjid were meanwhile challenging some of the most basic ideas held by the senior Modernists, and earned their denunciation for doing so. The government attracted their ire, too. Many of these Modernist leaders were men of deep conviction and courage in the face of government authoritarianism and their complaints sometimes tested the limits of regime tolerance. A few examples will convey the flavour of this discourse.

In December 1969, Hamka spoke lengthily and in uncompromising terms to a Muhammadiyah conference in Ponorogo. He was rather more Revivalist than Modernist on this occasion, reflecting a stream within Muhammadiyah that would strengthen in coming years, and clearly angry. He emphasised that Muhammadiyah was a renewal movement (*gerakan tajdid*) that was *Salafi*, that is, which sought to hold firm to the example of the Prophet and his companions as found in the *Qur'an* and *Hadiths*. 'To do that, it is important for us to pay attention to the fruits of new thinking

¹⁵⁹ Ahmad Syafi'i Mufid, *Tangklukan, abangan dan tarekat: Kebangkitan agama di Jawa* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor, 2006), esp. pp. 131–46. The local saint in question is the 18th-century figure Ky. H. Ahmad Mutamakin; see M.C. Ricklefs, *The seen and unseen worlds in Java: History, literature and Islam in the court of Pakubuwana II* (St Leonards, NSW, and Honolulu: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin and University of Hawai'i Press, 1998), pp. 131 et seqq.

discovered by modern Islamic thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb and ... Mawdudi ... and others. ... Their thinking is very different from the previous period, for example the time of Muhammad 'Abduh'. Hamka went on,

In the period since the Muslim Brotherhood, pioneered by Sayyid Qutb, we are invited to think how to stand firm on the base of Islam itself. Islamic movements are nowadays pioneered by intellectuals who have fathomed Western culture and, after discovering all its secrets, have returned to Islam with full conviction. ... If the Western world were asked, which do they regard as more dangerous, Communism or Islam, Westerners will spontaneously answer, 'Islam is more dangerous'. ... Because of this, even if political colonialism has ended, the West and the Communist world want to try to introduce a new colonialism which is more dreadful; that is, colonialism of thought. ...

*Thought Attack*¹⁶⁰

Thought Attack is an amazing propaganda technique, via every avenue, whether crude or smooth, whether cultural or scientific, so that the way the Islamic world thinks should change from its religious base, and so it unconsciously thinks that the only way for Muslims to progress is to abandon Islamic Thought. ...

Since Indonesian independence, the continuation of [the colonial government's] 'neutrality' is 'secularism'. ... The minority [meaning the Christians] has got on top and the majority [meaning the Muslims] finds its way diminished. ... The word 'tolerance' is used to cover up idleness and weakness. So without limits the followers of that other religion I just mentioned erect churches in Muslim areas, even though there are no Christians there. And if the Muslim side opposes and challenges this, it is they who are called fanatics. ...

When the post-Sukarno age came, after PKI was successfully neutralised, a new sound arose — that is, the sound of modernisation. ... Human instinct certainly believes in the supernatural. After people rejected militant and dynamic Islam, they channelled their sense of the supernatural and their secularism into other paths. Thus arose rituals of meditating at graves, ... lighting candles at midnight, meditating in front of a grave to ask blessings. ... Thus arise 'tolerance' holidays, praying in the Islamic fashion, praying in the Christian fashion and meditating in the Hindu Balinese fashion in a *halal bi halal*¹⁶¹ gathering. And in lots

¹⁶⁰ Hamka uses the Arabic phrase *al-ghazwul-fikri*, meaning literally an assault upon the realm of thought. It is commonly used in the Islamic world to describe the perceived attack upon Islam by Western ideas.

¹⁶¹ The paying of mutual respects and seeking forgiveness for past mistakes and offences.

of other ways, until secularism becomes a kind of religion — just so long as you change from Islam, which is feared, because according to colonial teaching, Islam is dangerous. It is Extreme Right. ...¹⁶²

There is constant contriving so that people implement and preserve *Pancasila*, but anybody at all who consistently adheres to *tauhid*,¹⁶³ the unity of Allah, *Ketuhanan yang maha esa* [‘the one and only God’, the first principle of the *Pancasila*] at some time or other will be accused of being anti-*Pancasila*. ...

The spread of immorality nowadays is also from the influence of ideological colonialism; Christianity and Zionism have united to face Islam which is arising. ... Pornographic films, miniskirts, the Beatles and the hippy movement — their targets are the youths. ... This moral destruction has been spreading since from America and Europe, youths have been inhaling marijuana. ... In big cities like Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung and others, there is spreading the association [of young men and women] before marriage. When there is a child in the belly: just because of that, they marry. ...

In the West, no one cares any more about religious values. ... There is a philosopher named Jean-Paul Sartre — that is, a Jew — who teaches the philosophy of ‘Wujudiyya’¹⁶⁴ (Existentialism), which proposes awareness of one’s own self. ... This doctrine is more extreme than Communism and its creator, too, is a Jew. ...

Family planning is also within the realm of Thought Attack, of thought-colonialism. ... And then comes every kind of gambling. Nalo, Lotto, Hwa Hwee, casino. This is clearly immorality, but who dares to prohibit or resist it? None other than youths who are educated in Islamic sentiments.... If government seeks money ... by opening up gambling, that means that government is collecting money by destroying the mentality and morality of the people. ...

There were festivities in Surabaya that were full of immorality during National Sports Week¹⁶⁵ — immorality that was very striking! Many cultural figures asked very politely that the government curtail this immorality, but that request was not granted. Then a bomb went off in the midst of these festivities. And who was arrested? An Islamic youth!

¹⁶² A term used in Soeharto’s time for extremist Islam, as opposed to Extreme Left, which was Communism.

¹⁶³ The unity, the oneness, of God, the most central of all Islamic doctrines, affirmed in the first part of the confession of faith, that there is no God but God (*La ilaha illa ‘llah*).

¹⁶⁴ Not, of course, the term used by Sartre. Wujudiyya was a Sufi doctrine of emanation that was denounced as heretical by Nuruddin ar-Raniri in 17th-century Aceh.

¹⁶⁵ PON, the *Pekan Olahraga Nasional* held in Surabaya in August–September 1969.

In the time of [the 1965] Gestapu/PKI,¹⁶⁶ ... in Surabaya it was Muslim youths who helped ABRI¹⁶⁷ wipe out the PKI's strength. Now it is these youths who are arrested and are thrown into jail and accused of being Communist. ...

Anyone at all who suggests 'to command the right and forbid the wrong'¹⁶⁸ is accused of engaging in 'political guerilla war' and shortly thereafter may even be accused of being anti-*Pancasila*. ...

We haven't yet even considered the other forms of immorality which are known in Javanese as *ma-lima* [the five Ms]¹⁶⁹ ...

These things are all organised and put together from outside, in order to subjugate independent Indonesia by demolishing its moral and mental defences. It is regrettable, too, the implementation of this can sometimes be found in the institutions of government themselves.

It is also regrettable that leaders of a certain Islamic political party collude in the importation of pornographic films,¹⁷⁰ while the opening of a 'nightclub' — a place to exhibit naked women — whether in Jakarta or Surabaya, begins with the reading of prayer for which a *kyai* is invited — a figure from an Islamic political organisation.¹⁷¹ ...

Radio and television are full of songs imitating or plagiarised from the West, with Indonesian language that is Englished. ...

Militant Muhammadiyah youths have already pioneered resistance to immorality everywhere. Muhammadiyah youths sit in jail in Makassar

¹⁶⁶ The conventional way of describing the coup attempt of 1965. Gestapu was short for *gerakan tigapuluh September* (the 30 September movement) and an obvious allusion to the Gestapo of Nazi Germany.

¹⁶⁷ The armed forces: Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia.

¹⁶⁸ *Amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar*, a fundamental obligation upon all Muslims, based on several Qur'anic passages, e.g., *Qur'an* 3:104: 'You are the best community singled out for people: you order what is right, forbid what is wrong, and believe in God'; *Qur'an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem*, p. 42. On this crucial concept, see further Michael Cook, *Commanding right and forbidding wrong in Islamic thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

¹⁶⁹ The *ma-lima* are regarded — both by pious Muslims and *abangan* themselves — as the vices characteristic of *abangan*: *main* (gambling), *madat* (smoking opium), *maling* (thievery), *madon* (womanising, adultery) and *minum* or *mendem* (drinking alcohol).

¹⁷⁰ I am not certain of this allusion, but imagine that it refers to NU.

¹⁷¹ Given the reference to a *kyai*, NU must be meant here. The specific reference may well be to Ky. Hamim Jazuli (1941–93, usually known as Gus Mik) from the Ploso *pesantren* (Kediri), an idiosyncratic and controversial, beer-drinking *kyai* frequently seen in the nightclubs and brothels of Surabaya, believed by his followers to be a saint (*wali*). See the account in Arif Zamhari, *Rituals of Islamic spirituality: A study of Majlis Dhikr groups in East Java* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2010), pp. 219–27. Gus Mik's activities in Surabaya are described as *dakwah* like that of the *wali sanga* in *MmK*, 15 Oct. 2003.

[as also] the head of the Tulungagung Muhammadiyah branch [and] several Muhammadiyah youths [because of] the incident when grenades were thrown during the all-night festivities in Surabaya

In the future we will see how amazing Thought Attack is — until sometimes even we ourselves, our neighbours, our way of thinking, like it or not, will suffer infiltration from this Thought Attack.

In our renewal movement, in our belief and in our worship, we return to the *Salaf* school.¹⁷² ... And in worldly affairs, we make use of all modern instruments to build the Ways of the Prophet. ... Amin!¹⁷³

The anger displayed by Hamka in this speech in 1969 was repeated by many Modernist leaders on many occasions during the early New Order. Consider this speech on 'various efforts to destroy the Islamic community', delivered at the opening of a Muhammadiyah Youth conference in 1976 by the Muhammadiyah leader H.A.R. Fakhruddin:¹⁷⁴

There are those whose target is the disappearance of Islam from Java within 15–30 years and from Indonesia in 50 years. In fact, there are some even more daring: Islam should be wiped out entirely by three years after the 1977 elections.

If these efforts to destroy the Islamic community are unsuccessful, then there will be efforts to render superficial their understanding of the true teaching about Islam. That in addition to efforts to slander and divide the Islamic community, above all its leaders and organisations. ... Not even I have escaped calumny. ...

There are also efforts to undermine Indonesia's youth by destroying their moral character in various ways, for example by using films, licentious publications and so on.

Because of this, the Muhammadiyah Youth (*Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah*) which is active in the field of *dakwah*, in 'commanding the right and forbidding the wrong',¹⁷⁵ must constantly increase the dynamism of its movement.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷² *Madzhab Salaf*, that is, of the time of the Prophet and the pious forefathers of Islam.

¹⁷³ Hamka, 'Beberapa tantangan terhadap Islam dimasa kini', *Pandji Masyarakat* yr 4, no. 50 (Dzulkaidah 1389H / Djanuary 1970), pp. 3–5, 32–4. Hamka — who was editor of *Pandji Masyarakat* — gave this speech at the conference of the *Majlis Tanwir* of Muhammadiyah, 25–8 December 1969, in Ponorogo.

¹⁷⁴ Fakhruddin was born in Yogyakarta in 1916 and headed Muhammadiyah from 1971 to 1985.

¹⁷⁵ *Amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar*. See note 168 above.

¹⁷⁶ Fakhruddin, 'Berbagai usaha ingin hancurkan ummat Islam', *Suara Muhammadiyah* yr 56, no. 13 (Rajab II 1396 / 1 July II [sic] 1976), p. 1.

Many similar examples could be found from the 1970s and later of national level Modernist leaders' laments. They denounced Christianity, warned that *kebatinan* was a barrier to progress and development as well as a way for Communists to re-infiltrate the society, suspected the government of secret anti-Islamic agendas, bemoaned the corruption of the young by Western ideas and materialism, and feared that the *abangan* would continue to resist deeper Islamisation — despite mounting evidence to the contrary — and, along with them, so would many other Indonesians. While these fulminations were going on at national level, and doubtlessly encouraged by them, at the grass roots of Javanese society, activists inspired by Modernist and Revivalist ideologies, and with both Islamist and Dakwahist agendas, were taking action to purify their society and its practice of Islam. We can see this process — and its widely varying styles and consequences — best in the city of Surakarta.

Grass-roots purification movements in Surakarta in the 1970s

Surakarta was strongly pro-PKI in the late Sukarno period. In October 1965, Surakarta's mayor was a Communist and announced his support for the coup action in Jakarta. The lives of many PKI members and sympathisers from the *abangan* community, along with Chinese lives and property, were lost there in the subsequent violence. Thereafter Islamisation efforts were intensified, with a significant increase in *Qur'an* study sessions (*pengajian*). This activity was initiated particularly by Modernists, for NU was, and remains, quite weak in the city. In the early stages the Jamsaren *pesantren* played a leading role. Its Ky. Jamaluddin (d. 1995) was particularly influential.¹⁷⁷ He was of a Modernist inclination in his reliance upon reason to understand Islam's revelations. He stood out above all the other Islamic leaders in Surakarta of the time, recalled Hj. Siti Aminah Abdullah (one of the founding pair of Assalaam school): he used his intellect to understand Islam and was moderate in his views.¹⁷⁸ Abu Bakar Ba'asyir — later to gain fame as the

¹⁷⁷ See M. Hari Mulyadi, Soedarmono *et al.*, *Runtuhnya kekuasaan 'Kraton Alit' (Studi radikalisi sosial 'wong Solo' dan kerusuhan Mei 1998 di Surakarta)* (Surakarta: Lembaga Pengembangan Teknologi Pedesaan, 1999), pp. 330–1. Jamsaren was founded in the 18th century, had its ups and downs over time but began to develop again from c. 1960; it was in considerable danger in October 1965 because the surrounding population was heavily PKI; this according to notes on its history provided by Drs Soedarmono, 11 Nov. 2004.

¹⁷⁸ Interview with Hj. Siti Aminah Abdullah, Surakarta, 11 Sept. 2008.

reputed spiritual mentor of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorists — dismissed him for the same reasons: he was a ‘rationalist’ who relied too heavily on human reason to understand supernatural matters. For his part, the moderate Jamaluddin also criticised Ba’asyir and his colleague Abdullah Sungkar, for reasons which will become clear below.¹⁷⁹ The main actors in the purification movements in the 1970s and 1980s created major new schools, notably three Abdullahs — Abdullah Marzuki, Abdullah Thufail and Abdullah Sungkar. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was also involved, but of less prominence in the 1970s and 1980s. These men exemplify the diversity of ideology and aspirations in Java’s Islamic world, and even display a not-irrelevant diversity of ethnic backgrounds — from Javanese to Pakistani to Arab.

Abdullah Thufail (or Abdullah Thufail Saputra or Abdullah Topel Suryasaputra) was the oldest of Surakarta’s three Abdullahs. He founded Majelis Tafsir al-Qur’an (MTA, The Qur’anic Interpretation Council) in Surakarta in 1972 and ran it until his death in 1992.¹⁸⁰ His father was a Pakistani gem trader with a Javanese wife, who gave birth to Abdullah Thufail in Pacitan in 1927. Abdullah Thufail attended a Taman Siswa school at least at some point, was thus familiar with Javanese arts, and could perform classical Javanese dance. He became a trader as a means to support himself and, as he travelled throughout Indonesia, became persuaded that religious reform was essential and could only be achieved by returning to the *Qur’an* and *Hadith*. His religious thought was Modernist, with Modernism’s characteristic reliance on the human intellect to understand the true meaning of Islam. He was influenced by the great figures of Modernist thought such as al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh and Muhammad Rashid Rida, and by Mohammad Natsir, whom he much admired. His successor Ust. Ahmad Sukina describes MTA thought as very similar to that of Persatuan Islam. At some earlier stage, when he was living in Bali, Abdullah Thufail was regional head of Natsir’s DDII for the Nusatenggara Barat region.

Abdullah Thufail was active in proselytising work in Surakarta in the wake of the upheaval of 1965–6 and collaborated in *pengajian* sessions with Abdullah Marzuki and Abdullah Sungkar, both discussed below. Abdullah Thufail sought to join no faction and avoided politics. ‘We are without

¹⁷⁹ Interview with Ust. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Ngruki, Surakarta, 13 Sept. 2008.

¹⁸⁰ The following account of Abdullah Thufail and MTA, unless otherwise indicated, rests upon interviews with Ust. Drs Ahmad Sukina *et al.*, Surakarta, 6 Nov. 2006 and 24 March 2008; and *Sekilas tentang Yayasan Majelis Tafsir al-Qur’an (MTA)* (mimeo brochure, n.d.). Further information on MTA is available through Majelis Tafsir Al Qur’an Online at <http://mta-online.com/v2/>.



Illustration 10 MTA headquarters, Surakarta, 2008

a school (*madzhab*)', he told his followers, meaning that they adhered to no Traditionalist interpretation of Islam. MTA exemplified Modernist epistemology, with its reliance on the *Qur'an* and *Hadith*, and on human reasoning to understand them. Abdullah Thufail nevertheless sought to remain neutral in Modernist-Traditionalist disagreements. MTA regarded Sufism as full of deviations and had nothing to do with it, but was respectful towards those who wished to believe in it.

MTA avoided conflict with the New Order regime. When that regime demanded that everyone recognise the supremacy of *Pancasila* (which we will discuss in the next chapter), Abdullah Thufail saw no problems and introduced the required *Pancasila* lessons into the MTA curriculum. Abu Bakar Ba'syir remembered him as being easy-going with regard to the government's shortcomings and progressively more easy-going over time towards Javanese culture.¹⁸¹

¹⁸¹ Interview with Ust. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Ngruki, Surakarta, 13 Sept. 2008.

Whereas for many reformers of Modernist inspiration, Christianisation was a major issue, for MTA — according to Ahmad Sukina — it was not, because the Islam that MTA teaches is ‘pure gold’, whereas the gold offered by others is counterfeit. So MTA was confident that Islam would prevail. Local Javanese traditions, however, were important matters. Javanese art forms were respected and, indeed, some were taught by MTA, including *gamelan* and *wayang*, so long as the supernatural ideas associated with them were expunged. But those that necessarily involved non-Islamic spiritual forces — which meant, of course, such crucial matters as *slametans*, *pusakas*, honouring the dead and propitiating local spirits and Ratu Kidul — must be abolished, for this was a form of polytheism. The MTA co-educational school in Surakarta eventually spawned a national network amounting to 134 branches by the early 21st century.

The rigorous, indeed rather puritanical, intellectualism of Abdullah Thufail was not, however, to the taste of two other reformers, Abdullah Marzuki and his wife Siti Aminah Abdullah (who was also his cousin).¹⁸² They were both Javanese in descent, from a pious *santri* background, and their parents had all been students at the famous Termas *pesantren* in Pacitan. Abdullah Marzuki was born in the early 1940s and came to know Islam initially in its village and Traditionalist Javanese style. Both his and Siti Aminah’s fathers were in a Sufi *tarekat* — in the case of Abdullah Marzuki’s father, at least, it was reportedly Naqshabandiyya — and Abdullah Marzuki himself followed Naqshabandiyya at least for a time. He and his wife became primary school teachers. For all their piety, neither of them was a learned scholar of Islam or expert in Arabic. In 1958 they were living in Wuryantoro (where Soeharto also had once lived) and set up a small printing business to produce materials needed in schools. From this beginning, an entrepreneurial flair enabled Abdullah Marzuki and Siti Aminah Abdullah to provide an economic foundation to their *dakwah* that the other, more learned, purifiers lacked. According to Siti Aminah’s brother Ahmad Syamsuri, they also had a committed work ethic in the secular world that made them different in style from the other Surakarta activists.

¹⁸² The following account of the history of Assalaam rests upon interviews with Hj. Siti Aminah Abdullah, Surakarta, 11 Sept. 2008; Drs Ahmad Syamsuri, Surakarta, 20 March 2008; and Bambang Arif Rahman (who was teaching at the school), Surakarta, 20 March 2008. Further information on the school can be found at <http://www.assalaam.or.id/>.

They moved their *Tiga Serangkai* (triumvirate)¹⁸³ printing business to Surakarta in 1972 and there deepened their study of Islam with Ky. Jamaluddin, who had the greatest influence on them, and with others, including Abdullah Thufail. The latter they found too puritanical, too extreme in his views, so they formally advised him that they were withdrawing from his circle of followers. In their intellectual and religious progress, the pair had thus moved from their Traditionalist background to Modernist-style purifying ideas.

The couple organised *pengajian* for the employees of their printing firm and for the wider Surakarta society during the 1970s, in the new freedom made possible by the annihilation of PKI. In 1982 they formally established what they called Pondok Pesantren Modern Islam Assalaam for both male and female pupils. This was, says Ahmad Syamsuri, specifically set up to resist the extremism that the founders saw in other Islamic organisations around them. Assalaam was modeled in many ways on the famous school at Gontor, but it was not meant to be an exact copy. The government curriculum was combined with Islamic subjects so that graduates were qualified for higher



Illustration 11 Assalaam *pesantren*, Surakarta, 2006, with a banner saying, 'Welcome, *santris* of Assalaam: return to Assalaam with new enthusiasm to become the best'

¹⁸³ So named to commemorate the 'Book Store Three' — *Toko Buku Tiga* — which had been acting as their agent in selling the publications. Nowadays, it would be surprising for a Modernist Islamic organisation to use 'three' in a title, for that is frequently — and irrationally — taken by extremists as a covert sign of the Christian Trinity.

education and employment. Here, with fully Javanese leaders of a small-town background and past links with Sufism, the Javanese arts were allowed, but not of course the ideas about supernatural forces that are associated with them. 'Modern Sufism' like Hamka's *tasawwuf modern* has also come to be discussed more recently (although not as part of the formal curriculum). *Wayang* and *gamelan* were acceptable there. Nor, it seems, was there any haste about getting rid of ideas about Ratu Kidul or Sunan Lawu: that was something that would come in time through education. Today, Assalaam is one of the foremost *pesantrens* of Central Java, situated on over 10 ha with over 2,000 students.¹⁸⁴

If, however, Abdullah Thufail was too hard-line for Abdullah Marzuki and Siti Aminah, he was not firm enough for the real hard man of the three Abdullahs: Abdullah Sungkar.¹⁸⁵ He, like his associate Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, was of Arab ancestry, but neither of them was a Habib. That is to say, neither could claim descent from the Prophet and the special spiritual authority that attaches to it. Abdullah Sungkar was a native of Surakarta, having been born there in 1937; in the early 1970s he was chairman of the Central Java branch of DDII. His associate Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was born in Jombang in 1938; from 1959 to 1963 he studied the Arabic language at Gontor, and then moved to Surakarta, just as the political conflicts of the late Sukarno period were reaching their peak. There he met Abdullah Sungkar. Audiotapes of sermons by these two capture something of their different styles. Sungkar's

¹⁸⁴ Bambang Arif Rahman advises me (email of 1 July 2010) that the Assalaam enrolment figures at that point were 1,259 male and 1,011 female pupils, for a total of 2,270. It should be noted that Assalaam has arrangements to keep boys and girls separate from each other, including separate library spaces, separate dormitories and separate entrances to the school.

¹⁸⁵ The following account of Adullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Ngruki rests upon interviews with Ust. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Ngruki, 26 March 2007, 20 March 2008 and 13 Sept. 2008; and with Ust. H. Wahyuddin (Abdullah Sungkar's son-in-law, in charge of the school while Ba'asyir was in jail), Ngruki, 26 March 2006; as well as International Crisis Group, *Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The case of the 'Ngruki network' in Indonesia* (Asia briefing; Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 8 Aug. 2002), esp. pp. 8–11. See further van Bruinessen, 'Traditionalist and Islamist pesantrens', pp. 231–2. There are many other publications with information (and not a small amount of disinformation) on these subjects. In general, the work of the International Crisis Group in Indonesia under the leadership of Sidney Jones is to be preferred over other sources. Publications by self-proclaimed terrorism experts, on the whole, either are based on International Crisis Group material if they are reliable or, if not based on that material, are frequently unreliable.



sermon on ‘serving God’ was coldly analytical, scholarly in a narrow-minded way, and uncompromising. Even Ba’asyir himself described Sungkar as ‘very rigid’ (*sangat keras*).¹⁸⁶ Ba’asyir’s sermons on ‘recognising the character of unbelievers (*kafir*)’ and ‘recognising the character of hypocrites’ were more populist and entertaining, less scholarly, but just as uncompromising.¹⁸⁷ These two were the most political of Surakarta’s purifiers and hence, in the atmosphere of the New Order, the ones who got into the most trouble.

Illustration 12 Ust. H. Wahyuddin, Ngruki, 2006



Illustration 13 Audiotapes of sermons by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir on ‘serving God’, ‘recognising the character of hypocrites’ and ‘recognising the character of unbelievers’

¹⁸⁶ Interview, 13 Sept. 2008.

¹⁸⁷ These tapes were purchased while visiting the school at Ngruki on 20 March 2008.

Sungkar's and Ba'asyir's views were more Revivalist than Modernist. Later interviews with Ba'asyir confirmed his distrust of human intellect and his belief that he was directed by God to have correct understandings of Islam. Needless to say, such divine guidance leaves no room for debate or doubt. For Ba'asyir, the most crucial command in the *Qur'an* is found in *sura* 2:208: 'You who believe, enter wholeheartedly into submission to God and do not follow in Satan's footsteps, for he is your sworn enemy.'¹⁸⁸ It is this uncompromising wholeheartedness that Ba'asyir sought to maintain and to instill in others. He and Sungkar read the works of Muslim Brotherhood figures, including Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Banna and often agreed with them, but were not influenced by them, Ba'asyir claimed, for they sometimes saw flaws in the argumentation. In the late 1960s Sungkar, Ba'asyir and others established radio stations to promote Islamic reform. The first was connected with the Arab-led Al-Irsyad organisation, but the leaders of that organisation found it too hard-line. So Sungkar and Ba'asyir instead established Radio Dakwah Islamiyah Solo¹⁸⁹ in 1970, in which Abdullah Thufail was also involved. Security forces shut down the radio station in 1975 on the grounds that it was critical of the regime.

In 1972 Sungkar and Ba'asyir set up their own school, which they called Al Mukmin (the Believers). This was initially located in Surakarta but was moved in 1973 to the village of Ngruki, just outside Surakarta, and the school is thus frequently referred to simply by the name of the village. The Ngruki school catered mainly for students from poorer backgrounds. It has come to be regarded as a sort of 'Eton for terrorists', since most of the prominent Indonesian terrorists of the late 20th and early 21st centuries passed at some stage through Ngruki or other schools associated with it. The vast majority of its students, however, have never been associated with any violent activity. As is common among Revivalists, Ba'asyir (and presumably Sungkar) believed that women could not be leaders and were the source of temptations that could distract men from their devotion to God. Ba'asyir confessed that he even felt uncomfortable hearing female voices reading the *Qur'an*, but had not yet issued a *fatwa* on the matter. Ngruki was nevertheless co-educational. Girls should be educated equally with boys — but of course separately from them.

¹⁸⁸ *Qur'an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem*, p. 23.

¹⁸⁹ Solo is the original name of the place that became the court city of Surakarta and is still used as an alternate name for it.



Illustration 14 Entrance to *pesantren* Al-Mukmin, Ngruki, 2007

Ngruki aimed to train proselytisers to spread its uncompromising Revivalist views, but there was also a clear Islamist political agenda in the minds of Sungkar and Ba'asyir. Islam must have power and that must be exercised through the restoration of a caliphate. *Kafirs* would have to submit to the superior political authority of the Islamic state. In the minds of such people, interpretations of law were crucial. Ba'asyir's view — and no doubt that of Sungkar — was that because Indonesia did not have *shari'a* law as its constitution and its legal system did not rest upon the punishments found in the *Qur'an* (such as amputating the hands of thieves and stoning adulterers), it could not be regarded as part of the peaceful

Islamic world (*dar al-Islam*). Indonesia was, instead, still part of the 'land of war' — the *dar al-harb* — where holy war (*jihad*) is legal.¹⁹⁰ The idea of secular government was, Ba'asyir believed, a Jewish invention whose purpose was to destroy Islam.

Around 1976 Sungkar and Ba'asyir were inducted into the underground remnant of *Darul Islam*. 'Our struggle was consistent with their principles,' said Ba'asyir, but later Sungkar and he broke away to form their own organisation. Somewhere in the midst of all this conspiracy, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was born as a clandestine terrorist organisation. In January 1979 the Assistant Rector of Universitas Sebelas Maret in Surakarta was murdered, apparently because he was believed to have revealed JI's existence to the authorities and thereby to have brought about the arrest of Sungkar and Ba'asyir two months before. This murder the government blamed on JI and an organisation it labeled Komando Jihad (Holy War Command). Sungkar and Ba'asyir were arrested in November 1978, tried and then sentenced to nine years' imprisonment for subversion in 1982. Legal manoeuvres a few years later gave them a period out of jail, which they used to escape to Malaysia in 1985, where they remained until the fall of the Soeharto government in 1998.¹⁹¹

With its foremost leaders gone from the scene in Java, Ngruki nevertheless carried on with its educational work. Its attitudes towards local culture were generally hostile. While in principle the school took the view that anything in local culture could be maintained so long as it did not contain either immorality or polytheism, in practice virtually everything did. Much Javanese culture was a survival from Hindu-Buddhist Majapahit, said Ba'asyir, and it had to go. *Slametans* were of course a major target. Ideas about the Goddess of the Southern Ocean or the *wayang's* god-clown Semar, the power of *krisses*, propitiating ancestral spirits, the magic of the *waringin* trees that stand before the *kratons* — all such nonsense had to go. *Batik* cloth was about the only acceptable item on the traditional Javanese scene, for it was regarded as mere technology and Muslims were allowed to borrow technology even from *kafirs* in Ba'asyir's view. *Wayang* could

¹⁹⁰ For further information on these concepts, see A. Abel, 'Dār al- Ḥarb', in P. Bearman *et al.*, *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (2nd ed.), vol. 2, p. 126.

¹⁹¹ A valuable account of the connections from *Darul Islam* to JI is found in Quinton Temby, 'Imagining an Islamic state in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah', *Indonesia* no. 89 (Apr. 2010), pp. 1–36. On Komando Jihad, see also Feillard and Madinier, *Fin de l'innocence*, pp. 39–41.

remain if it were purged of non-Islamic concepts — not an easy task for an art form resting mainly on pre-Islamic stories. But in fact *wayang*, *gamelan* or Javanese dance was never performed at Ngruki. All of these things were regarded as the entertainments of unenlightened *abangan* peasants, something that would disappear with greater understanding. Youthful music was generally discouraged at the school, although *nasyid* (devotional songs, usually by males with minimal musical accompaniment) was allowed, as was the use of the tambourine. Ngruki taught the Indonesian, English and Arabic languages, but never Javanese. Sufism was rejected. Mysticism could be accepted only if it was kept within strict limits. Sufism's obedience to a *shaykh* and the ritualised movements that go along with Sufi litanies (*dhikr*) were absolutely unacceptable.

Thus it was that by the mid-1970s Surakarta was already becoming what it has remained — a city known for active Islamic proselytisation and even Islamic extremism, along with high levels of Christianity. Modernist and Revivalist activists were engaged in vigorous Dakwahist activity and — at least in the case of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir — were promoting Islamist causes. Many local people responded positively to these initiatives, but a substantial minority did not and were even prepared to abandon Islam altogether. We noted in Tables 9 and 11 above that by 1975 Surakarta was becoming a city largely divided between Muslims and Christians and that by the 1980s approximately one-quarter of the city's populace was Christian, as it has remained. This makes for an instructive contrast with the East Javanese city of Kediri, whose history has parallels with that of Surakarta (see the appendix on research methodology and case studies below), but where Islamic life was dominated by the *kyais* of NU. In the absence of Modernist and Revivalist purification movements of the kind seen in Surakarta, the Christian proportion of Kediri's urban population remained fairly stable at around 8–9 per cent.¹⁹²

Modernist-led Islamisation

Although we have noted above — and will see again below — Traditionalist involvement in Islamisation efforts in the 1970s, it was nevertheless largely a Modernist- and government-led development. Government hostility towards NU continued and meant that, at grass-roots level, bureaucrats and

¹⁹² Based on data in the *Kota Kediri dalam angka* series for the 1990s to 2005.

the military were unlikely to cooperate with Traditionalist activities. *Kyais* were kept under surveillance and interrogated and many NU branches 'fell into disarray'.¹⁹³ Muhammadiyah, by contrast, generally distanced itself from political activities from c. 1969, thereby submitting to the political hegemony sought by the regime and making its peace with the New Order.¹⁹⁴ Thus it was that Modernists mainly held the initiative at grass-roots level, despite the continuing laments of some senior Modernists.

This Modernist prevalence meant that many cherished NU practices came under criticism and attack; we have already seen examples of Modernists' hostility to Sufism above. The life of Ky. H. Abdurrahim Nur exemplifies how such hostility could arise even from within circles where one might expect Traditionalism to prevail. He was born in 1932 in Porong (Sidoarjo), near Surabaya, so his life experience paralleled the events we have been observing in this book. He was a student at the Traditionalist Darul Ulum *pesantren* in Rejoso, Peterongan (Jombang) from 1948. In 1955, however, he went to the Persatuan Islam *pesantren* at Bangil and there imbibed Modernist ideas. Thence he proceeded in 1958 to study theology at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, gaining his *Licentiate* in 1963. In Egypt he came to admire the Muslim Brotherhood. From 1967, early in the New Order, he taught and fulfilled leadership roles at the IAIN in Surabaya. He also taught theology, at least for a time, at the Persatuan Islam school in Bangil and inspired his pupils with stories of Muslim Brotherhood figures such as Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and others. Abdurrahim Nur acquired the reputation of being a charismatic *kyai*, but this was no *kyai* of the Traditionalist stamp. He was an activist and leader in Muhammadiyah, having left his Traditionalist roots behind, and proved himself able to maintain smooth relationships between Muhammadiyah and the New Order bureaucracy. He was reputedly skilful at using *wayang* as a proselytisation tool. He defended strict Wahhabi ideas relating to the unity of God (*tauhid*) and denounced polytheism. According to the head of Muhammadiyah in East Java, Prof. H. Fasich, for Abdurrahim Nur, Sufism meant complete submission to God's will and religious devotion 'in accordance with the example of the Prophet, with nothing deleted or added'. In other words, no

¹⁹³ Abdul Kadir, 'Traditional Islamic society and the state', pp. 185–7; quote from p. 185.

¹⁹⁴ See the account in Syarifuddin Jurdi, *Muhammadiyah dalam dinamika politik Indonesia, 1966–2006* (intro. Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2010), pp. 199–201.

ritualised *dhikr*, no *Shaykh* — in fact, no Sufism of the kind practiced by the Traditionalist *tarekats* at all.¹⁹⁵

Modernists' animosity towards Sufism was one of the most profound dividing issues between themselves and Traditionalists in this period. Prof. Rasjidi spoke of mysticism as 'rather a kind of exaggeration of living according to the teaching of Islam'. He could understand that some people might need something beyond the five daily prayers and fasting, he said. But 'as for making himself nearer to God, I think what is prescribed in the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah* [the ways of the Prophet, the *Hadith*] is sufficient if it is practised well. ... There are many *tarekats* who teach their followers very good exercises ... for their spiritual thinking. But on the contrary there are many other *tarekats* which are in contradiction with Islam.'¹⁹⁶ The Gadjah Mada University engineer, scientist and local Modernist thinker H. Ahmad Syahirul Alim expressed similar views. He emphasised the need to purify the faith from traces of animism and Hindu-Buddhist thought and of illegal innovations. 'There might be some opposition from other Muslims groups. Because in Nahdlatul Ulama, for example, they consider that some way of mysticism can be considered as part of religion, but according to Muhammadiyah that kind of innovation is nothing but sheer partnership to God [i.e., polytheism]: [it constitutes] wrong innovation in religion, neglecting the example of the Prophet.'¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁵ The account of Abdurrahim Nur rests upon [A. Fatichuddin, Biyanto and Sufyanto (eds)] *Pergumulan tokoh Muhammadiyah menuju Sufi: Catatan pemikiran Abdurrahim Nur* (Surabaya: Hikmah Press, 2003), esp. pp. ix, xiii, 7–12, 55, 62, 147, 151, 153–4, 166, 209–11. The quote from H. Fasich is on p. xiii. Perhaps I should thank the editors of this work for paying me the compliment of plagiarising a passage from my own book *Yogyakarta di bawah Sultan Mangkubumi* on pp. 128–9.

¹⁹⁶ Interview, Jakarta, Aug. 1977.

¹⁹⁷ Interview H. Ahmad Syahirul Alim, Yogyakarta, 10 Aug. 1977. The second part of his name is also sometimes spelled Sahirul; he was of Madurese descent, with an M.Sc. in Astronomy from UCLA (1964); he was a member of neither NU nor Muhammadiyah himself. He wrote a book 'setting out the harmony among science, technology and Islam': Ahmad Sahirul Alim, *Menguak keterpaduan sains, teknologi dan Islam* (Yogyakarta: Dinamika, 1966). After the 1985 bombing of the 9th-century Borobudur temple in Central Java, Syahirul Alim was detained but then released without charge after giving evidence against the former Minister of Industries H. Mohamad Sanusi, who was sentenced to 19 years imprisonment. When Abu Bakar Ba'asyir formed his MMI (Indonesian Holy Warriors' Council) in Yogyakarta in 2000, Syahirul Alim was among the prominent Muslim leaders who attended (*Tempo*I, 5 Aug. 2000). He died in 2007. My thanks to Sidney Jones for some of these details.

For most Modernists, the general rule was that anything not specifically allowed by the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* as religious belief or practice was innovation (*bid'a*) and therefore to be rejected, whereas the Traditionalist position was generally that anything not specifically forbidden by the *Qur'an* and *Hadith*, and which was in itself good, could be accepted. Hence, as Abdurrahman Wahid put it, 'Anything that's not forbidden explicitly by religion is allowed even though it came from foreign sources. For example, Sufism. ... That's why Muhammadiyah, after they cleanse the Islamic world or ... purify [it] from foreign elements, they found it necessary to attack Sufis.'¹⁹⁸

For the first two decades or so of the New Order, Sufism seemed to be in retreat. The largest Sufi order in Java was probably the Qadiriyya wa Naqshabandiyya, although Tijaniyya was also prominent. Around 1970 there were four centres of Qadiriyya wa Naqshabandiyya, located at the Darul Ulum *pesantren* in Rejoso, Peterongan (Jombang), led by Ky. Musta'in Romly; at Mranggen near Semarang; and in two West Javanese locations: Suralaya (Tasikmalaya), led by Abah Anom; and Pagentongan (Bogor). When Ky. Musta'in announced his support of Golkar in 1976, he lost many of his followers, confirming the entwining of politics and spirituality. By the late 1980s, the other leaders except for Abah Anom had died and were succeeded — if at all — by less charismatic figures. The teaching died out altogether in Pagentongan.¹⁹⁹ Given the generally private — not to say secretive — nature of many *tarekats*, particularly at a time when this form of spirituality was under criticism, it is hard to know the extent to which other Sufi orders suffered a loss of influence and membership in the early New Order period. But certainly from the late 1980s and into the 1990s, when Islamic mysticism became obviously popular, people spoke of this as a 'revival' after a lean period. Ironically, while Musta'in Romly may have lost followers upon affiliating with Golkar in 1976, Qadiriyya wa Naqshabandiyya may have found it easier to grow when its leader in Tegal did the same thing in the different context of 1983.²⁰⁰ This was part of the growing reconciliation

¹⁹⁸ Interview, Jakarta, 7 Aug. 1977.

¹⁹⁹ Martin van Bruinessen, 'Tarekat Qadiriyyah dan ilmu Syekh Abdul Qadir Jilani di India, Kurdistan dan Indonesia', *Jurnal Ulumul Qur'an* no. 2 (1989), pp. 74–5. A more detailed account is in Mahmud Sujuthi, *Politik tarekat: Qadiriyyah wa Nasqsyabandiyah Jombang: Studi tentang hubungan agama, negara dan masyarakat* (intro. Martin van Bruinessen; Yogyakarta: Galang Press, 2001).

²⁰⁰ Julia Day Howell, 'Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic revival', *The Journal of Asian Studies* vol. 60, no. 3 (Aug. 2001), esp. pp. 713–7; Julia Day Howell, Subandi and

of Traditionalist Islam and the Soeharto regime which we will consider further in the following chapter.

With regard to Javanese traditions in general, Modernist opposition in this period is clear. Most Traditionalists took a different view. Indeed, for Traditionalist *kyais*, accommodating Javanese concepts while promoting Islamisation came as second nature. Mbah Lim (Ky. H. Muslim Imampura) never found Javanese culture a barrier, he claimed. When he began his *pesantren* near Klaten in 1959, the local people were *abangan* who did not know how to pray. So he taught them. The Goddess of the Southern Ocean and the spirit of Mount Lawu (Sunan Lawu) are simply spirit beings (*makhhluk halus*) that really exist, he said, but they are just ‘culture’ and don’t need to be destroyed. There are many other local spirits, but there is no need to honour them, so he never forbade this. Nevertheless, over time belief in local spirits just began to die out. The story with gambling was similar. There was resistance to this slow process of Islamisation, but that resistance ‘was defeated by God’.²⁰¹ Teaching by example was an important part of this version of Islamisation, and no doubt Mbah Lim’s protection of PKI people who fled to him for help during the 1965–6 killings had a significant impact.

In the early New Order there were some voices in NU that were hostile to local traditions and even to Sufism. One such was Imron Rosyadi, himself a somewhat unusual NU leader. He had studied in Malaya, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and made a career in the foreign service, acting in Saudi Arabia and Iraq during 1947–52 and in Switzerland in 1956–7. In Indonesia, he taught at the Military Law Academy. He rose through Ansor to a leadership position within NU itself, but lost that position because of his firm opposition to Sukarno’s Guided Democracy. He was a PPP member of parliament in the New Order and a senior member of the foreign service.²⁰² He was, thus, far more internationally experienced than most NU figures. When I spoke with him in 1977, I mentioned some Modernists’ wish to get rid of *slametans*,

Peter L. Nelson, ‘Indonesian Sufism: Signs of resurgence’, in Peter B. Clarke (ed.), *New trends and developments in the world of Islam* (London: Luzac Oriental, 1998), pp. 277–97.

²⁰¹ Interview with Ky. H. Muslim Imampura (Mbah Lim), Pondok Pesantren al-Muttaqien Pancasila Sakti, Karang Anom, Klaten, 27 March 2006.

²⁰² Roeder, *Who’s who*, p. 322; Martin van Bruinessen, *NU: Tradisi, relasi-relasi kuasa, pencarian wacana baru* (Yogyakarta: LKIS bekerjasama dengan Pustaka Pelajar, 1994), p. 291.

Sufism and various cultural traditions and asked him to describe NU's attitude towards traditional Javanese culture. His response was somewhat unusual within the NU context: 'We want also to abolish it,' he said, 'but in a very smooth way, not confronting against them. ... That is not the Javanese way of doing things.'²⁰³ So, for Imron Rosyadi, there was a difference of approach, but not of ultimate purpose. Even a devotee of Javanese traditions and local spiritual forces like Abdurrahman Wahid believed that, in the long run, Javanese arts such as *wayang* would survive, but with more Islamic content infused into them.²⁰⁴

The fundamental problem for most Modernists about Javanese traditions — *slametans*, spiritual forces in dance performances, the Goddess of the Southern Ocean, *krisses* that are 'alive', Sufi practices and all the rest of it — was that they smacked of superstition and irrationality. True to their basic epistemology, Modernists of this period saw Islam as fundamentally rational and consistent with modern science. That also made their kind of reformed Islam consistent with the government's agenda of economic development, educational expansion and social welfare improvement.²⁰⁵ As Islamisation deepened from the 1970s in Jatinom (Klaten district, near the main Yogyakarta-Surakarta road), it was Muhammadiyah taking the lead. By the time of his fieldwork in 1990–1, Irwan Abdullah could observe that 'a new ethos is being formed and rationalization is being introduced, signs that the society is becoming more modern. The *pengajians* provide help in the rationalization of life'.²⁰⁶

Sjafruddin Prawiranegara said that Islam must be interpreted so that it is consistent with science. For example, what the *Qur'an* called angels was the same as what science called natural laws. 'If we are really religious, we should also be really scientific', he said.²⁰⁷ Similarly, Prof. Osman Raliby referred to *Qur'an* 55:33, which reads, '*Jinn* [spirits] and mankind, if you can pass beyond the regions of heaven and earth, then do so: you will not pass

²⁰³ Interview with H. Imron Rosyadi, Jakarta, 5 Aug. 1977.

²⁰⁴ Interview with Ky. H. Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 7 Aug. 1977.

²⁰⁵ There is an interesting contrast here with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who expressed the view that it is wrong to fight poverty, for the poor have been made so by God. One should, however, treat the poor justly. For example, they should have access to health care and education. Interview, Ngruki, 13 Sept. 2008.

²⁰⁶ Irwan Abdullah, *The Muslim businessmen of Jatinom: Religious reform and economic modernization in a Central Javanese town* (Doctoral thesis, University of Amsterdam, 1994); p. 95; see also pp. 6, 85–8 on the role of Muhammadiyah.

²⁰⁷ Interview, Jakarta, 3 Aug. 1977.

without Our authority'.²⁰⁸ This was meant as a warning, since at that time there were no airplanes, said Raliby. But in the modern world, with airplanes and rockets available, we can say, 'Oh, that is what it means really'. Similarly, the Qur'anic references (which are multiple) to the seven heavens would, he believed, become clearer as science progressed. *Qur'an* 21:30 says, 'Are the disbelievers not aware that the heavens and the earth used to be joined together and that We ripped them apart...?'²⁰⁹ To Raliby, this showed that the *Qur'an* contained the Big Bang Theory.²¹⁰

The rights and freedoms of women are commonly issues in religious reformist movements and were no less so in the Islamising Indonesia under Soeharto. The regime had its own image of what women should be — mistresses of the home, upbringers of children, supporters of their men, but also modern, educated and able to contribute to national development. The government sought 'to define women's private as well as public roles by stressing that women are primarily wives and mothers, but they should also serve the nation as skilled or semi-skilled professionals'.²¹¹ The views of Islamic activists were similar in principle, but in practice there were considerable variations. Several of the *kyais* we have mentioned in this book had polygamous marriages, for example, which was very rare among Modernists.

It is important to note that all sides supported education for women. There was no significant group advocating Taliban-style exclusion of women from education.²¹² But other differences separated Traditionalist and Modernist views. Muhammadiyah had a women's branch — 'Aisyiyah, founded in 1917 — and Modernist women played a role in supporting progressive views. But they were separate from the men who ran Muhammadiyah and even in the early 21st century felt that they were excluded from real power

²⁰⁸ *Qur'an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem*, p. 354.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

²¹⁰ Interview, Jakarta, 14 Aug. 1977.

²¹¹ Virginia Matheson Hooker and Howard Dick, 'Introduction', in Virginia Matheson Hooker (ed.), *Culture and society in New Order Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur, etc.: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 11.

²¹² For this reason, regardless of the merits of the book's contents, the lurid title given by the publisher to Bilveer Singh's study of extremist Islamic politics in Southeast Asia is misleading: Bilveer Singh, *The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: Losing the war on terror to Islamic extremists* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007). Not even Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar wished to exclude girls from schooling.

in the main organisation. Not until 1972 did Muhammadiyah issue a ruling saying that women could go out in public alone, but they could do so only with their husband's permission — this being an attempt by Muhammadiyah to catch up with the reality that 'Aisiyiah women were travelling widely. Yet even the national head of 'Aisiyiah from 1965 to 1985, Prof. Baroroh Baried of Gadjah Mada University, reported that she had to cancel trips because her husband refused her permission to go. Family planning was a priority for the government, with a goal of only two children per family, but contraception was a problem for many Muslim thinkers, since it seemed to be interference in God's designs. We have already noted Hamka denouncing it as part of 'Thought Attack' in 1969. Nevertheless, family planning was accepted by Muhammadiyah.²¹³ 'Aisiyiah was no feminist organisation, however; its views remained conservative and based closely on readings of the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* as interpreted by reason, as with all other Modernist organisations.

NU was slower to address women's issues. Traditionalism had its roots in the countryside where, as we have seen, fewer women were literate and forces of modernisation were slower to penetrate than in urban areas. In 1946 a women's branch was created called Muslimat NU, but the Traditionalists' strongholds in *pesantrens* remained male-dominated until the 1970s, when women first began to appear as teachers. Their role within NU strengthened as years passed, assisted in large measure by the support of Abdurrahman Wahid and several other crucial *kyais*. Abdurrahman's wife Sinta Nuriyah Wahid also became prominent in this cause. Early marriage had been common in Traditionalist circles, but now girls were encouraged to complete their schooling and to go on to higher education. In this context, as noted above, the IAIN system played an important role. Muslimat NU also encouraged birth control from the 1960s and, in 1972, NU itself ruled that it was allowable.²¹⁴

MUI only issued a *fatwa* on contraception in 1983. This declared family planning for the purpose of maternal or infant health or in the interest of the education of children to be *halal* (thus providing medical and social grounds for limiting family size), so long as it did not employ contraceptive procedures that were *haram* in Islam. Intrauterine devices were allowed. Abortion, vasectomy and tubectomy were declared forbidden.²¹⁵

²¹³ Van Doorn-Harder, *Women shaping Islam*, pp. 79, 115, 119.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 170, 175, 218.

²¹⁵ Mudzhar, *Fatwa-fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, pp. 126 et seqq.

Deepening Islamisation by the early 1980s

From across Java, information about the deepening Islamisation was accumulating by the early 1980s. Despite regime hostility to the political aspirations of Modernists and to the rural influence of Traditionalists, government policies and grass-roots Islamisers were all heading in the direction of the religious transformation of Javanese society and that of Indonesia more generally.

Between the late 1970s and mid-1980s, Robert Hefner observed in the remote Pasuruan highlands what was almost surely the first serious penetration of Islam into an area where previously Islamic allegiance had mostly varied from nominal to zero. None of the local anti-Islamic Javanist groups survived the events of 1965–6. The New Order government's schools then penetrated the region and with them came teachers sympathetic to more orthodox forms of Islam. As elsewhere, the young thereby gained a new understanding of, and commitment to, their previously at-best-nominal faith. *Madrasahs* more than doubled in number. Pious Islam was associated with education, development and progress. To many young Javanese there, as Hefner puts it, 'the transition from belief in village guardian spirits to orthodox Islam looks like an enlightened transition to modernity'. Officials of the local branch of the Ministry of Religion affiliated themselves with Golkar — an obligatory step for all public servants — and thereby kept their jobs. They and other Golkar officials promoted *pengajian* for the society in general. Education programmes for mosque officials were developed, and mosques and prayer-houses were upgraded and expanded (with the customary public address systems for the call to prayer). This was Dakwahism at government and activists' behest.²¹⁶

Cederroth's fieldwork in a small village in the Malang area in the mid-1980s also documented an Islamisation process which, however, had encountered significant hindrances. This area had paid obeisance to village spirits and potent places, held *slametans* and annual village cleansing ceremonies (*bersih desa*) and performed *jaranan* dances. When a new village head succeeded in 1978, however, villagers found themselves being led

²¹⁶ Hefner, 'Islamizing Java?' esp. pp. 540–8. Hefner's fieldwork was done in 1978–80 and 1985. Quotation from p. 548. The local anti-Islamic *kebatinan* movement called *agama Buda Wisnu Jawi* wanted to return to the 'original' Javanese religion of the time of Majapahit (ibid., p. 538). This is probably the same as the movement in the Blitar area that Raharjo calls *agami Budha Jawi Wisnu* (the Vishnuite Javanese Buddhist religion); Raharjo Suwandi, *Quest for justice*, p. 147.

by someone with little interest in such observances. NU opposed these practices, too, and made headway in undermining them. Indeed, in some respects NU here was more intolerant of *abangan* ideas and art forms than was Muhammadiyah, which was locally represented by people who came in from outside. In the later 1960s, the local head of NU built the village's first *madrasah*. There was a 'deep cleavage' between the Traditionalist and Modernist camps, but both promoted deeper Islamisation. This, however, produced a backlash in the form of two new *kebatinan* movements led by men claiming supernatural powers. Cederroth thus observed part of the revival of mysticism from the later 1980s that will be considered more below. In his case, however, this was not Islamic Sufism but old-fashioned Javanese *kebatinan*.²¹⁷

On the north coast, near Lamongan, older spiritual ideas were progressively Islamised. In the fishing village of Brondong there had been a custom to propitiate spirits connected with fishing, but its leaders had been PKI and the practice disappeared along with them in 1965–6. Around 1970, however, this was revived as a new ritual called *tutup layang* (furling the sails), in which offerings were made off the coast to a spirit called Kyai Anjir, the supposed spirit of the waters — a sort of north-coast male counterpart to the south-coast female Ratu Kidul. The head of the village mosque (the *modin*) pronounced the conventional Islamic invocation, followed by a Javanese invocation of the spirit: '*Bismillah*'²¹⁸ ... We make offerings to Kyai Anjir who reigns in the Java Sea. May we receive good fortune and welfare' Brondong was no longer, however, just a place of *abangan* fishermen. Like everywhere else, there were now Modernists among the government school teachers, who established Muhammadiyah there in 1970. The idiosyncratic, doctrinaire — and much condemned — Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia (LDII, Indonesian Islamic Proselytisation Institute, discussed in the following chapter) came there in 1975, being greeted with initial hostility but eventually being accepted. NU followed with a branch in the 1980s. By the early 21st century, even the most extreme of Modernist and Revivalist

²¹⁷ Sven Cederroth, *From syncretism to orthodoxy? The struggle of Islamic leaders in an East Javanese village* (Copenhagen: NIAS report no. 3, 1991). Cederroth's fieldwork in the village of Bokor (Tumpang district) was done in 1986–7. Quotation from p. 34.

²¹⁸ Short for the Arabic invocation of God's blessing that should precede any important act and which opens all but one of the *suras* of the *Qur'an*: *bismillah al-rahman al-rahim*, 'in the name of God the lord of mercy, the giver of mercy' (following the translation in *Qur'an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem*).

movements would be represented in Brondong.²¹⁹ So the *tutup layang* ceremony became a cooperative affair, but one that clearly trended towards deeper Islamisation. After the initial ritual, there followed a day of *pengajian* and *slametan* for the Traditionalists. In the evening, local youths danced to the popular driving rhythms of *dangdut* music and frequently got drunk. There was also *tayuban* dancing and *wayang*, but the dancers and singers must all be modestly dressed, the women even performing in headscarves (*jilbab*). This was all that the believers in the old spirituality got. By the time that Budi Ashari did his fieldwork there in 2004–6, *kebatinan* adherents were down to about fifteen, mostly elderly, people without any formal institution to support them, in a village of nearly 15,000 residents. In surrounding villages, however, there was not even the degree of cooperation seen in the *tutup layang* ritual; Muhammadiyah and NU activists dominated there and were in frequent disagreement, except in their opposition — sometimes violent — to the entry of any new religious interpretations.²²⁰

While we do not have case studies such as those described above for all of Java's thousands of villages, the pattern we have seen here appears to have been generally applicable. One of the most astute observers of this phenomenon, Robert Hefner, commented as follows:

By the 1980s anthropologists and journalists were reporting that normative Islam was making great progress in many former strongholds of secular nationalism, while public Javanism was in decline. The institutions of public Javanism were hit particularly hard. In most of the countryside, for example, the lavish communal rituals (*slametan desa*) celebrated by Javanists at village spirit shrines (*dhanyang*), so vividly captured in Clifford Geertz's *Religion of Java*, had disappeared by the late 1980s. Where they survive, most operate as private celebrations no longer sanctioned by local authorities ... By the 1980s there was clear evidence of Islamic revival and Javanist decline. ... The policies of the New Order state made ... full-blown public Javanism untenable.²²¹

In 1985 the intellectual journal *Prisma*²²² published an issue dedicated to 'Islam in Indonesia: In search of a new image'. *Prisma* was a publication

²¹⁹ Including FPI, PKS, MMI and the *Tablighi Jamaah*, originally of Pakistani origin. These will arise later in this book.

²²⁰ Budi Ashari, 'Tutup layang: Manifestasi masyarakat Brondong, Lamongan, Jawa Timur' (MA thesis, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2006).

²²¹ Hefner, *Civil Islam*, pp. 84, 122, 248 n69.

²²² 'Islam in Indonesia: In search of a new image', *Prisma: The Indonesian indicator*, no. 35 (March 1985).

of LP3ES (Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial, Institute for research, education and social and economic information), established in 1971 by young intellectuals of Traditionalist background and one of the most important NGOs in Indonesia. Its work received crucial support from the beginning from the German Friedrich Naumann Stiftung. The *Prisma* issue's contributors were a 'who's who' of the younger intellectual elite of both Modernist and Traditionalist backgrounds. Abdurrahman Wahid wrote of Islam as complementary to Indonesian nationalism. He emphasised the importance of NU's decision of 1984 — discussed in the following chapter — to dissociate itself from any political party.

Nurcholish Madjid criticised the current state of Modernist thinking, accusing it of suffering from 'blockages' and giving inadequate attention to the 'classical intellectual heritage' — the fruit of his own study of the thought of Ibn Taymiyya in his Chicago doctoral thesis under Fazlur Rahman the year before. Amien Rais wrote of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and the Iranian Islamic revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini. He criticised NU for being easily co-opted by governments and Muhammadiyah for appearing to be in need of 'reorientation and revision of its frame of thought'. Dawam Rahardjo described the aims of the Iranian revolution as 'most attractive' for 'trying to develop the values of a new culture' that was neither capitalist nor socialist. Ahmad Syafii Maarif wrote that in Indonesia's *Pancasila* state, Islam must be implemented 'gradually, wisely, carefully and responsibly' — a critique of more radical aspirations. Jalaluddin Rakhmat criticised 'Islamic Fundamentalists' for their 'low knowledge ... of religion'. The writer Abdul Hadi W.M., who was known for his Sufi views, observed that interest in Islam as a political force was on the wane, but not as an 'intellectual and cultural force', and that Sufism had 'begun to be accepted again among the educated elite'.

Taken together, the contributions to this 1985 issue of *Prisma* reflected the degree to which the New Order regime had been successful in dominating the Islamisation process. These young intellectuals were all thinking in the context of a permanent regime reality in which acceptable limits of ideological discourse would be set by Jakarta. Islam would not shape those limits, but must adjust itself to them. We will see in the following chapter how the acceptance of this reality by Islamic activists of most persuasions, and how in particular NU's change of political course, led from the mid-1980s to a collaborative Islamisation effort that carried dramatically forward the process we have already observed in this chapter. The exceptions to this generalisation were found among Revivalists like Ba'asyir and Sungkar. Yet extreme views such as theirs would also find themselves facing a more fruitful

environment for growth because of the general progress of Islamisation, as well as crucial international developments.

Soeharto himself was becoming more interested in Islam as the 1980s began. He employed Ky. H. Kosim Nurseha to teach himself and his family more about the faith. Kosim Nurseha was originally from Tegal and is said to have claimed expertise in martial arts that had enabled him to repel a PKI assassination attempt. He was a member of the army's *Staf Kerohanian* (spirituality staff).²²³ He thus had the right sort of pedigree for teaching Islam to the Presidential household. As we have seen above in Soeharto's 1986 collection of inspirational 'seeds', *Butir-butir budaya Jawa*, however, the President's attachment to Javanese-derived spirituality of the older Mystic Synthesis style and associated magical practices persisted. We may reasonably presume that his wish to know more about Islam derived from a desire to add Islam to the spiritual realms that he was able to control. It is possible — from what we know of the man, even probable — that he aimed to make of this faith that was increasingly influential in the society around him, which his regime had encouraged as a grass-roots anti-Communist force, also a supernatural force supporting him and his regime, rather than running the risk that it might come to threaten him. Soeharto was adept at co-opting and using people who might resist him — that is to say, those who were not so problematic that they must lose their jobs, or be denounced, imprisoned or killed — and probably now sought to do the same in the realm of the supernatural. Soeharto had little or no knowledge of the history of Java, but he was probably replicating what Sultan Agung had done at Tembayat 350 years before and Ratu Pakubuwana had done 250 years before: mobilising the supernatural powers of Islam so that they supported, rather than threatened, the regime. Neither Soeharto nor Sultan Agung thought it necessary to abandon the occult powers of Java to do that.

Early New Order ironies

In the early New Order, from its inception in 1965–6 to the early 1980s, the confluence of political agendas on the one hand with socio-religious agendas on the other produced some ironic outcomes. Before the advent

²²³ His name is sometimes spelled Qosim Nursekha. He was born c. 1936. The information here rests upon a 1996 interview with him entitled 'KH. Kosim Nurseha, "Saya Harus Hati-hati"', found at <http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/1996/07/21/0011.html>; I cannot vouch for this source. See also Hefner, *Civil Islam*, p. 83.

of the Soeharto regime, there were fairly consistent patterns of political conduct that distinguished the Modernist from the Traditionalist side of Indonesian Islam. The Modernists — whose base was mainly urban and, in particular, outside Central and East Java — maintained a firmly reformist religious stance with a firmly principled political stance. It was the very stiffness of their political position — exemplified by Natsir and other leaders of Masyumi — that got their party banned during the Sukarno years. The Traditionalists of NU, on the other hand, spent the Sukarno years accommodating themselves to the changing nature of the political regime and were never banned. Modernists and others accused NU of being opportunist and unprincipled during this period, but that was not quite true. Rather, it was a principle of Traditionalist jurisprudence to accommodate established political authority so long as Islam was not oppressed, on the grounds that even imperfect government was preferable to anarchy. We have noted above that they based this on *Qur'an* 4:59, which admonished Muslims to 'obey God and obey His Messenger and those who are in authority over you'. Traditionalists also believed in the idea of weighing up benefits and costs, and then acting in accordance with the principle of seeking the greater *maslahat* (Arabic *maslaha*, the general good, welfare). Thus, in the interest of the Islamic community (*ummah*) as a whole, NU worked with the prevailing regimes. We may say that, in a sense, it was an NU principle not to stand on principle. What mattered to NU was not Islamism but Dakwahism — and that usually of a pretty gentle, patient sort.

In the early New Order, those old political patterns were turned upside down. Now Modernists, who despaired of gaining political power under the prevailing regime, generally abandoned Islamism and turned their attention to Dakwahism. This new approach was pioneered and exemplified by Natsir when he created DDII in 1967. Now the Modernist agenda was about Islamisation from below rather than the imposition of Islamic power from above. In effect, the Modernist politicians adopted what had always been the strategy of Muhammadiyah: to do good, to transform and to support the society while moving it in a more Islamic direction, all the while working with whatever government regime it had to work with. Although Modernism remained rooted in urban environments, through the New Order's expansion of education and its mandating of religious teaching in all schools — and, in particular, the appearance of government-appointed school teachers throughout Java — Modernism's stricter understandings of Islam began to penetrate previously *abangan* and Traditionalist areas even in the countryside.

Modernists' Dakwahism was consistent with the government's own *dakwah* agenda. For the former, the objective was the destruction of

Communism and deeper Islamisation in accordance with God's directives. For the latter, the objective was the destruction of Communism and deeper social control in accordance with Soeharto's directives. There was no necessary inconsistency between these sets of objectives. Modernists still found much to complain about — above all about Christianisation — but in the Islamisation agenda they and the government were in agreement.

Whereas the Dakwahist agenda of Modernism was consonant with New Order priorities, NU now found itself under suspicion and, in effect, increasingly in opposition to the regime. NU's Ansor had played a prominent role along with the military in the physical annihilation of PKI, so NU might reasonably have expected collaboration with the regime to continue. After all, it had grass-roots networks outside towns and cities, across Java's countryside — particularly in East Java — that were far more extensive than anything the Modernists could offer. But instead NU found itself treated with suspicion, its *kyais* under surveillance, bureaucrats and the military reluctant to associate or cooperate with it, and its branches, as Suzaina Abdul Kadir has it, falling 'into disarray'.²²⁴ NU grew increasingly critical of New Order policies. It was dissatisfied with several regime policies, including its domestic economic development priorities that favoured foreigners and Indonesian Chinese over the indigenous entrepreneurs who were a core NU constituency. It also became critical of New Order foreign policy. Just two years into the new regime, Andr  e Feillard notes, NU was looking more and more like an opposition party.²²⁵

The reasons for this inversion of political roles lay in the nature of the regime itself, for here was the first government in Indonesian history that had the desire and some real capacity to impose totalitarian control. It sought to shape not only the conduct but also the thought of its citizens, and intended to brook no opposition. We have already noted above the actual constraints upon the New Order's totalitarian aspirations — that Indonesia was spared genuinely totalitarian rule by general incapacity and pervasive incompetence. But the Soeharto regime went further in this direction than any before. Pre-colonial states were ramshackle affairs that certainly would have embraced totalitarianism if they could have, but couldn't. The Dutch colonial regime sought to impose a quiet, controlled and economically efficient peace upon the countryside, but never sought to control what everyone thought. The Japanese sought to mobilise the populace and to imbue it with appropriate

²²⁴ Abdul Kadir, 'Traditional Islamic society and the state', p. 185.

²²⁵ Feillard, *Islam et arm  e*, pp. 79–95.

ideas, but the chaos of the Second World War period made real totalitarian indoctrination impossible. The Revolutionary years and the Sukarno period were full of contradictions, and it was consistently true that the central state was barely in control of the nation and many schools of thought contended. Only now, with the New Order regime, did control of both what people did and what they thought become imaginable. Thus, to understand the new position in which NU found itself, we must consider further the nature of the New Order state itself.

The New Order as an historicist state

As we think of the New Order regime in broader, more universal contexts, we may reasonably conclude that Soeharto's government was, in Karl Popper's terms, historicist. Its view of history and of its own place in it, and its socio-political aspirations, were comparable to those that inspired Popper's analysis. Its approach to society was equivalent to what Popper calls

an approach to the social sciences which assumes that *historical prediction* is their principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the 'rhythms' or the 'patterns', the 'laws' or the 'trends' that underlie the evolution of history.²²⁶

The applied purpose of this historicism is what Popper calls 'Holistic or Utopian social engineering', which is

never of a 'private' but always of a 'public' character. It aims at remodeling the 'whole of society' in accordance with a definite plan or blueprint; it aims at 'seizing the key positions' and at extending 'the power of the State ... until the State becomes nearly identical with society', and it aims, furthermore, at controlling from these 'key positions' the historical forces that mould the future of the developing society.²²⁷

Popper's targets in *The poverty of historicism* (first published in 1957) were the ideas that he saw as underpinning the most devastating totalitarian regimes of the first half of the 20th century: Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Such ideas were found in the New Order of Soeharto as well. From early in the regime it was concerned to produce an account of history

²²⁶ Karl R. Popper, *The poverty of historicism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 3.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 67. The quotes within Popper's passage here are from the sociologist Karl Mannheim (1893–1947).

that served its purposes and made itself seem the culmination and agent of inevitable development and modernisation, the heir of those ‘rhythms’, ‘patterns’, ‘laws’ and ‘trends’ which ‘underlie the evolution of history’. Or, to put it more simply, it was anxious to promote what Hannah Arendt — like Popper, an analyst of the greatest tyrannies of the early 20th century — called ‘the monstrous forgeries in historiography of which all totalitarian regimes are guilty and which announce themselves clearly enough in totalitarian propaganda’.²²⁸

This project was seen most clearly in the production of the six-volume *Sejarah nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian national history) which was to be the approved account of history for all students to absorb. It was rather dismissively nicknamed ‘the standard book’ (*buku standar*) by professional historians, who found (and still find) the idea of a politically correct ‘standard’ version of history something between scandalous and comical. The project was directed by Prof. Nugroho Notosusanto, a historian from the University of Indonesia who was also head of the historical section of the Ministry of Defence and bore the titular rank of Brigadier General. Many of Indonesia’s serious historians were engaged in this project and found themselves under pressure to produce ideologically acceptable accounts. Sukarno’s shortcomings and the evils of Communism of course received much attention. The volumes first appeared in 1975, with further editions following in 1977, 1981–3 and 1993.²²⁹

The *Sejarah nasional Indonesia* passage on the New Order’s initiatives in religious education reflects the regime’s view of how little NU’s *pesantrens* had to contribute and of how essential it was that they receive government ‘assistance and direction’:

In the field of religious education and the training of religious personnel there was also a raising of quality. To this end there was inter-departmental cooperation Cooperation *inter alia* in building-construction, assistance with textbooks, curriculum improvement and the upgrading of teachers. At the same time, to improve the guidance of

²²⁸ Hannah Arendt, *The origins of totalitarianism: New edition with added prefaces* (Orlando, FL, etc.: A Harvest Book, Harcourt, Inc., n.d. [1973 edition]), p. 332. We will return to the parallels with the ideas of Popper, Arendt and other writers in Chapter 14.

²²⁹ This ‘standard book’ is among the topics described in the doctoral thesis by Katherine E. McGregor, published as *History in uniform: Military ideology and the construction of Indonesia’s past* (Singapore: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with NUS Press, 2007).

pesantrens, assistance and direction were given so that these institutions could develop and be among the centres for the cultivation of village-level development cadres, along with their function as institutions for Islamic education.²³⁰

Traditionalist *pesantrens* were thus useful if they were guided by the regime to become agents of development, but were otherwise rather dismissed.

For the historicist and aspirant totalitarian New Order, the central problem about NU was, almost surely, simply that it was so independent of government. Totalitarian, historicist regimes may be able to oppress, imprison, murder or co-opt opponents, but they find it difficult to deal with actors who are simply independent. NU's *kyais* and *pesantrens* had local social roots, local networks, local sources of income and an organisational network hardly more substantial than a list of who was married to, had studied with, or was descended from whom. This was not something that the Soeharto regime could just take over. It could not be given a directive that would be carried out in all its branches — NU just did not (and does not) work that way. Jakarta could intervene in a political party, and frequently did so. It could shape the national education curriculum, and did so. The regime could do many such things, but it couldn't just make the network that was NU do whatever it wanted it to do. So NU had to be cold-shouldered. Its control of the Ministry of Religion could be ended; its educational subsidies could be cut away; its existence as a political party could be ended when it was 'fused' into PPP in 1973. It could be subjected to surveillance, to suspicion, to isolation from the bureaucratic and military interests that dominated the nation. The government, which could not just take over the NU network, could compete with it, so that the Traditionalist *pesantrens* even ceased to be the main vehicles for conveying religious knowledge to the rural young. But the government couldn't make NU conduct its affairs at government direction.

Over time, as NU was progressively cold-shouldered by the state, Traditionalists found themselves becoming willy-nilly an opposition force. Eventually new leaders in NU realised that the only way forward was to reconcile with the regime. We will see in the following chapter how this became unavoidable when Soeharto took a decision to impose all-encompassing ideological conformity upon the nation — the ultimate step for any totalitarian regime, the formal definition of how people must think.

²³⁰ This quotation is taken from the 1993 edition. Marwati Djoened Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notosusanto (eds), *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* (6 vols; Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1993), vol. 6, p. 500.

While all of this was going on, the *abangan* side of Javanese society lost the only institutions that had previously sustained and promoted the *abangan* view of life: the *abangan*-supported political parties. PKI was slaughtered, imprisoned and made illegal. PNI was fused into PDI and political irrelevance. The *abangan* constituency was garnered at election time by Golkar and subject at all times to the Islamisation projects we have seen in this chapter. There was resistance to this Islamisation, of course, and the deeper Islamisation of a society once so polarised and embittered along *santri-abangan* lines could not proceed smoothly or quickly. But it was proceeding.

We will see in the following chapter how, in the last years of the New Order, political alignments and social contexts changed. This would facilitate both the further Islamisation of Javanese society and the emergence of extremist Islamic movements. Some of these movements — unlike Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's oppositionist group — would gain legitimacy by sharing in the totalitarian vision of the regime.

CHAPTER 6

The totalitarian experiment (II): Grass-roots Islamisation and advancing Islamism, c. 1980s–98

The break between the preceding chapter and this one is rather artificial, as often with historical periodisations, and the years covered overlap. The aim of this chapter is to show how, from roots that we have seen in the preceding chapter, in the last 20 years or so of the New Order four major departures grew to fruition:

- a regime push for ideological hegemony,
- rapprochement between NU and the regime which served to advance Dakwahism,
- the emergence of Revivalist and Islamist groups whose aspirations were consistent with some elements within the regime elite, and
- consequently deeper Islamisation — at the time commonly called ‘greening’ — of the regime itself.

Taken together, these developments accelerated the Islamisation of Javanese society — and of Indonesian society more generally — and prepared the ground for Islam to return as a political force, as well as a social and cultural one, after the regime fell in 1998. The New Order would end with little room remaining for opposition to deeper Islamisation.

At the start of the period discussed here, the regime was far more stable than it was at the beginning of the period covered in Chapter 5. It was never as monolithic as it aspired to be, but by the 1980s, Soeharto’s regime had tentacles and loyal acolytes from one end of Indonesia to the other. Through

the combined dominance of the bureaucracy and the military down to village level, with Golkar as an electoral vehicle, it was close to inconceivable that the New Order regime could be overturned by any domestic force, including any form of politically organised Islam. Internationally, the regime was widely admired for its economic management, its suppression of Communism, its apparent domestication of Islam — a major international strategic issue in the wake of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 — and its near-miracle of actually seeming able to govern the world's largest archipelago. Despite international criticism of the New Order's human rights record and corruption, Soeharto was received as a state visitor in Washington and Tokyo, and himself received in Jakarta heads of government from nations such as Japan, India and Pakistan. Such facts no doubt reinforced the regime's self-confidence and Soeharto's own belief that he was something much more than a village-boy-made-good-through-the-army: he was a statesman, a seer perhaps, possibly even (as suggested by his musings in *Butir-butir budaya Jawa* and his memoirs, both done in the 1980s) a philosopher king.

By the 1980s, Soeharto's New Order regime was coming under increased criticism domestically for its corruption and brutality. In May 1980 a 'Petition of 50' signed by prominent people criticised Soeharto, accusing him of misrepresenting *Pancasila* as if he himself were its embodiment. Nonetheless, the regime was successfully dominating most of the context for social transformations, although such transformations were not always susceptible to regime control, given the scale and complexity of the society on the one hand and, on the other, the regime's own administrative and other limitations.

Religion was at issue here. As we noted above, Soeharto was evidently taking a greater interest in Islam himself, without abandoning his commitment to what Hefner has called 'power-oriented mystical magic'¹ of a more familiarly Javanese type. The possibility of Islam becoming difficult to manage, however, was suggested when PPP staged a walkout of the parliament in 1978 and Islamic extremists hijacked a Garuda aircraft in 1981. It may have been the regime's perception of the depth of ongoing Islamisation and the possibility of Islamic forces becoming difficult to control, along with the government's permanent anti-Communism, that led it to decide to implement thorough-going ideological conformity across the nation. But let us first look at the changing social context of the 1980s and 1990s.

¹ Hefner, *Civil Islam*, p. 83.

A changing, Islamising society

The New Order's developmental, educational and religious initiatives had already spawned significant changes in Javanese society. People were becoming more urban and fewer were working in agriculture. In 1961, 71.2 per cent of men and 64.3 per cent of women were employed in agriculture; by 1980 these figures had fallen to 52.6 and 46.6 per cent respectively, while employment in manufacturing, construction, trade, transport and services had risen. In rural areas, many women were employed in cottage industries.²

During these last two decades of the regime, an urban middle class became visible in Indonesia — if it remained notoriously difficult to define or quantify.³ Observers noted that this middle class often displayed a high level of Islamic piety. We saw above how Islam as it was being promoted in the expanding educational system was associated for many young Javanese with the very idea of modernity. Beatty noted in his fieldwork in the early 1990s that piety was 'a prominent aspect of an emerging national youth culture'.⁴ Elite Islamic schools were being created in major cities for the middle class, with good facilities and offering the national curriculum along with Islamic studies.⁵ Salaried urban workers in modern enterprises or government employment and university-educated professionals, fixing up older houses or living in newly built suburbs, sending their children to university and driving new automobiles, while also observing Islam's requirements for the faithful — these became a more prominent feature of Indonesian life than ever before.

It has to be remembered, however, that for most Indonesians in both the cities and the rural countryside, life remained hard. Poverty, malnutrition and chronic illness all declined in this period, but none was eliminated. From the 1930s to the 1960s, a Javanese villager might aspire to own a bicycle and a sewing machine. By the 1980s and 1990s those aspirations could extend to a motorbike and a radio, and eventually a television set. But most

² Diane L. Wolf, *Factory daughters: Gender, household dynamics, and rural industrialization in Java* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 43, 45.

³ For example, see the papers in Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young (eds), *The Politics of middle class Indonesia* (Clayton, Vic: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990).

⁴ Beatty, *Varieties*, p. 129.

⁵ On such schools, see Noorhaidi Hasan, 'Islamizing formal education: Integrated Islamic school and a new trend in formal educational institution in Indonesia' (Working Paper no. 172. Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2009), p. 5.

people living in Java or in Indonesia more generally remained poor as well as inadequately supported by social services, even by the standards of other Southeast Asian countries. Nevertheless, there were significant changes. Among them was the impact on literacy of the regime's increasing provision of education.

Literacy, as already noted above, was rising dramatically. We saw figures in the previous chapter confirming rising literacy across Indonesia. By 1995, as the New Order neared its end, the more detailed picture was as follows for Central and East Java.

Table 15 Literacy in Central and East Java as percentages of total population, 1995⁶

Area	Urban male	Urban female	Total urban	Rural male	Rural female	Total rural
East Java	94.4	84.3	89.2	82.3	64.9	73.4
Central Java	94.6	84.5	89.4	88.1	74.5	81.2

By 2003, there would be further improvement on these figures, as seen in Table 16.

Table 16 Literacy in Central and East Java and Yogyakarta as percentages of total population, 2003⁷

Area	Urban male	Urban female	Total urban	Rural male	Rural female	Total rural
East Java	95.3	87.9	91.6	85.8	71.7	78.5
Central Java	94.6	86.5	90.5	89.8	78.7	84.2
Yogyakarta	95.1	86.8	90.9	86.9	74.4	80.5

⁶ The statistics relate to literacy in the Latin script on the part of persons aged ten and over. *Penduduk Jawa Timur / Population of Jawa Timur: Hasil survey penduduk antar sensus 1995 / Results of the 1995 intercensal population survey 1995* (Seri S2.13 [Jakarta:] Biro Pusat Statistik [1996]), pp. 47–9; *Penduduk Jawa Tengah / Population of Jawa Tengah: Hasil survey penduduk antar sensus 1995 / Results of the 1995 intercensal population survey 1995* (Seri S2.11 [Jakarta:] Biro Pusat Statistik [1996]), pp. 47–9. I do not have figures for the Special District of Yogyakarta for 1995.

⁷ The statistics, like those in Table 15, relate to literacy in the Latin script on the part of persons aged ten and over. *Statistik kesejahteraan rakyat 2003 / Welfare statistics 2003* (Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik [2003]), pp. 144–9. Figures relating to those over the

Thus, male literacy was approaching 100 per cent and female literacy was improving dramatically. Males and urban dwellers were still ahead of females and rural dwellers, a reflection principally of differential educational opportunities. We noted in Chapter 2 above that in 1930 it would have been nearly impossible to find a literate woman in many parts of Java; by the 1990s it was becoming difficult to find anyone who was not literate. It should also be noted, however, that concerns about the loss of facility in Javanese script were well-founded: literacy in other than the Latin script was below 1 per cent in all of the categories covered in Tables 15 and 16 except for East Java in both 1995 and 2003, where 1.5 per cent of rural dwellers were literate in a non-Latin script. That might have been literacy either in Javanese script or — even more likely — in Arabic script.⁸ It was clear that Javanese society was becoming more modern in many ways, more urban, less agricultural, more literate and, as we saw in the last chapter, more deeply Islamic. But perhaps it was also growing less Javanese in culture by the standards of the past.

The growth of modern communications media under the New Order played an important role in improving the dissemination of information and ideas across Javanese society, and thus in its modernisation. In its anti-Communist enthusiasms, the Soeharto regime banned many leftist publications and continuously remained alert for anything that might disturb the regime's stability or question its virtue.⁹ Pornography was also suspect of course, but violence in the media was not usually a concern — perhaps unsurprisingly, given the regime's own bloody birth and continuing violence.

In an increasingly literate society, newspapers played an increasingly important role. Newsprint circulation remained rather low for a country of such size, in 1991 being just over 13 million. It tended to be concentrated

age of 15 are given in Statistics Indonesia Tabel 3.1.1 Angka melek huruf penduduk umur 15 tahun ke atas menurut provinsi dan Kab/kota at http://www.datastatistik-Indonesia.com/component/option,com_tabel/task,show/Itemid,181/

⁸ Javanese-language Islamic religious works are often written in Arabic script (in these circumstances called *pegon*) rather than Javanese script.

⁹ This included the first edition of my own *History of modern Indonesia*, published in 1981. It was being sold openly even in fairly remote parts of Indonesia for about a year before someone who mattered read it and discovered in its final chapter, *inter alia*, the comment that Soeharto was 'adept at gaining the loyalty of others, not least by allowing them to reap the financial rewards of loyalty with little concern for legality'. The publishers (Macmillan) and I were invited to alter the text, to withdraw the book from sale voluntarily, or to face it being declared illegal. I refused to alter the text and Macmillan withdrew the book from sale in Indonesia.

in urban areas — particularly in Jakarta — but papers were read by multiple persons so their real readerships are hard to assess. Local newspapers were important in Java, as in the outer islands of Indonesia.¹⁰ Even more important was radio, the reach of which expanded greatly as economic development brought greater prosperity and allowed even rural villagers to buy radio sets. By 1996, Sen and Hill report, most households in Java owned a radio set and radio was ‘the primary mass medium for much of rural Indonesia’.¹¹ Television was introduced in Indonesia only in 1962 and really developed from the 1970s onwards. We have already noted above the pervasive dullness of television programmes under Soeharto — its programmes mainly about development, always about the government’s view of things, always emphasising the unity of Indonesia and the harmony that must prevail among its ethnic and religious communities, whenever possible reminding viewers of the perfidy of Communists. There was a state-controlled TVRI, but in the late 1980s private television was allowed and — hardly surprisingly — members of the Soeharto family and their cronies were prominent in this new branch of business.¹² Television and radio, however, also created a problem for the regime’s totalitarian aspirations, for citizens could access some foreign radio broadcasts — particularly the BBC and Australian radio — and some could get Singapore and Malaysian television. By the mid-1990s the Internet was beginning to provide another means of bypassing regime control of information.

Signs of deepening Islamisation continued to appear throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Religious education, as we have seen, was an obligatory part of the national educational system from the early days of the New Order. A new education law in 1989 reinforced this and introduced a provision — which Islamic activists, particularly from Muhammadiyah and MUI, had demanded in the face of Christian objections — that a religion must be taught in schools by an adherent of that faith. In principle (if not always in practice) this guaranteed that Muslim children in Christian schools would be taught about Islam by a Muslim.¹³ The government’s IAIN system continued to be upgraded and expanded. By 1991 there were 2200 teaching staff in the 14 IAINs and a hundred thousand students were enrolled. At the end of the Soeharto period, according to Hefner, 18 per cent of all

¹⁰ Krishna Sen and David T. Hill, *Media, culture and politics in Indonesia* (Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur: Equinox publishing, 2007), pp. 66–7.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 90–1.

¹² *Ibid.* pp. 109–17.

¹³ Effendy, *Islam and the state*, pp. 155–6.

Indonesians in higher education were studying at IAINs.¹⁴ At lower levels of education, after 1984 — that is to say, after the rapprochement between the regime and NU discussed below — government subsidies to *pesantrens* grew.¹⁵ Muhammadiyah also continued to be a provider of Islamically inspired education, but (as was also true of NU's *pesantrens*) these schools were a small part of the government-dominated educational system. Across all of Indonesia, in 1988 Muhammadiyah's 44,430 teachers at 4,262 schools taught just 1.6 per cent of all school-age children (a group amounting to some 37.5 million by then).¹⁶

We have already noted in the preceding chapter the increasing number of mosques in Central and East Java into the 1990s, just one of many indications of profound social change. Feillard noted that by the later 1980s government officials and Golkar apparatchiks felt that it was no longer inconsistent with their career prospects to attend *pengajian* sessions, as religion grew more fashionable across Indonesia. Even quite zealous organisations like DDII enjoyed better relations with the regime.¹⁷ In the mid-1990s, Feillard wrote of 'un phénomène général de renouveau religieux'.¹⁸ By this time, Bambang Pranowo was arguing — perhaps a bit prematurely, but surely based on shrewd observation — that 'the *santri-abangan* dichotomic approach is no longer relevant to an understanding of the religious life of Javanese Muslims'.¹⁹ In fact ideas and practices associated with the *abangan* life style survived — and still survive today — but by the 1990s it was already seeming likely that *abangan* had become a minority among Javanese. *Kebatinan* appeared to be weakening further.²⁰

¹⁴ Hefner, *Civil Islam*, p. 120; idem, 'Islam, state, and civil society: ICMI and the struggle for the Indonesian middle class', *Indonesia* no. 56 (Oct. 1993), p. 10. See also Porter, *Managing politics and Islam*, pp. 53, 60; Feillard, *Islam et armée*, p. 261.

¹⁵ Feillard, *Islam et armée*, p. 227.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 253.

¹⁷ Andrée Feillard, 'Traditionalist Islam and the state in Indonesia: The road to legitimacy and renewal', in Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvatic (eds), *Islam in an era of nation-states* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997), pp. 146, 150.

¹⁸ Feillard, *Islam et armée*, p. 260.

¹⁹ Bambang Pranowo, 'Islam and party politics in rural Java', *SI* vol. 1 (1994), no. 2, p. 18.

²⁰ Abdurrahman Wahid's characteristically idiosyncratic explanation for this was that the *empus* were finding it hard to gather their spiritual forces because it was very difficult to find a place where the call to prayer could not be heard, and where they could therefore conduct their ascetic exercises (*tirakat*); discussion, Jakarta, 14 Nov. 1995.

The *jilbab* — the headscarf that fits tightly around the face — was an indicator of change. It was rarely worn by Javanese women in the first decades of independence. Leading Modernist figures whom we have already met in this study — Natsir, Sjafruddin and Roem, for example — did not regard veiling or covering the head as necessary for Muslim women and most of their wives did not wear a *jilbab*.²¹ The diaphanous *kerudung* headscarf was sometimes seen in the 1950s and 1960s, but rarely the *jilbab* and never — at least to my knowledge — the face veil. In the late 1970s, Nancy Smith-Hefner reports, less than 3 per cent of female students on the campus of Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta wore the *jilbab*. Veiling was prohibited in government offices and state schools until 1991. After these restrictions were abolished, wearing a *jilbab* became not only a sign of Islamic identity and piety but also a mark of protest against the Soeharto regime among some girls and young women. By the time Smith-Hefner surveyed Gadjah Mada students in 1999, 2001 and 2002, over 60 per cent of females had adopted the *jilbab*.²²

Local-level observation confirmed the broader picture of deepening Islamisation. In Jatinom at the time of Irwan Abdullah's fieldwork of 1990–1, Muhammadiyah was having considerable success in deepening the Islamisation of the town, where it had taken 'deep root', but less success in the surrounding villages, where 'the population does not consider Islam a central issue in their lives'.²³ Traditionalism remained strong in the villages. *Abangan* styles also continued, but they were in decline.²⁴ Even Mystic Synthesis ideas about local spiritual forces were being Islamised in some cases. A *dukun* informant of Kim Hyung-Jun reported that in the past the Goddess of the Southern Ocean had had no religion, but now — in the 1990s — she had become a Muslim and was able to read Arabic.²⁵

Kim studied a rural village in the Yogyakarta area in the 1990s. This had once been a majority PNI and PKI village, with neither a prayer-house nor a mosque. Early in the New Order period, Muhammadiyah activists grew in number there. Religious education was, of course, introduced into the school curriculum. Significant Islamisation followed. Regular *pengajian*

²¹ Luthfi Assyaukanie, *Islam and the secular state* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), p. 85.

²² Smith-Hefner, 'Javanese women and the veil', pp. 390, 397.

²³ Irwan Abdullah, *Muslim businessmen of Jatinom*, p. 87.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 98, 140, 155.

²⁵ Kim, *Reformist Muslims*, p. 167.

sessions began in the mid-1980s and a mosque was built in 1988.²⁶ In Bambang Pranowo's study village on the western slopes of Mount Merbabu, new mosques were built in 1981 and 1984 to meet the 'urgent need' for more places to worship. By 1987 another was planned. This deeper Islamisation — dubbed *santrinisasi* (santrinisation), an increasingly common Indonesian term — was observable not just as a political phenomenon but rather as part of 'a genuine religious resurgence among the villagers'.²⁷

Imam Tholikhah's study of a village in East Java can also give us a sense of countryside realities in the early 1990s. He conducted interviews in 1993 in a village called Madukoro near Magetan, 90 km east of Surakarta.²⁸ This was a poor area, where poverty had been at its worst in the mid-1960s as the Indonesian economy approached collapse. Instead of the terms *santri* and *abangan* being used, the local terms were *jama'ah* and *non-jama'ah* (congregation and non-congregation respectively), with about 50 per cent of the population in each category, but we will continue to use the more familiar terminology here. The story, too, is familiar and consistent with the general pattern that has already emerged in this book. The *abangan* mostly lived in the upland part of the village and were poorer than the *santri*, who lived mostly in the lowland part. The leaders of the local mosques estimated that nearly 80 per cent of the upland villagers were *abangan* while in the lowland area *abangan* were not to be found. There was political tension between the two groups during the pre-Soeharto period and killings took place in the area in 1965–6. Such tensions subsided during the New Order. The destruction of PKI and the general depoliticisation at village level meant that the *abangan* side lost its institutional support and the *santri* side could grow. After the government's push for ideological hegemony and reconciliation with NU in the early 1980s — discussed below — the regime was more relaxed about cooperation at grass-roots level with Islamic organisations. The general Islamic revival visible across the country thus proceeded also in Madukoro, leading to deeper Islamisation.

Cultural differences remained between *abangan* and *santri* in Imam Tholikhah's study village. The former enjoyed performances of *gamelan*, *wayang*, *kethoprak*, *ludruk*, *reyog* and so on. They gambled for small amounts

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Bambang Pranowo. 'Islam and party politics in rural Java', pp. 15–6.

²⁸ The following account rests entirely on Imam Tholikhah, *Anatomi konflik politik di Indonesia*, esp. pp. 1, 10, 26–9, 45–6, 53, 70–3, 76, 79–81, 91–2, 94–6, 115–6, 143–8, 160.

and drank alcohol. The lowland *santri*, by contrast, preferred what they called ‘Islamic arts’: *rebana* and *terbangan* (playing tambourines), *kasidah* and *samrah* (Arabic devotional poetry) and suchlike. Marriages across the *santri*–*abangan* divide were rare. One of Imam Tholkah’s informants from the *abangan* side told him,

My religion is Islam and I believe that God exists. When I married, I recited the *Shahada* (confession of faith). But I am a Muslim who cannot read the holy *Qur’an* and I can’t carry out the prayers. According to me, what is most important for everyone is to do good, be honest and not to harm to others.²⁹

The most important tensions in the early 1990s were, it seems, no longer between *santri* and *abangan*, but rather within the *santri* community between those whom Imam Tholkah calls the ‘fanatics’ and the ‘moderates’. The former tended to be people in private employment and without political power, often zealous supporters of the PPP, while the latter were in the government sector and of course affiliated to Golkar — reflecting again that regime hegemony over ‘acceptable’ forms of religion.³⁰ *Kyais* competed with each other for influence and resisted the influence of Modernists, but generally Traditionalist Islam remained dominant. In this village of some 4,600 people (850 families), there were two mosques and fifteen prayer-houses in the upland part of the village and three mosques and ten prayer-houses in the lowland area. The Naqshabandiyya *tarekat* was found there, but was mainly followed by older women.

Schooling reflected, and maintained, the difference between upland *abangan* and lowland *santri*. The upland children went to government schools (where, of course, they were also taught about Islam). The lowland children mostly went to two schools run by private Islamic institutions. One was established in the 1960s by an organisation promoting Traditionalist-type education called Pesantren Sabilil Muttaqin, and the other by NU in the 1970s. The *slametan* — the object of so much animus from the Modernists — provided something of a bridge between Traditionalist *santri* and *abangan*. It was observed by both on such occasions as the first, third, seventh, fortieth, hundredth and thousandth day after a death. The difference between them was that a *santri slametan* was led by a *kyai* who prayed in Arabic while an *abangan slametan* was led by the village *modin* (the head of the local mosque)

²⁹ Ibid., p. 70.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 28. See also Mudjahirin Thohir, *Orang Islam Jawa pesisiran*, p. 229, 231, on PPP hostility to the government in Jepara.

or by a village elder and the prayers were in Javanese, but still reflected Islamic values.

In general, there had been a progressively deeper Islamisation of Madukoro society. In the wake of the murderous crisis of 1965–6 *abangan* villagers flocked to the mosques and were welcomed by the *santri*. The central sacred site of the *abangan*, the village *pundhen*³¹ where their annual village *slametan* had taken place, was demolished by the *santri* so that site was gone, and with it the annual ritual. Political differences at village level of course changed in the wake of the 1973 amalgamation of political parties and the depoliticised ‘floating mass’ policy. Now it was no longer politicised *santri* vs *abangan* but rather PPP (i.e., NU) supporters opposing the government’s vehicle Golkar. When core leaders of Pesantren Sabibil Muttaqin decided to lend their support to Golkar, the *santri* side of Madukoro became split. Some of the *pesantren*’s anti-Golkar leaders were imprisoned on a charge of being involved in Komando Jihad in the 1970s. In the elections of 1971–92, Golkar consistently won a majority of votes in the village, with PPP never gaining more than 40 per cent and PDI never more than 7 per cent. By the time of the 1982 general election, all of the village *kyais* had thrown their support to Golkar in recognition of political realities and the benefits to be gained.

One version of events credited spiritual powers for Golkar’s dominance of Madukoro. The village head claimed in an interview in 1993 to have used supernatural formulae (*mantras*):

The day before the election [of 1987], I and the village officials visited every polling station to bewitch the place. We circled each vote-box three times and spread salt around the place and prayed for the victory of Golkar. ... I think that many people, above all the older generation, still believe in supernatural forces. By doing this, we were able to explain that the victory of Golkar was assisted by hidden powers. If anyone protested about the outcome of the vote-counting, we were able to explain that many people in fact punctured the Golkar symbol, although what they saw with their own eyes was that they were puncturing the symbol for PPP or PDI.³²

Other case studies also show a picture of Islamisation at village level as a process that was consistent with the regime’s continuing dominance — a synergy of interests whose roots we have already seen in the previous chapter.

³¹ Imam Tholkhah, *Anatomi konflik politik di Indonesia*, p. 145, does not say what form this took.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 164–5.

It was not the case that *abangan* had disappeared, but they were almost surely declining as a proportion of the population and had virtually no political significance, since the only meaningful political choice they might make was to support Golkar, a choice also made by many *santri*.

Endang Turmudi's research on the Jombang area presents such a picture.³³ This was based on field work in 1992–3. As we have already noted above, Jombang is an area noted for its famous *pesantrens* and is at the very centre of the NU network of relationships. The relative political solidarity of Jombang's *kyais* was disrupted when Ky. Musta'in Romly, the leader (*murshid*) of the Qadiriyya wa Naqshabandiyya at the Darul Ulum *pesantren*, announced his support for Golkar as the 1977 elections approached, thereby losing many of his followers. Mutual bitter accusations that those on the other side of the political divide were *kafirs* followed. In fact, Golkar won all the elections in Jombang during the New Order period. After the NU-regime reconciliation of 1984 to be discussed below, many more local *kyais* transferred their support to Golkar, on the grounds that this was the best way to pursue the interests of the *ummah*, leaving others embittered at their defection from PPP. The political divisions among *kyais*, however, had two local consequences. On the one hand, cynicism about *kyais* necessarily grew, and their overall political influence began to decline within the community. This was true even of *tarekat* members, who continued to recognise the authority of their *murshid* in mystical matters but no longer followed his political allegiance. Secondly, these political differences were reflected more broadly in the *santri* community, so that PPP supporters were sometimes uncomfortable attending *pengajian* led by Golkar supporters. By the early 1990s, Turmudi could describe the relations between the *kyais* of Jombang and the New Order regime as 'harmonious' and politics as 'secularised'.³⁴ He goes on to say that, since politics was 'no longer intertwined with Islam', there was no longer a 'moral obligation for a Muslim to affiliate with a certain political party'.³⁵ In fact, Islam and the dominant political force — the regime itself — were by that time quite thoroughly intertwined, and it was for that reason that many Muslim leaders saw no difficulty in supporting Golkar.

³³ The following account rests on Endang Turmudi, *Struggling for the umma: Changing leadership roles of kiai in Jombang, East Java* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006), esp. pp. 90–6, 121, 128–30, 132 et seq., 139–41, 153, 157, 159, 161, 170–1, 179–80, 185, 188, 198–9. This was originally a PhD thesis of 1996.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 152, 170.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

As these developments were going on among Jombang's *santri*, a process of deepening Islamisation was underway among its *abangan*. The gentle type of *dakwah* for which NU was known had considerable success. Added to this were the influences of religious education in public schools, of the local Islamic schools and of students returning to the area after studying at Islamic higher education institutions. The result was 'a decrease of *abangan* practice in general'.³⁶ *Abangan* beliefs and practices were increasingly found only among the older generation. Islamic Modernism was represented in Jombang by Muhammadiyah, but although it remained 'essentially anti-tradition'³⁷ Muhammadiyah was more moderate in its attitude to local traditions than in some other places, or indeed in principle. We also noted this with regard to Muhammadiyah in Kota Gede in the previous chapter.³⁸ While there was some tension and discord between Modernists and Traditionalists in Jombang, this decreased significantly by the early 1990s. All of this promoted the further Islamisation of Jombang society.

A.G. Muhaimin did fieldwork in 1991–3 in Cirebon, a city where the grave of one of Java's *walis*, Sunan Gunungjati, is found, which has given Cirebon 'great spiritual status and made it a place of pious visitation and special veneration'.³⁹ Muhaimin's is a fine study of popular Islam there, of the intersection of Islam and local spirits, traditions and interpretations, and a detailed account of actual practice. He demonstrates the perseverance into the 1990s of older practices in Traditionalist circles that still resisted Modernist reforms. Muhaimin provides, for example, a detailed account of the *Ruwahan* observances in the middle of the month Saban, which we have already encountered in the 1930s in Chapter 2 above. As in the past, so at the time of Muhaimin's research, pious Muslims believed that on the 15th of the month, the heavenly tree of life would be shaken so that some of its leaves would fall; the names written on those leaves foretold who would die during the coming year.⁴⁰ Various traditional ritual practices follow from that idea. Muhaimin shows the continuing importance of pilgrimages (*ziarah*) to sacred sites, of the Buntet *pesantren* and its various *kyais*, and of the Tijaniyya and Shattariyya Sufi orders.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 199.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 179.

³⁸ There citing Nakamura, *Crescent arises over the banyan tree*, pp. 182–3.

³⁹ A.G. Muhaimin, *The Islamic traditions of Cirebon: Ibadat and adat among Javanese Muslims* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006). This was originally a PhD thesis of 1995.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 133–4.

In the generally pious Traditionalist atmosphere for which Cirebon was (and is) well-known, many beliefs were preserved that also made sense to *abangan*. For instance, beside the God of the *Qur'an* and the other spiritual beings of Islamic tradition, 'some Cirebonese do recognise a variety of other deities: *dewa* (*deva*, male) and *dewi* (*devi*, female), *Betara* (*Bhatara*, male) and *Betari* (*Bhatari*, female), and also *Sang Hyang*', all of these being pre-Islamic, Sanskrit- and/or Old Javanese-derived terms. Interpretations differ, however, as to what sort of beings these are.⁴¹ Thus, Muhaimin could observe things reminiscent of the Mystic Synthesis of earlier times. But times were in fact different and here, too, New Order politics led to political splits, when some *kyais* supported Golkar in the 1992 election and some PPP.⁴² Muhaimin did not study the issue of the ongoing deepening of Islam's influence among the *abangan*, but we can see in his study the sort of bridges of thought and practice that existed in Traditionalist circles and facilitated the ongoing Islamisation of Javanese society.

Andrew Beatty's fieldwork in the 1990s in Banyuwangi, at the eastern tip of Java, also encountered the variety (a term he uses in the title of his book) of local Islams in Java.⁴³ His main fieldwork site was a village on the slopes of Mount Ijen which he calls 'Bayu', populated largely by 'Osing' people — a group who regard themselves as the original inhabitants of the region and who speak their own dialect of Javanese. The dominant form of Islam in 'Bayu' was Traditionalist; there was little presence of Modernist Islam. For local villagers, the *slametan* remained a ritual of central importance, but interpretations of it differed, from the less Islamic to the more orthodox. Here the local terms used for *abangan* and *santri* expressed a sense of ethnic as well as religious identity: *wong Jawa* versus *wong Islam*, that is, Javanese versus Muslims, although these terms were not used rigidly.⁴⁴ These two

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 32.

⁴² Ibid., pp. 239–40.

⁴³ Beatty's fieldwork was done in 1991–3 and 1996–7. The following account derives from his *Varieties of Javanese religion*, pp. 20–1, 27, 43, 52–9, 126–7, 130–4.

⁴⁴ This usage may have quite old roots in this region. A similar distinction between *gama Jawa* (Javanese religion) and the Islamic faith, between being Javanese or being Muslim, was drawn in a Javanese-language Islamic text from the early stages of Islamisation, published in G.W.J. Drewes (ed. and transl.), *An early Javanese code of Muslim ethics* (Bibliotheca Indonesica 18; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978); see esp. pp. 34–6. This is a problematic text, discussed on pp. 23–4 of my book *Mystic synthesis in Java*. While the provenance of this work cannot be confidently established, I think it possible — perhaps even likely — that it came from the Banyuwangi area.

groups lived in the same areas and had contrived means to tolerate each others' presence and practices. 'In the interest of social harmony and inner calm one adjusts one's own behavior to others', observed Beatty in the 1990s. '*Santri* relativise supernaturalism as *adat*, custom, and thereby avoid confronting it as a challenge to formal religion; mystics relativise normative piety as a first step in knowledge, and they treat supernaturalism as a symbolic language referring to inner realities. Diversity is embraced as a fact of social life.'⁴⁵ Nevertheless, local mystics were prone to 'contrast their own open-minded speculation with what they see as the narrow dogmatism of the *santri* ... The quiet, bewildered majority, caught between the two sides, is apt to defer to either as the occasion demands.'⁴⁶

Thus, a relatively tolerant co-existence prevailed in 'Bayu'. The local cult of the *wong Jawa* in 'Bayu' was focused on the spirit Buyut Cili, who was believed to be a were-tiger. Even the wife of the *pangulu*, the chief religious official of the mosque, took part in observances at Buyut Cili's remotely located shrine. Such conduct was not the rule in some surrounding villages. In one nearby village the local spirit shrine was in the centre of the village and had been vandalised by pious villagers. In another, the leading NU figure since the time of the Revolution had pressed for thoroughgoing reform of local religious practices. Beatty met his son, who still insisted that old traditions that were inconsistent with Islam must be 'wiped out', leading by Beatty's time to 'fierce dogmatism' and 'intensive indoctrination' in the village.⁴⁷ Thus, in this remote southeastern corner of Java, the process of Islamisation varied significantly from village to village, a salutary warning to us not to assume too much on the basis of the local case studies available to us. Nevertheless, the general direction of social and religious change was clearly in the direction of deeper Islamisation.

The process of deepening Islamic influence was also seen in the arts. We have noted the vicissitudes of older Javanese arts in previous pages and will return to this topic below. A new musical form must now attract our attention, one that came effectively from nowhere c. 1965 to become within a decade the best-known, most popular music of Java and Indonesia more broadly, called *dangdut*. The name is onomatopoeic, reflecting the sound of the driving drum beat that defines the form. This was truly popular music, for

⁴⁵ Beatty, *Varieties of Javanese religion*, p. 157.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 131–4.

the creation of which the male singer and film star Rhoma Irama is usually credited. Sen and Hill describe his contribution in this way:

He transformed the older-style *orkes Melayu* (Malay orchestra) and combined it with the rhythmic style of Indian film songs, popular with urban working-class audiences, into up-tempo *dangdut*, acceptable across society and patronized by Cabinet ministers.⁴⁸

Dangdut or similarly popular music might be thought to be an improbable vehicle for Islamisation, but Rhoma Irama sought to make it such, particularly from the later 1970s onwards.⁴⁹ One of his songs which — one might think, rather surprisingly — became a popular dance tune, recites the *Shahada* and says,

Say that God is One,
God, the object of our prayers and supplications;
Say that God is One,
God, who has no children and is the child of none.⁵⁰

Another of his songs is about going on the *hajj* to Mecca. Interspersed among stanzas in Arabic, he sang passages such as the following:

We are coming, we are coming
To fulfill your call, O Allah.
We are coming, we are coming
To seek your blessing, O Allah.
Go on the *hajj*, forgiven your sins
And forge faith and piety.
Struggle in the path of God;
Hajis are the fortress of religion.
We are coming, we are coming
To fulfill your call, O Allah.
We are coming, we are coming
To seek your blessing, O Allah.

Haji haji, haji, come let us carry out the religious duty of
pilgrimage (x 12)
Many kinds of peoples of this earth

⁴⁸ Sen and Hill, *Media, culture and politics*, p. 174.

⁴⁹ For an early account of Rhoma Irama and the origins of *dangdut*, see William H. Frederick, 'Rhoma Irama and the dangdut style: Aspects of contemporary Indonesian popular culture', *Indonesia* no. 34 (Oct. 1982), pp. 103–30.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 116–7.

Are as one, mixed together in front of the *ka'ba*.
 Many sorts of languages reverberate,
 Beseeching forgiveness as they pray.⁵¹

In Rhoma Irama's lyrics we may note the first major example of a phenomenon that has been important in the Islamisation process in Indonesia — making Islamic piety trendy. This would have seemed strange at the time to most young people in Europe. While Rhoma Irama was urging his fans to fulfill their 'religious duty of pilgrimage', John Lennon was telling his to imagine that there was no heaven or hell, no countries, 'nothing to kill or die for and no religion, too'.⁵² It would have seemed much less remarkable to many in the United States, however, where Campus Crusade and other evangelical Christian movements were beginning to make a major impact among the young, and where Americans had been singing along to the hit song *It is no secret what God can do* since the 1950s — recorded by, among many others, Elvis Presley, Pat Boone, Mahalia Jackson and Tammy Wynette. As Micklethwait and Wooldridge point out, in 1970s America, 'Evangelicals produced their own blockbusters, their own pop songs, their own cultural forms, their own version of Bible-infused modernity'.⁵³ Indonesia's pattern was not so different.

It became — and has remained — normal for *dangdut* performances to accompany political campaigns and other major public occasions. Rhoma Irama used his music to support PPP in its opposition to Golkar and the regime, but he could not contain *dangdut's* popularity in this way. It was (and is) often sung in utterly irreligious fashion by young females in provocatively short skirts with gyrations that any *ustadz* or *kyai* would find difficult to approve — which is not to claim, of course, that none managed to enjoy such performances.

From the 1970s and 1980s there also emerged another form of trendy devotional music called *kasidah pop* or *kasidah modern*, using modern instruments such as acoustic guitar and flute. The first group to become famous for this was a quartet of pious Muslims calling themselves Bimbo, whose first hit was *Tuhan* (God), written in 1973. The prominent littérateur Taufiq Ismail composed many of their lyrics. Not only their lyrics but also

⁵¹ My translation from the lyrics of Rhoma Irama's song *Haji*, taken from http://lirik.kapanlagi.com/artis/rhoma_irma/haji.

⁵² John Lennon's *Imagine* was released in 1971.

⁵³ John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, *God is back: How the global revival of faith is changing the world* (London, etc.: Penguin Books, 2010), p. 101.

their performance style mixed music and devotionism. Sometimes the group was so carried away by religious fervor that they turned their backs on the audience and abandoned their singing in mid-song.⁵⁴ Other groups joined the *kasidah pop* trend over the coming years.

Regime demands for ideological conformity

From the late 1970s and with increasing insistence to the end of his reign, Soeharto pursued the totalitarian goal of imposing ideological conformity across the nation, hoping to make all of its citizens alike in their understanding of the nation and its ideological underpinnings. There was, however, no question of designating Islam as the foundation of the state — as his contemporary Mahathir Mohamad sought to do in Malaysia — for that would immediately threaten the multi-religious nation. We have noted above that in the last two decades of his rule, Soeharto took a greater interest in Islam, but this did not mean the abandonment of his interest in more nativist Javanese ideas of occult powers. It is therefore not surprising — given what we know of Soeharto's own beliefs and given both the multi-religious reality of Indonesia and the traditions of its military — that Soeharto sought to make *Pancasila* the only acceptable ideology in matters of state and, indeed, in everything else as well. For many Muslim leaders this looked like a direct challenge to Islam, an attempt to create a new national religion called *Pancasila*, an idea that was of course utter anathema to them. Continuing doubts about the strength of Soeharto's Islamic identity supported such suspicions. So did the Soeharto fashion for choosing Javanese or Sanskrit/Old Javanese terminology wherever possible instead of Arabic. The six Soeharto children all had grandiloquent names in this style: the daughters Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (better known as Tutut, b. 1949), Siti Hedyati Hariyadi (a.k.a. Titeik, b. 1959) and Siti Endang Adiningsih (a.k.a. Mamiek, b. 1964) and the sons Sigit Haryoyudanto (b. 1951), Bambang Trihatmojo (b. 1953) and Hutomo Mandala Putra (known as Tommy, b. 1962). And as we will see, when the regime began to insist on mass indoctrination in *Pancasila*, it also inclined to the use of pre-Islamic terminology.

⁵⁴ On Bimbo and other expressions of middle-class piety, see Moeflich Hasbullah, 'Cultural presentation of the Muslim middle class in contemporary Indonesia', *SI* vol. 7 (2000), no. 2, pp. 1–58. Being carried away by one's religious emotions during a performance is not unique to this group, of course; Mahalia Jackson was an American example of the same.

Pancasila was originally adopted as the philosophical foundation of Indonesia in the negotiations that created the Constitution of 1945, during the last weeks of the Japanese occupation. Sukarno conceived these five principles as the foundation of a religiously neutral form of nationalism. They were sufficiently vague in nature that the contending leaders of the about-to-be nation of Indonesia could agree on them. The date of his *Pancasila* speech — 1 June 1945 — was remembered during the Sukarno years with an annual observance on 1 June of *Hari Lahir Pancasila* — *Pancasila* birth day. This observance carried on for a few years under Soeharto, but it was clearly desirable to diminish its Sukarnoist implications. So in 1970 it was replaced with a new date and designation. Now, on 1 October of each year — the anniversary of Soeharto's victory in Jakarta over the coup attempt of 1965 — *Hari Kesaktian Pancasila* was observed.⁵⁵ The new terminology was significant, for *kesaktian* comes from *sakti*, an Indonesian version of a Sanskrit-derived Javanese term for supernatural power (*sekti* and hence *kesekten*), a term used widely in Javanese culture and without Islamic connotations. So this was the '*Pancasila* supernatural-empowerment day'. It is unsurprising that Islamic political leaders were offended.

In 1978 Soeharto ramped up the regime's ideological drive through a formal decision of the Parliament (MPR) that mandated indoctrination across the nation through a programme known as P4, standing for *Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila* (Guidelines for the Instilling and Implementation of *Pancasila*).⁵⁶ This decision decreed, *inter alia*, the following:

These Guidelines for the Instilling and Implementation of *Pancasila* represent a manual and something to hold on to in life,⁵⁷ in social life

⁵⁵ Faisal Ismail, *Ideologi, hegemoni dan otoritas agama: Wacana ketegangan kreatif Islam dan Pancasila* (Yogyakarta: TiaraWacana, 1999), p. 134. *Hari Kesaktian Pancasila* has continued to be observed in Indonesia since the fall of Soeharto; see the report of Cabinet discussion of this in *Tempo*I, 23 Sept. 2005.

⁵⁶ Unless otherwise indicated, the discussion of P4 here rests on the official publication *Pedoman pelaksanaan P-4 bagi umat Islam* (Jakarta: Proyek Bimbingan Pelaksanaan Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila bagi Umat Beragama, Departemen Agama RI, 1982–3). See also Michael Morfit, 'Pancasila: The Indonesian state ideology according to the New Order government', *Asian Survey* vol. 21, no. 8 (Aug. 1981), pp. 838–51.

⁵⁷ *Pegangan hidup*. This term, too, could be ambiguous, for a magical amulet could also be called a *pegangan*.

and national life, for every citizen of Indonesia, every state manager, every state institution and every social institution, both in the centre and in the regions, [to be] carried out completely and entirely.⁵⁸

These Guidelines sought to neutralise accusations that P4 was meant to displace Islam or any other faith. Separate versions were published for each of the recognised religions. The version for Muslims had an introduction from the Minister of Religion, Alamsyah Ratu Prawiranegara — the only general to serve in this position⁵⁹ — which was uncompromising in asserting both the centrality of *Pancasila* and its consistency with existing religion:

Pancasila as the state ideology must be understood and instilled by the society. This is because in truth understanding of the state ideology represents one of the measures for promoting consciousness of being part of the state and the people. ... Through the approach of religion, *Pancasila* can be instilled and implemented by the people. In reality, religious people carrying out the teachings of their religion as well as possible, means that they already carry out the meaning of the whole of *Pancasila* themselves.⁶⁰

Despite emphasising that P4 did not intend to meld *Pancasila* and religion, the Guidelines repeatedly offered up signals that irritated and offended Islamic leaders. Soeharto said that P4 could also be interpreted as *Ekaprasetya Pancakarsa*⁶¹ — again, Sanskrit/Old Javanese-derived terms meaning something like ‘A single oath to support the five aspirations’. Why not an Arabic phrase, Islamic leaders probably asked themselves, while knowing the answer? The Guidelines themselves contained quotations from the *Qur'an* and collections of *Hadith* intended to show that *Pancasila* was consistent with Islamic teachings — an effort that was, predictably, rather weak on *sila* number three, the unity of Indonesia. But counter-signals

⁵⁸ *Pedoman pelaksanaan P-4 bagi umat Islam*, p. 14.

⁵⁹ Alamsyah was minister from 1978 to 1983. He lacked a background in formal Islamic educational institutions but was regarded as a practising Muslim. For a biography, see Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam, *Menteri-menteri Agama RI*, pp. 321–65.

⁶⁰ *Pedoman pelaksanaan P-4 bagi umat Islam*, p. 3.

⁶¹ Soeharto first said this in a speech of April 1976, according to Zakiah Daradjat *et al.*, *Pedoman pelaksanaan pendidikan P. 4 bagi lembaga pendidikan Islam tingkat perguruan tinggi (pegangan dosen)* ([Jakarta:] Departemen Agama R.I., Proyek Bimbingan Pelaksanaan Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila bagi Umat Beragama, 1980–1), p. 11.

said, for example, that it was necessary to support 'the continuance of the supernatural power (*keampuhan dan kesaktian*) of *Pancasila*'. The *Qur'an* certainly offered no support for the idea that something like *Pancasila* might have supernatural powers. The P4 Guidelines also exemplified the breath-taking hypocrisy of the increasingly corrupt regime in its emphasis on equality and social justice as *Pancasila* values. 'Indonesians feel that we must be able to restrain ourselves and our self-interest so that we can carry out our responsibilities as citizens and members of society,' it proclaimed.⁶²

In the end, the Guidelines were, of course, about obedience to the government. The Guidelines for Muslims expressed this with reference to the *Qur'an*:

Islam teaches us to be obedient to Allah, his Messenger and the *ulil-amri*. *Ulil-amri* means the legitimate government, so long as that government does not force us to be immoral. Because of this, the obedience of the Islamic community in Indonesia towards the legitimate government of Indonesia is regarded as a religious obligation.⁶³

All of this invited both the contempt and ridicule of intellectuals and the anger — sometimes muted, but often not — of Islamic leaders.

As these Guidelines were being implemented and the populace indoctrinated in all educational and other institutions across the nation, Soeharto took a further step by saying in 1982 that all Indonesian organisations should have only a single ideological foundation which must, of course, be *Pancasila*. This was known as the *asas tunggal* (sole foundation) and was immediately seen by many Islamic leaders as a threat to their faith and their institutions. No one saw anything encouraging in the fact that — unusually for the New Order at this time — an Arabic word (*asas*) had at last been used in a technical term. PPP staged a parliamentary walk-out. Leaders we have already encountered in this book including Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara,

⁶² *Pedoman pelaksanaan P-4 bagi umat Islam*, p. 21. More examples of such hypocrisy are to be found in Zakiah Daradjat *et al.*, *Pedoman pelaksanaan pendidikan P. 4 bagi lembaga pendidikan Islam*; e.g., p. 41: 'The state is run not on the basis of just power, but above all on the basis of law, where implementation and changes of government are carried out on the basis of a constitutional system and not on the basis of absolute power.'

⁶³ *Pedoman pelaksanaan P-4 bagi umat Islam*, p. 48. The reference here is to *Qur'an* 4:59: 'You who believe, obey God and the Messenger, and those in authority among you', the last being the *uli l-amri*; translation as in *Qur'an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem*, p. 56.

Fakhruddin, and others took exception to the government's demands.⁶⁴ The Modernist academic Deliar Noer (1926–2008) — a Minangkabau with a Cornell PhD — wrote several pieces in the newspaper *Kompas* and the magazine *Panji Masyarakat* over 1982–3 criticising P4 and the *asas tunggal*.⁶⁵ Hamka had died in 1981; otherwise we may be sure that he would have excoriated the regime. Such objections had no effect and Soeharto's demand for the *asas tunggal* was formally passed into law in June 1985.⁶⁶

The two great national, but Java-based, Islamic organisations — NU and Muhammadiyah — had to face the issue of accepting or not accepting *Pancasila* as their sole foundation. For the former this was complicated by its being, as well as a socio-religious group, also a political organisation that had been absorbed (uncomfortably) within PPP a decade earlier. Grumpily giving into *force majeure*, PPP accepted *Pancasila* as its sole foundation in 1984. Muhammadiyah did so in stages which culminated in a formal decision at its national meeting in Surakarta in December 1985. It declared that it was based upon *Pancasila* but was also a socio-religious organisation that pursued *amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar* (commanding the right and forbidding the wrong), consistent with the teachings of Islam as found in the *Qur'an* and *Hadith*.⁶⁷ It thus preserved its Islamic identity while acceding to the demand for *Pancasila* to be its foundation — but perhaps not such a 'sole' one.

Reconciliation between NU and the New Order regime

NU's acceptance of *Pancasila* as its sole foundation went along with major changes in its leadership and strategy, associated in particular with the rising influence of Ky. H. Abdurrahman Wahid (1940–2009), who was eventually, but rather briefly, to become Indonesia's fourth president (1999–2001). We have already referred to him several times in the previous chapter. He was the son of Ky. H. Wahid Hasyim, whom we have met before, and grandson of Ky.

⁶⁴ Ismail, *Ideologi, hegemoni dan otoritas agama*, pp. 160 et seqq. Ismail's account — originally a McGill doctoral thesis of 1995 — is generally sympathetic to the New Order government, as is suggested by its subtitle *Wacana ketegangan kreatif Islam dan Pancasila* (the discourse of creative tension between Islam and *Pancasila*); in the original English version the subtitle was 'A study of the process of Muslim acceptance of the *Pancasila*'.

⁶⁵ The articles are reprinted in Deliar Noer, *Islam, Pancasila dan asas tunggal* (Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1983).

⁶⁶ Ismail, *Ideologi, hegemoni dan otoritas agama*, p. 207.

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 239–50.

H. Hasyim Asy'ari, one of the founding fathers of NU. He was, thus, a true NU 'blue blood' — a term indeed used within NU circles. He was educated at famous *pesantrens* as well as in state schools in Yogyakarta and Jakarta. He went to Al-Azhar University in Cairo in 1963 but was dissatisfied with what he found there, so he moved to the University of Baghdad. He was thus out of Indonesia during the terrible, bloody years from 1963 to 1966. During his time in the Middle East, he attended some classes but mostly read across an extraordinarily wide range of interests, including not only works of Islamic inspiration, but also Marxism, socialism, and various philosophical traditions of the West. He returned to Indonesia in 1970 to find the New Order installed and NU effectively being treated as an opposition force.

Abdurrahman Wahid — commonly called Gus Dur⁶⁸ — was a charismatic figure with an unusual breadth of knowledge, steeped in Javanese and Traditionalist ideas and knowledgeable in contemporary Western and Islamic intellectual trends, a man of profound humanity and commitment to concepts that underpin Islamic Liberalism. Indeed, in coming years he would become one of the most public and staunchest fighters for Liberalism. For him, Islam's encounter with Indonesia required the Indonesianisation — he called it *pribumisasi*, indigenisation — of Islam no less than the Islamisation of Indonesia. Among his gifts was the ability to make a joke of anything, a gift that would provide strengths in the years of public and private challenges that he would face. It is important to emphasise that this extraordinary figure — whose personal charisma and idiosyncrasies were readily explicable within the NU tradition of idiosyncratic *kyais* — firmly believed in the world of hidden powers. He knew many of the traditions about Java's past of both the pre-Islamic and Islamic periods and believed himself to be in touch with ancient spirits and supernatural powers. His versions of various traditions were not always quite what one might find in other Javanese sources and, indeed, could vary from occasion to occasion, but he was confident of their reality and their continuing influence and importance in his own time. To many of his devoted followers from the Traditionalist community, he was a *wali* — a saint, a friend of God — to whom, it need hardly be said, ordinary obligations and standards of conduct, in the eyes of devotees, do not apply.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ *Gus* is a Javanese term of respect for a scion from an elite family, while 'Dur' is derived from Abdurrahman.

⁶⁹ A brief biography of Abdurrahman Wahid is to be found in Feillard, *Islam et armée*, pp. 337–8. A fuller account, done with Abdurrahman's approval and collaboration but which underestimates his interest in occult powers is to be found in Greg Barton, *Gus*

By the early 1980s, many of NU's *kyais* were becoming dissatisfied with the oppositional position they found themselves in with regard to the New Order regime, were critical of NU's political leadership in Jakarta led by Idham Chalid, felt that Traditionalists were discriminated against within the PPP superstructure they were supposed to be part of, and wished to reclaim their authority as *kyais* over NU. Many wished to return to the original socio-religious purposes of the organisation, a move that came to be known as returning to the *khittah* 1926 (the line of action or charter of 1926). The senior *kyai* Ahmad Siddiq (1926–91), who had been prominent in the anti-Communist actions of the 1960s, was a strong proponent of returning to the *khittah* 1926, arguing in the tradition of irenic *ulama* that confrontation with the governing authority was unwise, against the interests of the *ummah*, and obstructed the principal religious and social purposes of NU.⁷⁰ His views accorded with those of younger reformers who gathered around Abdurrahman Wahid. In 1983 a meeting of *kyais* proposed to end NU's political role, withdraw from PPP, accept *Pancasila* as sole foundation and return to the *khittah* 1926. This met stiff resistance from those *kyais* — notably several from Madura — who were loyal to PPP and from the NU political elite in Jakarta.

These issues were resolved at NU's 1984 general conference. There, Ahmad Siddiq was elected to the top leadership position (*rais aam*) in NU's advisory board (*Syuriyah*), the senior body within NU, a post which he held until his death in 1991. Abdurrahman Wahid was elected head of NU's executive board (*Tanfidziyah*). NU withdrew from PPP, abandoned its formal political role, declared *Pancasila* to be its foundation, but also asserted that it was an Islamic religious organisation that followed the Traditionalist Sunni schools of law, consistent with its return to the *khittah* 1926.⁷¹

NU's withdrawal from political party activities diminished the regime's suspicions of NU as a political opposition force and a competitor for control of the society at grass-roots level. Conflicts continued within NU ranks,

Dur: The authorised biography of Abdurrahman Wahid (Jakarta and Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2002). I knew Abdurrahman Wahid from 1977 until his death in 2009, discussed pre-colonial history and Javanese supernatural ideas with him on multiple occasions, and have no doubt that he believed such powers to be real.

⁷⁰ A brief biography may be found in Feillard, *Islam et armée*, pp. 329–31 (but with a mistake for the year of his death, which is printed there as 1992).

⁷¹ A detailed account of these events is in *ibid.*, pp. 158–91. See also Robin Bush, *Nabdhlatul Ulama and the struggle for power within Islam and politics in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 73–5.

where there were still pro-PPP activists, but the organisation as a whole was no longer in a confrontationist position with regard to the regime. Even before this time there had been some signs of a possible NU-regime reconciliation. Ansor and its uniformed militia wing Banser — NU's youth and paramilitary groups — had suffered regime discrimination along with the rest of the organisation. Their role in the wiping out of PKI would have persuaded the regime that this might be the most potentially dangerous part of the entire NU network. For a decade after 1969 Ansor was unable to hold a national congress and Banser members were not allowed to wear uniforms. In 1979, however, Ansor's leader Chalid Mawardi — an ally of the Idham Chalid faction of NU politicians — broke ranks with the senior *kyais* of NU and announced that Ansor recognised Soeharto as *Bapak Pembangunan* (the father of development) and supported his reelection as president in 1983. Chalid Mawardi was severely criticised by the senior *kyais* for this, but Ansor thereafter found itself more favourably treated by the regime, which even facilitated military exercises.⁷²

With the whole of NU no longer seen as a political force opposing the regime and Golkar, grass-roots competition in Islamisation turned to widespread collaboration with, as Robin Bush has noted, 'high-level Muslims in the bureaucracy and army who had previously denied their NU origins openly beginning to support NU'.⁷³ Government funding for NU *pesantrens* grew, after a period when Modernist versions of Islam had been more likely to be promoted through government support. In 1990 *pesantrens* in East Java received some four times the amount of state subsidies received before 1984.⁷⁴

Young activists, who helped to inspire, and were in turn further inspired by, this re-envisioning of NU as primarily a socio-religious organisation, began setting up organisations which collectively promoted a more open, tolerant and indeed modern version of Islam. It was now ironically true that Traditionalist Islam was the source of more modern rethinking of Islam's message than was Modernist Islam. The most important of these new organisations were probably the following.⁷⁵

⁷² Feillard, *Islam et armée*, p. 165; Hairus Salim, *Kelompok paramiliter NU*, pp. 16–7, 72–3.

⁷³ Bush, *Nabdhlatul Ulama and the struggle for power*, p. 81.

⁷⁴ Feillard, *Islam et armée*, pp. 227–30; also in idem, 'Traditionalist Islam and the state', pp. 141–3.

⁷⁵ A fuller account of such organisations is in Ahmad Ali Riyadi, *Dekonstruksi tradisi: Kaum muda NU merobek tradisi* (Jogjakarta: Ar-Ruzz, 2007), pp. 61–81.

- P3M (Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat, Association for *Pesantren* and Community Development), established in 1983 with a role in assisting *pesantrens* to rethink and modernise their teaching
- Lakpesdam (Lajnah Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumberdaya Manusia, Committee for the Study and Development of Human Resources), a think tank established in 1985 with a ‘mandate to carry out programs of research, education, training and publication and as an NU documentation centre in the context of NU’s service and the process of forming a society that is prosperous, just and democratic’⁷⁶
- LKiS (Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial, Institute for the Study of Islam and Society) — established in 1992 with a mission to ‘bring into being a transformative form of Islam on the side of justice and plurality with an Indonesian foundation’.⁷⁷ LKiS became in due course a major publisher of liberal interpretations of Islam, the works of Western thinkers and more general works.

Women now became more prominent in NU’s activities and in grass-roots *dakwah*. The organisations mentioned above, and particularly P3M under its leader Ky. H. Masdar F. Mas’udi, were instrumental in NU rethinking the position of women, encouraging them as religious and social leaders.⁷⁸ Abdurrahman Wahid’s wife Sinta Nuriyah Wahid was a prominent activist in this cause. By 1997, over 44 per cent of the 1.6 million *pesantren* students were girls.⁷⁹ Women also came to play increasingly prominent roles in the IAIN network. The growing prominence of women in Islamic circles (both Modernist and Traditionalist) promoted consideration of major social issues affecting women, but there were grounds for concern. In the early 1990s, several leaders expressed concerns that deeper Islamisation of an Arabian or fundamentalist sort, with its promotion of patriarchalism, could threaten women’s freedoms.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ As stated in its current self-description at <http://www.lakpesdam.or.id/profil/>.

⁷⁷ As stated in its current self-description at http://www.lkis.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=89&Itemid=88. See also Bush, *Nahdlatul Ulama and the struggle for power*, p. 95.

⁷⁸ See van Doorn-Harder, *Women shaping Islam*, pp. 190, 191, 237.

⁷⁹ Howell, ‘Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic revival’, p. 716, citing 1997 Ministry of Religion data.

⁸⁰ Andrée Feillard, ‘Indonesia’s emerging Muslim feminism: Women leaders on equality, inheritance and other gender issues’, *SI* vol. 4 (1997), no. 1, pp. 83–111, esp. 101–5.

NU also committed itself to the government priority of economic development. Its *pesantrens* developed programmes of local activism in this regard and cooperatives were established. Under Abdurrahman Wahid's leadership, in 1990 NU attempted to set up rural 'People's Credit Banks' (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat) with backing from Bank Summa, a conventional bank run by the Chinese-Indonesian and Christian Soeryadjaya family. These banks would be run on conventional lines; that is to say, they charged interest rather than being run on interest-free Islamic banking lines. This enterprise, with its Christian Chinese connections and conventional banking rules, shocked some of Abdurrahman's followers — hardly the only action on his part, it must be said, which shocked others. But ambitious plans were laid to set up 2,000 branches. Only a few, however, were actually opened before Bank Summa collapsed in 1992. In these various enterprises, a shortage of modern management skills in NU consistently made success difficult.⁸¹

Collaboration between NU's *kyais* and the regime supported Islamisation in Java's countryside but also brought dependency — a consequence which would naturally have been welcome to the government. *Kyais* interviewed by Abdul Kadir in 1997 expressed their reliance on government funds to keep their *pesantrens* running.⁸² For the regime, this collaboration and dependency meant that there was now a greatly diminished risk of NU becoming a challenger. For both, deeper Islamisation was desirable, for it was consistent with the aspirations of religious leaders as well as serving the social-control objectives of the regime, while representing an ever-strengthening bulwark against any possibility of a Communist revival.

This NU-regime reconciliation did not mean that Islam as a political force was now totally under control. Nothing could deliver such a watertight solution. A serious clash occurred in the Jakarta port district of Tanjung Priok in September 1984, when mobs objecting to the *asas tunggal* policy, shouting *Allahu akbar* (God is great!), rampaged out of a mosque into the guns of the security forces. At least 28 were killed, perhaps more. This was followed by several bomb and arson attacks in Jakarta and a bombing of the ancient Borobudur Buddhist temple in Central Java. A general clamp-down followed.⁸³

⁸¹ See Abdul Kadir, 'Traditional Islamic society and the state', pp. 241–9.

⁸² Ibid., pp. 117, 120. Ibid., p. 126, reports that in 1996–7 NU claimed that it had 5,742 *pesantrens*, the vast majority of which would have been located in Java.

⁸³ A brief overview of this period is given in Ricklefs, *History of modern Indonesia*, pp. 358–9.

Nor was the NU-government collaboration without its own tensions. After all, the values of Abdurrahman Wahid and many other *kyais* were hardly capable of reconciliation with the brutal and ever more extravagantly corrupt regime. Nevertheless, Soeharto had reason to be pleased with the general domestication of Traditionalist Islam. In the 1987 election, the impact of NU's withdrawal from party politics was clear. The 'deflating'⁸⁴ of PPP by NU's defection and the support many NU people gave to Golkar produced a dramatic effect. At national level, PPP fell from 27.8 per cent of the vote in 1982 to only 16 per cent in 1987. Golkar grew dramatically — mainly by capturing former PPP supporters — from 64.3 per cent to 73.2 per cent. Most of PPP's losses were in areas where NU had previously been the dominant *santri* party, above all in East, Central and West Java.⁸⁵

In the mid-1990s relations between Abdurrahman Wahid and the government deteriorated and the government sought to unseat Abdurrahman as NU leader.⁸⁶ This attempt failed and the subsequent renewed reconciliation between NU and Soeharto was such as to disturb many of Abdurrahman's pro-democracy and Liberal followers. As the 1997 election approached, Abdurrahman went campaigning for Golkar in the company of Soeharto's daughter 'Tutut'. He told me that he could imagine several possible scenarios for Indonesia's future, in most of which Tutut had a major role to play. She was not, he claimed, the sort of jet-setting person she was thought to be, but rather a serious, able and constructive person who spoke simply to the *kyais* and won their hearts.⁸⁷ Two months later, and perhaps feeling less positive about the matter, he told Suzaina Abdul Kadir that NU had to avoid becoming a 'trouble-maker' and that it was necessary to 'appease Soeharto'.⁸⁸ His admirers both within the country and internationally were more than a little stunned by Abdurrahman's embrace of such a leading figure of the Soeharto family. But there was no time for this to come to much, for the Soeharto regime was by then in its last months.

⁸⁴ As Indonesians called it: *penggembosan*.

⁸⁵ R. William Liddle, 'Indonesia in 1987: The New Order at the height of its power', *Asian Survey* vol. 28, no. 2 (Feb. 1988), pp. 182–3.

⁸⁶ See the account in Abdul Kadir, 'Traditional Islamic society and the state', pp. 345–6, based on comments by Ky. H. Hasyim Muzadi (there spelled Hashim Muzati) about intimidation by local authorities and pressure not to support Abdurrahman Wahid in 1996.

⁸⁷ Discussion with Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 5 July 1997.

⁸⁸ Abdul Kadir, 'Traditional Islamic society and the state', pp. 335–8, 241–6, 354, 385–6 (citing an interview with Abdurrahman Wahid on 1 Sept. 1997).

The arts under the later New Order

In this study we have watched the changing art scene in Java because it provides a bellwether for larger religious and social changes. In the last two decades or so of the New Order, the experience of the arts in Java was mixed, with multiple competing tendencies. But we may say that, in general, once-widely spread Javanese arts such as *gamelan*, *wayang*, *kethoprak*, *ludruk*, *reyog*, *jaranan*, *tayuban* and so on — those shadow plays, masked dances, masquerades, horse-dances, youth dance performances, male group dances, village dancing and singing women, and suchlike, many of them described by Pigeaud in great variety in the 1930s and discussed in Chapter 2 above⁸⁹ — were becoming less common and, where they survived, they were losing much of their older spiritual and supernatural aspects and were subject to more Islamic norms. Among Traditionalist *santri* communities, the male devotional performances such as *slawatan* carried on, as seen in Imam Tholkhah's study of a village in East Java near Magetan cited earlier in this chapter.⁹⁰ But the increasing role of Revivalist interpretations of Islam, and indeed the views of many in the Modernist camp, were hostile to many of these performances, including those of the Traditionalists. There were some attempts to modernise and Islamise various art forms, but they had patchy success. Meanwhile all of these forms were threatened by the spread of television, modern films, electronic games and in some cases — notably *wayang* — by the rising cost of performing them. Modern forms of theatre also evolved in this period and sometimes adopted explicitly pious Islamic styles and themes. But this, too, enjoyed mixed success. One common problem was a degree of discomfort — sometimes indeed downright hostility — among pious Muslims to artistic performances of almost any sort.

A wave of Islamisation was evident in modern, urban-based performances. In the wake of the government's 'campus normalisation' of universities in 1977–8, discussed in the preceding chapter, much student activism relocated to mosques, but some students were also attracted to modern theatre. During this time a prominent role was played by the playwright, poet, musician, social activist, writer and devout Muslim Emha Ainun Najib (born in Jombang in 1953). He took a leading role in the Yogyakarta-based Dinasti theatre. His musical group Kiai Kanjeng combined Javanese *gamelan* and other folk instruments with modern instruments to produce a new and popular musical form, its lyrics inspired by Islamic

⁸⁹ Pigeaud, *Volksvertoningen*.

⁹⁰ Imam Tholkhah, *Anatomi konflik politik di Indonesia*, pp. 71–2.

devotionalism. In 1988, activists of the Salahuddin mosque at Universitas Gadjah Mada approached Emha to help them set up a theatre group. He and a colleague from Dinasti took up this invitation and they went on to produce colossal, Islamically themed productions. Their work also came to be supported by the Muhammadiyah women's organisation 'Aisyiyah, despite a general tendency within Muhammadiyah to disapprove of theatrical performance. Emha's large-scale productions came to a halt after 1991, however, for no very clear reason.⁹¹ While this was going on in Yogyakarta, all five professional *kethoprak* companies there had died by the early 1990s, although *kethoprak* continued to be broadcast on Radio Republik Indonesia. *Wayang wong* carried on for a while at a single venue, then died. *Kethoprak* continued to be performed by the Diponegoro Division-sponsored 'super troupe' Sapta Mandala, which refined its folksy burlesque style with 'proper' Javanese language, written scripts, and so on. It is not clear, however, whether this sort of *kethoprak* could still function as a 'folk art'.⁹²

The village *abangan* art form that Muslim proselytisers in Java most hated was *tayuban* — the enticing dance by women, inviting men to join them, often accompanied by drunkenness, prostitution, and veneration of local spirits. Muhammadiyah had always opposed *tayuban* and by the 1950s had effectively stopped it in Javanese towns and cities. The village countryside, however, was a different matter. In the 1970s — a time when, as we have noted earlier, Golkar had begun using some older-style folk arts such as *reyog* and *kethoprak* as vehicles for election propaganda — local officials tended to defend *tayuban* against Islamic reformers' denunciations. But by the mid-1980s, in the wake of the reconciliation between the regime and NU and the advancing Islamisation of Javanese society, these same officials were inclined to share the criticism of *tayuban* performances and to support the Islamisation (which is to say, substantial revision or abolition) of such art forms. Hefner observed that 'politics ... in a changing Java seems certain to bring about [*tayuban*'s] demise'.⁹³ In Gunung Kidul there was an attempt by local authorities in the late 1980s to stop *tayuban* performances, an attempt

⁹¹ Hatley, *Javanese performances*, pp. 131–4, 148–54. See also Guinness, *Kampung, Islam and state*, p. 131. There was not another major production by Dinasti Theatre until 2008, when it put on a performance in Yogyakarta of Emha's 'The Devil's bend', depicting the human experience from creation to decline under the influence of the Devil, to audiences that nearly overflowed a theatre holding 1200 people; *Tempo*I, 24 Aug. 2008.

⁹² Hatley, *Javanese performances*, pp. 155, 158.

⁹³ Hefner, 'Politics of popular art', pp. 90–1, 93, 94 (quotation from p. 94).

which failed in the end. Because performances there were associated with veneration of the spirit of the local village spring — said to be linked with pre-Islamic Majapahit — Hughes-Freeland sees this as consistent with the New Order's hostility to any contending sources of authority.⁹⁴ That hostility of course existed, but this attempt also coincided with ever-deeper Islamisation even of remote areas like Gunung Kidul. The proponents of the Gunung Kidul *tayuban* observed by Hughes-Freeland themselves were trying to cleanse local *tayuban* of 'low associations' and to emphasise its 'sacred dimensions'.⁹⁵

In the 1990s, some Golkar officials sought to promote a bowdlerised version of *tayuban* for political purposes, partly in response to a perceived need for symbols of local identity. We will see this tendency strengthen in the following chapter in the wake of the national policy of decentralisation which was implemented from 2001. If *tayuban* was to be used in this way, however, it had to be sanitised and made more refined. As late as 1989 in the Blora area studied by Amrih Widodo, *tayuban* was still its lascivious, vulgar, inebriated self. But then the government stepped in and transformed *tayuban* within a year. Officials of the Ministry of Education and Culture provided training and 'guidance' (*pembinaan*) to performers. Alcohol was no longer allowed, nor men putting money into female dancers' breast-coverings, nor gambling, nor prostitution. It was emphasised that a dancer 'should not try to excite her male dancing partners, for instance by moving her hips excessively, shaking her shoulders, giving him a sexy look', and so on. Songs were to have verses conveying 'development programs and state ideological teachings'. Graduates of these training courses got certificates, without which they would not be allowed to perform.⁹⁶ In other words, *tayuban* dance was to become something quite different from what it had always been in the past, emulating the dullness, the demobilisation of mind, body and spirit for anything other than the economic development and social control sought by the New Order at village level.

There were occasionally attempts to create Islamic versions of older Javanese arts and thereby supplant them. These generally failed. Suryadi

⁹⁴ Felicia Hughes-Freeland, 'Golék Ménak and *tayuban*: Patronage and professionalism in two spheres of Central Javanese culture', in Bernard Arps (ed.), *Performance in Java and Bali: Studies of narrative, theatre, music and dance* (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1993), pp. 108–12.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 114.

⁹⁶ Widodo, 'Stages of the state', pp. 1–4, 9, 17, 20 (quotations from p. 20). See also Bisri Effendy, 'Pengantar', in *Kebijakan kebudayaan di masa orde baru*, pp. 668–9.

W.S. was from a *santri* Javanese family. His father had forbidden him to study Javanese dance or other performances. The family was surrounded socially by ‘an atmosphere of ignorance and hedonism’, marked by the stereotypical *abangan* vices (the *ma-lima*). But Suryadi was inspired by a verse in the *Qur’an* which suggested to him that God used a kind of shadow theatre.⁹⁷ He interpreted this in a different way from the older Mystic Synthesis metaphor of the *wayang dbalang* as God and the created world as the puppets. Rather, for Suryadi, this was a license to employ *wayang* for Islamic reform. So he created a form of *wayang* called *wayang sadat* (*Shabada wayang*).⁹⁸ This depicted the age of the bringers of Islam to Java, the *wali sanga*, in the time of the kingdom of Demak. It was first performed in 1986 but never gained any popularity. ‘Indeed, it has not yet been popularised in the circles of the Islamic *ummah* who precisely were hoped to become its main supporters’, he lamented.⁹⁹ Two decades later, *wayang sadat* was still rarely performed. When young Muhammadiyah activists sponsored a performance at Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta, it evoked little interest because its stories were not those of the classical *wayang*.¹⁰⁰

Insofar as there were attempts to preserve Javanese village arts on the part of Islamic organisations or leaders, they were few and not surprisingly they came from Traditionalist circles, which enjoyed roots in the countryside and bridges to *abangan* culture. The Tegalreja *pesantren* (Magelang, Central Java) — unlike most Traditionalist *pesantrens*, it must be emphasised — celebrates its annual graduation ceremonies with a festival of folk arts. *Wayang*, *jaranan* (in Central Java usually called *jathilan*), *reyog*, *kethoprak*, *dangdut*, other bands, and many other such performances take place over several days, even including female performers. Religious teachings (*pengajian*) are presented during this same time. This innovation began in 1979 and has carried on since. Some *santris* and *kyais* were critical of this,

⁹⁷ He refers to *Qur’an* 25:45, translated in *Qur’an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem*, p. 229, as, ‘Do you not see how your Lord lengthens the shade? If He had willed, He could have made it stand still’. Suryadi understood this to mean that God ‘performs shadows’ or ‘plays shadows’ (*memainkan bayang-bayang*), leading to his analogy with the *wayang*.

⁹⁸ Javanese *sadat* is from Arabic *Shabada* (the Islamic confession of faith).

⁹⁹ Suryadi W.S., ‘Prestasi kaum Muslimin dalam sejarah perkembangan wayang’, in Jabrohim and Saudi Berlian (eds), *Islam dan kesenian* ([Yogyakarta:] Majelis Kebudayaan Muhammadiyah, Universitas Ahmad Dahlan, Lembaga Litbang PP Muhammadiyah, 1995), pp. 162–73; quote from page 173.

¹⁰⁰ Discussion with Fajar Riza Ul Haq *et al.*, Yogyakarta, 20 Oct. 2005.

seeing these as *abangan* performances tainted with their former political associations. *Abangan* were equally amazed at these things being performed at a *pesantren*. Over time, however, the result was that *abangan* communities began to invite Tegalreja's *kyai* to give religious teachings in their villages and even asked his help to construct mosques. As devout Muslims came to see the potential for these arts to be vehicles for Islamisation, criticism declined.¹⁰¹

Although there was much suspicion and animosity on the part of *santri* towards *abangan* art forms, the fate of *jaranan* horse-dances reminds us that *abangan* culture was not without powers of resistance to the prevailing trend of Islamisation in the later years of the New Order. Against the general trend of decline in such arts, *jaranan* (*jathilan*) was introduced into Kim's study village near Yogyakarta sometime around the early 1990s. As usual, it involved dancers going into trance, chewing glass, and so on. Not everyone believed this trance to be genuine, but most did. Devout Muslim reformers regarded this as possession by 'heathen spirits' (*jinn*): 'The reformist villagers were certain that the responsibility lay in the heathen *jinn* or Satan, whose duty was to entice human beings. ... Muslims should distance themselves from the *jathilan*, as they fought against the temptation of Satan.'¹⁰²

After the initial troubles it faced in the wake of the killings of the mid-1960s, *jaranan* revived in the Kediri area in the 1970s when a group called Samboyo Putro was formed. The moving figure here, Sukiman Mangunsena, familiarly known as Pak Samboyo, was a member of the national police and of Golkar, which of course lent legitimacy and protection to his group. In the 1980s, just as was true of *tayuban*, the government sought to make *jaranan* more respectable and less involved with the Javanese spirit world, cleansing it of spirit-possession which, as Clara van Groenendaal observes, 'many people regarded ... as the essence of the horse dance'. Children's groups and national-level competitions were promoted. Yet *jaranan* generally resisted the dulling-down, bowdlerisation and Islamisation that we see in other folk arts. Pak Samboyo himself was meditating at the site associated with the ancient king of Kediri, Jayabaya, when he received supernatural inspiration to form his group. Its performances involve spirit possession and always begin with a sung Javanese invocation of 'authentic Javanese culture' (*budaya Jawa asli*), which is of course code for 'not Islamic'. They end with a version of the Javanese text *Kidung rumeksa ing wengi* (the song keeping

¹⁰¹ Bambang Pranowo, *Islam factual*, pp. 69–73.

¹⁰² Kim, *Reformist Muslims*, pp. 155–60 (quotation from p. 158). It is not clear in Kim's work just when these performances began.

guard at night), which is regarded as ‘an exceptionally potent charm against evil’.¹⁰³ One of the surviving elders of this group commented to me that *slametans* might be used for Islamic proselytisation, but *jaranan* could not be, for it only used ‘Javanese prayers’ (*doa kejawen*).¹⁰⁴

Revivalism, Islamism and the later Soeharto regime

We have already noted in the previous chapter how the uncompromising Revivalism and Islamism of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar led to their arrest and imprisonment, and then to their flight to Malaysia in 1985. There they set up another school that promoted their views and recruited fighters to join the anti-Soviet *jihad* in Afghanistan.¹⁰⁵ Indonesian intelligence no doubt kept a continuing eye on this group, but they were marginalised from Indonesian political and social affairs and played no significant role in Indonesia until after the fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998. Other forms of extreme Islamic movements, however, were able to survive and even grow in the latter decades of the New Order.

Among such movements that survived and grew was LDII (Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Proselytisation Institute).¹⁰⁶ As its name implies, this organisation was principally Dakwahist in orientation, with little interest in political action beyond what was necessary for its own survival. Its epistemology was Revivalist in character. LDII was founded by H. Nurhasan Ubaidah Lubis (d. 1982), who returned from Mecca after living there for ten years and established a *pesantren* at Kediri in 1952. Nurhasan believed that he had the right understanding of Islam and the correct means

¹⁰³ Victoria M. Clara van Groenendaal, *Jaranan: The horse dance and trance in East Java* (VKI vol. 252; Leiden: KITLV Press, 2008), pp. 36–7, 43, 198–9, 202 (quotations from pp. 37, 202).

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Pak Cokromiharja and Pak Pardi, Kediri, 16 March 2005. Cokromiharja commented that trance (*dadi*) occurs in the performances, but if the *gamelan* makes a mistake the performers get angry, so they are conscious at the same time. Samboyo Putro carries on, now under the name Sanjoyo Putro.

¹⁰⁵ See the account of his experiences in Malaysia under Sungkar and Ba’asyir, before going off to Afghanistan, by Nasir Abas — a former member of the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah — in his book *Membongkar Jemaah Islamiyah: Pengakuan mantan anggota JI* (Jakarta: Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu, 2005), pp. 26–37.

¹⁰⁶ LDII has been the name of this organisation only since 1990, following after previous names Darul Hadis or Islam Jemaah, then Yayasan Karyawan Islam (YAKARI) and then Lembaga Karyawan Islam (LEMKARI).

to teach it — the uniquely correct *manhaj* (way of knowing) which would pass on Islam as found in Mecca and Medina. He was totally against all forms of innovation (*bid'ā*) or polytheism (*shirk*). His teachings were to be conveyed in a direct line of transmission from him to subsequent generations of teachers and disciples. The problem for LDII's relations with other Islamic movements was that it regarded them all as being wrong; they were not true Muslims because they did not share LDII's *manhaj*. As a consequence, LDII followers should not even pray together with non-LDII people.

The essence of LDII's *manhaj* was studying the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* through word-for-word interlinear translations into Javanese (in Arabic script, called *pegon*) or Indonesian. All other sources were ignored, or indeed condemned. There was no room for Sufism or the Traditionalist schools of law. Nor for any other Islamic writings — the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* were totally sufficient for the understanding of Islam. In fact, the only other matters taught at LDII's central *pesantren* in Kediri are to do with modern management, reflecting (its leaders say) the historic connection between Islam and commerce. The *pesantren* itself is managed like a modern school, with no *kyai* to dominate its activities. Because its teachings are restricted in scope, LDII's course of study is brief; the length of time depends on individual progress, but no student stays at the Kediri *pesantren* for more than 1.5 years. That school therefore produced large numbers of graduates, amounting by the end of the 20th century to millions of people, LDII claimed. Its prayer halls are found throughout the Javanese countryside and across Indonesia more generally.¹⁰⁷

LDII's uncompromising view of other Islamic movements as wrong won it great enmity and denunciation. Indonesia's Attorney General declared it illegal to spread LDII teachings in 1971 but the organisation resurfaced in 1972 and affiliated with Golkar, guaranteeing it a considerable degree of political protection.¹⁰⁸ The government could not, however, entirely ignore the ongoing animosity of other Islamic organisations. In 1988 LDII was subjected to an investigation by the Ministries of Religion and the Interior,

¹⁰⁷ Discussion with H. Kuncoro Kaseno (the chairman of LDII's central administration) and Abdul Malik (a teacher), at LDII's main *pesantren*, Kediri, 28 Aug. 2003. LDII's website may be found at <http://www.ldii.or.id/in/home-mainmenu-1.html>.

¹⁰⁸ H. Kuncoro Kaseno was indeed a Golkar member of the Kabupaten Kediri local parliament (DPRD) from 1977 to 1985; Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi interview of H. Kuncoro Kaseno, Kediri, 16 Apr. 2007. Other LDII figures also served as Golkar members in such bodies.

MUI, the provincial attorney general's office, local government and the police. The head of the East Java branch of MUI accused LDII of still spreading false teachings and of being disloyal to the government, saying that this was because the organisation was loyal solely to the teachings of its leader Nurhasan, who falsely claimed that his uniquely correct understanding of Islam was conveyed to him in a direct line from the Prophet Muhammad. Even the East Java head of Golkar agreed that LDII should be disbanded by the government. Nevertheless, the government allowed the organisation to survive under its new name of LDII, adopted in 1990.¹⁰⁹ At village level, conflicts arose from time to time. In the early 1990s, for example, LDII appeared in Ngoro (East Java) and began to burn the 'yellow books' (*kitab kuning*) — the classic works of Traditionalist Islam taught in NU *pesantrens* — on the grounds that they were the cause of stagnancy among Muslims. *Kyais* wanted LDII banned, but the government refused to act.¹¹⁰ In the following chapter we will see renewed anti-LDII campaigns in the years when the Soeharto regime was no longer available to protect it, by which time its main protection was its claim to have millions of adherents.¹¹¹ Whatever the precise size of its following, it became a large target for opponents to tackle.

Other exclusive — sometimes indeed extreme — Dakwahist movements were spreading in Javanese society in the 1990s. The general Islamisation of the society with government support provided a congenial environment for such movements, so long as they were willing to express their loyalty to the regime, *Pancasila* and the *asas tunggal*. Andrew Beatty, whose anthropological work centred on Banyuwangi, later wrote a quite personal account of how, between 1993 and 1996–7, a small group of zealots began to disrupt the tolerance that he had previously observed (and clearly preferred) in the village 'Bayu', an account to which he gave the evocative

¹⁰⁹ 'Islam Jamaah, setelah katanya meresahkan' in *Tempo*, 26 Nov. 1988. Concerning the serial names used by this movement, see n106 above.

¹¹⁰ Turmudi, *Struggling for the umma*, pp. 187–8.

¹¹¹ I am unable to give any reliable numbers for LDII adherents. Some Internet sources mention a total of over 25 million, but I have no means to verify that and suspect it to be an exaggeration. We may note the statement by the current manager of the Kediri *pesantren*, H. Kuncoro Kaseno, that it produces some 200 graduates every month. If it has been doing that since 1952, its graduates would amount to something over 140,000 by 2011. There are other LDII *pesantrens* and H. Kuncoro claimed that in total there are millions of graduates, without providing a specific figure. Interview with H. Kuncoro Kaseno and Abdul Malik, Kediri, 28 Aug. 2003.

title *A shadow falls*.¹¹² 'The Java we first knew and the Java we left in 1997 were different places,' he wrote. 'A puritan, ideologically driven Islam had made rapid progress, pushing aside older traditions, disturbing an ancient pact that allowed ancestral spirits and pre-Islamic deities a place among the prayer-houses.'¹¹³ One reformer told him that one's only guide should be the *Qur'an* and *Hadith*. 'Anything beyond that is unnecessary, useless.'¹¹⁴ Beatty observed a phenomenon we have already noted above: 'All that the headman's generation had rejected as backward, wasteful, divisive, even foreign (*Arabism*, they quietly called it) had returned, rebranded as modernity.'¹¹⁵ 'Bayu' was not, however, the first village in the region to have such an experience. We have noted above that, when Beatty did his first fieldwork in 1993, villages near to 'Bayu' were already seeing the impact of Islamic reformers, and indeed what he labelled 'fierce dogmatism' and 'intensive indoctrination'.¹¹⁶ We have also noted that in the East Java village Madukoro, studied by Imam Tholkah, in the early 1990s there was significant tension within the *santri* community between those whom Imam Tholkah calls the 'fanatics' and the 'moderates'.¹¹⁷

Some Dakwahism was more gradualist, less insistent, in style. In the 1990s the Jamsaren mosque in Surakarta began Qur'anic lecture and study sessions (*pengajian*) open to the surrounding public, which gradually spread religious awareness and observance. The characteristically *abangan* vices known as *ma-lima* — gambling, opium smoking, thievery, womanising and drinking alcohol — began to decline and more people attended Friday devotions. As the years passed, the local *abangan* became increasingly *santri* and *ma-lima* became rarer.¹¹⁸

A significant actor in this late New Order Islamisation was the Institute for Islamic Sciences and the Arab language (LIPIA, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab). This was established in Jakarta in

¹¹² Andrew Beatty, *A shadow falls: In the heart of Java* (London: Faber and Faber, 2009).

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. ix.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹¹⁶ Beatty, *Varieties of Javanese religion*, pp. 131–4.

¹¹⁷ Imam Tholkah, *Anatomi konflik politik di Indonesia*, p. 28.

¹¹⁸ As reported on the basis of oral evidence in Ridwan al-Makassary and Ahmad Gaus AF (eds), *Benih-benih Islam radikal di masjid: Studi kasus Jakarta dan Solo* (intro. Komaruddin Hidayat; Jakarta: Center for the Study of Religion and Culture, Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah, 2010), pp. 243–4.

1980 by Saudi Arabia, at least in part in order to maintain Saudi influence in Indonesia in the wake of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the consequent popularity of the Shi'ite Ayatollah Khomeini. LIPIA became one of the main centres in Indonesia for the study of Arabic and Islam. It need hardly be said that the interpretations of the faith taught there were those acceptable to the Wahhabis who ruled Saudi society. LIPIA also distributed the ideas of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood ideologues Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, and of Mawdudi. Many of its graduates became Revivalists and Islamists, but not all followed such a path.

The top students at LIPIA were supported for further study at Saudi universities. From there, some also went on to fight in the *jihad* against the Soviets in Afghanistan. These students began returning to Indonesia in significant numbers in the late 1980s and the 1990s, and proclaimed themselves *Salafis* — which is to say that they insisted that Muslims should follow the examples of the pious ancestors of early Islam, the *Salaf al-Salih* — an ideological position supported also by DDII. These young men were, as Noorhaidi Hasan puts it, 'squarely within the puritanical *Salafi*-Wahhabi tradition'. In the terminology used in this book, these were Revivalists in epistemology. Their social and political projects were Dakwahist and, in the long run, Islamist. That is to say, they sought to change the society in directions which they regarded as more purely Islamic — as judged by the standards of what they believed early Islam to have been — and generally aimed ultimately for an Islamic state in which *shari'a* law would rule. Saudi Arabia provided a model for them of what this new Indonesia might look like. Many of these returning *Salafis* taught in *pesantrens* and *madrasahs* across Java and won considerable influence as teachers 'because of their command of Arabic and their facility with Islamic sources'.¹¹⁹ The emerging *Salafi* groups began to become publicly conspicuous by the late 1980s. They were marked by their *faux*-Arab appearance: 'Bearded males wearing long flowing robes (*jalabiyya*), turbans and trousers to their ankles (*isbal*), and ... women wearing a form of enveloping black veil (*niqab*)'.¹²⁰

The spread of Revivalist thought and associated Dakwahist and Islamist agendas was supported — in this ever more literate society — by numerous publications. We have noted already the publications supported by LIPIA. DDII was also increasingly active in this field. Its weekly magazine *Media Dakwah* supported strict interpretations of Islam and conveyed hostility

¹¹⁹ Hasan, 'Salafi madrasahs of Indonesia', pp. 249–52.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 249.

towards Christianisation and local influences in Islam as well as, increasingly, towards globalisation, American influence and supposed international Jewish conspiracies (the latter three being, really, all the same to this school of thought). By 1991 *Media Dakwah* was being printed in 20,000 copies — ten times its initial print-run of 1967. Among DDII's publications were also found *Suara Mesjid* (the Voice of the Mosque), a children's magazine entitled *Majalah Sahabat* (Friend's Magazine) and the *Serial Khotbah Jumaat* (Friday Sermon Series).¹²¹ After Natsir's death in 1993, Anwar Harjono took over as DDII's leader. He became, as Michael Feener puts it, 'increasingly outspoken in his railings against the perceived threat of *Kristenisasi* and other dangers to Islam (especially Communism, atheism and secularism)'.¹²²

Through the 1990s the New Order became progressively more inclined to follow its support of grass-roots Islamisation in the interest of social control with political, legislative and symbolic measures that were welcome to many Islamic leaders. One of the most significant steps was the creation of ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia, All-Indonesia Union of Muslim Intellectuals) in December 1990. This was led by Dr B.J. Habibie (b. 1936), a rising star who combined scientific and technological standing with personal Islamic piety, a protégé of Soeharto himself, the man who was to become vice-president of Indonesia in 1998 and then Soeharto's successor as the nation's third (but brief) president. ICMI attracted large numbers from Indonesia's middle class, technocrats and bureaucrats for whom Islamic piety was no longer a matter that could threaten their rise but rather a mark of having the right values and the right connections for advancement. By 1993 it had 11,000 members. It published its own newspaper *Republika* and established its own think tank called CIDES (Centre for Information and Development Studies). Under the wing of their patron Habibie, ICMI members rose to positions of influence across Java and more generally in Indonesia. Some senior generals were also regarded as being close to ICMI and there was talk of the 'greening' of ABRI. ICMI itself, however, was a rather divided house, for as well as devotees of the New Order it contained activists who sought reform and democratisation. Abdurrahman Wahid denounced it for being elitist and sectarian and refused to join.¹²³ In 1991

¹²¹ Feillard, *Islam et armée*, p. 255.

¹²² Feener, *Muslim legal thought*, p. 116.

¹²³ See Robert W. Hefner, 'Islam, state and civil society: ICMI and the struggle for the Indonesian middle class', *Indonesia* no. 56 (Oct. 1993), pp. 1–35; idem, *Civil Islam*, pp. 142–3, 151.

Soeharto, his wife and close family members went on the *hajj* to Mecca. The regime also passed legislation in the early 1990s approving the wearing of the *jilbab* in schools and the introduction of Islamic banking.

Anti-Communism had been a uniting issue for Dakwahists and the New Order regime from the latter's inception and now strengthened the burgeoning alliance between the Soeharto regime and more insistently puritanical versions of the faith. It has been observed that occasionally stimulating an almost entirely irrational fear of Communism assisted the regime to paper over the cracks in its own inner circle,¹²⁴ but the roots of anti-Communism were much deeper than that on both the Islamic and New Order sides of the political equation. This was not just a matter of uniting the regime with Modernists and Revivalists, of course, for Traditionalists shared such views. In 1996 at the Lirboyo *pesantren* in Kediri, two leaders of NU's Banser told Suzaina Abdul Kadir that they believed Communism 'remained a threat in their midst and that they ... had to [remain] vigilant against such potential threats in the near future'.¹²⁵

The military men who were the backbone of the regime were aware that the international environment — for all the support given by non-Communist nations to the regime — could not be counted on to remain supportive. This was particularly true as the Cold War came to an end with the progressive breakup and final collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire in 1988–91, at which point there also collapsed the political imperative for Western nations to support any state that was anti-Communist, no matter how odious. Even before that time, during Jimmy Carter's presidency of the United States (1977–81), the Americans, upon whom Jakarta relied for aid, pressured Jakarta to improve its human rights record. The regime had then felt obliged to release several thousand political prisoners whom it had held without trial — and frequently maltreated, even tortured — since the events of 1965–6. Freed ex-prisoners and their families still faced severe discrimination, but at least were out of imprisonment, except for those whom the regime claimed that it would one day bring to trial.

From the late 1970s and through the 1980s ABRI elaborated a doctrine of 'vigilance' (*kerwaspadan*) which became the *leitmotif* of military thinking to the end of the Soeharto regime, and eventually promoted an alliance with the more anti-globalisation, anti-Western and totalitarian schools of Islamic

¹²⁴ Ariel Heryanto, *State terrorism and political identity in Indonesia: Fatally belonging* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 33–61.

¹²⁵ Abdul Kadir, 'Traditional Islamic society and the state', p. 159–60 n32.

thought.¹²⁶ This was based on the idea that Communism could revive as leftist movements particularly among university students — this in the wake of the suppression of student dissent in 1977–8 discussed in the preceding chapter — or as ‘shapeless organisations’ working within society at large. From the right, there was also a perceived threat of anti-regime Islamic fanaticism, exemplified in the 1978 furore over Komando Jihad and the arrest of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, described in Chapter 5.

In a paper of 1988, ABRI’s strategic doctrine concerning ‘vigilance’ extended to monitoring multiple threats to the regime and ABRI’s dominance. These were, as Honna paraphrases them:

- (1) social organisations which in the past had shown hesitation in accepting *Pancasila* as the sole principle ...;
- (2) the fourth-generation Communist group which based its tactics on the new-style Communism, no longer using physical means but instead constitutional methods, intellectual activities, government administration, etc. in order to ‘depoliticise ABRI’;
- (3) extreme groups which would try to use extra-constitutional methods — such as instigating mass riots — to further their political interests based on racial and separatist motivations; and
- (4) a certain group of people ... who wanted liberal democracy with unlimited freedom, and whose activities spread through academic forums, discussions and seminars as well as via the mass media.¹²⁷

A further document in 1993 about the threat of latent Communism identified globalisation as the means by which ‘capitalism, liberal thought and other foreign ideologies’¹²⁸ that contradicted *Pancasila* might enter Indonesia.

In 1995 Gen. Farid Zainuddin — later to be made head of military intelligence in 1997 — specifically provided the link between defending Islam on the one hand and military concerns for ‘vigilance’ against the multiple threats of Communism, Western influence and globalisation on the other:

The West is always antagonistic to Islam. This is not unrelated to the recent international campaign for political liberalisation ... which

¹²⁶ The following discussion of military thinking rests on Jun Honna, *Military politics and democratization in Indonesia* (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. 108–30.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 114, citing *Analisa lingkungan strategi pertahanan keamanan Negara 1988–1989* (published by the Department of Defence [Dephankam]).

¹²⁸ Honna, *Military politics and democratization*, p. 115, citing *Sekitar padnas, bahaya laten & Tapol G.30.S./PKI* (published by the Department of Defence [Dephankam]).

has also been promoted in Indonesia as the revival of Islam becomes apparent It is globalisation that facilitates this [campaign]. It ... also strengthens the international network of non-*pribumi* [code for Chinese] business which has dominated the Indonesian economy since the beginning [of the New Order].¹²⁹

The strengthening alliance between the New Order regime and Islamist groups was in response both to the increasing confidence of Islamisers and to the increasingly uncertain nature of the regime itself. Regime unity had never been as total as outside observers were sometimes inclined to think, and it was certainly becoming distinctly shaky by the later 1990s. Soeharto and his cronies were engaging in favouritism and nepotism, including within the military itself, which generated considerable disaffection. Even military figures were by now discussing the need for reform. The elections held in 1997 were the most violent of the New Order period. Outside the regime's inner circle, many religious, intellectual and political activists felt that Soeharto must go. The president's health was beginning to look shaky, too. Soeharto was said to have passed tests in Germany on his heart and kidneys but in December 1997, at the age of 76 and with the Asian financial crisis gathering pace around him, he suffered what was apparently a minor stroke. The possibility of an end to the Soeharto era was now in the minds of many people.

Soeharto may now have made a calculation not unlike Sukarno's in the early- and mid-1960s. Sukarno knew that he could not trust the military to support him, so he turned to PKI. Soeharto was also no longer quite certain whether he could count on ABRI support, so it seems that he, too, looked to civilian support. In his case, this meant Islamic forces, including more extreme, exclusivist, anti-pluralist and anti-Western forms of Islam. No doubt both presidents — surrounded by sycophants and overly confident of their own unique abilities — imagined that, if necessary, they could dispose of these civilian allies if they should become difficult to manage.

In the middle and later 1990s, the government found opportunities to ring the anti-Communist bell again. In 1995 the nation's greatest prose writer, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, was awarded the Ramon Magsaysay Foundation's award for literature. As we have seen, Pramoedya had been the foremost literary figure in PKI's Lekra; he had spent many years in confinement for his pro-Communist activities, only being released from the Buru

¹²⁹ Honna, *Military politics and democratization*, p. 119, citing Farid Zainuddin's article in *Majalah Ketahanan Nasional* 1995.

island prison camp at the end of 1979. During his imprisonment he had written the tetralogy of historical novels about early Indonesian nationalism that won him international recognition.¹³⁰ But he was no honoured figure in New Order Indonesia. In 1989–90 students who distributed his works were interrogated and put on trial.¹³¹ Great controversy followed the announcement of the Magsaysay award. One of Indonesia's other great writers, Mochtar Lubis, had received the Magsaysay award for journalism and literature in 1958 but he now travelled to Manila to return his medal as an act of protest.¹³² Islamic leaders were inclined to see in this the potential for Communism to revive in Indonesia.

The regime's leaders were also becoming concerned about their capacity to stage-manage Golkar electoral landslides. PDI had never previously threatened Golkar's dominance in the elections, but from 1993 it was led by Sukarno's daughter Megawati Sukarnoputri (b. 1947, later the nation's fifth president) and looked like it could become a serious challenge. So Soeharto sought to intervene in the party by supporting an alternative candidate as its chair, which led to a split, a contest over who should control the party headquarters in Jakarta, and a standoff, with pro-democracy activists and Jakarta's urban poor rallying to Megawati. Indeed, to an increasingly nervous military, PDI looked like it might embody all at once most of the threats encapsulated in ABRI's strategic doctrine of 1988: new forms of Communism, extremists ready to provoke rioting and proponents of liberal democracy. On 27 July 1996, the PDI headquarters were attacked by thugs supporting Megawati's opponent, including ABRI soldiers out of uniform. This sparked two days of serious rioting in Jakarta. The government sought to blame a new leftist group who called themselves the People's Democratic Party (PRD, Partai Rakyat Demokratik) for all of this, which the regime denounced as an attempt to revive Communism. Several Islamic organisations supported the government's conduct in the crushing of the PRD, as we will see in more detail below.

Through 1995–6, the leading Islamic biweekly magazine *Ummat* underscored the risk of 'latent Communism'. This was, said the magazine, exemplified by the award of the Magsaysay medal to Pramodya. It quoted Mochtar Lubis: 'We believe that the Magsaysay appreciation of

¹³⁰ *Bumi manusia, Anak semua bangsa, Jejak langkah and Rumah kaca* (*This earth of mankind, Child of all nations, Footsteps and Glass house*).

¹³¹ Heryanto, *State terrorism and political identity*, pp. 63–105.

¹³² See Jörgen Hellman, *Performing the nation: Cultural politics in New Order Indonesia* (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2003), pp. 22–3.

[Pramoedya] is not just for his novels, but also for his contemptible attacks on non-Communist writers and artists when PKI held power in the time of President Sukarno.' Twenty-six other Indonesian writers and cultural figures wrote in protest to the Magsaysay Foundation. Others disagreed with the anti-Pramoedya protests — prominent among them Abdurrahman Wahid, the leading intellectual Goenawan Mohamad, the litterateur H.B. Jassin (himself a prominent victim of Communist intimidation in the past) and the sociologist and anti-Soeharto activist Arief Budiman. *Ummat* editorialised about the past 'viciousness' of PKI and Lekra towards Muslim intellectual figures, including Hamka, and expressed concern that 'in certain circles, above all among the young, Pram[oedya] receives extraordinary sympathy'. *Ummat* continued:

Although Communist ideology is bankrupt, there are still some youths who are infatuated with lapping up the books of Karl Marx and other leftist writers. There are even many who are sympathetic towards former PKI figures What is clear is that we should pay attention to the warning by the chair of the East Java MUI and DDII, Ky. H. Misbach, who has much experience of PKI tactics: 'Communism always represents a latent danger that we must be on guard against.' ... It is appropriate for us all to reflect upon Ky. Misbach's admonition.¹³³

Ummat also interviewed Brig. Gen. Suwarno Adiwijoyo, then head of ABRI's information centre, who was predictably unequivocal in linking anti-Communism and Islam:

Communism represents a latent danger that threatens the life of the society and the nation. Even more so because down to today they acknowledge no regrets or errors. ... If the society is not on guard, there is a possibility that PKI will return, albeit in a different form. ... Including being on guard against those who seek to make heroes of former PKI figures or seek to expunge the episodes of oppression by PKI and its mass organisations against their political opponents, including religious folk, in particular the Islamic *ummah*.¹³⁴

As political tensions rose in 1996, *Ummat* grew more enthusiastic in its support of the increasingly shaky Soeharto regime. Its issue of 22 July 1996 had Gen. Faisal Tanjung — then ABRI commander and one of the foremost

¹³³ M. Syafi'i Anwar *et al.*, 'Bukan dendam, tapi pelurusan sejarah', *Ummat* yr 1, no. 6 (18 Sept. 1995/22 Rabiul Akhir 1416 H), pp. 21–3.

¹³⁴ Surya Kusuma, 'PKI harus tetap dicurigai', *Ummat* yr 1, no. 6 (18 Sept. 1995/22 Rabiul Akhir 1416 H), p. 27.

practising Muslim ‘green’ generals¹³⁵ — pictured on the cover with the quotation, ‘There are PKI in NGOs who want to overthrow the government’. The article itself claimed that the supporters of Megawati’s branch of PDI were using the stand-off at PDI headquarters to generate rioting — just as in the 1988 ABRI doctrine about the next generation of Communists and extreme groups that would try to foment mass riots to pursue their political interests. Faisal Tanjung was asked deferentially whether he could clarify the issue of NGOs that wanted to overthrow the government. ‘Yes, we are examining that,’ he replied, ‘because within them there are PKI figures’.¹³⁶

After the violence of 27 July, *Ummat* editorialised that ‘the voice of the Islamic *ummah* unanimously supports the resoluteness of the government in dealing with the riot of 27 July and its aftermath’. It added that,

the majority of Muslim leaders and Islamic organisations indeed support the resolute action of the government in suppressing the riot of 27 July. They have truly never sympathised with, indeed incline to be suspicious of, PDI. ... Moreover, they subsequently received confirmation from government announcements, having seen and been convinced of this themselves, that this movement is being utilised by groups that have the smell of PKI. Clearly, the Islamic *ummah* can disagree about everything, but not about the issue of Communism.

Ummat then quoted statements supporting this interpretation from the leaders of hard-line movements including the Islamist KISDI (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam, Indonesian Committee for the Solidarity of the Islamic World) and DDII (with which KISDI was closely linked). Other organisations’ support was also reported: that of MUI, Al-Irsyad, NU’s Ansor and the Muhammadiyah Youth (Pemuda Muhammadiyah). ‘As is known,’ said *Ummat*, ‘PRD and other such groups often adopt Islamic symbols. In their actions and protests, they recruit younger generation Muslims, including girls in *jilbabs*.’ But several other Muslim youth groups were then quoted as rejecting such organisations and emphasising that ‘PRD is a group whose ideology is Communist’. The only dissenting voice reported came from the leader (*rois aam*) of NU’s advisory

¹³⁵ Faisal Tanjung, Hartono, Syarwan Hamid and Prabowo Subianto were usually regarded as the foremost ‘green’ generals; see Hefner, *Civil Islam*, p. 151; Marcus Mietzner, *Military politics, Islam and the state in Indonesia: From turbulent transition to democratic consolidation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), p. 103.

¹³⁶ Hamid Basyaib, ‘Gaduh PDI dan tuduhan Panglima ABRI’, *Ummat* yr 2, no. 2 (22 July 1996/6 Rabiul Awal 1417 H), pp. 28–9.

board (*Syuriyah*), Ky. H. Ilyas Ruhiyat, who told *Ummat* that he was neutral and neither accepted nor rejected the government's claim that PDI was being used as a vehicle by PKI. The Islamist Yusril Ihza Mahendra — an academic with a Malaysian doctorate, a DDII and ICMI leader regarded by some as the 'young Natsir', later to become a cabinet minister and be accused of corruption — contributed an opinion piece in which he wrote, '[The claim by PRD *et al.* that] religion must be separated from the state ... is Marxist secularism which in essence is hostile to religion'.¹³⁷

It was thus appealing to both Islamists and the New Order regime to perceive Communism as a reviving threat, along with globalisation, Westernisation, doctrines of personal liberty and democracy and the Internet that increasingly conveyed these threats. Islamists and the New Order were alike in seeking control of what people did, what they believed, and the power to enforce these things: they had now discovered that they wanted people to do and believe pretty much the same things and thus could collaborate in the exercise of power. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar, out of Indonesia and angrily running their school in Johor, maintained their opposition to the regime, but many other Islamists had by now made their peace with it.

The increase in the public presence of more hard-line interpretations of Islam did not, at this stage, pose a challenge to rural-based NU, but it was beginning to produce a potential split within the other great Java-based organisation, Muhammadiyah. Just as many leaders in NU were becoming more modern, more progressive, more tolerant of other faiths and more in support of democratic transition, a younger leadership group with such aspirations was also rising in Muhammadiyah. At the once-in-five-years general conference in 1995, a group with such views was elected to Muhammadiyah's leadership. The general chair was now M. Amien Rais, and supporting him were other progressive thinkers such as Ahmad Syafii Maarif (who succeeded Amien Rais when he went into formal politics in 1999), Amin Abdullah, Abdul Munir Mulkhan and others. These people were generally Modernist in views, Dakwahist in aspirations and sometimes even Liberal in their aims. They supported what they called 'cultural proselytism' (*dakwah kultural*), which was a means of reaching out in culturally sensitive ways to people less committed to Islam, above all to *abangan* villagers who remained in Java, and their analogues elsewhere. But at about the same time

¹³⁷ Taken from multiple articles in *Ummat* yr 2, no. 4 (19 Aug. 1996/4 Rabiul Akhir 1417 H).

there began to return to Indonesia a generation of Muhammadiyah activists who had studied in the Middle East and who wanted a narrower, more literalist — indeed often Revivalist — interpretation of Islam to be promoted by Muhammadiyah. The group led by Amien Rais, Syafii Maarif and others was dominant in the Muhammadiyah leadership until c. 2000, after which time those who opposed them began to plan a take-over of the organisation. Among the Muhammadiyah branches most anxious to overthrow the influence of the 1995–2000 reformers were those in Yogyakarta and Surabaya, along with some in Sumatra.¹³⁸

The depth of the growing difference between these two wings within Muhammadiyah is suggested by the comment of Ahmad Syafii Maarif in his memoirs, reflecting the conclusion he had come to by the 1990s with regard to what he calls ‘religious fundamentalism’:

Religious fundamentalism which is eager to monopolise truth in the name of God will produce results not much different from those of atheistic secularism which is totally divorced from faith. ‘Learn from this, all of you with insight!’ calls the *Qur’an* in *sura al-Hasyr* (59): verse 2.¹³⁹

We will see more of the ramifications of this contest within Muhammadiyah in the following chapter.

Thus, by 1996–8, in Java (and across Indonesia more generally) there was a potent mix emerging:

- a shaky regime,
- increasingly assertive Revivalist interpretations of Islam,
- deepening general Islamisation,
- increasing presence of Islamists and
- both regime and Islamic insistence that the society was surrounded by threats to stability, to development and to Islam itself.

There were parallels here with the late stage of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and — similarly — social violence began to spread. We noted above that the 1997 elections were the most violent of the New Order period, leaving an estimated 250 dead across the nation. Significant violence was directed against Christian churches. This often included an ethnic dimension, for many of Indonesia’s Chinese were Christians;

¹³⁸ Interview with Prof. Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Kota Gede, 22 Oct. 2005. See also Syafii Maarif, *Titik-titik kisar di perjalanananku*, pp. 255–8, 270–88, 294–7.

¹³⁹ Syafii Maarif, *Titik-titik kisar di perjalanananku*, p. 251. *Qur’anic translation as in Qur’an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem*, p. 365.

anti-Chinese and anti-Christian violence were thus sometimes the same thing. There was significant fighting between Muslims and non-Muslims in Jakarta in 1992 and some churches were attacked. In 1996 a Muslim mob burned six churches in the centre of Surabaya, but this was hushed up on military orders. Then in October 1996, around Situbondo in East Java — a NU stronghold of heavily Madurese ethnicity — 25 Christian schools and churches were burned down and five people died. Multiple Chinese properties were damaged or destroyed. A few months later, similar violence followed in Tasikmalaya, West Java, leaving four dead and Chinese properties damaged and destroyed. Recognising the role that NU followers had played, Abdurrahman Wahid publicly apologised to Christians for this violence and mobilised Banser to protect churches.¹⁴⁰ Church-burnings were becoming more common across Indonesia in this period. One calculation has it that over 1985–94 13.2 churches were burned each year, but in 1995–7 that rose to 44.5 each year.¹⁴¹

It was in this environment that the corrupt, oppressive, increasingly unrealistic and dysfunctional Soeharto regime ran into the spreading Asia financial crisis that began in Thailand in mid-1997; as it stumbled to its end, the New Order found its greatest support from conservative Islamic circles. By this time Prabowo Subianto was not only a prominent ‘green’ general and Soeharto’s son-in-law, but also commander of ABRI’s special forces.¹⁴² He was also regarded as an ally of Habibie and ICMI.

¹⁴⁰ Hefner, *Civil Islam*, pp. 190, 192; Abdul Kadir, ‘Traditional Islamic society and the state’, pp. 351–2; Mujiburrahman, *Feeling threatened*, pp. 293–4, 374 n164.

¹⁴¹ Calculation by Thalele and Santoso, cited in Mujiburrahman, *Feeling threatened*, p. 374 n165.

¹⁴² To quote my own thumb-nail description of Prabowo: ‘Major-General Prabowo Subianto (b. 1951) ... was the son of the distinguished economist and former PSI politician Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and was married to Soeharto’s daughter Siti Hediati Hariyadi (nicknamed Titiek, b. 1959). Prabowo was brilliant, highly educated, and, in the eyes of his opponents, a man of unbridled ruthlessness and ambition. In 1983 he was named deputy commander of the army’s ... Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus, Special Forces Command). This consisted of para-commandos and covert warfare elements. Under Prabowo’s leadership, the special forces fought separatist movements in Papua, East Timor and Aceh. Their record of using terror against civilians was probably the worst of any element in ABRI. As Prabowo pursued his meteoric rise through the military, he won both admirers and bitter enemies. Some suspected for a time that here, at last, was Soeharto’s successor, others that Prabowo represented the ultimate corruption of ABRI by presidential favouritism.’ Ricklefs, *History of modern Indonesia*, p. 354.

In an atmosphere of rising tension and crisis early in 1998, Prabowo in particular courted Islamic hard-liners, breaking the Ramadan fast with a gathering of 5,000 people that included well-known extremists. He announced that the current crisis was the result of an international conspiracy linked to Chinese Indonesian businessmen. Sofjan Wanandi (Liem Bian Koen), a Chinese Indonesian entrepreneur and Catholic, became a particular target of Prabowo and his Islamist allies, along with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, of which Sofyan and his brother Yusuf Wanandi (Liem Bian Kie) were leading lights. MUI responded to Prabowo and the regime's call for Islamic support. It declared that there should be a Holy War (*jihad*) against 'a group of irresponsible people who dominate 70 per cent of the country's economy even though they are only four per cent of the total population [code for Chinese Indonesians], in order to prevent their political conspiracy to topple the government and Islam'.¹⁴³

On 8 February 1998 a meeting at the Al Azhar mosque in Jakarta denounced Sofjan Wanandi and CSIS for being behind the monetary crisis. A 'National Solidarity Front of Indonesian Muslims' was announced to oppose such alleged traitors to the nation. Among those present were KISDI's leader Ahmad Soemargono, Ky. H. Kholil (sometimes spelled Cholil) Ridwan (a DDII and MUI luminary) and others of a generally Islamist persuasion. The main speaker was the Arab Indonesian H. Habib Hamid Alatas, who said that there was a conspiracy of non-Muslims afoot and that ABRI and Islam must stand together against it.¹⁴⁴ A few days later the Minister of Religion Tarmizi Taher opened the national conference of MUI. There the head of MUI, Ky. H. Hasan Basri, said that all Muslims should carry out a 'national Holy War' (*jihad nasional*) in concert with the government and ABRI to defend 'the nation, the people and religion' from all threats from a 'certain group with an international conspiratorial network'. The Secretary General of DDII, Ky. H. Hussein Umar, also said that the enemies were hard to define, but it was clear that they were part of an international conspiracy. Again, the only caution came from the head of NU's advisory board (*Syuriyah*), Ky. H. Ma'ruf Amin, who observed that *jihad* had a wide range of meanings and that it was the view of religious

¹⁴³ Honna, *Military politics and democratization*, pp. 48–9; the quote is Honna's translation from 'MUI serukan Jihan Nasional', *Republika*, 11 Feb. 1998. See further Mietzner, *Military politics, Islam and the state*, pp. 114–5.

¹⁴⁴ *KmpsO*, 9 Feb. 1998.

scholars that the main enemy facing the nation was poverty arising from the monetary crisis.¹⁴⁵

Soeharto's reign was about to end. The tale of local and international manoeuvrings that attended the end of the regime has often been told and need not detain us here.¹⁴⁶ The important facts are that the Islamist-regime alliance came to nothing, the military games played by various factions did not end in a new military takeover, no international players were prepared to salvage the regime, and in the end Soeharto — accepting the inevitable — announced his resignation on 21 May 1998 and handed power to his Vice-President Habibie. Many Islamist activists saw the latter as an even more attractive ally than Soeharto, because of Habibie's long-standing personal piety.

Soeharto's decision to resign was reportedly based on a combination of Islamic and older Javanese considerations of the kind that had typified his period in power. Prof. Abdul Malik Fadjar, a Yogyakarta-born Muhammadiyah intellectual who was head of the Muhammadiyah Universities in both Malang and Surakarta, and shortly to become the first Minister of Religion in a post-Soeharto Indonesia, was present at the final discussions at which Soeharto decided to step down. Soeharto invited nine Muslim leaders to meet with him on 19 May, a gathering that also included Abdurrahman Wahid and Nurcholish Madjid, but not Amien Rais, who had emerged as Soeharto's principal opponent. At this meeting, various constitutional matters were discussed along with Islamic legal issues. But Javanese books of divination (*primbons*) were evidently being consulted as well and there was consideration of what day would be most propitious for the momentous step of resignation. It was reportedly still Soeharto's practice to sit facing in particular directions on particular days, depending on the location of the invisible but supernaturally powerful serpent (*naga*) on that day. This sort of thing created a profound gap of understanding between Soeharto and Habibie, because the latter could simply make no sense of such ideas.¹⁴⁷ In any case, there were no political, military, economic, diplomatic or supernatural powers available to salvage the New Order. On 21 May 1998 it died with Soeharto's resignation.

¹⁴⁵ *JP*, 11 Feb. 1998.

¹⁴⁶ A brief overview is available in Ricklefs, *History of modern Indonesia*, pp. 378–81. A detailed account including the role of various Islamic figures and organisations is in Mietzner, *Military politics, Islam and the state*, pp. 146–84.

¹⁴⁷ Discussion with Prof. H. Abdul Malik Fadjar, Jakarta, 18 June 1998.

Java Islamised?

Social processes never come to an end, cultures never stand still, the changing influence of religions or ideologies has no end-point, and the story of the deeper Islamisation of Javanese society will not end where this book ends. Yet it is not inappropriate for us to observe at this stage that, when the Soeharto regime fell in 1998, the religious changes that had taken place in Javanese society over the previous three decades were profound, that something like a watershed had been crossed.

We have seen that the New Order period — covered in the last chapter and this — dramatically increased the impact of Islam at all levels of Javanese society, both in the towns and cities and in the countryside. The politics of this process were complex, with NU initially being treated as an opposition force by the regime, as a competitor for social control of the countryside, but then as an ally. We have seen how the *abangan* side lost the only major institutions — the political parties PKI and PNI — that supported *abangan* identity and practices, while the *santri* side retained a vast range of institutions that supported the *ummah* and further Islamisation. We have observed *abangan* Javanese becoming more observant Muslims, as well as followers of other faiths, particularly Christianity. We have seen how, in the last two decades or so of the Soeharto years, the regime intensified its push for totalitarian ideological hegemony and won — albeit within the limits imposed by its administrative shortcomings. As international waves of Islamic reform washed up on Indonesia's shores, Revivalist and Islamist approaches to Islam became more visible, more active and more confident. The essential totalitarianism of such groups and the regime — the wish on both their parts to control not only what people did but what they believed — made them, in those last decades, more allies than competitors.

When Indonesia became independent in 1945–9, it was probably true (statistical inadequacies notwithstanding) that *santri* Javanese were in a minority, perhaps a very small minority. Intense social and political conflict was generated between *santri* and *abangan*. By 1998 (still in the absence of really satisfactory statistical indicators) it was very likely that the proportions were reversed. The *abangan* were possibly a minority now, and in any case were politically voiceless and insignificant. They had nowhere to go that was politically significant but Golkar, the vehicle of a regime that was itself 'greening', with the bureaucracy, the military and even the Soeharto family burnishing their Islamic credentials.

We have tried to trace the deeper social transformation in Javanese society here, necessarily working with evidence that is not always as complete or convincing as one would like. But the general trend of the New Order

period at grass-roots level seems clear: Javanese society was being more deeply Islamised. The opponents to that process who were such a prominent element of the pre-Soeharto story hardly mattered any more. I may offer an anecdotal footnote to this which may be suggestive, even though it is unsupported by any hard evidence and may be contrary to the impressions of others who have also spent 40 years doing research in and about Java. When we first lived in Central Java in 1969, young Javanese had both indigenous Javanese and Arabic names — the former commonly found among *abangan* and the latter among *santri*. The most common seemed to be names of the *abangan* style: boys with names starting in Su ..., or Joko, Sigit and Bambang; girls with names like Siti, Nini, Ratih and Yati. Some *abangan* boys were named Slamet, an Arabic-derived name, but I doubt that *abangan* knew of that etymology or thought of the name as particularly Islamic, any more than they regarded the *slametan* as such.¹⁴⁸ Thirty years later, it seemed that Arabic names were in the majority: now Javanese boys were likely to be called Muhammad, Abdul, Hussein or Ibrahim, while girls were commonly named Nur, Ayisya, Lina or Fatimah. If this impression is correct, it is another indicator of the strengthening sense of Islamic identity across Javanese society.¹⁴⁹

In some ways, perhaps we can say that the Islamisation of Javanese society had resumed a course that had been interrupted for about a century, from the mid-19th to the mid-20th century, by the polarisation and politicisation that are discussed in the previous book in this series — *Polarising Javanese society* — and in earlier chapters of this book. That century or so of polarisation and politicisation generated immense, deeply rooted and eventually bloody opposition to the deeper Islamisation of the society. That conflicted and tragic stage of Javanese history was now effectively over. Of course there were still *abangan* and still people who resisted Islamisation. Unlike in 1830, in 1998 there was a substantial Christian minority in Java whose presence could not be gainsaid. But the general trend in the direction of deeper Islamisation was probably now irreversible.

¹⁴⁸ On Javanese naming practices, see Uhlenbeck's essay 'Systematic features of Javanese personal names', originally published in 1969, in E.M. Uhlenbeck, *Studies in Javanese morphology* (Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde translation series 19; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), pp. 336–51.

¹⁴⁹ The LKiS leader M. Jadul Maula commented also on the phenomenon of children of *abangan* being given Arab names as a part of the broader process of '*santrinisasi*'; interviewed by Nur Choliq Ridwan, Yogyakarta, 9 Dec. 2007.

It is a token of that resumed process of Islamisation that, in the following Part II of this book, our discussion will have only little to say about resistance to Islamisation per se. Rather, the conflicts that we will observe will be contending views of what a more Islamic Java — and, of course, a more Islamic Indonesia — should look like. The contending parties will be less *abangan* and *santri* than defenders of conflicting interpretations of Islam.

CHAPTER 7

The political and social settings

Introduction

In the following seven chapters, we will observe a major transformation in the social, political, religious and cultural dynamics of Java, and hence of Indonesia. This history is, like all histories, plagued by imperfect and contradictory evidence and multiple, often confusing, directions of events. Nevertheless, there is a dominant trend evident from the story that follows, which involves an important change in the direction of causation, a shift in the source of initiatives for change.

Throughout this book, the nature of the reigning political regime has been crucial to the story. Whether Java was under Dutch colonial rule or Japanese wartime occupation, was in the midst of its Revolution or experimenting with political freedom and democracy in the 1950s, the political regime facilitated certain developments in the spheres of religion and culture and inhibited others. Down to the mid-1960s religious, social, cultural and political polarisation gravely threatened social harmony, leading in the end to the horrific slaughters of 1965–6 that ushered in Soeharto's regime. In the preceding two chapters, we have seen how Soeharto's New Order brought an aspiring totalitarianism to Indonesia and facilitated a much deeper Islamisation of Javanese society, a profound social change from Java's past. Even while multiple scholars, journalists and politicians, both within Indonesia and outside, maintained the view that the Javanese constituted a sort of impregnable *abangan* bastion against greater Islamic influence in Indonesian affairs — an idea resting largely on the still-influential 1950s work of Clifford Geertz — Javanese society was moving beyond this stereotype.

Here we will see how in the post-Soeharto years, it became less a case of the political regime setting the religious agenda than the reverse: religious

dynamics shaping the political regime. In the concluding Chapter 14 of this book, we will investigate some of the larger issues that are involved here — including the question of whether politicians' surrender of initiative to religious groups is necessary, given the realities of how political power works. Even though expressly Islamist political parties did poorly in elections, the Islamisation of the society from the grass roots upward persuaded politicians that they must make their compromises with the increasingly powerful faith — perhaps in many cases because Islam was increasingly powerful in their own lives. By the time of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–14), a much weakened presidency was reluctant to wield state authority against even the more thuggish forms of religious activism.

Thus it was that Soeharto's wish to make everyone act and believe by the standards of *Pancasila* — and to define what that meant — was superseded by the wish of religious activists to make all Muslims act and believe by the standards of Islam, a wish pursued with governmental acquiescence and sometimes direct support. But just what those standards actually amount to was contested, as we will see in this Part of this book. Soeharto could arrogate the right to say what *Pancasila* was, but there was no single voice with the power to say what Islam was. One sort of totalitarian aspiration was thus succeeded by another, but the religious version was plagued by the contested nature of religious authority that is found in virtually all faiths.

By the time of the Yudhoyono presidency, the policy of regional autonomy facilitated Islamisation and Islamist agendas in local contexts, despite the frequent failure of Islamists either to win power through national elections or to amend the national constitution to their liking (as they failed to do in the long process of amending the constitution in 2002). But regional autonomy also introduced another complication. Each region sought to find something to capture its particular identity, often with the hope of attracting the attention of (mostly domestic) tourists. This turned their attention to local art forms, which in many cases were of pre-Islamic origin or at least in a style unwelcome to more puritan forms of Islam.¹ Thus the homogenising aspirations of Islamic reformers now faced another trend in the opposite direction: the frequently heterogenising agenda of regional autonomy.

¹ A similar observation is made in Hatley, *Javanese performances*, p. 199. *Kebatinan* figures also expressed the view that regional autonomy provided a good opportunity for *kebatinan* to revive after Soeharto's attempt to impose a homogeneous national culture; discussion with Drs KRAT Basuki Prawirodipuro and KRT Giarto Nagoro, Surabaya, 25 Nov. 2007.

The political setting: The second freedom experiment

Soeharto's resignation in 1998 ushered in a period of extraordinary political change in Indonesia, whereby within a very few years one of the most centralised, authoritarian and non-democratic states was transformed into a decentralised democracy — rather chaotic, to be sure, but one where government was moved much closer to the people and elections really did change who were their representatives and governors.²

Soeharto's protégé and Vice-President B.J. Habibie succeeded as President for just 17 months (1998–9). Pro-democracy activists feared the worst, but in fact Habibie laid the foundations for Indonesia's 'second freedom experiment', as this chapter calls it. He freed political prisoners and arranged for free and fair national elections. Most controversially, Habibie allowed a United Nations-supervised referendum in East Timor in 1999 which led to the excision of that territory (conquered by Indonesia in 1975) and the creation of the new nation of Timor-Leste. In the midst of ongoing social violence and economic crisis, Habibie achieved much more in the way of reform than many imagined possible.

Habibie had a reputation as a devout Muslim, as well as a promoter of immensely expensive, loss-making state technology projects. He followed a practice known among pious circles of voluntarily fasting on each Monday and Thursday as an additional religious discipline. His combination of modern technological knowledge, civilian background and Islamic piety made his presidency welcome to many who sought a greater role for Islam in the nation — notably people who had found ICMI to be a useful professional and religious vehicle for their own aspirations. The alliance we noted in the previous chapter among an increasingly 'green' military, Islamist groups and the former Soeharto regime — all of them feeling threatened by globalisation and various forms of liberalisation — continued to resonate under Habibie. One of the military men he worked closely with was Gen. Z.A. Maulani (1939–2005), a 1961 graduate of the Magelang Military Academy. He was on Habibie's expert staff when he was Minister for Research and Technology and in the crisis month of May 1998 was briefly secretary to Habibie as Vice-President. Thereafter he became Indonesia's intelligence chief as head of the State Intelligence Coordination Body (BAKIN, Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara) from 1998 to 2000. In 2002 Maulani, now retired from

² An overview of the period down to 2008, with references to the most important studies, may be found in Ricklefs, *History of modern Indonesia*, Chapters 24–5.

active government service, published a book entitled *Zionism: The movement to subjugate the world*. This asserts the authenticity of the well-known forgery 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion',³ writes of a Jewish conspiracy to take over American finance, politics and foreign affairs, to dominate the world's press, the IMF and World Bank and so on.⁴ Another person Habibie was close to was Anwar Harjono, who succeeded Natsir as head of DDII when the latter died in 1993. We have noted above Anwar Harjono's increasing antipathy towards Christianisation and other perceived threats to Islam such as Communism, atheism and secularism.⁵ Other connections between senior military men and Islamists also continued.

In the first post-Soeharto parliamentary elections of June 1999, there were 48 parties contending, several with explicitly Islamist agendas. Muhammadiyah circulated a call to all Muslims, telling them it was 'obligatory to choose one of the parties ... which represents the interests of the Islamic *ummah* and genuinely fights for reform'. A call published by a group calling themselves the Islamic Society for Democracy quoted *Qur'an* 3:28 as saying 'Let not believers make unbelievers leaders by abandoning believers'⁶ and went on, 'Don't choose a party that is dominated by non-Muslim candidates' — a charge frequently leveled by Islamist activists at Megawati's PDIP party. This echoed advice given by MUI on 7 June, which many people reportedly regarded as a legal ruling (*fatwa*).⁷ In fact, the *ummah* was hardly united politically. There was great animosity particularly between Abdurrahman Wahid's followers (PKB supporters) and those of Amien Rais (supporters of PAN). Anti-Amien demonstrations in Bangil and Pasuruan threatened such violence that he had to cancel a trip there in June 1999.⁸

³ It may be noted *en passant* that Henry Ford's famously anti-Semitic book *The international Jew*, originally published in 1920 and which also published these 'Protocols', has been translated into Indonesian, but I failed to note the translator or publisher when I saw this work on sale in an Indonesian bookshop.

⁴ Z.A. Maulani, *Zionisme: Gerakan menaklukkan dunia* (Jakarta: Penerbit Daseta, 2002).

⁵ Feener, *Muslim legal thought*, p. 116.

⁶ Abdel Haleem's translation renders the verse rather differently: 'The believers should not make the disbelievers their allies rather than other believers'; *Qur'an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem*, p. 36.

⁷ These two 'calls' (*seruan*) appeared side-by-side in *JP*, 5 June 1999, and were also no doubt published in many other newspapers. The MUI advice (*tauisiyah*) is discussed in Moch. Nur Ichwan, 'Ulamā', state and politics: Majelis Ulama after Suharto', *Islamic law and society* vol. 12 (2005), no. 1, pp. 55–8.

⁸ *Kmps*, 15 June 1998.



Illustration 15 PDIP election rally, Surakarta, June 1999,
with supporters dressed as *wayang* clowns

Despite such efforts, even in this first election very many Indonesians proved unwilling to accept the political advice of religious leaders and responded positively to Megawati's image as the daughter of Sukarno and the foremost representative of anti-New Order politics. The specifically Islamist PPP had a modest level of support, with 10.7 per cent of the national vote. PAN, led by Muhammadiyah's former head Amien Rais but with a clearly secularist platform, did worse at 7.1 per cent. PKB, headed by Abdurrahman Wahid, gained 12.6 per cent. The big winners were two parties with no special claim on a self-consciously Muslim constituency: Megawati's PDIP, which won fully 33.7 per cent of the national vote and — surprisingly to many — Golkar, which had managed to present itself as a 'new Golkar' and gained 22.4 per cent nationally.

The results in the Javanese heartlands, as given below, demonstrate the appeal of PDIP there, the weakness of Golkar compared to its national result

— where ironically it became the heir to Masyumi's position of the 1950s as the main representative of the outer islands — and the predictable strength of PKB in East Java, where NU's popular support was always greatest (not least because of overwhelming support of Madurese living there) and where it beat PDIP into second place.

Table 17 Percentage of valid votes won by major parties in Central and East Java and Yogyakarta, 1999⁹

Region	PDIP	Golkar	PKB	PPP	PAN
Central Java	30.7	9.8	11.5	7.6	5.1
Yogyakarta	16.0	6.3	7.4	2.3	8.7
East Java	23.5	8.9	24.9	3.4	3.3

Although PDIP was the largest party and Megawati had a presumptive claim to be elected by the national parliament (MPR) as President, astute manoeuvring by Abdurrahman Wahid handed him the vote for the presidency. He held the post for just 21 months (1999–2001). The man who most represented the hopes of Liberal thinkers, who had the authority of a Traditionalist 'blue blood' but insisted on a secular state, was now President of Indonesia. But he was very sick: he had suffered strokes and was blind, so to his long-standing idiosyncrasies and mystical inclinations were added a damaged mind and an inability to read anything himself.¹⁰ He was nevertheless remarkably energetic and worked to overthrow the legacies of Soeharto and Habibie. He supported openness in government and pluralist tolerance in society. But his erratic statements and impatience with critics, along with growing rumours of corruption among his circle and involving Abdurrahman himself, soon doomed his presidency. Modernist youth

⁹ Calculated on the basis of figures in *SPK* online, 16 June 1999. These are provisional results, but I've been unable to locate official final results (which would not differ significantly) for these areas.

¹⁰ An example of the way his mind was working: in 2007, he told me that the previous year in Kediri he had met with 'grandfather Semar' (the most powerful of the god-clowns of the *wayang*), who was born 700 years before. If Abdurrahman called Semar, he would come to him every day; discussion with Ky. H. Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 7 June 2007. There were many publications exploring Abdurrahman's conduct and thought. For example, see Khoirul Rosyadi, *Mistik politik Gus Dur* (Yogyakarta: Jendela, 2004).

organisations associated with Muhammadiyah, PAN and other parties were prominent in denouncing Abdurrahman and demanding that he be removed from office.¹¹ NU's youth activists in Ansor were prepared to defend their *kyai* with physical force if necessary and attacked Muhammadiyah and Golkar properties in East Java.¹²



Illustration 16 Abdurrahman Wahid, Ciganjur, October 2009

¹¹ For example, *JktP* online, 15 Jan. 2001.

¹² *TempoI*, 7 Feb. 2001, 29 May 2001; *JktP* online, 27 May 2001; *KmpsO*, 9 Feb. 2001.

Abdurrahman acted to free the press from Soeharto-era constraints. This fostered some good journalism, as exemplified in several Jakarta-based newspapers, the leading papers of Yogyakarta and the Surabaya-based *Jawa Pos*, but it also allowed the publication of much Revivalist, Dakwahist, and Islamist literature — including extremist forms of these. The latter was exemplified by magazines such as *Sabili* (the most influential of these),¹³ *al-Wa'ie*, *Risalah Mujahidin*, *Suara Hidayatullah* and others, as well as very many books. Extremists loathed Abdurrahman. One of the many inflammatory anti-Abdurrahman books published during his presidency was written by Dr Sidik Jatmika of the Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, published by Wihdah Press — a publishing enterprise of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (about which, more below)¹⁴ — and entitled *A Zionist movement with a Malay face*, featuring on its cover Abdurrahman's head with a star of David superimposed.¹⁵

With crisis and controversy on all sides, at the end Abdurrahman was ready to abandon his own principles and overturn Indonesia's democracy by declaring a state of emergency. The relevant minister (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, later to be president himself), however, refused to do so. Abdurrahman was impeached by the MPR in mid-2001, whereupon his Vice-President Megawati was elevated to the presidency (2001–4).

Megawati's presidency was notable for a restoration of the dignity of her office but little else. She had little competence for discharging the duties of a president and, it seemed, still less interest in anything but the status that came with it. Two fundamental developments took place during her presidency. The first was the decentralisation of the nation. A law passed in 1999 and implemented from 2001 introduced regional autonomy. Because of the fear of the nation breaking up, authority and budgets were not devolved to the level of provinces and special districts (of which there were 33) but rather to the level of regencies and cities, of which there were over 400 at the time, a figure that grew to 530 by 2009. Religion — along with defence,

¹³ A useful history of *Sabili* is in Miftahul Anam, 'Fatwa sesat "Media umat"', *MaJEMUK* no. 26 (Mei-Juni 2007), pp. 6–17. For an authoritative account of publishers associated with JI, see International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's publishing industry* (Asia report no. 147. Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 28 Feb. 2008).

¹⁴ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's publishing industry*, p. 2.

¹⁵ Sidik Jatmika, *Gerakan Zionis berwajah Melayu* (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, AH 1422/2001).

foreign relations, justice and monetary affairs — was one of the areas reserved for national-level determination, but (as we shall see) in fact much in the way of religious affairs came to be determined locally, especially with a national government unwilling to exercise its prerogatives in this area. From one of the world's most tightly controlled and centralised nations, Indonesia was now one of the most decentralised.

The second major development followed upon the al-Qaeda attacks in the United States in September 2001 and the subsequent American-led invasion of Afghanistan. Suddenly there were major demonstrations protesting the impending invasion in Indonesia's towns and cities, often led by Indonesians who had military experience in the earlier anti-Soviet *jihad* in Afghanistan. Down to this time, the contending understandings of Islam by Modernists and Traditionalists and political differences between them had frequently produced disagreement, tension and conflict. Now both of those schools of thought — represented above all by Muhamadiyah and NU, who were quick to label themselves 'mainstream' and 'moderate' — realised that they faced a common threat in more extremist versions of Islam, and began to cooperate with each other more than to bicker. Thus, animosities that went back to the founding of Modernist movements in Indonesia in the first years of the 20th century at last declined into a shared tolerance and opposition to extremism. Muhammadiyah and NU leaders were soon jointly declaring their opposition to imposing *shari'a* law in Indonesia and to the use of violence for religious purposes, and emphasising their commitment to the Indonesian national state (rather than the idea of a universal caliphate), in opposition to the demands of more extremist groups.¹⁶

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became president in 2004, the first president in Indonesian history to be directly elected by the people. He was reelected in 2009 for a further five years. With that direct election mandate, he might seem to have been in a strong position to provide leadership at national level, but decentralisation meant that the presidency's prerogatives were sharply restricted and much of Indonesian politics had become local politics. There were times when SBY (as he was commonly known) — who was not a man ever noted for decisive action — seemed nearly paralysed by the political constraints of his position. We will see below the rather remarkable extent to which he was prepared to surrender political initiative to religious leaders and unwilling to stand against religiously inspired violence.

¹⁶ For example, *JktP* online, 1 Jan. 2003. Other leading scholars also expressed such views.

Throughout these years, violent and extremist religious movements grew within Indonesia, as did the opposition to them.¹⁷ There was bloody Muslim-Christian fighting in Maluku (eastern Indonesia) which cost over a thousand lives in 1999. Churches were bombed in 11 cities across Indonesia on Christmas Eve in December 2000, including several in East Java, leaving 19 dead: this was the first significant attack by the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), although it was not yet identified as such by the authorities at that stage. The 2002 JI bombs in Bali were the deadliest, killing 202 people, most of them foreign tourists. In the wake of this violence, eventually even sceptics were obliged to accept that Indonesia had an Islamic terrorist problem. Extremists and their sympathisers continued to deny that this was so and preferred absurd ideas such as the Bali bombs having been secret CIA ‘mini-nuclear’ devices. A special police anti-terrorism task force known as Densus 88 (from Detasemen Khusus 88, Special Detachment 88) was formed with American and Australian support, and soon proved itself highly competent at detecting, disrupting, capturing and/or killing domestic terrorists. While these developments grabbed headlines both domestically and internationally, such terrorist violence remained a marginal phenomenon in the context of the larger society. It is that larger topic of the broader changes in Javanese society to which we now turn.

The *santri-abangan* balance

Just as we did before considering the history of *aliran* politics in the 1950s and early 1960s, we will try here to assess the balance of numbers between the two sides of Javanese society, after the Islamising transformations of Soeharto’s New Order. It must be said at the outset that, despite the introduction of social surveys done to international standards in Indonesia, the information we have on this issue in the early 21st century is hardly any better than half-a-century before. Over the past four decades I asked many people in Indonesia — and in the research for this Part of this book over the years 2003–11, I asked nearly everyone I spoke with — what they estimated the balance between *santri* and *abangan* to be. In recent years, such

¹⁷ A valuable brief overview is to be found in Noorhaidi Hasan, ‘Reformasi, religious diversity and Islamic radicalism after Suharto’, *Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities* vol. 1 (2008), pp. 23–51.

estimates were complicated by changing terminology. *Abangan* have become more likely to call themselves *kejawen* (Javanese, or Javanist, implying truly authentic Javanese identity), probably because of the implication that those called *abangan* were people without religion, whereas *kejawen* claim to have a coherent, but truly Javanese, set of beliefs. For the *santri* side, *abangan* or *kejawen* is sometimes taken to mean just followers of *kebatinan* sects rather than a broader social category. In the midst of these confusions, many had the impression that *abangan* were declining as a proportion of the Javanese population, but there were just as many shrewd observers who thought *abangan* had become a minority as who thought that they still constituted a majority. The term *santri*, too, seems to be changing — probably reflecting a growing view of Javanese society as more uniformly Muslim, so that *santri* is less important as a broad social category — and seems now to be used more frequently in its original meaning of a student at an Islamic school (a *pesantren*, the place of the *santri*).

Social surveys can shed some light on this issue but they are problematic. Colleagues at the State Islamic University (UIN) in Jakarta supported my research by adding specific questions to their annual social surveys over three years (2006, 2008, 2010).¹⁸ Comparison of these surveys suggests that the samples were not entirely consistent or as representative as one would wish, the number of respondents was small and they were probably influenced by knowing that questions were being put by people from an Islamic university.¹⁹

Nevertheless, it is useful to note that responses reflected a generally high level of self-identification and reported practice as observant Muslims. To avoid a spurious impression of accuracy, figures in the tables below are rounded to the nearest whole percentage.

¹⁸ The surveys were conducted by PPIM (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat, Centre for the Study of Islam and Society) at UIN Jakarta, at the direction of Prof. Jamhari Makruf.

¹⁹ As a control, in the 2006 and 2008 surveys, respondents were asked what party they had voted for in the national parliamentary election of 2004. The results showed inconsistencies between the samples. For example, in Central Java 18.1 per cent of the 2006 sample said that they had voted for Golkar and 6.5 per cent that they had voted for the Democrat Party; in 2008 these answers were given by, respectively, 7.4 and 26.4 per cent. In a national survey of some 1200 respondents, the numbers for the Javanese heartland were necessarily small, e.g., a total of around 600 across Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java in the 2010 survey.

Table 18 Self-identification as *santri*, *abangan* or other, as rounded percentages, 2006 survey²⁰

<i>Santri</i>	<i>Abangan</i> or <i>kejawen</i>	Other
57	23	20

Table 19 Frequency of observation of the five daily prayers, as rounded percentages, 2006 and 2010 surveys²¹

	Always/Routinely/Often enough	Rarely
2006	90	9
2010	89	9

Table 20 Frequency of fasting during Ramadan, as rounded percentages, 2006 and 2010 surveys²²

	Always/Routinely/Often enough	Rarely
2006	93	6
2010	94	5

A less formally sampled telephone survey by research colleagues in the regency of Kediri produced results which are consistent with the tables above.

²⁰ Survey conducted by PPIM (see note 18) in March 2006, with 398 respondents across Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java. The 'other' category seems to reflect people who were unsure of, or rejected, the terminology being used, rather than the *kebatinan* affiliation which such a category indicated in Tables 8 and 9 above, for a *kebatinan* follower could have identified him- or herself as *kejawen* in 2006; Cf. table 22 below.

²¹ Surveys conducted by PPIM (see note 18) in March 2006 and August 2010, with 398 and 584 respondents respectively across Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java. The categories used here bring together those who answered *selalu/rutin/sering/cukup sering* and *jarang*.

²² See the preceding note.

Table 21 Frequency of observation of the five daily prayers and fasting during Ramadan, as rounded percentages, 2007 telephone survey, Kediri²³

	Always/Very often/Often enough	Rarely/Very rarely
5 daily prayers	92	4
Ramadan fast	95	1

In another survey of 500 respondents in Jekulo (Kudus area) in 2004, 81 per cent of respondents said that they carried out the five daily prayers.²⁴

We can draw at least one reasonably sound conclusion from this survey data. Given the problematic nature of all social surveys regarding sensitive topics such as religion — where respondents may tell you what they believe and do, what they want you to think they believe and do, what they believe you want them to believe and do, what they believe the society regards as acceptable belief and behaviour, or combinations of these — we can conclude that even if the data above is not convincing in detail about actual levels of religious observance, it does tell us about the dominance of religious paradigms and expectations in Javanese society generally in the post-Soeharto era. As Micklethwait and Wooldridge put it when addressing the issue of ambiguities in religious statistics, ‘Would you confess to atheism in Texas, let alone Jeddah?’²⁵

The Kediri telephone survey provided another insight into the weakening significance of *santri-abangan/kejawen* distinctions, as can be seen in Table 22. Respondents were asked to self-identify along such lines. A

²³ The survey was conducted by Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi in February–April 2007, with valid responses from 287 respondents over the age of 17, 93.3 per cent of whom identified as ethnically Javanese. Suhadi Cholil was identified as a member of staff of Gadjah Mada University and Imam Subawi as a senior journalist at *Radar Kediri*, so no connection with an Islamic university was presented to respondents, unlike in the PPIM surveys cited in previous tables. The categories used here bring together those who answered *selalu/sangat sering/cukup sering* and *jarang/sangat jarang*.

²⁴ Achmad Ta’yuddin, ‘Masyarakat toleran: Budaya demokrasi dan partisipasi politik (Studi kasus perilaku politik umat Islam Jekulo Kudus pasca orde Baru)’ (Magister Agama thesis, Program Studi Agama dan Lintas Budaya, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2005), p. 51.

²⁵ Micklethwait and Wooldridge, *God is back*, p. 26.

Table 22 Self-identification as santri, abangan or other, as rounded percentages, 2007 telephone survey, Kediri²⁶

<i>Santri</i>	<i>Abangan</i> or <i>kejawen</i>	Other (national, neutral, ordinary, common, general)	No answer
52	7	24	13

majority called themselves *santri*, but about a quarter rejected the distinction and another 13 per cent declined to answer at all. Those who said that they were ‘other’ gave themselves descriptions such as ‘national’, ‘neutral’, ‘ordinary’, ‘common’ or ‘general’ Muslims. That is, they responded that they thought of themselves as Muslims but refused to be situated in the old dichotomy.

Earlier in this book, we have taken the number of Javanese going on the *hajj* to Mecca as another indication of the depth of Islamisation. That indicator for the post-Soeharto years is consistent with the other evidence for a dramatically deeper Javanese commitment to Islam, but the figures themselves are subject to a major constraint. That is, the Saudi Arabian government imposes a quota of 0.1 per cent of the domestic Muslim population for pilgrims from any country each year. For Indonesia, that means some 200,000, well below the number of aspirant *hajis* in an increasingly pious nation with more people able to afford the trip. So there has developed a years-long waiting list. By 2008, East Java’s quota (33,935 per year) was already taken up down to 2012 and in 2009 it looked like the years down to 2015 would be booked out.²⁷ In 2008, Yogyakarta’s quota for 2011 was already filling²⁸ and by 2011 it was filled until 2018.²⁹ In 2010, Central Java’s quota was just 29,435 but there was already a waiting list beyond that of nearly 80,000 people. As a consequence, there would be no

²⁶ Survey conducted by Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi, February–April 2007, with valid responses from 287 respondents over the age of 17, 93.3 per cent of whom identified as ethnically Javanese. The Indonesian terms used for ‘other’ were *nasional*, *netral*, *biasa*, *arwam* and *umum*.

²⁷ *Republika* online, 17 June 2009. Note that waiting lists were real, for they consisted of people who had already made bank deposits towards their costs. In 2004, each pilgrim had to pay about USD2,768 for a ‘full board and transport package’; *JktP*, 16 Dec. 2004.

²⁸ *Republika* online, 16 Oct. 2008.

²⁹ According to email from Arif Maftuhin, 2 June 2011, based on published Yogyakarta Department of Religion data.

further vacancies for pilgrims from Central Java until 2013.³⁰ Such figures make for a dramatic comparison with those in Tables 5 (showing 3,889 departures in 1956) and 14 (with 4,024 departures in 1974) above.

The pilgrimage data is persuasive, and whatever our lingering uncertainties about how robust survey data can be, it is reasonable to conclude that by the early 21st century, a strong sense of Islamic identity and widespread orthopraxy characterised much of Javanese society. Even if people who responded to the surveys exaggerated their Muslimness, their doing so would reflect the dominance of an Islamised identity and discourse in Javanese society. In the 1950s, *abangan* had no hesitation to express their lack of interest in prayer or fasting or the pilgrimage, even to show contempt for *santri* practice and belief; sixty years later, such views — where still held — were more likely to be concealed. Certainly those spending their money on the *hajj* may be regarded as responding to a much more dominant Islam. The next chapter explores further how dominant this Islamised identity and discourse have become in Javanese society.

³⁰ Ibid., 1 March 2010.

CHAPTER 8

An Islamising society

Quite unlike Javanese life in the 1930s to mid-1960s, in the post-Soeharto era, from politics to government to culture to social practices to literature to academic life, Islam is prominent. Forty years ago an academic seminar began with the presenter saying *selamat pagi* or *selamat sore* (good morning, good afternoon) but by the turn of the 21st century, a seminar must begin




Illustration 17 Interior of the Great Mosque (Masjid Al-Akbar) of Surabaya, begun in 1995 and opened in 2000

with *assalaamu'alaikum wa rahmatullahi wa barakatuh* (peace be with you, and God's mercy and blessing) or a similar pious phrase. Indonesian academic theses once opened with thanks to the author's family and supervisors; now they are more likely to begin with thanks and praise to God.

Politics and government

Islamic symbols and Islamic concepts are prominent in political affairs. Just as religious leaders are expected to comment on public matters in the United States, so also are they in Indonesia. Indonesian Islamic organisations were prominent in the demonstrations against the American invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001. MUI also took a prominent stand and thus lent a semi-official legitimacy to the demonstrations. In late September 2001 it called upon Muslims to wage Holy War (*jihad fi sabilillah*) if the United States and its allies should invade Afghanistan, while also condemning the al-Qaeda attacks of 11 September as a violation of Islamic values. MUI's head Din Syamsuddin, however, denied that *jihad* necessarily meant war. The MUI statement was criticised by the head of the Jakarta IAIN, Prof. Azyumardi Azra. NU and Muhammadiyah leaders condemned the American action (as did the Catholic bishop of Semarang) but urged people not to attack foreigners in Indonesia.¹

Anti-Americanism was (and remains) a staple in Indonesian public commentary, encouraged not least by United States military actions in majority-Muslim countries and the United States' own public religiosity. Masdar Hilmy observes that,

when uttered by ostensibly respectable mainstream politicians, anti-American sentiments are afforded a degree of social legitimacy. This in turn creates a space for militant and terrorist groups whose agendas rest on the belief that the United States poses a direct threat to Muslims in general and to Indonesian Muslims in particular.²

The 2003 American-led invasion of Iraq provided more fuel to this particular religious fire. *Sabili* magazine announced that there was a 'Crusader-Davidian' (i.e., Christian-Jewish) conspiracy at work here. George

¹ *JktP*, 26 Sept. 2001, 27 Sept. 2001, 9 Oct. 2001. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir opened a registry for *mujahidin* who wished to go to Afghanistan, but the government banned any volunteers going there; *JktP*, 5 Oct. 2001, 9 Oct. 2001.

² Masdar Hilmy, *Islamism and democracy in Indonesia: Piety and pragmatism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), p. 146.

W. Bush's prominent Christian religiosity, use of words like 'crusades' and practice of holding prayers at the start of meetings was exploited. Citing the spoof website www.whitehouse.org (the real Whitehouse website is www.whitehouse.gov) as its source — and no doubt persuading many of its readers that the information was thereby authentic — *Sabili* reported that on Sunday 23 March (just three days after the invasion began) Bush assembled his 'Prayer Team' of leading evangelists, greeted them as 'brothers in Christ' and went on to say 'Our mission in provoking a crusade against the Islamic *ummah* is now at an important juncture Let us take this moment to rise up and grasp this victory of Jesus!'³ MUI, Revivalist groups such as LDII and Islamist organisation such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI, discussed below) were prominent in anti-American demonstrations, but so were thousands of followers of NU and Muhammadiyah.⁴

Even political parties that have sometimes been depicted as 'secular' or 'nationalist' rather than religious — above all PDIP — have adopted religious symbols, either out of expediency or conviction. Megawati Sukarnoputri's campaign posters and banners typically depicted her wearing a diaphanous *kerudung* headscarf (but not a *jilbab*). The PDIP in Kudus in 2004 was recruiting *kyais* and *santris*, and its village branches were said to be frequently involved in running local mosques.⁵ In 2005 the PDIP-supported candidate for *Bupati* of Kediri (Ir. H. Sutrisno) and his PKB running mate distributed

³ *Sabili* cyber-news edisi 20, 22 Apr. 2003. I cannot rule out the possibility that the editors of *Sabili* themselves thought www.whitehouse.org to be the official Whitehouse website. In 2005 *Sabili* reported that American soldiers had thrown the *Qur'an* down a toilet, referring to a report published in *Newsweek*, after the latter had already admitted that the original report was wrong; *Sabili* cyber-news yr. 12 no. 23, 25 May 2005.

⁴ For example, *Tempo*I, 25 Jan. 2003, 26 Jan. 2003; *KmpsO*, 7 Apr. 2003. Indonesian ideas on this issue were not so different from some Americans' beliefs. A survey of 32,800 adult Americans in 2008 revealed that 32 per cent of Republicans agreed that 'George W. Bush was chosen by God to lead the United States in a global war on terrorism' and another 21 per cent said they were not sure, which was interpreted as most often meaning 'maybe', while 46 per cent said no; 4 per cent of Democrats answered yes, 7 per cent said maybe, and 89 per cent said no; Gary C. Jacobson, 'A tale of two wars: Public opinion on the U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq', *Presidential Studies Quarterly* vol. 40, no. 4 (Dec. 2010), p. 598.

⁵ Discussion with Noer Hartoyo (PDIP leader), Kudus, 28 March 2004. The leaders of the Islamist party PPP Himmatul Fu'ad, Masarah Bahtiyar and Noor Aziz commented that *abangan* no longer mattered in politics; discussions in Kudus, 28 March 2004.

prayer clothing to village women in the context of 'Ritual Prayer Study and Guidance Activities' (Kegiatan Bimbingan Belajar Salat) and distributed funds to mosque committees, village *pengajian* groups and suchlike, as well as to soccer clubs and other non-religious groups.⁶ PDIP announced in 2006 that it was establishing an Islamic proselytisation branch, which was welcomed by MUI, Muhammadiyah and NU leaders.⁷ PDIP in Kediri held a *Qur'an* study session (*pengajian akbar*) for 800 party cadres in 2007 and said that it hoped to be able to change the image of PDIP as a party of the *abangan*.⁸ PDIP's repositioning was of course a process, and the idea that it was really *abangan*-inclined remained in many minds. Nevertheless, it sought to be seen as 'wise, religious and nationalist' — as a PDIP candidate's 2009 banner in Yogyakarta claimed of himself. Such examples could be multiplied manyfold across PDIP, Golkar and other parties. The Islamist PPP (like other parties depicting themselves as Islamic in inspiration and aspirations) continued to present itself as religious, with banners saying, '*Bismillah* — choose the *ka'ba*' (the party's symbol on the ballot paper) — yet it consistently did poorly in elections.

There was no revival of *aliran* politics in the post-Soeharto period. It was routine for candidates for office from all political parties to pay court to *kyais*, to make gifts to their *pesantrens* and to seek opportunities to be seen — and if possible endorsed — by major Islamic leaders of all persuasions. When Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's new Democrat Party appeared in the 2004 election campaign, some competitors sought to paint it as un-Islamic, but the party insisted that it was both 'nationalist and religious' (*nasionalis dan agamais*). In a social setting in which most Muslim Javanese and all political parties were more self-consciously religious, devout Muslims needed no longer to vote for parties that labeled themselves piously Islamic, with the consequence that such parties fared badly at the polls. That did not mean — as some political analysts have claimed — that the political system was now secular.⁹ Rather, it reflected the fact that politics — mirroring the society more generally — was more uniformly religious.

⁶ Email from Suhadi Cholil, 6 Aug. 2005.

⁷ *Tempo*, 15 Nov. 2006.

⁸ *RK*, 30 Apr. 2007.

⁹ Struggling with this problem, Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle classify Indonesia's main parties as 'secular' (including Golkar, PDIP and Democrat), 'Islamist' (PKS and PPP) and 'secular parties linked to ... Islamic mass organizations', NU and Muhammadiyah (PKB and PAN). They argue that there is a 'trend to secularism' and conclude that 'secular political parties and secular politicians now dominate Indonesian politics'; see their article 'Muslim Indonesia's secular democracy', *Asian*



Illustration 18 PPP election rally, Kudus, March 2004; the youth's headband reads, 'In the name of God (*Bismillah*), I and my family vote for PPP'.

A revealing survey of people who regarded themselves as being of the Traditionalist 'NU family' (*warga NU*) was conducted in the election year 2009. They were asked whether their electoral choices were influenced by religion. Some 40 per cent said no, 24 per cent that they were influenced

Survey vol. 49, no. 4 (July/Aug. 2009), pp. 575–90. Similar categories are used in Bernhard Platzdasch, *Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the emerging democracy* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009). These are fine studies, but I remain unpersuaded that the analytical categories are helpful. For example, treating a party such as PKB, led by *kya*is of NU, as 'secular' seems to me highly problematic and the efforts of other parties (described above) to be seen as favourable to Islam seem to me something other than 'secular' politicking. In a 'postscript', Platzdasch observes (p. 333) that 'while previously "secular" parties have become more pro-Islam in recent years, Islamist parties have further downgraded their Islamism'.

to some degree, 12 per cent said they were influenced ‘enough’, 9 per cent responded that they were greatly influenced, and 9 per cent said not much.¹⁰ Asked about their party preferences in the national legislative elections of that year, these ‘NU family’ members divided as in the following table with regard to the parties with the largest followings among them and the two parties particularly closely associated with NU leaders.

Table 23 Electoral preferences of NU followers for major parties, 2009¹¹

Party	% supporting
Democrat	30
PDIP	19
Golkar	16
PPP	7
PKB	6
PKNU	2

Thus, among a group who regarded themselves as NU and of whom 45 per cent said that they were influenced, influenced enough, or very influenced by religion in their preferences,¹² only 7 per cent preferred PPP, with its Islamist agenda. Still fewer preferred PKB, the party born from NU and led by Abdurrahman Wahid, and even less supported PKNU, another NU-born party led by *kyais* in opposition to Abdurrahman. This does not, in my opinion, show that electoral politics was secularised, but rather that religious positioning and politicking was so ubiquitous that *santris* could comfortably choose from across the party spectrum. No party wished to seem unreligious. This also reflects both a generally individualistic voting pattern that is seen across Indonesia and the limited ability of supposedly ‘traditional’ leaders to influence how their followers vote — a matter to which we will return below when we consider the declining influence of Traditionalist *kyais*.

¹⁰ Figures are rounded to the nearest whole number; source as in the following note. The original terms used here were *tidak*, *berpengaruh*, *cukup*, *sangat* and *kurang*.

¹¹ Figures rounded to the nearest whole number. The survey was conducted by the research arm of *Kompas* newspaper (Litbang Kompas) in February–March 2009 and reported in *Kmps*, 1 Apr. 2009. There were 3,000 respondents across 33 provinces.

¹² Grouping together those who answered that Islam was *berpengaruh* (24%), *cukup* (12%) or *sangat* (9%) influential.



Illustration 19 PKNU election banner in Kediri, 2009,
emphasising the support of senior NU *kyais*

The more religious style of Javanese life was visible also in the ongoing connections between governmental institutions and Islam. Such links had been promoted during the Soeharto era and continued in the post-Soeharto period. Religious education continued to be compulsory in state and private schools. A new law of 2003 required schools to recruit teachers of religion and to provide places of worship according to the students' religious faiths. This was opposed particularly by non-Muslims as well as by former President Abdurrahman Wahid, who did so on the grounds that religion and the state should be separated, an idea with little traction in this Islamising environment. President Megawati signed the bill into law in July 2003.¹³

Government officials saw the promotion of Islamic piety as a proper task. This was notable in Kediri regency. We have referred above to the 'Ritual Prayer Study and Guidance Activities' in East Java promoted by Sutrisno. He set up local Ritual Prayer Study and Guidance Groups (Kelompok Bimbingan Belajar Sholat) while he was *Bupati* of Kediri regency (2000–10) to promote proper observation of Islamic prayer at grass-roots level. Many

¹³ *JktP* online, 20 March 2003, 17 July 2003.

of these groups had become inactive by 2006, which was said to be because by then they had mastered the way to pray.¹⁴ In that year, at Sutrisno's urging, the members of the Regional Executive Conference (Muspida) of Kediri — the senior level of administration — spent a month in optional nighttime prayer sessions from 0200 until the dawn prayer at the Kediri regency headquarters. Lesser officials and the surrounding populace were urged to join in.¹⁵ It was reported that these activities and a great growth in the number of mosques and prayer-halls had nearly eliminated more mystical forms of spirituality in the region.¹⁶

A link between police forces and Islamisation grew stronger in the wake of the JI bombing campaigns and other terrorist acts. Such a link, it was believed, would make it harder for extremists to paint the police as anti-Islamic, while promoting acceptable forms of the faith would create something of a barrier against extremist ideas. Moreover, the more that police personnel knew of Islam, the easier it would be for them to gather intelligence from and infiltrate extremist circles. The last point was emphasised by the head of the Surakarta police in 2005 when he declared that all his police personnel who were Muslim must learn how to recite the *Qur'an*. To that end, he arranged Qur'anic recitation instruction at Surakarta police headquarters each morning during Ramadan.¹⁷ In Surabaya, in 2009 the East Java police chief advised all Muslim female officers to dress in Islamic style (i.e., to wear the style of uniform incorporating the *jilbab*), told Christian women personnel to say a prayer on starting work, and every broadcast announcement was to begin with the Islamic greeting and invocation of blessing *assalaamu'alaikum wa rahmatullahi wa barakatuh*. This constituted a previously unprecedented religionising of the East Java police.¹⁸ The Yogyakarta police chief organised an inter-religious meeting in 2008, where he emphasised that in Western nations religion might be a private matter (a common stereotype, of course), but that was not true in Indonesia. In Indonesia, he said, religious issues were shared issues. He ordered his personnel to meet with religious leaders at least twice a week.¹⁹ The Yogyakarta police also arranged an all-day *Qur'an* study gathering

¹⁴ *MmK*, 3 Dec. 2006.

¹⁵ *MmK*, 11 Aug. 2006.

¹⁶ Email from Suhadi Cholil.

¹⁷ *JktP*, 16 Oct. 2005.

¹⁸ Email from Masdar Hilmy, 23 March 2009.

¹⁹ *KR*, 16 Apr. 2008.

for all police personnel, which was also attended by senior Yogyakarta administrators. All Muslim policemen and women were ordered to know and be inspired by the *Qur'an* in their work and life.²⁰ The head of the police anti-terrorist unit Densus 88 could be found among the dignitaries giving religious lessons during Ramadan.²¹ Religious promotion was found in the military as well. During a 'Mental Cultivation' session for the Central Java Diponegoro Division of the army, soldiers were admonished to take the Prophet Muhammad as their model; soldiers needed 'spiritual ablution' in these difficult times, they were told.²²

Even though the Indonesian constitution clearly reserves religious matters for national-level determination, devolved local governments sometimes introduced regional ordinances (*peraturan daerah* or *perda*) that looked like an attempt to introduce Islamic law (*shari'a*) at their level, it having been an utter failure at national level. Returning to the point above about the 'secular/nationalist' vs 'Islamic' political party distinction being moot, it is worth noting *en passant* that, as Robin Bush has shown, many such regulations across the nation were approved by *Bupatis* from the supposedly secular or nationalist parties such as Golkar or PDIP.²³ Only few such regulations were passed in Central and East Java or Yogyakarta. Most were in areas where the *Darul Islam* rebellion had been strong, which did not include the Javanese-speaking heartland. It is reasonable to guess that local politicians believed a wish for *shari'a* to be so much a part of local identity in former *Darul Islam* regions that supporting it was a way to win votes. The wave of such local regulations peaked in 2003 and declined thereafter.²⁴

In Javanese-speaking areas, governmental efforts to promote Islamisation exist, but they rarely take the form of local legislation. Moreover, where there are local ordinances, they are more likely to be of the nature of anti-vice rules, which gain the support of many non-Muslims as well as Muslims. Practicing Christians, Buddhists and Hindus are just as likely as Muslims to support the suppression of drunkenness, gambling, prostitution and the like. As we know, however, in the Javanese context this also amounts to a campaign against the *ma-lima* — gambling, opium (or marijuana) smoking,

²⁰ *KR*, 15 Apr. 2008.

²¹ *Bernas*, 10 Oct. 2007.

²² *KR*, 12 June 2008.

²³ Robin Bush, 'Regional sharia regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or symptom?' in Greg Fealy and Sally White (eds), *Expressing Islam: Religious life and politics in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008), p. 188.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 179, 183.

thievery, womanizing and drinking alcohol — the entertainments regarded as characteristic of the *abangan*. When Bantul regency (south of Yogyakarta) introduced anti-prostitution regulations in 2007 at the urging of ‘Bantul people who are religious’ (as the head of the Social Department put it), it undermined a thriving trade at south coast beach sites. Raids followed, flimsy local huts were broken up and women were arrested, not all of them prostitutes, it seems. Protests followed about the damage to local tourism, which in other circumstances governments are always anxious to support. Business fell off not only for the prostitutes but also for all the others, from pimps to food-stall traders, who depended on the local sex-tourist traffic. The Bantul government — which was dominated by PDIP and PAN — was accused of marginalising women, but it denied this and stood firm.²⁵

University student politics — so crucial a matter in Indonesia — was to a large extent Islamic student politics after 1998. Some senior figures claimed that younger people had become less interested in religion. The preacher and lecturer at UIN Yogyakarta Abu Suhud, complained that in his *pengajian* sessions, most attendees were either older people or women for whom it was a social activity that took them out of the house.²⁶ Nevertheless student politics in the university town of Yogyakarta (like elsewhere) was largely dominated by organisations defining themselves in terms of their Islamic identities, some of them linked to NU, some to Muhammadiyah, some to PKS, some with ideas like those of HTI, and so on. The GMNI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Student Movement) was the main exception to this pattern, with its commitment to Sukarnoist (vaguely leftist) ideology and links to PDIP.²⁷ The chair of the GMNI presidium for Yogyakarta, however, commented on the priority that must nevertheless be given to religion, for ‘in Indonesia, religion cannot be relegated to second place’.²⁸ A 2007 study of 100 campus mosque activists aged 18–23 in five universities in Yogyakarta suggested that their social and intellectual inspiration was largely from Revivalist, Islamist and Dakwahist sources. The Book of the Unity of God (*Kitab al-Tawhid*) by Wahhabism’s founder Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab and the thinking of the medieval

²⁵ *KR*, 6 Oct. 2007, 8 Oct. 2007, 9 Oct. 2007, 1 Feb. 2008, 2 Feb. 2008; *Bernas*, 8 Oct. 2007.

²⁶ Arif Maftuhin interview of Abu Suhud, Yogyakarta, 29 March 2008.

²⁷ This pattern was clear in interviews conducted by M. Irfan Zamzami with ten activists from student organisations at UIN Yogyakarta and Gadjah Mada University during August–September 2008.

²⁸ M. Irfan Zamzami interview of Andi Rahmat, Yogyakarta, 1 Sept. 2008.

scholar Ibn Taimiyya were the most prominent sources on theology used in these circles. Among admired figures few mentioned thinkers such as Abdurrahman Wahid or Nurcholish Madjid; far more popular were Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, some of the prominent Muslim televangelists and, predictably, Habiburrahman El Shirazy (the author of the popular novel *Ayat ayat cinta*, discussed below).²⁹

MUI and the state

The most notable semi-governmental institution supporting deeper Islamisation of the society is the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Islamic Scholars' Council), which has appeared several times above. We noted that it was created in 1975 as part of the Soeharto government's agenda to direct Islam, using religion as a form of social control. In the post-Soeharto period, it developed into a means for generally conservative — and sometimes quite radical Islamist and Dakwahist — views to influence the government. In the next chapter, we will see MUI playing a particularly active role in attempts to impose conformity on local Islam through its *fatwas*.

Before discussing MUI's role, however, it would be wise to remind readers of the meaning of a *fatwa*, which can be misunderstood. It is sometimes thought to be a kind of binding edict, but it is nothing more than an opinion on a matter of Islamic law, given by a qualified legal interpreter (a *mufti*).³⁰ Islam, like other religions — as Masdar Hilmy usefully reminds us — 'is a wide and open text; its manifestations are as diverse as its adherents' readings of the text'.³¹ Since there is a plurality of understandings of Islam, there is an equally wide range of interpreters, so that *fatwas* on the same point may dissent from one another. This gives rise to what has been called 'fatwa shopping', as people seeking guidance turn from *mufti* to *mufti* in search of a congenial ruling.³² In Indonesia, it has become conventional for

²⁹ Hilman Latief, 'Youth, mosques and Islamic activism: Islamic source books in university-based *halaqah*', *Kultur: The Indonesian Journal for Muslim Cultures* vol. 5 (2010), no. 1, pp. 63–88.

³⁰ See E. Tyan and J.R. Walsh, 'Fatwa' in P. Bearman *et al.*, *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (2nd ed.), vol. 2, p. 866.

³¹ Hilmy, *Islamism and democracy*, p. 30.

³² See Nadirsyah Hosen, 'Online fatwa in Indonesia: From fatwa shopping to Googling a *kiai*' in Fealy and White, *Expressing Islam*, pp. 159–73. *Fatwa* shopping is, of course, a practice as old as *fatwas* themselves, which arose very early in the history of Islam.

fatwas from MUI and the large organisations Muhammadiyah and NU to be thought particularly authoritative, although many other organisations and individuals also dispense *fatwas*. An example of the degree of dissent that can exist between *fatwas* was the profound disagreement between Muhammadiyah — which issued a *fatwa* declaring smoking to be forbidden on the grounds that it was tantamount to suicide, which is forbidden in Islam — and NU, which rejected this interpretation, and whose *kyais* seem to be almost universally addicted to tobacco and frequently rely on financial support from tobacco companies (notably in tobacco towns like Kudus, Kediri and Mojosoongo). NU pointed out that tobacco was unknown in the time of the Prophet so that there is nothing on the subject at all in the *Qur'an* and *Hadith*.³³

A *fatwa* can only have an element of compulsion if individuals, groups or organisations with compulsory capacity lend their powers of enforcement, and here we see a remarkable development in Indonesia. Particularly during the decade of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's presidency (2004–14), MUI — which *nota bene* has no constitutional standing — has been treated almost as if it were a legislative body. In opening MUI's national congress in 2005, Yudhoyono made the following extraordinary statement:

We open our hearts and minds to receiving the thoughts, recommendations and *fatwas* from the MUI and *ulamas* at any time, either directly to me or to the Minister of Religious Affairs or to other branches of government. We want to place MUI in a central role in matters regarding the Islamic faith, so that it becomes clear what the difference is between areas that are the preserve of the state and areas where the government or state should heed the *fatwas* from the MUI and *ulamas*.³⁴

In principle and in law, of course, there should be no 'areas where the government or state should heed the *fatwas* from the MUI and *ulama*', for

³³ There is much coverage of this in Indonesian newspapers of March 2010, e.g., *Republika* online, 15 March 2010; *Tempo*, 16 March 2010; *Kompas*, 16 March 2010. The Minister for Religious Affairs also criticised Muhammadiyah for this *fatwa*; *JktP* online, 17 March 2010. Kediri and Kudus appear often in this book. On the mutually beneficial cooperation between *kyais* and a cigarette company that dominates the local economy in Mojosoongo, see Suhadi, 'Kiai pondok dan cukong rokok di Modjosongo: Dilema institusi agama dalam ruang capital', *Antropologi Indonesia* no. 1 (Jan.–Apr. 2010), pp. 1–13.

³⁴ <http://www.presidentri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2005/07/26/370.html>, cited also in International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah decree* (Asia briefing no. 78. Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 7 July 2008), p. 8.

these have no legislative standing. The national head of the police was also at the MUI congress, as Yudhoyono added,

I am happy that the head of police is with us. The task entrusted by the *ulamas* to the government that I lead is not just to wipe out evil, but to fight all forms of evil and immorality. God willing and with the blessing and support of the *ulamas* — the various forms of wickedness and immorality, whether it is narcotics, gambling, pornography or pornographic actions, and other things connected thereto, we'll have to face up to firmly in order to save our future, to save our generation.³⁵

As we will see further below, this approach means that MUI *fatwas* have been upheld as if they had the force of law, not because they do, but because governments at the national and indeed lower levels (where there are also MUI local branches) have decided to treat them so. We may speculate why this is so — whether it arises from political calculation (that is, as a means to winning support in an increasingly Islamised society) or from personal piety, but we can hardly doubt that its implications are significant.³⁶ For MUI *fatwas* came to be regarded by local authorities, police, and vigilantes as rulings requiring and legitimising their enforcement. Among the general populace there is a widespread but mistaken belief that MUI is legally an arm of government.³⁷

MUI sought to encompass a broad range of Islamic opinions in its deliberations, with the result that it made itself open to influence not only by respected Traditionalist and Modernist *mufitis* but also by figures locally dubbed 'hard-liners', in the terms used in this book meaning the more extreme versions of Revivalists, Dahwahists and Islamists. Some of these were MUI members and others attended its sessions and influenced its deliberations. A few members of MUI are regarded as supporters of HTI, with its agenda of seeking a global caliphate and the imposition of *shari'a*

³⁵ <http://www.presidentri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2005/07/26/370.html>.

³⁶ The general issue of the relationship between governmental and religious authority is explored further in M.C. Ricklefs, 'Religious elites and the state in Indonesia and elsewhere: Why take-overs are so difficult and usually don't work', in Hui Yew-Foong (ed.), *Encountering Islam: the politics of religious identities in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, forthcoming). We will return briefly to this issue in Chapter 14.

³⁷ Arif Maftuhin noted this in a report covering Yogyakarta from January to March 2009. I am confident that this misapprehension can be found virtually everywhere in Java at the level of the general populace.

law. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's MMI was able to influence discussions, as also were DDII and its Saudi-sponsored ally the Rabitat al-'Alam al-Islami (Muslim World League).³⁸

A Constitutional Court decision of April 2010 confirmed the constitutionality of the state's integration with religiosity. Chapter 5 above referred to the Jakarta Charter, a form of words historically associated with the drafting of the 1945 Constitution that seemed (in the eyes of some) to oblige the state to impose Islamic law on all who professed to be Muslims. The 1945 Constitution continued in the post-Soeharto era in amended form, but Islamists failed in attempts to get the Jakarta Charter or something like it incorporated into the text of the Constitution itself. The Constitutional Court, while not asserting a state role in imposing *shari'a* law, did in some respects go beyond even the Jakarta Charter in its decision. The Indonesian law against blasphemy was being used to criminalise divergent sects of Islam and to validate the actions of Islamic vigilante groups, as we will see below. Human rights and pro-pluralism groups petitioned the Constitutional Court in October 2009, arguing that this law was inconsistent with constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion. MUI argued before the court in favour of the existing law, which was also supported by groups such as HTI and, predictably volubly, by FPI members who attempted to shout down those whose testimony they disliked. The Constitutional Court upheld the blasphemy law in April 2010, with one dissenting opinion.³⁹ Its reasoning included the following:

The state — consistent with the mandate of the Constitution — also has a responsibility to upgrade piety and noble character. The religious domain is a consequence of the acceptance of Pancasila ideology. In the Pancasila state there may be no activities that cause estrangement from religious standards and religiosity. Thus the state may not provide an opportunity to disgrace another religion.⁴⁰

³⁸ Noorhaidi Hasan, 'Reformasi, religious diversity and Islamic radicalism', p. 44; discussion with Prof. Azyumardi Azra, Jakarta, 4 Feb. 2008; ditto with Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said, *pesantren An-Nur*, Wonocolo, Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008.

³⁹ By Prof. Maria Farida Indrati, the Court's only female (and Christian) justice.

⁴⁰ The Constitutional Court ruling is reported at <http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=website.BeritaInternalLengkap&cid=3941>. The original phrases translated above are, '*Negara sesuai amanat konstitusi juga turut bertanggung jawab meningkatkan ketakwaan dan akhlaq mulia. Domain agama adalah konsekuensi penerimaan ideologi Pancasila. Dalam negara Pancasila tidak boleh diadakan kegiatan yang menjauhkan nilai religiusitas dan keagamaan. Jadi negara tidak memberikan peluang untuk menodai agama lain.*'

The Constitutional Court's decision thus seems to have sealed the integration of the state — implicitly at all its levels and in all its agencies — with religion. Now government was said to bear a responsibility to 'upgrade piety' and to prevent activities 'that cause estrangement from religious standards and religiosity' in general, that is to say, among the adherents of all religions, whereas the Jakarta Charter referred only to Muslims. That responsibility was not restrained by principles of freedom of religion. Moreover, since in the case of Islam it is only religious authorities — above all those in MUI — who can tell the government what Islam is, the court's decision seems to confirm that the state should act as the servant of religious authorities more than the other way around. At the time of this writing, the longer-term implications of this ruling are not yet clear. It need hardly be said that supporters of pluralism, freedom of religion and human rights more generally were dissatisfied with the ruling,⁴¹ but there is no appeal from decisions of the Constitutional Court. Nor, however, does the Court have its own powers of enforcement.

Women

As is true in most religious traditions when undergoing intensification, the position, rights, responsibilities and freedoms of women became a central issue.⁴² Javanese society was one of those where this was particularly acute, since Javanese women historically enjoyed greater freedom than in some other Islamic societies, inherited equally with males (contrary to Islamic inheritance law) and, if wearing traditional non-*santri* or indeed modern dress displayed more of their body (e.g., hair, neck, shoulders, arms, and their figure generally) than thought proper by many Dakwahists and Islamists. As we saw in the census data of 1930, polygamy (polygyny) had been historically at low levels among Javanese. As Islamisation progressed, these historical patterns became contested matters. The very idea of gender equality was unacceptable to many Dakwahists and Islamists. A speaker at a Ramadan meeting of HTI women in Yogyakarta denounced gender equality as a

⁴¹ For example, see *JktP* online, 20 Apr. 2010.

⁴² Valuable essays on contemporary Islamic women's issues may be found in Susan Blackburn, Bianca J. Smith and Siti Syamsiyatun (eds), *Indonesian Islam in a new era: How women negotiate their Muslim identities* (Clayton, Vic: Monash University Press, 2008).

Western secularist plot to undermine Islam and to destroy Islamic families (including polygyny), indeed a part of so-called 'Jewish protocols'.⁴³ A Javanese restaurateur named Puspowardoyo was a prominent promoter of polygyny, with four wives himself (the maximum allowed by Islamic law). His restaurants, called 'Wong Solo' (Solonese, i.e., Surakarta, people), had dishes coyly named to promote the joys of polygamous marriage (e.g., *juice poligami*), served by *jilbab*-wearing waitresses.

Opponents to gender equality and supporters of polygyny did not, however, monopolise public discourse. In 1998 an MUI *fatwa* declared that a woman could not be elected president. NU had issued a *fatwa* the previous year saying that there was no barrier in Islamic law to a female president, and NU activists and leaders quickly denied the authority of the MUI ruling.⁴⁴ But NU (typically) was not of one mind on the question. *Kyais* addressed the issue again in 1999, were sharply split over the matter and ended up with a complicated decision on the qualities required by *shari'a* for a president that simply avoided mentioning gender at all. Because all candidates for the presidency had shortcomings, they said, the candidate with the least of these should be picked and would then be regarded as a leader 'in emergency circumstances with *de facto* authority'.⁴⁵

Prof. Siti Chamamah Suratno, the dynamic head of 'Aisyiyah, the Muhammadiyah-affiliated women's organisation, rejects polygyny and patriarchal interpretations of the *Qur'an* in general.⁴⁶ Islamic law allows polygyny with up to four wives on certain conditions, including the fair treatment of them all. But 'Aisyiyah generally opposes polygyny, relying on *Qur'an* 4:129: 'You will never be able to treat your wives with equal fairness, however much you may desire to do so.'⁴⁷ On the grounds of this and a previous verse in the same *sura* of the *Qur'an* (4:3) that says, 'if you fear that you cannot be equitable [to your wives], then marry only one',⁴⁸ the Indonesian Minister of Religious Affairs Maftuh Basyuni declared that

⁴³ *Bernas*, 10 Sept. 2009.

⁴⁴ Bush, *Nabdlatul Ulama and the struggle for power*, p. 128.

⁴⁵ Ali Maschan Moesa, *Nasionalisme kyai: Konstruksi sosial berbasis agama* (Yogyakarta: IAIN Sunan Ampel Pres and LKiS, 2007), pp. 154–7.

⁴⁶ Discussion with Prof. Siti Chamamah Suratno, Yogyakarta, 21 March 2008. See also Feillard, 'Indonesia's emerging Muslim feminism'.

⁴⁷ *Qur'an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem*, p. 63.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

the government regarded Islam as essentially monogamous. It banned civil servants (in theory, at least) from practicing polygyny.⁴⁹

On the Traditionalist side, the rights of women have been championed by the Cirebon-based organisation Rahima: Pusat Pendidikan dan Informasi Islam dan Hak-Hak Perempuan (Centre for Education and Information on Islam and Women's Rights) led by Ky. H. Husein Muhammad. He is a Traditionalist *kyai* with command of the classical works of Islam, which he cites in support of women's rights. With regard to the wearing of the *jilbab*, for instance, he points out that this was originally a means to distinguish free women from slaves. Since there are no longer any slaves, there is no longer an obligation upon free women to wear the *jilbab*, although it is of course permitted to do so. Rahima seeks to empower women, including their role in the public realm.⁵⁰ Given that that is so, it is not surprising that Rahima has had to face hostility and even threats of violence from extremist quarters. Many other organisations are also active. Universitas Islam Indonesia in Yogyakarta, for example, held training sessions in 2008 for religious leaders (of all faiths) in order 'to create agents of change ... to ground (*membumikan*) values of gender justice within families'.⁵¹

Feminism has considerable support among Javanese women and seems to be particularly strong among younger and middle-aged women of Traditionalist background.⁵² Interviews of a few younger women in Kediri in 2008 showed that most supported the idea of gender equality and opposed polygyny. Several said that they would seek divorce if their husband wished to take a second wife.⁵³ In fact, divorce rates rose ten-fold across Indonesia from 1998 to 2009, which a senior Ministry of Religious Affairs official ascribed to women being more aware of their rights. Another factor, he

⁴⁹ *JktP* online, 28 June 2007. These statements were made in a hearing of the Constitutional Court. Muhamad Maftuh Basyuni was Minister 2004–9. He was born in Rembang in 1939 and is a graduate of Gontor and the Islamic University of Medina.

⁵⁰ See the *Rahima* website at <http://www.rahima.or.id>.

⁵¹ *KR*, 18 Apr. 2008.

⁵² Smith-Hefner, 'Javanese women and the veil', p. 403, makes the same observation.

⁵³ Interviews by Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi with Ratna M. (single 21-year-old student president at STAIN Kediri), 15 June 2008; Wahyu Eka Nugraha (single 23-year-old village teacher), 18 June 2008; Irma Lusiana Apriliani (single 21-year-old deputy head of NU students' organisation), 30 June 2008; Insiyah (married 46-year-old mother and deputy head of a village NU branch), 2 July 2008.

said, was cross-religious marriages often ending in divorce. But the most frequently cited reason for divorce in Islamic religious courts was polygyny.⁵⁴ This may, of course, reflect a rise in polygyny and/or an increase in women's rejections of it. The topic continues to be hotly debated.

Popular culture promoted Islamisation and, for those opposing polygyny, a particular problem was caused by a runaway best-selling novel entitled *Ayat ayat cinta* ('the love verses') published in 2004. This is by Habiburrahman El Shirazy, who was born in Semarang in 1976 and who, to the best of my knowledge, has only one wife himself. He studied in a *pesantren* in Demak, a *madrasah* in Surakarta and then at Islamic institutions in Cairo.⁵⁵ The novel charts the travails of a pious young Javanese, Fahry, who has been taught to be terrified of women. He goes to Cairo to study, where his great piety and other virtues make him attractive to several irresistible, emotional women. This is a sort of Mills-and-Boon style romantic novel, all weeping hero and swooning heroines, layered with saccharine piety. Fahry enters polygynous marriages with women who cannot resist him. Polygyny is justified on the grounds of the uncontrollable sexual appetites of men and the permissiveness of women, and is contrasted with the less acceptable practices of the West:

In the West, the matter of polygamy in Islam is questioned. They regard polygamy as degrading women. They prefer their daughters to have extra-marital relations and cohabit outside marriage with hundreds [*sic*] of males — even those who are already married — instead of living within a family officially polygamous. According to them, a whore who freely satisfies biological lusts with anyone at all whom she likes

⁵⁴ *JktP* online, 2 March 2009. It may also be relevant that age at first marriage is rising for both men and women; Smith-Hefner, 'Javanese women and the veil', pp. 411–2. Divorces constitute the main business before the Islamic religious courts in Indonesia. Their competence encompasses matters of family law and pious endowments (*wakaf*). For further information on these courts, see R. Michael Feener and Mark E. Cammack (eds), *Islamic law in contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and institutions* (Cambridge, MA: Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School, 2007), esp. Mark E. Cammack, 'The Indonesian Islamic judiciary' on pp. 146–69; Tim Lindsey (ed.), *Islamic law and society* (2nd ed. Annandale, NSW: Federation Press [2008]), esp. section IV on 'Islam and the law'; and M.B. Hooker, *Indonesian syariah: Defining a national school of Islamic law* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), esp. pp. 9–17.

⁵⁵ Information taken from the online *Tokoh Indonesia*: <http://www.tokohindonesia.com/daftar-tokoh/article/157-daftar-tokoh/2463-habiburrahman-el-shirazy>.

is better and more respectable than a woman who lives properly in a polygamous way.⁵⁶

Ayat ayat cinta was so popular that it beat out Harry Potter stories (pitched at a similar readership level) for citation as the most favorite novel in a Muslim women's magazine.⁵⁷ Habiburrahman was propelled to national fame and his book was made into a wildly popular film. He followed with further novels on similar themes uniting Islamic piety and love, which also proved to be material for television soap operas.

The Islamic literary world was not, however, without its challenges for those who supported polygyny, even from within Dakwahist circles. Ust. Cahyadi Takariawan is from Surakarta, a prolific writer and a member of the Advisory Council (*Majelis Syuro*) of the quasi-Islamist and Dakwahist party PKS, several of whose leaders are polygynists. Among Cahyadi's books is *Bahagiakan diri dengan satu istri* ('Make yourself happy with one wife', 2007), which promotes monogamy. This produced considerable controversy, particularly within PKS circles themselves both in Indonesia and among PKS's overseas branches, which are strong among Indonesian students.⁵⁸ Novels by the prominent woman writer Abidah El Khalieqy (b. Jombang, 1965, now based in Yogyakarta) promote anti-patriarchal views of women's roles within an Islamic frame of reference, even depicting sexual relations candidly, including homosexuality, pre-marital sex and women's pleasure in sex. One of her novels has been made into a controversial film, but her work cannot challenge the popularity of *Ayat ayat cinta*.⁵⁹

There is an important point to be made about this debate concerning the rights of women, and particularly polygyny: it is an Islamic debate. The proponents of polygyny base their views on interpretations of Islam. The opponents to polygyny are Islamic women's organisations and prominent Muslims who based their views on contending interpretations of Islam. There are no secularist voices in this debate — at least none of significance known to me. There is no audible voice saying that Islam is wrong, or irrelevant, or

⁵⁶ Habiburrahman El Shirazy, *Ayat ayat cinta* (Jakarta: Penerbit Republika; Semarang: Pesantren Basmala Indonesia, 2004), p. 151.

⁵⁷ *Majalah Muslimah* Jan. 2006, according to the dust jacket of *Ayat ayat cinta*.

⁵⁸ Arif Maftuhin interview with Ust. Cahyadi Takariawan, Yogyakarta, 15 Sept. 2007. The PKS leaders Anis Matta, Tifatul Sembiring and Zulkieflimansyah are polygynists, but the practice is not widespread in PKS circles.

⁵⁹ Tineke Hellwig, 'Abidah El Khalieqy's novels: Challenging patriarchal Islam', *BKI* vol. 167 (2011), no. 1, pp. 16–30.

should be ignored on issues of gender equality. The terms of the debate itself are thus consistent with the depiction in this book of Javanese society as one that is now suffused with Islamic discourse.

Women's dress naturally becomes an issue in such a context. Those who demand that women wear the *jilbab* and other forms of Islamic dress based their views on the *Qur'an*, particularly 24:31 and 33:59. The former passage reads,

Tell believing women that they should lower their glances, guard their private parts, and not display their charms beyond what [it is acceptable] to reveal; they should let their headscarves fall to cover their necklines. ... They should not stamp their feet so as to draw attention to any hidden charms.⁶⁰

The second reads, 'Prophet, tell your wives, your daughters, and women believers to make their outer garments hang low over them, so as to be recognised and not insulted.'⁶¹

Chapter 6 reported, based on Nancy Smith-Hefner's work, that in the 1990s the *jilbab* became a symbol both of Islamic identity and piety and of protest against Soeharto's New Order. Whereas in the 1970s, less than 3 per cent of female students at Gadjah Mada University wore the *jilbab*, by the turn of the century over 60 per cent did so.⁶² Muhammadiyah universities, UINs and IAINs required female staff to wear the *jilbab* and urged students to do so.⁶³

In the post-Soeharto age, however, in the midst of the general wave of Islamisation, the *jilbab* and other forms of 'Islamic' dress also became fashion items, particularly in the sophisticated environment of Jakarta and Yogyakarta, but not only there. Designers competed to bring out clothing that was Islamic yet still fashionable, trendy and alluring.⁶⁴ Models, media stars and musicians adopted more 'Islamic' styles.⁶⁵ There were '*jilbab* creation'

⁶⁰ *Qur'an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem*, p. 222; see also Abdel Haleem's notes on that page regarding the ambiguities in this passage and the *Hadith* traditions understood to mean that a woman should show only her face and hands to strangers.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 271.

⁶² Smith-Hefner, 'Javanese women and the veil', pp. 390, 397. This paper is the most authoritative study available of the *jilbab* issue.

⁶³ For example, Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta; *Solopos*, 27 Aug. 2003.

⁶⁴ For example, *KR*, 16 July 2007; *Bernas*, 29 July 2007, 7 Oct. 2007; *Surya*, 3 July 2009; *KR*, 26 July 2009.

⁶⁵ For example, the fashion models Okky Asoka (*KR*, 18 Sept. 2007) and Arzeti Bilbina (*JktP* online, 9 Aug. 2008).

competitions during Ramadan.⁶⁶ At Islamic fashion shows, attractive models demonstrated that one could wear Islamic styles including the *jilbab* yet remain beautiful in appearance. Different styles of wearing the *jilbab* were demonstrated and discussed, including something improbably called a 'sexy' *jilbab* (*jilbab seksi*).⁶⁷ There was a 'Miss *Jilbab* of East Java' competition in 2007 and in Yogyakarta a 'Top Model *Muslimah*' competition in 2007.⁶⁸

All of this was, of course, rather contradictory to the purpose of dressing modestly, so that women did not 'draw attention to any hidden charms', as the *Qur'an* has it. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's MMI denounced these departures from Islamic modesty.⁶⁹ Muhammadiyah University Yogyakarta took steps from 2006 to standardise female clothing, including *jilbabs*, worn on campus.⁷⁰ But fashion can have a logic of its own. It became possible to see young *jilbab*-wearing women in tight T-shirts and jeans, even sometimes bare midriffs, and even at Islamic universities. A campus *dakwah* group in Yogyakarta went out one Ramadan to give out complimentary *jilbabs* so that women would have the right sort to wear, but evidently found that they had too few takers, so also passed them out to the male drivers of pedicabs and parking attendants (presumably to take home to their wives).⁷¹ Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the *jilbab* was winning as a more Islamic form of female dress. The loose, diaphanous *kerudung*, which one might allow alluringly to fall from the hair and then replace with elegant aplomb, was now found rarely, and mostly among the older generation.⁷²

We should note, however, that Java's historical and spiritual traditions could still interfere with this particular aspect of Islamic formalism. An Islamic activist and founder of a *pesantren* in Yogyakarta, Ky. H. Zulfi Fuad Tamyis, joined a group pilgrimage (*ziarah*) to the grave of Java's greatest king, the 17th-century Sultan Agung. They were escorted by one Ky. Amir, who claimed the ability to communicate with Agung's spirit. Among the group was a woman wearing a *jilbab*, whom the spirit of Agung

⁶⁶ For example, *KR*, 6 July 2007, 5 Aug. 2007.

⁶⁷ *KR*, 18 Sept. 2007, 9 Sept. 2008.

⁶⁸ *Jawa Pos*, 21 Sept. 2007; *KR*, 3 Sept. 2007.

⁶⁹ Smith-Hefner, 'Javanese women and the veil', p. 414.

⁷⁰ *Bernas*, 23 Feb. 2008, 9 June 2008; *KR*, 24 June 2008.

⁷¹ *Bernas*, 5 Sept. 2008.

⁷² Prof. Siti Chamamah Suratno, head of 'Aisyiyah, has even found herself criticised by younger women for still preferring a *kerudung*, which she wears closely under the chin but which does not qualify as a *jilbab*; discussion with her, Yogyakarta, 21 March 2008.

reprimanded for her attire. Angrily, Agung demanded, 'Where did you become a Muslim? If the rule here is to wear the *kemben*, then you have to wear the *kemben*' — referring to the breast-cloth historically worn by women in a Javanese court, which leaves the shoulders and arms bare and the hair exposed, contrary to Qur'anic requirements. Zulfi Fuad accepted this on the grounds that there are different levels or stations of spiritual advancement (what Sufism calls differential *maqams*). 'So, according to me,' he said, 'for persons at the level of Sultan Agung, culture and tradition are just external appearances and what is more important to measure Islamness is what is inside the heart.'⁷³

A more widespread clash between older Javanese traditions and Islamisation arose over proposals for a new law to ban pornography and 'porno-actions', the latter including improper public exposure of the body and such activities as kissing in public. A clash with Javanese traditions was inevitable, for older forms of women's attire often left neck, arms, shoulders, and hair exposed, and the Javanese *kain* and *kebaya* could be very revealing of the female body form. This was particularly an issue with regard to dress worn in older forms of dance and drama in Java (as in Bali), including the most sacred sorts, such as the *bedhaya*, as well as less elevated art forms such as *tayuban* and the burlesque *kethoprak*. When this national law was first proposed in 2006, many performers of Javanese arts and those involved in modern theatre protested mightily. So also did various activist NGOs and those of generally liberal persuasions.⁷⁴ The bill was equally volubly supported by demonstrators — many of them women — from Islamist and Dakwahist organisations. MUI and other Islamic organisations supported it. Prof. Chamamah Suratno of Muhammadiyah's 'Aisiyiyah was among the prominent persons endorsing the bill.⁷⁵

The anti-pornography bill thus became a *cause célèbre* and was stuck for some time in a parliamentary committee while opponents tried to kill it. Eventually it emerged in much reduced form and became law in 2008. It was still widely seen as a legislative assault on artistic freedom, women's rights and traditional arts. The law defines pornography sweepingly as

⁷³ Arif Maftuhin interview of Ky. H. Zulfi Fuad Tamyis, Yogyakarta, 12 Jan. 2008.

⁷⁴ *MmK*, 6 March 2006, 26 March 2006; *JktP* online, 16 March 2006, 17 March 2006; Hatley, *Javanese performances*, p. 281.

⁷⁵ *Suara Muhammadiyah* online, 17 May 2006. Opponents of the bill, she said, were acting on behalf of the 'capitalist interests that dominate the entertainment industry in Indonesia'.

'pictures, sketches, illustrations, photos, speech, sounds, moving images, animations, cartoons, talk, bodily movements or other messages ... which contain obscenity or sexual exploitation which offend the moral norms of the society'. Among the law's declared purposes is to 'respect, protect and conserve artistic and cultural standards, customs and traditions, and religious rituals of Indonesian society which is pluralistic', which has been understood as an exemption for indigenous cultural traditions such as those of Java. But its paragraph 20 declares that 'The society may play a part in preventing the creation, spreading or use of pornography' and this seems to constitute a license for vigilantism by religious zealots, the sorts of people whom we will consider in Chapter 12.⁷⁶ In 2010 the Constitutional Court rejected appeals against the constitutionality of the law, but upheld the exemption for indigenous cultural traditions, literature, sports or scientific knowledge.⁷⁷

Popular culture

Islamisation activists have achieved considerable success in making religiosity trendy among the young. We noted above how, in the Soeharto period, Islamisation had become associated with progress and modernity; in the post-Soeharto period it was sometimes associated also with trendy fashion and youth culture. The fashionable *jilbabs* discussed above were symptoms of this. In a discussion about politics at the Jogokariyan mosque in Yogyakarta in 2009, a young man's T-shirt had the Javanese slogan, 'Want to be more trendy? — hey, get with *ngaji*!' (referring to *Qur'an* studies).

A good deal of this trendy Islam is associated with Sufism, which is experiencing a significant revival in Java and the rest of Indonesia, including in urban areas.⁷⁸ In 2008, 'Mahajava Production' put on a monthly 'Ashabul Cafe'⁷⁹ in Yogyakarta, which would provide a 'Momentum Romantic Spiritual Talktainment' (*sic* in English) with 72-year-old Prof. Amin Azis,

⁷⁶ The text of the law is available at <http://www.bpkp.go.id/unit/hukum/uu/2008/44-08>.

⁷⁷ *detikNews* online, 25 March 2010.

⁷⁸ See Julia Day Howell, 'Modernity and Islamic spirituality in Indonesia's new Sufi networks', in Martin van Bruinessen and Julia Day Howell (eds), *Sufism and the 'modern' in Islam* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), pp. 232–40; idem, 'Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic revival'.

⁷⁹ The name comes from the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus, the Men of the Cave (*ashab al-kahf*) found in *Qur'an* 18:9–25.



Illustration 20 *Qur'an* study as trendy: T-shirt in Yogyakarta, 2009

the author of a book entitled *The power of Al Fatimah*.⁸⁰ Others would join him in a discussion of Sufism, accompanied by love poetry and songs.⁸¹ Sufi pop music was also a speciality of the Surabaya group Dewa which claimed inspiration from the medieval Sufi masters Al-Hallaj (d. 922) and Jalal al-Din Rumi (d. 1273).⁸² The band Ungu was another promoting piously Islamic music, its new album for Ramadan 2008 entitled *I and my God (Aku dan Tuhanku)* being more influenced, so said the bass player, by the style of the British rock band Black Sabbath (one cannot avoid a certain sense of irony here).⁸³ Emha Ainun Najib, whose theatrical and musical creations of Islamic inspiration were discussed in the Chapter 6, developed a Sufi-

⁸⁰ Published by Pinbuk Press, Jakarta, 2008. The *Fatihah* is the first brief verse of the *Qur'an* and part of the obligatory daily prayers, praising God and asking for his blessing and guidance.

⁸¹ *KR*, 26 Apr. 2008. Amin Azis was born in Aceh and gained a PhD in agricultural economics from Iowa State University; *KR*, 4 May 2008.

⁸² *Suara Muhammadiyah* online, 28 Apr. 2005.

⁸³ *Tempo*, 23 Aug. 2008.

style movement called Maiyah. This runs popular religious study sessions across Java and elsewhere in Indonesia, accompanied by Emha's musical group Kiai Kanjeng, with its combination of Javanese *gamelan*, other folk instruments and modern instruments. Timothy Daniels describes Emha opening Maiyah events 'with prayer, Qur'anic recitation, and short talks on a variety of religious topics, delivered with a great amount of wit and humor which often has those present bursting into laughter'. He leads the audience in *slawatan* and *dhikr*.⁸⁴

The popular music world of *dangdut* split in the post-Soeharto era on lines of piety vs impiety. We noted in Chapter 6 how Rhoma Irama led the development of Islamised *dangdut*. In 2003 there burst onto the scene a lady from Pasuruan called Inul Daratista, whose raunchy dancing, prominently featuring 'drilling' movements of her hips that seemed anatomically improbable, was very far from Islamic modesty. Emha defended her with the memorable comment that 'Inul's bottom is the face of all of us'. Rhoma Irama, however, was scandalised and the East Java MUI declared her performance to be pornographic. This episode was among those that inspired Islamising activists to press for the anti-pornography law described above.⁸⁵ Another young *dangdut* singer and actor, Dewi Persik — also from East Java, in this case Jember — was accused of being pornography in the flesh. It was reported that two mayors of West Java cities and the regency of Probolinggo banned her from performing — a suppression of artistic freedom that led to a critical editorial in the *Jakarta Post*. In 2008 she gave in, apologised to the whole country, and promised to mend her ways.⁸⁶

The drive for deeper Islamisation was targeted not only at those young people who might be too enticed by modern styles — particularly among city dwellers — but of course also at the rural villagers still committed to *abangan* ways. In Gunung Kidul, Ann Dunham studied the village of Kajar

⁸⁴ Timothy Daniels, *Islamic spectrum in Java* (Farnham, Surrey, and Burlington VT: Ashgate, 2009), p. 138. Daniels's extensive account of Maiyah is on pp. 134–55. On p. 147, Daniels — who writes very sympathetically of this movement — compares it to 'liberation theology' movements in Latin America and the Philippines.

⁸⁵ Jennifer Lindsay, 'Pomp, piety and performance: *Pilkada* in Yogyakarta 2005' in Maribeth Erb and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto (eds), *Deepening democracy in Indonesia? Direct elections for local leaders (Pilkada)* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 219–20; Daniels, *Islamic spectrum*, pp. 88–92; Hatley, *Javanese performances*, p. 250.

⁸⁶ *JktP*, 16 Apr. 2008.

over 1977–91, which she found to be ‘a strongly *abangan* cultural area’ and where there was ‘no village mosque’.⁸⁷ When Robert Hefner went to a nearby village in Gunung Kidul in 2003, however, he saw ‘a full-blown Islamic resurgence’ which was the fruit partly of government activities, especially the provision of religious education in schools, but above all the consequence of Islamisation efforts led by NU and Muhammadiyah.⁸⁸ Newspapers from Java are full of reports of religious activities at local level, particularly during Ramadan — *pengajian*, *mujahadah*, *dhikr*, observations at sacred graves, *Qur’an*-reading competitions, breaking of the fast together, and much more, led by *kyais* or other religiously educated persons. In rural villages, these are overwhelmingly of the Traditionalist style and often Sufi in style and content. The engagement of the local community makes these activities markers and welders of village harmony and thus powerful agents supporting conformity of belief and practice. As we will see when considering remaining *abangan*-style and *kebatinan* activities in Chapter 11, such Islamic activities do not have a monopoly at village level, but they are powerful, ubiquitous and (in my view) constantly winning ground.

Business

Banking and other forms of commerce also grew more obviously Islamic in style. We have already discussed the fashion industry above. Banking according to Islamic rules — which means essentially the banning of interest — began to grow in the early years of the 21st century.⁸⁹ Bank Muamalat Indonesia (Indonesian Commercial Transactions Bank) was the pioneer, having been established in 1991. It was followed in the new century by *shari’a*-compliant branches of established conventional banks. The collection of *zakat* also increased, with several governmental and private organisations being active in receiving the donations, among them the PKS-linked PKPU (Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat, Post of Justice and Care for the *ummah*). In 2001 the government made *zakat* contributions tax-deductible (in a country

⁸⁷ Dunham, *Surviving against the odds*, pp. 116–7.

⁸⁸ Robert Hefner, ‘Afterword: Ann Dunham, Indonesia and anthropology — a generation on’ in *ibid.*, pp. 340–1.

⁸⁹ For example, *KR*, 2 Aug. 2008, reported that *shari’a*-compliant banking in Yogyakarta had grown over 40 per cent over 2001–7, and as a consequence such bank branches were facing staff shortages.

where, however, collection of personal taxes is notoriously lax, inefficient and corrupt).⁹⁰

Businesses sought to use Islam as a promotional tool. A few examples will suffice here.⁹¹ During its nation-wide Ramadan 'roadshow' in 2007, Astra Motors came to Semarang and Yogyakarta and offered a new Honda car model at a special price. The 'roadshow' also encompassed religious advice from the popular young *ustadz* H. Jefri Al Bukhori (b. 1973), also known as UJE, as well as presenting television soap-opera stars, the singing of devotional songs (*nasyid*) and local bands.⁹² In a similar vein, the mobile phone company Telkomsel promoted its phone-cards during the 2007–8 *hajj* season. Anyone who used these cards while on the pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia entered a draw to cover their *hajj* costs. Twelve winners received USD5,000 each.⁹³ Companies themselves frequently honoured Islamic obligations. Kediri's giant tobacco company Gudang Garam — the financial pillar of local *kyais* — organises *pengajian* during Ramadan for its employees who, however, have to keep working while the lessons are delivered. The company also distributes symbolic *zakat* alms at the end of Ramadan to several thousand poor locals, each of whom gets IDR10,000 (about USD1, hardly enough to transform their circumstances significantly).⁹⁴

Publishing blossomed in the new atmosphere of freedom, and religious publications — of all world faiths as well as 'new age' spirituality and multiple 'secret-to-success' manuals — occupied prominent sections in book stores, but publishers and booksellers also found themselves the target of Islamically inspired vigilantism. The police were only rarely prepared to confront such actions. One example of such vigilantism was a campaign by organisations such as MMI against the new Indonesian version of *Playboy* magazine carried out by 'sweeping', i.e., invading bookshops to remove and destroy copies, but often finding that no bookshop dared to stock it.⁹⁵ In 2008 was published

⁹⁰ On *zakat*, see especially Amelia Fauzia, 'Faith and the state: A history of Islamic philanthropy in Indonesia' (PhD thesis, University of Melbourne, 2008), which will appear as a book in the near future.

⁹¹ Several papers in Fealy and White, *Expressing Islam*, analyse the post-Soeharto commercialisation of Islam.

⁹² *KR*, 7 Oct. 2007.

⁹³ *KR*, 'Semarang Plus' section, 22 March 2008.

⁹⁴ *RK*, 13 Nov. 2003, 23 Nov. 2003.

⁹⁵ Photos in the Indonesian version of *Playboy* were more modest than in the American edition, but that did not inhibit vigilantes. The editor was eventually arrested

Soemarsono's book *Revolusi Agustus* about the 1948 Madiun uprising, written with the aim of defending the PKI's interpretation of that critical episode, as noted in Chapter 3 above. Soemarsono's account was serialised in August 2009 in the newspaper *Jawa Pos*, whose Surabaya headquarters then became the target of a demonstration of 200 people calling themselves the Anti-Communist Front. This Front consisted of the East Java FPI, East Java MUI and other Islamic activist groups, a veterans' group and others. Soemarsono's book was burned — and quickly thereafter became difficult to find in bookshops. The chief editor of *Jawa Pos* thanked the demonstrators for their visit and for their 'correction'.⁹⁶ Many devout Muslims indeed continue to regard Communism as an ever-present threat to Indonesia and to Islam, and can be mobilised by anti-Communist appeals.

This atmosphere promoted self-censorship by publishers and distributors regarding publications that were regarded either as leftist or anti-Islamic. In 2001, the leading publisher and bookseller Gramedia, with a large chain of bookshops across the country, removed books by Pramoedya Ananta Toer in the face of threats from the Gerakan Pemuda Islam (Islamic Youth Movement).⁹⁷ Yogyakarta police conducted a pre-emptive confiscation of leftist books — all of them perfectly legal publications — from shops and street-stalls around the same time so that anti-Communist groups couldn't destroy them in 'sweeping' raids. The police even suggested that private citizens who owned such books should hand them to the police for safe-keeping. They did not, however, explain why they were not protecting the book sellers instead.⁹⁸

While English-language versions of some of the major atheist books of the age could be found in a few outlets in Indonesia — those by Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens and others — big publishers were not prepared to publish Indonesian-language translations. Quite apart from the risk of attacks by vigilantes, this must have been at least partly a commercial judgment, for anti-religious books are unlikely to sell well in

in 2010 and sentenced to two years' imprisonment for publishing pornography. He was acquitted of all charges by the Supreme Court and released in 2011. For some examples of coverage, see *RK*, 31 Jan. 2006; *Tempo*, 8 Apr. 2006; *KmpsO*, 9 Oct. 2010; *JktP* online, 24 June 2011.

⁹⁶ *JP*, 3 Sept. 2009.

⁹⁷ *JP* online, 3 May 2001. Gerakan Pemuda Islam had its origins as an affiliate of Masyumi in the 1950s, but has carried on without specific party affiliation since.

⁹⁸ *JP* online, 11 May 2001.

such a thoroughly religionised society,⁹⁹ where even the Constitution declares that the first foundation of the state is *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* ('belief in the one God', the first principle of the *Pancasila*). Gramedia thought about translating Dawkins' *The God Delusion* but decided that it would be too provocative. The smaller publisher Serambi, which has rather specialised in religious books, also decided that Indonesia was not yet ready for *The God Delusion*. The small Yogyakarta press Pustaka Pelajar took the risk of publishing an Indonesian-language version of Sam Harris's *The end of faith* but it attracted little attention. Certainly this and the few such works from other small publishers could not compare commercially with *Ayat ayat cinta* or, as the *Jakarta Post* pointed out, with Laksmi Pamuntjak's *Jakarta Good Food Guide*.¹⁰⁰ It was probably possible for a very few atheistic, anti-religious or specifically anti-Islamic works to be published by small presses in small print runs only because most religious zealots who would like to burn such books did not know of them, for they read nothing much other than Islamic devotional literature and magazines like *Sabili*.

Lack of interest on the part of many Islamic activists for older Javanese culture — and probably their weak command of the Javanese language — surely explains their failure to erupt furiously at the republication of three anti-Islamic Javanese books originally written in the 19th century.¹⁰¹ The original versions of these works seem all to have been composed in the Kediri area, and depict the Islamisation of the Javanese as a catastrophic civilisational mistake. *Babad Kedhiri*, written in 1873, presented a supposedly secret history of the triumph of Islam in Java, which is said to have relied on the grossly anti-filial treachery of the first Sultan of Demak and the *walis* who surrounded him. Here appears one Sabda Palon, the advisor of the king of Majapahit, who urges him to persevere in his *Buda* faith, and who is revealed to be in fact the god-clown Semar, the supernatural protector of all Javanese. *Suluk Gatholoco* — frankly rude, obscene and hilarious — was written by 1872 at the latest. It mocks Islam in many ways, even

⁹⁹ There are a few, very low-profile, atheists in Indonesia, keeping in touch with each other mainly via the Internet and avoiding attention as much as possible. See *JktG* online, 24 Sept. 2010.

¹⁰⁰ *JP*, 29 May 2008.

¹⁰¹ The original books are described in Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese society*, pp. 181–211. Their republication is also discussed in idem, 'Religion, politics and social dynamics in Java: Historical and contemporary rhymes' in Fealy and White, *Expressing Islam*, pp. 132–3.



Illustration 21 Reprinted versions of *Suluk Gatholoco*, 2005–7

reinterpreting the Confession of Faith as a metaphor for sexual intercourse. The third book, *Serat Dermagandhul*, combined *Babad Kedhiri*'s revisionism and *Gatholoco*'s obscene hilarity. It prophesied that after 400 years (i.e., in the 1870s) Javanese would devote themselves to modern learning and become truly Javanese again, and would convert to Christianity.

These extraordinary books could still be found during the Sukarno era,¹⁰² but were banned during the New Order. In 2005 and 2006, however, *Dermagandhul* was republished in Surakarta and Yogyakarta by ostensibly different authors,¹⁰³ in both cases *noms de plume* of a single writer who prefers anonymity, fearing that the legal ban on publication might still be in place. The book's original prophecy that after 400 years Islam would cease to

¹⁰² I do not know the full publication history of these books, but do have copies of Tāṇḍanagara, *Darmagandhul: Tjaritané adege negara Islam ing Demak beḍabé negara Madjapahit kang salaguné wiwité wong Djawa ninggal agama Buddha bandjur salin agama Islam: gantjaran basa Djawa ngoko* (7th printing; Solo: Penerbit "Sadu-Budi", 1961); and Prawirataruna, *Balsafah Gaṭolotjo: Ngemot balsafah kawruh kawaskiṭan* (Solo: Penerbit S. Mulija [1958]).

¹⁰³ Nurul Huda, *Tokoh antagonis Darmo Gandhul: Tragedi sosial historis dan keagamaan di penghujung kekuasaan Majapahi* (Yogyakarta: Pura Pustaka, 2005); Sigit Hardianto, *Ramalan ghaib Sabdo Palon Noyo Genggong* (Solo: Kuntul Press, 2006).

claim the loyalty of Javanese was changed by the publisher to 500 years¹⁰⁴ (which means c. 1978, thus leaving the predicted conversion away from Islam still behind schedule as well as utterly nonsensical). *Suluk Gatholoco* was republished at least three times in 2005 and 2007.¹⁰⁵ The Siti Maziyah version in Indonesian omits the most offensive passages. The Joko Su'ud Sukahar version offers a summary in Indonesian, including the offensive passages. It also has a series of comments by various luminaries who generally say that this is a book best reserved for reading by scholars and the culturally sophisticated. The Wawan Susetya version is a light-weight, historically confused Indonesian-language account, with the really offensive sections explained — utterly bizarrely — as a form of *dakwah*; this silliness leads to the most objectionable parts of *Gatholoco*, such as the sexual interpretation of the Confession of Faith, being published. In 2006, *Babad Kedhiri* was also reprinted in Kediri by collaboration between the original publisher's descendants and the local government, the Javanese text being accompanied by a high-quality Indonesian translation.¹⁰⁶ We may be confident that no one in the government had read this account of the *walis*' perfidious conduct in Islamising Java. The most important thing to note about the republication of these anti-Islamic books is that no one from the more zealous end of Islamic activists took any notice at all. There was simply no reaction. The first printing of *Babad Kediri* of 2,000 copies is said to have sold out¹⁰⁷ — probably collected by good citizens of Kediri who put it on their shelves without reading much of it. I do not know about the commercial fate of the others, which were undoubtedly brought out in small print runs.

Superstitions and 'science'

Javanese culture has long been rich in superstitions, and even these seem to have become more Islamised. Islam, like other faiths, does not doubt that there are miracles that reveal God's powers in the world. As with any other

¹⁰⁴ Discussion with the writer, who requested anonymity, Yogyakarta, 12 June 2007.

¹⁰⁵ Siti Maziyah, *Kontroversi Serat Gatholoco: Perdebatan teologis penganut kejawaen dengan paham puritan* (Yogyakarta: Warta Pustaka, 2005); Joko Su'ud Sukahar, *Tafsir Gatolotjo* (Yogyakarta: Narasi, 2007); Wawan Susetya, *Kontroversi ajaran kebatinan* (Yogyakarta: Narasi, 2007).

¹⁰⁶ Purbawidjaja and Mangunwidjaja, *Serat Babad Kadhiri: Kisah berdirinya sebuah kejayaan* ([transl. Siti Halimah Soeparno]; pengantar Edi Sedyawati; Kediri: Boekhandel Tan Khoen Swie, 2006).

¹⁰⁷ Discussion with Pak Kusharsono, Kediri, 28 Nov. 2007.

religion, however, the authenticity or orthodoxy of a particular phenomenon may be debated. We will see below that many of the historically important art forms of Java that were thought to have spiritual powers are losing those spiritual meanings in the modern world and being degraded to mere entertainment, where they face tough competition from more modern diversions. So it is possible that for many Javanese something of a spiritual or superstitious vacuum opens up in these circumstances, which Islam offers to fill. This is not a case of superstitions disappearing, but rather of them becoming more Islamised. This is particularly true of Muslims of Traditionalist background.

In Yogyakarta, abstract paintings by Ky. H. Muhammad Fuad Riyadi were displayed one Ramadan. He explained that he painted when, having done *dhikr*, he achieved a spiritual state in which he wished to spread love to all of God's creatures. His paintings consequently bore spiritual energies that inhered in them and which could spread blessings to others. Indeed the owner of one of his paintings might be 'protected from black magic' by this power. It was difficult for people to perceive this power, he said, but — reflecting some of the ecumenical style of much Javanese thought — if the Dalai Lama were to see one of his paintings he would 'surely feel the aura'. If his paintings were transported from one place to another, they had to be tightly wrapped and prayed over so as not to be struck by 'evil frequencies' en route.¹⁰⁸ Natural calamities — of which Java, like the rest of Indonesia, has a surfeit — and illness were readily interpreted as God's judgment on humankind, requiring moral improvement and mass *pengajian*.¹⁰⁹ In Cirebon, locals spotted what they thought to be a meteorite hitting the ground. Remarkably, when this object landed, smelling of sulphur, it melted in the shape of the word 'Allah' in Arabic script. The object turned out, however, to be not a meteorite but probably waste from a nearby sulphur factory.¹¹⁰

More remarkable than the persistence of Islamised superstitions is the spread of Islamised versions of science. We noted in discussing the 1970s how Modernists such as Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Osman Raliby depicted Islam as fundamentally rational and expressed the view that it

¹⁰⁸ *KR*, 14 Sept. 2009. Fuad Riyadi was the 38-year-old head of a *pesantren* in Pleret, Bantul.

¹⁰⁹ For example, *KR*, 13 Feb. 2008.

¹¹⁰ *Tempo*, 19 Aug. 2010; *JktP* online, 23 Aug. 2010. Other reports from around the Islamic world of such supposed signatures of God (*lafaz Allah*) are found on the Internet. Miracles from all faiths may be found there, of course.

should be understood in ways consistent with science. Osman and Sjafruddin accepted that scientific knowledge could elucidate the eternal truths of the *Qur'an*,¹¹¹ but by the late 20th and early 21st centuries it was becoming more common to think the other way around, to understand science in ways consistent with Islam.

A prominent proponent of Islamised science (or perhaps 'sciencised' Islam) is Agus Mustofa. He was born in 1963 in Malang, where his father was a Sufi teacher of the Naqshabandiyya-Khalidiyya, and did a degree in nuclear physics at Gadjah Mada University. Thereafter he worked as a journalist with *Jawa Pos* for 14 years. Because of his journalistic networks, he probably gets more press attention than would otherwise be the case. He left his newspaper job and became a writer on Islamic subjects, hoping to meld mysticism and modern scientific ideas. He employs ideas from physics, astronomy, medicine or any other discipline to approach the *Qur'an*, which is, he believes, the source of all knowledge. He churns out an endless stream of books, which he publishes himself. He also conducts individual therapy sessions at his (rather grand) house.

His ideas are controversial and attract opposition from other Muslims. 'Hard liners', he said, sometimes demand that his books be withdrawn or object to his titles. One of his books is entitled *Bersatu dengan Tuhan* (To become one with God), which raises questions of orthodoxy, for union with a transcendent God who does not enter into his creation is not an acceptable idea to most orthodox thinkers. For Agus Mustofa, this can be explained and proved by mathematics. All of being is one and that is God, he says. 'We are a part of Allah ... Everything exists within God.' We are the number 1, or 1,000, or any other number, but God is infinity. Any number divided by infinity results in zero, which shows that without God we are nothing,

¹¹¹ Similar views were set out in Suryadi W.S. 'Prestasi kaum Muslimin dalam sejarah perkembangan wayang', in Jabrohim and Saudi Berlian (eds), *Islam dan kesenian* ([Yogyakarta:] Majelis Kebudayaan Muhammadiyah, Universitas Ahmad Dahlan, Lembaga Litbang PP Muhammadiyah, 1995), pp. 148–9, where he says that *Qur'an* 52 on there being fire below the earth (in fact a description of the fires of Hell) could now be understood as describing oil and natural gas, and 57:25 on 'iron with its mighty strength' was an account of magnetism, which produced electricity. Suryadi says that it is ironic that natural gas and electricity were discovered by non-Muslims even though Muslims were told of them in the *Qur'an* 1,400 years ago. Olivier Roy, *The failure of political Islam* (transl. Carol Volk; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 102–3, notes comparable views more widely in the Islamic world.

he says. As proof of anything this is nonsense. He uses a Kirlian camera¹¹² to photograph people's auras. Only Muslims can achieve a white aura, he believes, because only they believe in the absolute oneness of God. All of this, he claims, is empirical and rational — although less gullible observers might speculate about the balance among science, piety and salesmanship. When pressed by my colleague Masdar Hilmy, Agus Mustofa agreed that in order to be persuaded by this kind of thinking one must already believe in it.¹¹³

It is not difficult to find others who claim that the source of all knowledge and all technology is the *Qur'an*, even that it offers scientifically demonstrable medical benefits. Dr Muhammad Usman, a Surabaya HTI leader from the Pharmacy Department of Airlangga University's medical school and former head of the Surabaya Muhammadiyah Hospital, and Joko Sarsetyoto who teaches at the Surabaya Institute of Technology and the Navy Technology College, and no doubt many another scientist, medical expert and technologist, shared the view that all knowledge is found in the *Qur'an* and that all the technology and scientific knowledge in the world comes from just one source, the ways of God (*sunna Allah*).¹¹⁴

Prof. H. Muhammad Fanani of the Medical Faculty of Sebelas Maret University in Surakarta reported computerised (and thus authoritative, it is implied) evidence that listening to recitations of the *Qur'an* reduced muscle tension in patients more effectively than hearing non-*Qur'anic* materials, even if the patient did not understand the Arabic. Hence, Islamic psychiatry should be developed.¹¹⁵ There were indeed efforts under way in Indonesia to define an Islamic school of psychology, building upon passages in the *Qur'an* and *Hadith*, and distinguished from Western psychological paradigms that were seen as implicitly atheistic.¹¹⁶ A medical colleague of Fanani's (a graduate of the medical school at Airlangga) said in his inaugural address as Professor that his research confirmed that carrying out religious

¹¹² A device that is claimed to photograph auras, invented by the Russian Semyon Davidovich Kirlian in the 1930s.

¹¹³ Discussion with Agus Mustofa, Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008. See also the interview with him published in *JktP*, 16 Sept. 2007.

¹¹⁴ Discussion with Ky. H. Dr Muhammad Usman, Surabaya, 24 Nov. 2007; Suhadi and Imam Subawi interview with Joko Sarsetyoto, Kediri, 17 July 2007.

¹¹⁵ *KR*, 4 Jan. 2009.

¹¹⁶ See Nur Hamim, 'Religious anthropocentrism: The discourse of Islamic psychology among Indonesian Muslim intellectuals', *Journal of Indonesian Islam* vol. 4, no. 2 (Dec. 2010), pp. 341-57. Readers should be warned that, unfortunately, this interesting paper is marred by errors in the English language.

obligations reduced the risk of heart attack. There was, he said, a ‘mystery of the heart’ that was still beyond science to understand.¹¹⁷ At the State University of Yogyakarta, the Islamic Medication Study Center hosted ‘Prophetic Medicine Training’, urging people to return to treatments taught by the Prophet as the best way to deal with various illnesses. These included the use of honey, cumin, *Zamzam* water, fruit vinegar, dates, bloodletting and Qur’anic readings.¹¹⁸ It is, of course, entirely possible — even probable — that religious activity (perhaps like placebos in drug trials) can stimulate brain phenomenon with beneficial therapeutic effects.¹¹⁹ But the practitioners cited here were making different sorts of claims. On the evidence of these newspaper reports and interviews, it is hard to think that this is anything other than religiously inflected ‘junk science’ and ‘junk thought’, something that is, it must be noted, probably even more pervasive in the United States than in Indonesia.¹²⁰

For their part, Traditionalists had long-established ideas of religious phrases, powerful persons and sacred objects having healing powers, for which no modern scientific proof was felt necessary. Such ideas carried on. A ‘weekend *pesantren*’ aimed at *abangan* in the Yogyakarta region taught, *inter alia*, a ‘health *dhikr*’, consisting of repetition of the 99 ‘beautiful names of God’ (*Asma al-Husna*) and ending with a prayer for good health.¹²¹ *Ruqya* also continued to be practiced, consisting of healing by pronouncing magic formulae or applying sacred amulets (*jimat*) bearing such formulae to exorcise evil spirits and black magic.¹²² These Traditionalist versions of Islam-as-medication were subject to denunciation from non-Traditionalist

¹¹⁷ *Tempo*I, 10 Nov. 2007.

¹¹⁸ *KR*, 8 March 2008. *Zamzam* water is from the sacred *Zamzam* well near the *ka’ba* in Mecca.

¹¹⁹ There is growing literature on this. For example, see the research mentioned in Micklethwait and Wooldridge, *God is back*, pp. 146–7.

¹²⁰ A valuable account of contemporary American ‘junk science’ and ‘junk thought’ is in Susan Jacoby, *The age of American unreason* (rev. ed.; New York: Vintage Books, 2009), Chapter 9. This is not just an Indonesian or American phenomenon, of course. For a fine example of spiritualist nonsense pretending to be science by a British professor, see David Fontana’s *Life beyond death: What should we expect?*

¹²¹ *KR*, 6 Dec. 2007.

¹²² For example, a *Ruqya* session at Kediri’s main mosque was advertised in *RK*, 13 Sept. 2006. For further information on this practice, see T. Fahd, ‘*Ruqya* (a.)’ in P. Bearman *et al.*, *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (2nd ed.), vol. 8, p. 600. Useful accounts of spiritual healing practices observed in Yogyakarta in 2003–4 are found in Daniels, *Islamic spectrum*, pp. 67–80.

organisations such as the puritan Persatuan Islam.¹²³ Natural phenomena could also be explained by Traditionalists from religious sources. In 2000, an organisation of NU-recognised Sufi brotherhoods explained on the basis of the opinions of 'the majority of the *ulama*' that lightning was the result of 'the movement of angels under instruction from God'.¹²⁴

The role of educational institutions

We have noted how, under Soeharto, state schools introduced compulsory religious education. The rather controversial law of 2003 entrenched that role still deeper by requiring schools to recruit teachers of religion and to provide places of worship according to the students' religious faiths. This law was resisted by pro-pluralists among Muslims such as Abdurrahman Wahid and by non-Muslim interests, but was signed into law by Megawati. As the population of Java has continued to grow, the demand for education has kept pace, which has produced both a demand for more state education and an opportunity for private providers.

The degree of Javanese society's commitment to religious and general education may be exemplified by the village of Karangtengah in the Yogyakarta Special District. In 2008 the village decreed that there would be a compulsory study time from 6 to 9 in the evening. No one in the village would be allowed to turn on their television during this time. From the time for the *maghrib* prayer (just after sunset, i.e., about 6pm) until time for the *isha* prayer (when complete darkness has descended) children were to be taught religion. Thereafter it was time for school studies until 9pm. If villagers failed to conform, they would be admonished the first time, their television would be confiscated the second time, and if there was a third refusal, said the village head, 'we are going to chase them away from our area'.¹²⁵

¹²³ Persatuan Islam (Persis) issued a *fatwa* in 2005 declaring *ruqya* using amulets or magic formulae to be polytheism (*syirik*, Arabic *shirk*), but other forms of protecting oneself through prayer were accepted. This is a complicated matter since the Prophet himself exemplified such practices. The Indonesian text of the Persis *fatwa* may be found at <http://pemudapersis-ck.blogspot.com/2009/05/bersiyasah-dalam-wawasan-jamiah-jeje.html> and other locations on the Web.

¹²⁴ Michael F. Laffan, 'Lightning, angels and prayers for the nation: Reading the *fatwas* of the Jam'iyah Ahlith Thoriqoh', in Feener and Cammack, *Islamic law in contemporary Indonesia*, p. 67.

¹²⁵ *KR*, 23 Jan. 2008.

The state schools' provision of religious education — although undoubtedly playing a major role in Islamisation of the young — was nevertheless thought too little by some. In primary schools this was only three hours per week and at higher levels just two, so there was a demand for extra-curricular religious education.¹²⁶ This demand created an opportunity for new schools to be established called Sekolah Islam Terpadu (Integrated Islamic Schools), which combined the national curriculum with Islamic studies in an all-day school. Because they engaged the pupils for the full day, they were particularly attractive to young urban couples where both partners were working, as a safe place to put their children.

Integrated Islamic Schools were pioneered by the Lukmanul Hakin school established in Bandung in 1995. These schools were particularly a project of the activists who also created the Dakwahist political party PKS. Their inspiration generally came from the writings of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood figure Hassan al-Banna, who had been a school teacher himself. These PKS-affiliated schools blossomed after 1998 until there were hundreds of them in Java and elsewhere, keeping in communication with each other through a network called JSIT (Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu, Integrated Islamic Schools Network). JSIT has established its own teacher training college in Yogyakarta. Religious studies of course play an important part in the schools, and the books used reflect the ideology of PKS, including *Kitab al-Tawhid* (The Book of the Unity of God), the strict monotheistic interpretations of Islam by Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism. The schools come under the purview of the Department of National Education and attain a high academic standard which enhances their appeal to middle-class parents.¹²⁷

Not all such schools are the creations of PKS activists. The extremist (and notoriously anti-Christian and anti-Jewish) Hidayatullah organisation has such schools, as do HTI activists. Integrated Islamic schools have also been established by Gadjah Mada University mosque activists, by Amien Rais and by Muhammadiyah.¹²⁸ These are not encompassed within JSIT. This is because, says a prominent HTI leader, JSIT is 'exclusive'.¹²⁹ Such

¹²⁶ Such observations were made by the Director General of Islamic Education in the Department of Religious Affairs, Prof. H.M. Muhammad Ali; *Bernas*, 29 July 2008.

¹²⁷ Hasan, 'Islamizing formal education', pp. 1–2, 6–25.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 13–4.

¹²⁹ Email from Muhammad Ismail Yusanto, 26 June 2007.

exclusivity is, of course, a common feature of movements of all persuasions that operate near, or beyond, the boundaries of doctrinaire ideologies.

Muhammadiyah has been working hard to create such integrated schools and has opened a 'Muhammadiyah Boarding School' — in other words, Modernist-style *pesantren* — in Prambanan, near Yogyakarta. Its aim is to 'to cultivate faith, knowledge and character', with Arabic taught as the language of religion and English as the international language. We may note *en passant* that the Javanese language seems not to be taught there. Fees are charged but scholarships are available for high achievers, poor students and orphans.¹³⁰ Such schools are held in high regard, but their standing has attracted some criticism. Younger Muhammadiyah activists accuse them of becoming too elite and too expensive, so that they are beyond the reach even of most Muhammadiyah followers. In Sidoarjo, for example, only about one-third of the pupils in Muhammadiyah schools are from Muhammadiyah families and in Gresik the proportion is still lower.¹³¹ Whatever the truth of that complaint, there can be no doubting the decisive role that Muhammadiyah education plays in the deeper Islamisation of Javanese society.

Other Islamic primary- and secondary-education institutions are also important. Several thousand Traditionalist *pesantrens* continue to provide religious education across Java. A reliable total number is not available, but figures of 11,000 to 17,000 have been reported.¹³² NU collaborates with government in developing the general knowledge part of *pesantren* curricula, so that graduates are on a par with those from state schools.¹³³ The famous school at Gontor continues to produce highly qualified graduates, although it is not difficult to find Gontor graduates who believe that the institution has drifted in more conservative directions in recent years. The Persatuan Islam (Persis) *pesantren* at Bangil remains important as well, and has a reputation for producing rather illiberal Wahhabi-influenced graduates. These include many Muhammadiyah leaders in East Java, who set the more conservative

¹³⁰ *KR*, 16 Jan. 2008. Information on the boarding school is available at <http://muhammadiyahboarding.blogspot.com/2010/01/profil-mbs.html>.

¹³¹ Discussion with Prof. Syafiq Mughni, Sidoarjo, 23 June 2007.

¹³² Based on 2001 Department of Religious Affairs data, Riyadi, *Dekonstruksi tradisi*, p. 55 n1, reports 11,312 *pesantrens*, nearly 80 per cent of them in rural villages; *RK*, 24 Nov. 2005, quotes the figure of 17,000 from Ky. H. Anwar Iskandar.

¹³³ *JktG*, 26 Oct. 2010.



Illustration 22 Muhammadiyah University, Yogyakarta, 2007

style for which East Java Muhammadiyah has a reputation. The Persis magazine *al-Muslimun* also exercises such an influence.¹³⁴

Muhammadiyah is prominent in higher education as well, with universities in major towns across Java that are held in high regard. Some of these — particularly the Muhammadiyah University in Surakarta — have been accused of housing extremist ideologies, but most have not.¹³⁵ The scale of Muhammadiyah's contribution may be gauged from its role in Yogyakarta, where it is headquartered. There nearly 34,000 students are in Muhammadiyah institutions of higher education: Ahmad Dahlan University (some 13,000 students), Muhammadiyah University Yogyakarta (some 13,000), 'Aisiyah Health Sciences College (some 6,000), the Muhammadiyah Polytechnic (around 800) and the teacher training college (around 1,600).¹³⁶

Another group of Muslim reformers also turned to education as a means of promoting their understanding of Islam, but with somewhat

¹³⁴ Discussion with Prof. Syafiq Mughni (then deputy head of Muhammadiyah in East Java and himself a graduate of the Persis *pesantren* at Bangil), Sidoarjo, 23 June 2007.

¹³⁵ The Rektor of the Surakarta university denied that there was truth in these accusations; discussion with Prof. Bambang Setiaji, Surakarta, 4 Aug. 2006.

¹³⁶ Discussion with Drs Agung Danarto, Head of the Muhammadiyah regional leadership for the Yogyakarta Special District, Kota Gede, 31 March 2009.

mixed success. From the late 1980s and 1990s there began to return to Indonesia graduates of the Saudi-funded LIPIA school who had gone to Afghanistan and fought in the anti-Soviet *jihad*. These were mainly Revivalists in epistemology and Islamists and Dakwahists in their agendas, and were known as *Salafis* in Indonesia (referring to the pious ancestors of early Islam, the *Salaf al-Salih*). They had a degree of social recognition for their command of Islam and Arabic, and for their demonstrated commitment to the struggle of Islam. Many set up schools that attracted poor students of *abangan* background and promoted more orthodox Islamic ideas among them. There were many of these in the Yogyakarta area, most of whose leaders were loyal to Ja'far Umar Thalib (the founder of Laskar Jihad, about which more below). In the wake of the 11 September 2001 al-Qaeda attacks in the United States, however, these schools came under more active police and intelligence surveillance and student numbers fell. Noorhaidi Hasan believes that these *Salafi* schools declined in appeal thereafter.¹³⁷

The nation-wide system of State Islamic Universities (UIN), State Institutes for Islamic Studies (IAIN) and State Colleges of Islamic Studies (STAIN) has continued to play a major role. The leading institutions — the UINs in Yogyakarta and Jakarta — have been particularly notable for the promotion of high intellectual standards and commitment to a democratic and pluralistic Indonesia. As noted above, they promote what has been described as 'enlightened' or 'liberal' Islam.¹³⁸ It is not only the top levels of this structure that operate in this way. For example, the small STAIN in Kediri grew from a mere 408 students in 2000–1 to 2,622 in 2009–10.¹³⁹ In 2005 it held a seminar to which national-level figures (both Muslim and Christian) were invited on the theme of 'religion as social criticism: an effort to defend the weak and oppressed'.¹⁴⁰ There are, however, some question marks over recent developments at the UINs. In order to make the transition from an 'institute' as an IAIN to a 'university' as a UIN it is necessary for faculties such as medicine, engineering and exact sciences to be added. As we will see below when we consider minority activist groups, it is just among students with such educational backgrounds that illiberal ideologies tend to

¹³⁷ Hasan, 'Salafi madrasas of Indonesia', pp. 251–2, 254, 257–65, 269–70.

¹³⁸ 'Enlightened' and 'liberal' are the terms used by, among others, Assyauckanie in *Islam and the secular state*, pp. 143–6.

¹³⁹ http://www.stainkediri.ac.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=30&Itemid=29

¹⁴⁰ *RK*, 7 Sept. 2005.

find support. Illiberal groups themselves tend to denounce the UIN-IAIN-STAIN system as a source of corrupting liberal and secular influences, and researchers from this system sometimes find it difficult to gain access to Revivalist groups.¹⁴¹ In 2000, members of FPI's Yogyakarta branch in turbans and waving swords and machetes physically attacked the offices of student newspapers at the local IAIN, destroying computers and other equipment, obliging students there to admit that they were pro-Communist or be beaten up, and wounding two.¹⁴²

The increasing presence of Islam in education was seen even in the Taman Siswa schools, which historically sought to combine modern Western-style education with Javanese high culture. Taman Siswa was in effect a sort of Javanist *priyayi* answer to Muhammadiyah's educational initiatives before World War II. From the 1990s, the leadership of Taman Siswa began to show more sympathy to Islamic sentiments. Prof. Ki Supriyoko — himself from a Yogyakarta Muhammadiyah family and with no Taman Siswa background — was one of the leaders and eventually became head of the organisation until ill health required him to step down in 2007. He reported that some Taman Siswa people were unhappy when he built a mosque within a Taman Siswa school. After he stepped down, some in the leadership who supported his seemingly more Islamic agenda lost their positions and the issue evidently remains controversial within Taman Siswa circles. Ki Supriyoko himself established a *pesantren* that uses the national curriculum, but students must be able to read the *Qur'an* and memorise the 40 short *suras*.¹⁴³

Javanese society is religiously plural, if overwhelmingly Muslim — with about 2.9 per cent of the population of Yogyakarta and Central and East Java being Christian.¹⁴⁴ Christian organisations have been particularly prominent as providers of education, particularly in larger towns and cities, where also the Christian percentage of the population is much higher, as we have seen.

¹⁴¹ See Masdar Hilmy's comments in his *Islamism and democracy*, p. 12; and Kholil Ridwan's and others' denunciations of IAIN and those who go from there to do higher degrees in Western universities in *Sabili* cyber-news, 11 May 2003.

¹⁴² *Tempo*, 21 Aug. 2000.

¹⁴³ Discussion with Prof. Ki Supriyoko, *pesantren* 'Insan Cendekia', Donokerto, Sleman, Yogyakarta, 22 March 2008.

¹⁴⁴ Leo Suryadinata, Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Aris Ananta, *Indonesia's population: Ethnicity and religion in a changing political landscape* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 109, 115, give a 2000 total for these three areas of 66,553,512 Muslims and 1,918,583 Christians.

This Christian presence in education has produced considerable disquiet among Muslims. Indeed, part of the original inspiration for the creation of Muhammadiyah in 1912 was to counter Christian influence in education. Such a spirit of competition has continued in the midst of more intensive Islamisation. A 2010 survey of about 500 teachers of Islam in state and private schools in Java revealed significant levels of opposition to having a non-Muslim as school head (69 per cent of respondents) and even to having non-Muslim teachers at their schools (34 per cent). Fully 87 per cent told their pupils not to study other religions and 75 per cent urged their Muslim students to encourage non-Muslim teachers to convert to Islam.¹⁴⁵

The attendance of Muslim pupils at Christian-affiliated schools became a *cause célèbre* in Yogyakarta. In 2001 banners and posters demanded that Muslim parents withdraw their children from such schools. A large banner across one of Yogyakarta's main roads proclaimed, 'It is forbidden (*haram*) for the Islamic *ummah* to study at schools of Protestant and Catholic foundations'. This statement was a reiteration of an MUI *fatwa* of 1994 that ruled, 'It is forbidden in law to send Muslim children to Protestant or Catholic schools'.¹⁴⁶ Another banner read, 'Do not sacrifice your children's faith just because you choose the wrong school'. In the wake of these banners, the Yogyakarta government and police announced a prohibition on provocative banners that touched on religious or similar matters.¹⁴⁷ In 2003 Din Syamsuddin, as Secretary General of MUI, declared that 1300 Muslim students had been converted to Christianity in Yogyakarta because they were educated in Catholic schools — an inflammatory claim for which he could cite no evidence.¹⁴⁸

H. Sunardi Sahuri — Yogyakarta native, supermarket entrepreneur, popular preacher and activist, and prominent in PKS — was among those most concerned about the threat of Muslim children being converted by

¹⁴⁵ *JktP* online, 9 Dec. 2010. The survey was conducted by the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) of UIN Jakarta; 45 per cent of those surveyed identified themselves as followers of NU and 24 per cent said that they followed Muhammadiyah.

¹⁴⁶ The text of the *fatwa* is widely available on the Web, including at <http://media-islam.or.id/2008/04/16/fatwa-mui-tentang-hukum-menyekolahkan-anak-anak-muslim-di-sekolah-sekolah-kristen/>

¹⁴⁷ *Kompas*, 29 June 2001.

¹⁴⁸ *Gatra.com*, 17 June 2003. On the anti-Christian schools campaign of 2001–3, see Imam Subkhan, *Hiruk pikuk wacana pluralisme di Yogya* (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Kanisius and Impulse, 2007), pp. 108–30.

attending Christian schools. He became a leader in a campaign to stop Muslims sending their children to such schools and claimed that success had been achieved. Over the period c. 2003–8, he said, many more Islamic schools had been created in Yogyakarta, Christian schools had lost students and some had even had to close.¹⁴⁹

Yet the education story in Yogyakarta was in fact more complex than Sunardi Sahuri suggested.¹⁵⁰ There was certainly a decline in Muslim students at Christian schools, but specifically religious issues seem to explain little of that. The number of Muslim students in Christian (Protestant and Catholic) primary schools in the city of Yogyakarta declined by nearly 12 per cent over 2001–7, and two Christian primary schools that had previously had a majority of Muslim students actually closed. At junior high level, the number of Muslim students in Christian schools was halved over this period, from 1,098 in 2001 to 562 in 2007. At high school level, however, the decline was of the insignificant order of 3 per cent. Some of these changes are more likely to be explained by the decline in student numbers generally as a result of a falling birth rate, given that dozens of state primary schools had to be closed over the same period. At high school level, whereas Christian schools saw a decline in their total enrolments of around 3 per cent, other private schools in Yogyakarta faced a decline of over 20 per cent. Among private providers, Muhammadiyah remained dominant. Its junior high school enrolments grew by 15 per cent over 2001–7, while its high school enrolments fell by 23 per cent. During that time, the total number of all high school students in Yogyakarta fell by 25 per cent. Meanwhile, Integrated Islamic Schools were growing in Yogyakarta and, for the reasons set out above, were attractive to many parents, but statistics are not available to measure their impact in detail. Given the complexity of changing enrolment figures and the fact that the percentage of Muslim pupils in Christian schools in the city of Yogyakarta was never more than about 5 per cent of the total number of Muslim pupils in the city, the fear that Christian schools were a powerful agent of conversion seems to have been exaggerated. In fact, the whole fear of large-scale conversions to Christianity in Yogyakarta was somewhat exaggerated, as we shall see in Chapter 12.

The susceptibility of the young to religious persuasion made education at all levels a priority for Islamisers. Hence the spread of kindergartens that

¹⁴⁹ Discussion with Drs H. Sunardi Sahuri, Yogyakarta, 14 Sept. 2008.

¹⁵⁰ The following discussion of enrolments rests entirely on research done by Arif Maftuhin and emailed to me on 5 January 2009.

teach four- to six-year-olds to read the *Qur'an* (*Taman Kanak-kanak al-Qur'an*). Religious education was proposed not only for those of an age to attend school, but also for infants just capable of communication. A senior official of the Yogyakarta government, who was also a Professor at the Universitas Islam Indonesia, observed when visiting an Islamic play group that it was extremely important to plant faith in the young from the earliest age. 'Children between the ages of 0 and 4 are like a white page with no mark on it,' he observed, who must be given 'a foundation and basis which is strong for shaping human character so as to become pious persons.'¹⁵¹

¹⁵¹ *KR*, 7 May 2008. This was Prof. H. Dahlan Thaib.

CHAPTER 9

Efforts to impose conformity of Islamic belief

Javanese society has historically hosted a wide variety of ideas about the supernatural, and at certain times pious reformers sought to eliminate local idiosyncrasies. The first major wave of reform in modern times began in the mid-19th century and contributed to the polarisation of Javanese society. In the wave of deeper Islamisation in the later 20th and early 21st centuries, local varieties of Islam again constituted a challenge to Islamisers. But now, in a post-colonial age, harmonising reform efforts were backed by large-scale organisations and institutions, including governmental and semi-governmental structures. Among them, MUI was particularly significant.¹ Thus began a serious attempt to force local understandings of Islam to conform to what reformers believed the correct version of Islam to be. Needless to say, they frequently differed among themselves as to what that was.

At a national level, the greatest controversy concerned the Ahmadiyya movement, although its impact within Javanese communities was limited. As already noted, Ahmadiyya is to orthodox Islam rather as Mormonism is to orthodox Christianity, in that both claim to have received new divine

¹ MUI also had other concerns, such as whether Yogyakarta mosques correctly indicated the *kiblat* (Arabic *qibla*, the direction of Mecca, towards which prayers must be directed in order to be valid). On investigation, fully 77 per cent were found to be 5–10 degrees out. A Yogyakarta Department of Religious Affairs official pointed out that an error of only 1 degree would mean that ‘our prayers will veer 145.67 km from the *ka’ba*’. *KR*, 15 May 2008, 25 May 2008.

revelations and have suffered discrimination and violence at the hands of more conventional believers as a result. Ahmadiyya exists in two branches, both represented in Indonesia. The Lahore branch regards its Punjabi founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, as a renewer of Islam rather than a new prophet. The Qadian branch, however, sees him as a new prophet, a clearly heretical idea to orthodox Muslims. MUI issued a *fatwa* in 1980 that declared Ahmadiyya to be a deviant sect that was outside Islam.² Nothing of significance followed from this *fatwa*; MUI was still seen as a tool of government in those days of the New Order and the regime was not going to tolerate internecine social violence. In the post-Soeharto era, however, as government was coming to be a tool of the MUI, things changed.

In July 2005 MUI again issued a *fatwa* declaring Ahmadiyya to be deviant and its adherents to be apostates. This time around, under the leadership of Din Syamsuddin, MUI recommended to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and the government more generally that both branches of Ahmadiyya be banned.³ The Ahmadiyya is particularly strong in predominantly Sundanese West Java, where — unfortunately for them — some extreme groups are also strong, notably the violent FPI. Violence soon followed, with the police being conspicuously reluctant to protect Ahmadis from attack or to arrest the perpetrators of violence. In Central and East Java and Yogyakarta, reactions were more restrained. Led by Ky. H. Idris Marzuqi (b. 1940), *kyais* gathered at Lirboyo *pesantren* in Kediri and denounced the Ahmadis in no uncertain terms. But the Ahmadis there were very few and they carried on their lives quietly as before.⁴ Similarly, in the major cities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta (where there was an anti-Ahmadiyya demonstration of thousands of people in August 2008),⁵

² Iskandar Zulkarnain, *Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia*, p. 292.

³ There is a vast amount of press coverage of this issue from 2005 to 2010. A good overview down to the time of its publication is in *Gatra*, 1 Aug. 2005. The best single source on the Ahmadiyya issue is International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah decree*. While the conventional Islamic interpretation is that apostates may be murdered, there was no proposal to kill all Ahmadis in Indonesia.

⁴ *RK*, 22 July 2005, 25 July 2005, 2 Aug. 2005, 5 Aug. 2005; *Mengislamkan kembali Qadiyani dan Lahore* (Kediri: Lajnah Bahtsul Masa-il Pondok Pesantren Lirboyo, Madrasah Hidayatul Muhtadi-ien, n.d. [2005]); discussion with Miji Purwanto (head of the local Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia, i.e., from the Qadian branch, in Kediri), Kediri, 26 Oct. 2008.

⁵ *JktP* online, 4 Aug. 2008.

Ahmadis kept a low profile — in Yogyakarta taking the sign down from their headquarters — but they were not attacked.⁶ The Ahmadis had a rather large mosque and 200 members at Tawangmangu on the slopes of Mount Lawu southeast of Surakarta, but had never had trouble with others. The MUI branch with responsibility for Tawangmangu did not ask the police to shut down the Ahmadis there but rather sought to make them aware of the ‘error’ of their beliefs.⁷ In Kudus also there was no trouble for the 40 or so Ahmadis there.⁸ Some NU *kyais* and younger activists publicly supported the Ahmadis’ right to freedom of belief⁹ and NU’s Garda Bangsa militia even guarded an Ahmadiyya mosque in Surabaya lest it be attacked by MMI.¹⁰ Emha Ainun Najib commented that the MUI *fatwa* had no power to bind anyone.¹¹

Given the perception that government should — or at least could — act to enforce MUI *fatwas*, there were persistent calls from activists for Ahmadiyya to be made illegal.¹² A gathering of 37 NU *kyais* from across Java and Madura objected to the idea that the government should act solely on the basis of *fatwas* from MUI, ignoring the views of other organisations, but nonetheless concurred with the *fatwa* against Ahmadiyya.¹³ Human rights and freedom-of-religion activists criticised the MUI *fatwa* and opposed any suggestion of making Ahmadiyya illegal. The violence associated with this issue culminated in an attack by FPI and other extremists on a demonstration of Ahmadis and human rights activists at the national

⁶ *MIO*, 30 July 2005; *RS* online, 7 Aug. 2005, 8 Aug. 2005. The *Bupati* of Sleman regency reported no problems for the Ahmadis there; they did not have a mosque but did have educational activities; *KR*, 15 June 2008. Sultan Hamengkubuwana X and the government of Yogyakarta said that they were prepared to protect Ahmadi properties if they were threatened; *KR*, 11 June 2008.

⁷ *TempoI*, 6 Aug. 2005.

⁸ *TempoI*, 11 June 2008.

⁹ Discussion with Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said (who defended the Ahmadis), *pesantren* An-Nur, Wonocolo, Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008; *detikNews* online, 7 May 2008.

¹⁰ *DetikSurabaya*, 7 Aug. 2005.

¹¹ *RK*, 21 Aug. 2005.

¹² A list of the groups in the anti-Ahmadi ‘Forum Umat Islam’ is given in International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah decree*, p. 3. FPI and HTI were prominent, along with MMI, KISDI, DDII, ICMI, PKS, PPP and others, but Muhammadiyah and NU were also represented.

¹³ *MmK*, 5 Aug. 2005.

monument in Jakarta on 1 June 2008, where several prominent Liberal Muslim leaders were injured.

Under continuing pressure from hard-line groups and fearing widespread anarchic violence, on 9 June 2008 the government issued a joint decree by the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Minister of the Interior and the Attorney General. This decree ordered the Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia — which is to say, the local version of the Qadian branch — to cease all activities ‘inconsistent with interpretations of Islam in general, such as the recognition of a prophet after the Prophet Muhammad’. Anyone who failed to do this was subject to ‘sanctions according to law’. Every regional government was ordered to ‘carry out guidance with regard to this decision’.¹⁴ The decree did not apply to the local organisation of the Lahore branch — the Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia — but this distinction made no difference to anti-Ahmadi activists. We should note that Ahmadiyya was not banned by this decree. Rather, Ahmadis were allowed to believe what they believed but were not to spread these beliefs.

The government decree of 2008 was not satisfactory to Ahmadiyya’s enemies, who still insisted that the government must act to make it illegal.¹⁵ Attacks on Ahmadis and their properties continued, particularly in West Java. By 2010 the national government was reviewing the 2008 decree in search of a more permanent solution, which could have only one meaning, since the government and its police forces remained reluctant to confront violent anti-Ahmadi groups like FPI. The Minister for Religious Affairs, the PPP politician Suryadharma Ali,¹⁶ simply said that Ahmadiyya had to be disbanded, since its followers continued to spread their beliefs in violation of the joint ministerial decree and were in fact not Muslims, as they claimed to be.¹⁷ In February 2011 the anti-Ahmadiyya campaign grew murderous, when a mob of 1,500 people attacked and destroyed an Ahmadi site in West Java, killing three Ahmadis in the course of the attack. The Minister for Justice and Human Rights, the PAN politician Patrialis Akbar, made it clear that

¹⁴ The text is available in multiple locations on the Web, including http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesian/news/story/2008/06/080609_ahmadiyah.shtml. The decree was published in local newspapers, e.g., *KR*, 10 June 2008.

¹⁵ Such demands were made across the Javanese heartland as well. For example, see *KR*, 9 June 2008, 17 June 2008.

¹⁶ Suryadharma Ali is a graduate of IAIN Jakarta, and General Secretary of PPP for 2007–12.

¹⁷ *JktP* online, 31 Aug. 2010.

the government was close to making it illegal for the Ahmadiyya to exist in Indonesia if its followers continued to claim that they were Muslims.¹⁸ In East Java, where the Ahmadis were next-to-invisible and had experienced no significant difficulty, puritanical groups still pressed for action. In February 2011 the governor of East Java, Dr H. Soekarwo, gave in and declared that all Ahmadiyya activity was banned in East Java. Ahmadis could not even display the name Ahmadiyya on their mosques, but were allowed to carry on their rituals in private. As the governor announced this, he was flanked by the head of police, the Brawijaya Division commander, the head public prosecutor of East Java, the speaker of the East Java legislature and the head of the local MUI.¹⁹

Ahmadiyya was, however, a rather small sect and therefore relatively easy for its enemies to attack;²⁰ this was not so in the case of LDII. We saw above that the problem with LDII was that the claim of its founder, Nurhasan Ubaidah Lubis, to have the uniquely correct *manhaj* (way of knowing) Islam, so that all other Islamic movements were wrong, indeed not even true Muslims. Consequently, LDII followers should not even pray together with non-LDII people. MUI declared the organisation to be deviant on more than one occasion, the last *fatwa* being in 1994.²¹ The organisation had survived multiple attempts to have it declared illegal by attaching itself to Golkar in 1972, but in the post-Soeharto age widespread condemnation of LDII revived. By then, however, it was an organisation with branches across

¹⁸ *Tempo*, 7 Feb. 2011. Twelve people accused of the murders of the Ahmadis were given trivial sentences of three to six months in July 2011; *JktP* online, 29 July 2011. Patrialis Akbar has generally been thought to be a poor performer as a minister, and it was clear that his view of justice and human rights did not include the idea of the Ahmadiyya continuing to profess its version of Islam.

¹⁹ *Tempo*, 28 Feb. 2011. The governors of West Java and South Sulawesi similarly issued bans on Ahmadiyya.

²⁰ Another idiosyncratic faith to be condemned by MUI was called Salamullah, whose leader, Lia Aminuddin (b. 1947 in Surabaya) claimed to be the incarnation of the angel Gabriel. She was twice convicted of blasphemy and sentenced to prison, in 2006 (for two years) and 2009 (for 2.5 years). This faith is centred in the Jakarta area and is not of significance in the Javanese-speaking heartland.

²¹ The text may be found in Hartono Ahmad Jaiz (ed.), *Bahaya Islam Jama'ah-LEMKARI-LDII* (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam, 1419H/1998M), pp. 247–8. A 1979 MUI *fatwa* in the same terms is in *ibid.*, pp. 94–5; another copy of that, but undated and with different signatures at the end, is at http://www.mui.or.id/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=84&limitstart=5 (under 'Islam Jama'ah').



Illustration 23 Sign for a rural branch of LDII, Karanganyar, 2008

the length and breadth of Java (and elsewhere in Indonesia) and at least claimed to have millions of adherents, although not everyone believed that this was so.²² In Kediri, where it was founded, LDII was a major presence, with its 99-metre-tall, gold-tipped minaret (the highest in all of East Java), called the *Menara Asmaul Husna* — the ‘minaret of the 99 beautiful names of God’. This was no easy target for its enemies to tackle.

²² The PKS leader and the then-speaker of the national MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly), Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid, said that he doubted that LDII followers were actually very large in number; discussion of 7 June 2007, Jakarta. In the previous chapter, I noted that I am unable to confirm LDII’s claim to have millions of adherents.

LDII was still growing in the post-1998 years, attracting new followers from other versions of Islam and generating conflict in some places. A *dakwah* activist in the Yogyakarta area intervened in a village where a conversion to LDII had taken place, provided anti-LDII literature and thereby stopped this process. After receiving his information, the villagers gathered and decided that there would be no more LDII *pengajian* in their village and, if the LDII convert did attempt this, he would have to leave.²³ Lirboyo's senior figure Ky. H. Idris Marzuqi declared LDII to be 'greatly in conflict with us'.²⁴

Among the foremost critics of LDII was Drs H. Hartono Ahmad Jaiz. He was from Central Java, born in Boyolali near Surakarta in 1953, educated in Surakarta and Yogyakarta in both Traditionalist style and at IAIN Yogyakarta, a writer on Islamic subjects and prominent in DDII circles. In 1998 he published an anti-LDII book on the 'dangers' of LDII, which contained 'confessions of former leaders of LDII'.²⁵ This presented a critical history of LDII, set out its ideological deviations and described the various decisions taken against it over time. Needless to say, LDII was angry at this. Hartono Ahmad Jaiz continued his criticisms of deviance and in 2002 published another book entitled *Deviant sects and concepts in Indonesia*.²⁶ In March 2006 he was a speaker at a mosque gathering near Surakarta organised by the 'Mosque Activists Communication Forum', a network established in Surakarta in 1998 and led by one of the city's foremost radicals, Mohammed Kalono.²⁷ The meeting was attacked by LDII supporters, who reportedly arrived in some 20 trucks and 50 other vehicles.

²³ Arif Maftuhin interview with Drs Moh. Abu Suhud, Yogyakarta, 29 March 2008.

²⁴ Discussion with Ky. H.A. Idris Marzuqi, Lirboyo, Kediri, 29 Nov. 2007.

²⁵ Hartono Ahmad Jaiz (ed.), *Bahaya Islam Jama'ah-LEMKARI-LDII*. The biographical information on Hartono is taken from one of his other polemical works, an attack on Sufism, entitled *Tasawuf belitan Iblis* (Jakarta: Darul Falah, 1422H/2001M), pp. 173–5.

²⁶ Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, *Aliran dan paham sesat di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Kautsar, 2002).

²⁷ This is FKAM: Forum Komunikasi Aktivis Masjid. See International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Noordin Top's support base* (Update briefing, Asia briefing no. 95. Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 27 Aug. 2009), p. 7. This report notes that 'Many radical discussion groups from Jakarta to Lombok take place in the name of FKAM. In Sragen, its website (<http://addakwah-fkamsragen.blogspot.com>) has links to a number of *jihadi* sites. ... It has sponsored book launches of JI books and protest actions against "deviant" groups and suspected places of vice.'

They entered the mosque and attempted to attack Hartono. He was protected by police who quickly arrived, but four others were injured. Stones were thrown at the vehicle taking Hartono to safety at the police station. There the stand-off continued, with the LDII side demanding a public apology from Hartono. Eventually both sides agreed to end the matter. LDII's actions were subsequently denounced by the head of MUI as criminal. Hartono was also pursued by LDII people when he addressed a gathering in Jakarta. Bambang Irawan Hafiluddin, one of the 'former leaders of LDII' whose 'confessions' were published in Hartono's *The danger of Islam Jama'ah-LEMKARI-LDII*, was also subject to LDII intimidation, as were other critics. Such, at least, was the detailed report in *Sabili*. On the other side, a senior LDII leader denounced Hartono and claimed that his rejections of LDII teachings referred to ideas that they had changed since the death of their founder Nurhasan Ubaidah Lubis. Further articles in this issue of *Sabili* nevertheless continued the denunciations of LDII.²⁸ It is important to note, however, that while LDII was denounced in terms similar to those applied to Ahmadiyya, and while MUI declared both to be deviant, at no level of government was anyone prepared to act against LDII, as they did against Ahmadiyya. This time the target was just too large, so that the cost in social violence would have been much greater.

Since 2006, there has been more evidence of LDII attempting to mend its fences — and they have indeed been formidable self-erected barriers — with other versions of Islam. They stopped calling other Muslims *kafirs*, reported Kediri Muhammadiyah figures, although they believed that LDII was not really changing its beliefs.²⁹ Ky. H. Idris Marzuqi thought that LDII was changing some of its ideas, but offered no examples of this.³⁰ Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said — himself an activist in inter-religious relations — regarded LDII as more moderate than in the past, but still exclusive.³¹ In Yogyakarta, LDII met with the local MUI and Department of Religious Affairs. The MUI officer said that 'LDII should continue to spread information about itself to other mass organisations so that the wider society will know more about LDII's programs'.³² LDII held a seminar in a

²⁸ *Sabili* vol. 13, no. 21 (6 Rabi'ulakhir 1427/4 May 2006), pp. 17–31.

²⁹ Discussion with Abdul Haris, Triyono and Hari Widasmoro, Kediri, 29 Nov. 2007.

³⁰ Discussion with Ky. H.A. Idris Marzuqi, Lirboyo, Kediri, 29 Nov. 2007.

³¹ Discussion with Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said, *pesantren* An-Nur, Wonocolo, Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008.

³² *KR*, 12 March 2008.

mosque in Sleman to discuss violence and criminality among youths, which was blamed on inadequate religious instruction beyond the level of *Qur'an* kindergartens. So LDII set up a *dakwah* and religious education programmes for 5- to 9-year-olds and 10- to 15-year-olds. The secretary of the local MUI was one of the speakers at the seminar.³³ Meanwhile, on the slopes of Mount Kelud near Kediri, a group of some 45 LDII members live in the village of Manggis, which has a population of perhaps 800 people. Most of the village is Muslim, although there is a substantial Hindu community (perhaps 30 per cent of the village). The LDII people give priority to harmonious relations. They do not attend the twice-weekly NU *pengajian* or take part in Traditionalist *tablilan*. But if they are invited to attend when, for example, there has been a death among the NU community, they do so. They even attend the annual village cleansing (*bersih desa*) ceremony, regarding it as



Illustration 24 *Bersih desa* (village cleansing) at Manggis village, Kediri, 2006
(photo by Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi)

33 *KR*, 6 Dec. 2008.



Illustration 25 Villagers gathered at the *bersih desa*, Manggis village, Kediri, 2006
(photo by Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi)

local custom and ignoring the belief in spiritual powers that other villagers still hold.³⁴

Wahidiyah — also based in Kediri — is another Islamic movement that is rather disliked by its critics but protected both by its size and by its proximity to Traditionalist practices.³⁵ It originated in a divine instruction that the head of the *pesantren* at Kedunglo, Kediri, named Ky. H. Abdoel Madjid Ma'roef, said he received in 1959. This consisted of a special form of *dhikr* — which was elaborated over time — known as *Sholawat Wahidiyah*, which could bring good fortune both in this life and in the hereafter. Indeed, it is claimed that if it is recited just once it can deliver 500 of the

³⁴ Discussion with Pak Sri Woko (the head of the local LDII group), Manggis, 3 March 2006.

³⁵ An important study of Wahidiyah and similar groups based in Kediri is to be found in Arif Zamhari, *Rituals of Islamic spirituality*. He covers Wahidiyah on pp. 76–7, 95–164.

dead from eternal torture.³⁶ The *dhikr* consisted both of recitation of specific phrases and much weeping.³⁷ Others dismiss this as ignorant nonsense. The senior *kyai* of Lirboyo, Ky. H. Indris Marzuqi, said of Wahidiyah that 'their knowledge is insufficient'.³⁸ Although its practices are in the Sufi mode, NU does not regard Wahidiyah as a proper, respected (*muktabarah*) *tarekat*.³⁹ Muhammadiyah figures in Kediri said that, like LDII, Wahadiyah just takes advantage of ignorance.⁴⁰

Wahidiyah is now led by the founder's son Ky. H. Abdul Latif Madjid (Gus Latif), whose teachings are idiosyncratic in a recognisably Javanese style.⁴¹ He says, for example, that all religions are the same: they proceed from scripture to intellectualisation to *rasa* — a deeply meaningful term in Javanese mysticism, conveying (amidst multiple complexities) a sense of the unmediated presence in humanity of the divine principle.⁴² In the end the objective is *makrifat* — gnosis — and, he says, Wahidiyah offers the most effective of all means to that end. Wahidiyah's doctrines are like those of 'no self' in Buddhism, says Gus Latif. The central activity is what is called *mujahadah* — 'striving', a common Sufi term — which in Wahidiyah means above all a great effort to battle and subdue lust and physical desires so as to become aware of one's return to God.⁴³ Gus Latif is not concerned that NU does not recognise Wahidiyah as a proper Sufi *tarekat* because it isn't one, he

³⁶ See the organisation's website at <http://sholawat-wahidiyah.com/id/>.

³⁷ Ritual weeping is also found in the version of Sufism promoted by the popular (until he took a second wife in 2006 and lost his devoted female following) TV evangelist Aa Gym (Abdullah Gymnastiar), but Howell is wrong to describe this as unique to his version, as the Wahidiyah case shows; Howell, 'Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic revival', p. 719.

³⁸ Discussion with Ky. H. Idris Marzuqi, Lirboyo, Kediri, 29 Nov. 2007

³⁹ It is omitted from the list of accepted Sufi orders in Sri Mulyati *et al.*, *Mengenal dan memahami tarekat-tarekat muktabarah*.

⁴⁰ Discussion with Abdul Haris, Triyono and Hari Widasmoro, Kediri, 29 Nov. 2007.

⁴¹ The following discussion rests upon my talk with Ky. H. Abdul Latif Madjid, Kedunglo, Kediri, 2 March 2006.

⁴² For the most authoritative analysis available, see P.J. Zoetmulder, *Pantheism and monism in Javanese suluk literature: Islamic and Indian mysticism in an Indonesian setting* (ed. and transl. M.C. Ricklefs; KITLV Translation Series 24; Leiden: KITLV Press, 1995), esp. pp. 182–4; other references may be pursued via the index.

⁴³ A description from one of the many Wahidiyah publications given to me when I visited Kedunglo on 2 March 2006: *Didalam Wahidiyah yang dimaksud adalah bersungguh-sungguh memerangi dan menundukkan hawa nafsu untuk diarahkan kepada kesadaran Fafirruu — Ilallah wa Rasulihi Shallallaahu 'alaihi wa sallam*.

says, for there is no swearing of an oath (*bayat*, Arabic *bay'a*) to accept the authority of the *murshid*, as in a *tarekat*. Gus Latif is intimate with a world of spirits: the dead send him greetings from the grave and many nearby spirits (*jin*) communicate with him. He heals the sick by visiting them in their dreams. The long-recognised local spirit forces of Java — including Ratu Kidul and Sunan Lawu — are genuine creations of God, he says.

The scale of the Wahidiyah movement is considerable. Gus Latif has some 1,500 students at Kedunglo from kindergarten to tertiary level. Arabic, English and Chinese are taught, with Javanese taught in the primary school. The studies include practical business skills and students are expected to set up their own small businesses. The *pesantren* includes a College of Economic Sciences, including departments of accounting and management.⁴⁴ Wahidiyah has many other branches in Java, elsewhere in Indonesia and in some places abroad. It holds great *mujadah* sessions with group *dhikr* and weeping over several days at its various branches and, twice a year, on a grand scale at Kedunglo itself. Then reportedly 75,000 to 150,000 devotees attend at Kedunglo, much to the profit of local food-stall owners.⁴⁵

Kediri is also the home base of *Dhikr al-Ghafilin*, another idiosyncratic *dhikr* movement. This *dhikr* was developed by three charismatic Traditionalist *kyais* who were thought to be particularly supernaturally endowed: the controversial Ky. H. Hamim Jazuli (Gus Mik) from Kediri, Ky. H. Ahmad Siddiq from Jember and Ky. H. 'Abd al-Hamid from Pasuruan. *Dhikr al-Ghafilin* is not institutionalised to the degree that Wahidiyah is. When it is about to meet, word travels by informal means and upwards of 20,000 followers gather to join its lengthy *dhikr* sessions at the *pesantren* Al Falah at Ploso, housed in tents erected along the road. Several sacred graves in the Kediri area are also used as locations for these *dhikr* sessions.⁴⁶ A similar group

⁴⁴ *MmK*, 29 Aug. 2005.

⁴⁵ For reports on such sessions, see e.g., *MmK*, 7 March 2005, 26 July 2005, 26 Aug. 2005, 29 Aug. 2005, 12 Aug. 2006; *RK*, 29 Aug. 2005, 18 Feb. 2006, 13 Aug. 2006. For a report on a Wahidiyah session in Yogyakarta, see *KR*, 9 June 2008.

⁴⁶ Zamhari, *Rituals of Islamic spirituality*, pp. 207–44; *MmK*, 15 Oct. 2003, 19 Oct. 2003, 29 Sept. 2003, 16 Oct. 2004; *RK*, 15 Oct. 2003; email from Imam Subawi, 18 Dec. 2008. One of the sites routinely used by this group is the grave of Syech (Shaykh) Wasil, the reputed *wali* who brought Islam to Kediri, but the actual identity and history of this character is obscure; see *RK*, 10 Feb. 2009. The grave of Gus Mik (d. 1993) at Mojojoto, Kediri, is itself a major pilgrimage site; see the account of observances there in *MmK*, 11 Oct. 2005. On Gus Mik, see further Muhammad Nurul Ibad, *Perjalanan dan ajaran Gus Miek* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pesantren, 2007).

calling itself *Dhikr ar-Rahmah* meets at the grave of Sunan Geseng in Kediri on the eve of Fridays, when it recites the *Fatihah* one hundred times.⁴⁷

A group called *Ihsaniyyat* is another Kediri-based *dhikr* movement also covered in Arif Zamhari's fine study.⁴⁸ Its leader — also named Ky. H. Abdul Latif, not to be confused with the Wahidiyah leader — is open to local arts usually thought of as typically *abangan*. He works among *jaranan* performers, for example. When he does mass exorcisms (*ruwatan*) he does not use *wayang* but that is only because it has become so expensive. He believes that *krisses* have power — 'there is a creature (*makhluk*) there', he says — but has no fear of them. In Banyuwangi, he was criticised by NU *kyais* for opening a *jaranan* performance, but he retorted that this was in the style of the *dakwah* of the *wali sanga* who brought Islam to Java.⁴⁹

Arif Zamhari makes an important point about the contribution of these *dhikr* groups in bringing *abangan* to more pious Islam:

These groups have attracted followers from a wide social base to their practices, hence contributing significantly to the improvement of religious practice among Indonesian Muslims who were not strict in their daily observance of Islamic practice. Based on their understanding of the teachings of *tasawuf* [Sufism], instead of rejecting nominal Muslims, these *Majlis Dhikr* groups have shown respect for and accommodation to all kinds of cultural symbols used by these Muslim groups. In doing so, the presence of these *Majlis Dhikr* ... has contributed to narrowing the gap between *santri* Muslims and nominal Muslims, who have long been ideologically opposed to one another.⁵⁰

Because such groups are so close to Traditionalist practices — whatever their idiosyncrasies and however low the regard in which they are held by the more sophisticated — and because they can mobilise followings in the tens of thousands, they have escaped anathematisation by MUI or vigilante organisations, the latter being in any case still weak in Kediri. But one cannot be confident that that will always be so.

⁴⁷ RK, 5 Oct. 2006. There is also a grave of Sunan Geseng in Piyungan, Yogyakarta. It is not remarkable in Java to find holy figures reputedly buried in more than one place; devotees are likely to ascribe this to the supernatural powers of those persons or simply to the unknowable.

⁴⁸ Zamhari, *Rituals of Islamic spirituality*, pp. 165–206.

⁴⁹ Discussion with Ky. H. Abdul Latif, *pesantren* al-Ihsan Jampes, Kediri, 16 March 2005. Arif Zamhari notes (*Rituals of Islamic spirituality*, p. 176) that when *Ihsaniyyat* spread to Banyuwangi, it became a threat to the standing of local *kyais* and thus generated rivalries within the Traditionalist side of Islam.

⁵⁰ Arif Zamhari, *Rituals of spirituality*, p. 3.

Other idiosyncratic and smaller Islamic movements and sects did not fare so well, as the suppression of 'deviant sects' (*aliran sesat*) became something of an obsession on the part of MUI, other major organisations, the police and public prosecutors, vigilantes and, in many cases, even local communities and individuals. In this respect, the social circumstances of Javanese villages in the early 21st century were not so different from those of 16th- and 17th-century England, as analysed in Keith Thomas's classic study of *Religion and the decline of magic* in that period:

Indeed if the records of Tudor and Stuart village life leave any single impression, it is that of the tyranny of local opinion and the lack of tolerance displayed towards nonconformity or social deviation. Rural society lacked much of the modern concept of privacy and private life. The customs of the countryside required joys and sorrows, weddings and funerals, to be shared with other members of the community Nor was there any challenge to the view that a man's most personal affairs were the legitimate concern of the whole community. On the contrary, everyone had a right to know what everyone else was doing.⁵¹

The chairman of the Yogyakarta Special District MUI said in January 2008 that, in order to prevent the emergence of deviant sects, the local MUI was going to coordinate the various Islamic mass organisations so as to guide the members of society in this regard, in order to maintain their faith and piety. MUI's coordination would also encompass the heads of local police and the provincial public prosecutor,⁵² again confirming MUI's view of itself as a body that could turn to the police and courts to implement its determinations, a view shared by government, as we have seen. The chairman of the Yogyakarta city branch of MUI expressed the hope that the police and public prosecutors would 'act resolutely' in this respect.⁵³ A member of Muhammadiyah's Majelis Tabligh dan Dakwah Khusus (Sermons and Special Proselytisation Council) said that the presence of such deviant sects was part of an international conspiracy to destroy the Islamic faith, which even threatened Muhammadiyah's educational institutions themselves.⁵⁴ The head of the Institute for the Study and Implementation of Islam at Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta felt

⁵¹ Keith Thomas, *Religion and the decline of magic: Studies in popular beliefs in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 629.

⁵² *KR*, 8 Jan. 2008. *KR*, 3 Nov. 2007, published the national MUI's prohibition of nine 'deviant sects'; this included Ahmadiyya, already discussed here. Others were also represented in the Yogyakarta area and will be discussed below.

⁵³ *KR*, 17 March 2008.

⁵⁴ *KR*, 14 Feb. 2008.

that Muslim leaders, Islamic organisations and the government must stand firm against deviant groups, whose emergence was facilitated by 'the euphoria or intoxication with freedom in this age of reform'.⁵⁵

A movement called *Al-Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah* had followers scattered in multiple places across Java and attracted much attention over 2006–8. Their leader was a retired Jakarta public servant living in Bogor (West Java) named Abussalam alias Ahmad Mushaddeq. After 40 days of ascetic practice, in July 2006 he claimed to have had a divine revelation that he was a new prophet. He called himself *Al-Masih Al-Marw'ud* — the messiah promised by Islam at the end of days (a claim also made by Ahmadiyya's founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in his time). Ahmad Mushaddeq's followers reportedly denied the Prophet's night journey to heaven (*isra'* and *mir'aj*) and did not pray five times a day or fast. MUI declared the group heretical and its followers apostates, and recommended that government declare it illegal to spread *Al-Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah* teachings and ban its publications. The head of NU, Ky. H. Hasyim Muzadi, also called for the arrest and trial of Ahmad Mushaddeq.⁵⁶ The police reported that by late 2007 he had 41,000 followers across the whole of Indonesia, with 8,972 followers in Jakarta, 511 in Tegal, 5,114 in Yogyakarta, 2,610 in Surabaya, similar numbers in some places outside Java and many very small groups elsewhere. Some 60 per cent of these followers were reportedly university students.⁵⁷

The government suppressed *Al-Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah* in late 2007. The Attorney General acted on the MUI's *fatwas*, with the advice of BAKORPAKEM (a body charged with oversight of *kebatinan* movements)⁵⁸ and the President's agreement. The Attorney General decreed the movement to be illegal and banned all its publications. The police were searching for Ahmad Mushaddeq in order to charge him with blasphemy, punishable with up to five years' imprisonment. He finally surrendered to the police in Jakarta, where they paraded him in handcuffs before journalists. His meditation site in Bogor was attacked and destroyed by hundreds of activists calling themselves Gerakan Umat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic *Ummah*

⁵⁵ *KR*, 10 Nov. 2007, quoting Drs Muhsin Hariyanto, head of the Lembaga Pengkajian dan Pengamalan Islam at the university.

⁵⁶ *KR*, 4 Oct. 2007, 25 Oct. 2007, 31 Oct. 2007.

⁵⁷ *KR*, 31 Oct. 2007.

⁵⁸ Badan Koordinasi Penganut Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat, a successor to the PAKEM (Peninjauan Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat, Observation of People's Belief Streams) mentioned earlier in this book, under the Attorney General's department since 1960.

Movement). The Department of Religious Affairs announced that it would attempt through *dakwah* to bring followers of such deviant sects back to the true Islam but if they refused to repent, legal action would be taken against them.⁵⁹ At a meeting in Yogyakarta of the Special District's provincial public prosecutor, the intelligence branch of the police, head of military intelligence and the head of the District MUI, this ban was officially declared in Yogyakarta as well.⁶⁰ The same action was taken in other jurisdictions. Reflecting the standing of MUI *fatwas* in the eyes of the police, a senior policeman in Bantul (south of Yogyakarta) said that the legal basis for police acting in this matter was 'the decision of the Attorney General and the *fatwa* of MUI'.⁶¹

Al-Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah quickly collapsed under the weight of MUI, police and activist pressure. In Yogyakarta, the local public prosecutors and police had begun interrogating sect members from at least September 2007. Adherents presented themselves to police stations and there both sought protection from assault and offered their repentance. It is worth noting that such acts of repentance were done in police stations, not in mosques, in almost all the cases known to me. Where this was done in a mosque or at the local Religious Affairs Office, local officials, police and frequently the military were present.⁶² In at least one case MMI members were in the office of the Yogyakarta Special District Attorney to witness two sect members reciting the *Shahadah*.⁶³ A group called Forum Masyarakat Islam (Islamic People's Forum) rounded up Al-Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah members in Sleman and obliged them to repent publicly.⁶⁴ In Klaten, locals threatened a sect follower and his pregnant wife when they refused to recant and punched the husband. The police took them under protection and then escorted them to a meeting where they repented.⁶⁵

The police arrested the sect's leader in Kediri and then the local heads of police, public prosecutor's office, Department of Religious Affairs and

⁵⁹ *KR*, 26 Oct. 2007, 31 Oct. 2007.

⁶⁰ *KR*, 3 Nov. 2007.

⁶¹ *Bernas*, 16 Nov. 2007.

⁶² For example, *KR*, 10 Oct. 2007, 2 Nov. 2007, 7 Nov. 2007, 10 Nov. 2007; *Bernas*, 21 Sept. 2007, 9 Oct. 2007, 10 Oct. 2007, 3 Nov. 2007, 9 Nov. 2007, 10 Nov. 2007, 15 Nov. 2007; *RK*, 3 Nov. 2007; *MmK*, 6 Nov. 2007.

⁶³ *Bernas*, 2 Nov. 2007. I suspect that the MMI activists took the sect members there for this purpose, but the newspaper report does not confirm this.

⁶⁴ *KR*, 3 Nov. 2007.

⁶⁵ *KR*, 16 Nov. 2007; *Bernas*, 16 Nov. 2007.

MUI gave his followers a religious lecture. Several of them refused to repent, however, and some who repented in a mosque withdrew their repentance the following day and accused the police of having no authority to act. So legal action was taken against them.⁶⁶ In Bantul it was the deputy head of the anti-terrorism police squad Densus 88 who lectured sect followers on the error of their beliefs. Al-Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah had not grown into a terrorist organisation, but had it not been banned that might have happened, he claimed.⁶⁷ A grand repentance session of around a thousand followers of Al-Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah took place at the mosque within the Yogyakarta Special District police headquarters in late November 2007. It was led by the leader of the sect in Yogyakarta and witnessed by the heads of local police, public prosecutor's office and MUI, as well as senior officers of the navy and air force, religious leaders and other prominent figures. The sect leader praised the Yogyakarta police for not having arrested any sect followers, as had happened in other jurisdictions.⁶⁸

In Jakarta, the sect leader Ahmad Mushaddeq recanted, but the justices of the South Jakarta District Court (a civil, not a religious, court) did not believe him. He was convicted of blasphemy and sentenced to four years in prison. FPI members and others present shouted *Allahu akbar* (God is great) although they had wished for a death sentence — which cannot, however, be applied under the Indonesian blasphemy law.⁶⁹ This was among the cases that led to the petition to the Constitutional Court in October 2009 seeking that it overthrow the blasphemy law, which (as we have seen above) it refused to do.

A small sect arose in the mountains of Gunung Kidul calling itself Laku Dumadi Anggayuh Titi Tentrem (ways to strive towards peacefulness), but it brought little peace to its adherents. Among its 'deviant' teachings was that, if ablution water was not available for cleaning oneself before the evening prayer, then earth or sand could be used.⁷⁰ Followers should not eat pumpkin, which is called *waluh* in Javanese, for that was said to be an abbreviation of *wali Allah* (a saint of God). Other similar ideas were

⁶⁶ *DetikSurabaya* online, 6 Nov. 2007.

⁶⁷ *KR*, 16 Nov. 2007; *Bernas*, 16 Nov. 2007.

⁶⁸ *KR*, 24 Nov. 2007; *Bernas*, 24 Nov. 2007.

⁶⁹ *JktP* online, 24 Apr. 2008.

⁷⁰ This practice is known as *tayamum* (Arabic *tayammum*) but I am not clear why this was declared deviant, since it is allowed in certain circumstances; see A.J. Wensinck — [A.K. Reinhart], 'Tayammum (a.)', in P. Bearman *et al.* (eds), *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (2nd ed.), vol. 10, p. 399.

also taught. An unnamed person from Magelang is said to have been the originator of these ideas, but it was a group of 30 from Gunung Kidul who recanted and prayed in the conventional fashion, under the watchful eye of the head and deputy head of Gunung Kidul MUI, police officers and local government officers.⁷¹

Reports of locals taking action against religious activities thought to be deviant are not uncommon. Hundreds of villagers in Gurah (near Kediri) physically attacked the small hut used by a group whose guru was one Supriyono. He seemed odd: frequently wearing Indian-style clothing and an ear-stud and failing to report his presence to village officers. His followers — who numbered between three and something over ten — purified themselves with water holding seven kinds of flowers. On the grounds of such suspicious, presumed deviant, conduct not only was his hut destroyed but he was arrested and interrogated by the police.⁷² Villagers in Grogol (Kediri) objected to a small *dhikr* group that moved into their area. This so-called Dzikru Syahadatain consisted of both men and women who carried out their *dhikr* together in a closed room. Villagers claimed that this was a deviant sect that was not observed to fast during Ramadan and that failed to mix with locals. The practitioners of this *dhikr* denied these allegations. So the police stepped in and ordered the group to cease their activities in the name of keeping the peace.⁷³ One Miftahul Huda set up an Islamic school in Malang but was accused by local people of heretical teachings called Jamaah Safaatus Shalawat. These teachings were said to include praying without ritual purification with water beforehand and forbidding visits to graves. The local authorities ordered Miftahul Huda to cease his activities by 22 December 2007 but he ignored this. So local people attacked the school five days later and burned four buildings. The police stepped in to secure the area.⁷⁴ In Sidoarjo some 200 villagers broke up a group of up to 100 people who had been doing *dhikr* together for a year or so. It was claimed that they did not do ritual prayer, just the *dhikr* late in the night — an accusation that the leader of the group denied. Meetings with local religious leaders had been chaotic and nearly ended in conflict. So the villagers took the matter into their own hands.⁷⁵

⁷¹ *KR*, 31 Dec. 2007.

⁷² *RK*, 1 Dec. 2005.

⁷³ *RK*, 17 July 2007, 26 July 2007.

⁷⁴ *JktP* online, 28 Dec. 2007; *AntaraNews.com*, 27 Dec. 2007. I do not know what happened to this Miftahul Huda thereafter.

⁷⁵ *Tempo*, 11 Nov. 2009. The group called itself Yayasan Karisma Usada Mustika.

Sometimes just an individual acted. One Joko Sembung of Nganjuk, who claimed to be a devout orthodox Muslim, was accused of blasphemy on the evidence of a single neighbour. The accuser claimed that, while they were in a vehicle together, Joko Sembung had called the Prophet Muhammad a great deceiver. He was said also to have influenced his family with other deviant teachings. He was reported to the police, denied all accusations, but was nevertheless held by the police for three months pending trial and then sentenced to three years in jail.⁷⁶

It was not only the law against blasphemy that was used to pursue deviance. Yusman Roy was a convert to Islam from Christianity and a former boxer. At the *pesantren* he set up in Malang, he and his followers performed the daily prayers in Arabic, followed by Indonesian or Javanese translations, on the principle that people should understand what they were saying in their prayers. MUI promptly denounced this as heretical and many others agreed with this view, including NU's Said Agil Siradj, who said that among the non-negotiable things in Islam are the rituals of prayer. Unsurprisingly, the police acted on the MUI *fatwa* and arrested Yusman Roy. There was, however, public opposition to the police action. Ahmad Syafii Maarif of Muhammadiyah said that Yusman Roy may have been in error, but he had not committed a crime. The prominent *kyais* Ali Maschan Moesa and Imam Ghazali Said of NU also objected to the arrest. Ulil Abshar Abdalla of the Liberal Islamic Network (JIL, Jaringan Islam Liberal, about which more below) argued that MUI was in error to condemn Yusman Roy. He was tried but not found guilty on the charge of blasphemy. Rather, another law against distributing a leaflet expressing opposition to or humiliating another group was used to sentence him to two years in jail.⁷⁷

Continuing this pursuit of deviance in East Java, the local MUI in Probolinggo decreed that teachings being used in an alternative drug-addiction and cancer rehabilitation centre were heretical. This centre had been established in 1991 and had dealt with thousands of clients for 15 years. Now, however, MUI took notice of what was in a book of guidelines

⁷⁶ *Tempo*I, 4 Sept. 2002.

⁷⁷ *JktP* online, 10 May 2005, 19 Aug. 2005; discussion with Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said, *pesantren* An-Nur, Wonocolo, Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008; Assyauckanie, *Islam and the secular state*, p. 211. An editorial in *Tempo*, 12 Sept. 2005, supported the conviction of Yusman Roy, but said that two years was too heavy a sentence. There are circumstances in which bilingual prayers are allowed; see Arskal Salim, *Challenging the secular state: The Islamization of law in modern Indonesia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008), p. 111; Arif Zamhari, *Rituals of Islamic spirituality*, pp. 174, 185.

distributed among clients. This reputedly advocated free sex and the belief that Satan served God. A mob of hundreds of people attacked the clinic; the police stopped them and then charged the centre's seven counsellors with causing a disturbance. They were subsequently charged and convicted of blasphemy, and received sentences of three to five years' imprisonment.⁷⁸

Not all idiosyncratic versions of Islam have yet been denounced. Near Yogyakarta, a movement calling itself Islam Tauhid⁷⁹ grew, until today it can claim some 200 mosques, with its main strength in Kulonprogo. It was founded there in 1954 by one Widarso, who was reputed to have supernatural abilities and had a background in Muhammadiyah and the Masyumi party. Islam Tauhid is exclusivist: one must offer oaths of loyalty (*bayat*) to progress up its ladder of understanding, which has 72 levels. It interprets Islam through Javanese concepts, but nonetheless rejects most Javanese cultural traditions. For example, it teaches that God is to his creation as the puppeteer (*dalang*) is to the *wayang*, but its followers are not allowed to attend *wayang* performances. Followers sing songs in Javanese but do not employ *gamelan*. They reject many *abangan* and Traditionalist practices such as *slametans*, *tablilan* and visits to holy graves. They observe the five pillars of Islam (the confession of faith, five daily prayers, giving of alms, fasting in Ramadan and the pilgrimage to Mecca for those who were able) but, most remarkably, Islam Tauhid teaches that in the end prayer is undesirable, for it implies that humans can give orders to God. Its opponents accuse it of practising black arts and hypnotism and say its people are 'Javanese who won't Javanise' (*wong Jawa kok ora njawani*). During Soeharto's time, Islam Tauhid was suspected of being behind some sort of Masyumi plot, yet it survived and now eschews party politics. It is notable that women play a prominent role in Islam Tauhid. When prayer takes place, men and women stand in the same line, rather than the women being behind the men.

⁷⁸ *JktP*, 23 Sept. 2005. Free sex is an accusation frequently leveled at deviant groups across the world in all religions, so it is hard to know when to take the claim seriously. I have not seen the evidence on which the MUI made these accusations. Given the police enthusiasm for seeking out heresy and the frequent association of heresy with sex, it is not surprising that when the well-known guru Anand Krishna was accused of sexual harassment, the Jakarta police interrogated him also about the contents of his many books; *JktP* online, 6 Apr. 2010.

⁷⁹ The following discussion rests upon Ahmad Salehudin, *Satu dusun tiga masjid: Anomali ideologisasi agama dalam agama* (Pengantar M.C. Ricklefs; Yogyakarta: Pilar Media, 2007); discussion with Ahmad Salehudin, Yogyakarta, 5 Aug. 2006; emails from Ahmad Salehudin, 1 Sept. 2007 and 4 Feb. 2011.

In 1987, after the death of Islam Tauhid's founder, a female successor named Ibu Maimunah introduced the sect into the village of Gunung Sari, in the mountains south of Prambanan. This brought conflict and polarisation to this hamlet of only some 840 people, who split along lines of religious identity. Before 1987, Gunung Sari had a prayer house but no mosque. Suddenly it found itself with three, becoming what Ahmad Salehudin describes as 'one hamlet with three mosques' — one each for Islam Tauhid (built in 1987), NU and Muhammadiyah, the latter two having been begun in 1988. One would think that a version of Islam such as Islam Tauhid would attract a *fatwa* from MUI, but that has not happened down to the time of this writing. In 2007 it was reported that Islamic leaders were aware of a rather strange sect in Kulonprogo (and we may guess that this was a reference to Islam Tauhid) which had its own *pengajian* and refused to join in the *pengajian* of other Muslims, but its teachings were judged not yet to be in conflict with Islam.⁸⁰

Leaflets distributed in Mojokerto as Ramadan drew to a close in 2010 also failed to produce MUI denunciation. These reportedly claimed that there was another prophet after Muhammad and criticised usual forms of *dhikr* and *Qur'an* reading. A PKB politician demanded police action and said that if they did not act, NU's 'mass organisations' would be mobilised. But, oddly — albeit consistent with the immense variety of what goes on in Java — the local MUI was inclined to dismiss the leaflets as insignificant sensation-chasing and to take no action unless some sinister organisation was found to be behind them.⁸¹

MUI and DDII leaders sometimes displayed tolerance towards indigenous, non- or semi-Islamic practices. The head of DDII's Education Bureau in Surakarta said that activists should not go about 'chousing here is *bid'a*, there is *bid'a*; here is *shirk*, there is *shirk*'. Islam exists in many cultural forms, he said, and to suggest that being Muslim and being Javanese involved a contradiction was an Orientalist idea. The *kratons* of Surakarta and Yogyakarta just 'want to maintain acculturation of their culture that is syncretic'.⁸² Reaching even further into the Javanese world of the occult, the head of Bantul MUI spoke at an arts festival taking place at Parangtritis

⁸⁰ *Bernas*, 21 Nov. 2007.

⁸¹ *Tempo*, 7 Sept. 2010.

⁸² Arif Wibowo, quoted in Solopos, 19 Dec. 2008. *Bid'a* means unlawful innovations in Islam and *shirk* is polytheism.

on the south coast, the area most exposed to the occult powers of Ratu Kidul, the Goddess of the Southern Ocean. Without mentioning that powerful spiritual being, he said that not all art forms were to be regarded as contaminated by *shirk*. 'Because of that,' he went on, 'all the activities performed at Parangtritis represent enlightenment for the populace of Bantul specifically, and for other members of the public.'⁸³

There were some voices raised against the targeting of 'deviant sects', but they were few and could not alter the tide of events. We noted above the criticisms of MUI's *fatwa* against the Ahmadiyya that came from religious freedom and human rights activists. A demonstration in 2008 of some fifty young activists in the 'Yogyakarta Alliance for a Peaceful Indonesia' protested MUI's judging of groups as deviant. They displayed slogans such as 'Indonesia is not a religious state' and '*fatwa* deviant: no — *fatwa* justice: yes'. The coordinator said that 'it is as if the police and prosecutors don't act on the basis of the constitution and law, but rather pressure from a particular group'.⁸⁴ At a seminar at UIN Yogyakarta, most speakers regretted the government's action against groups such as the Ahmadis and said that it was the task of government to protect its citizens, including minorities. The NU leader Masdar F. Mas'udi said that it was up to God to decide what was deviant.⁸⁵ But many NU figures were fully behind the campaign against deviance, as we have seen above. Speaking at a commemoration of the founding of NU 82 years before, Ky. H. Malik Madany said that there were threats to the faith of NU followers, notably fundamentalism, liberalism and deviant sects. NU people should develop the principle of the middle way, moderate in the style of NU,⁸⁶ but in his mind this moderation evidently did not extend to those three threats that he named.

There were many highly combative, uncompromising figures involved in sniffing out and denouncing 'deviance'. They were characters whom people of all stripes readily described as coarse, harsh, narrow-minded (*kasar, keras, sempit*) and suchlike, thinking of the young Adian Husaini (b. Bojonegoro,

⁸³ Ky. H. Zahid Ridwan, reported in *KR*, 28 Nov. 2007. A report on the 'religious arts' and 'spiritual dances' performed at this Festival is in *KR*, 22 Dec. 2007.

⁸⁴ *Bernas*, 9 Jan. 2008; *KR*, 11 Jan. 2008. This Aliansi Jogja untuk Indonesia Damai brought together both Islamic and Christian interfaith and student groups and NGOs.

⁸⁵ *KR*, 25 March 2008.

⁸⁶ *KR*, 11 Feb. 2008.

1965)⁸⁷ of DDII, the older-generation Ky. H. Kholil Ridwan (b. Jakarta 1947) of DDII and MUI and many another fervent reformer. We have noted above the anti-deviance fervor of Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, who also attacked Traditionalist Sufism as being ‘the tendrils of the Devil’.⁸⁸ The atmosphere, observed Ahmad Syafii Maarif, had become very nasty.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ For examples of his combative (to put it generously) style, here mobilised against Liberal thought, see the collection of his essays in Adian Husaini, *Membendung arus liberalism di Indonesia: Kumpulan catatan akhbar pekan* (Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Kautsar, 2009). He graduated in veterinary science from the Bogor Agricultural Institute, followed by a doctorate from the International Islamic University Malaysia.

⁸⁸ In his book *Tasawwuf belitan Iblis* published in 2001, which (to quote p. 160) describes ‘the dangers of *bid’a* and ... the various rotten ulcers of Sufis or Sufi teachings’. See also Arif Zamhari, *Rituals of Islamic spirituality*, p. 29.

⁸⁹ Discussion with Prof. Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Yogyakarta, 14 Sept. 2008.

CHAPTER 10

Large-scale Modernist and Traditionalist movements on the defensive

While there are many individuals and agencies involved in the deepening influence of Islam in Javanese society, the largest players are unquestionably Muhammadiyah and NU. The precise numbers of their followers c. 2011 are not known, but it is conventional to say that NU has some 40 million followers and Muhammadiyah something of the order of 30 million. Muhammadiyah tends to dominate Islamic activities in cities and larger towns, while NU is dominant in the countryside. With their educational institutions (discussed in Chapter 8), mosques, multiple subsidiary organisations and health and welfare services, they play a prominent role in society.

It is common for both NU and Muhammadiyah leaders, as well as other observers, to describe these organisations as ‘moderate’, to distinguish them from Islamist and violent groups, but the term is of limited analytical use. Masdar Hilmy’s caveat in this regard is salutary:

We cannot define a clear fault line dividing peaceful Islamism from radical and violent Islamism. ... In reality, Islamism is on a borderless continuum where the boundary between it and so-called ‘moderate Islam’ is blurred. In other words, Islamist ideas are contiguous with ‘moderate’ ones on particular grounds and can gain broad resonance within some mainstream Islamic organisations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Despite their wide reputation as being ‘moderate’ organisations, some segments of these organisations are surprisingly sympathetic to key points of the Islamists’ agenda. That

is why their rhetoric can at times be remarkably similar to that of Islamist groups.¹

It is important to note that, in facing more radical groups like those covered in Chapter 12 below, NU and Muhammadiyah have found themselves in an essentially defensive position. This is, however, a new experience for neither of them. Muhammadiyah's founding a century ago was to a large degree defensive, seeking to defend the *ummah* against the threat of Christian missions. But it also sought to reform Islam, and within Muslim circles it held the initiative as it sought to change the way that Islam was understood and practiced. Traditionalism has in a sense always been defensive. NU was set up in 1926 to defend Sunni orthodoxy and Sufism from the Modernist assault, which Traditionalists saw as puritanical and which they labeled 'Wahhabi'. They both sought to defend themselves against the threat of Communism in the 1950s and 1960s and against the totalitarian aspirations of Soeharto's New Order in subsequent decades. As the 21st century opened, both NU and Muhammadiyah found themselves defending their ideas against new, more radical and even extreme ideas and agendas in the Muslim community.

Facing a common threat tended to bring NU and Muhammadiyah closer together. In 2002, the heads of the two organisations, Hasyim Muzadi and Syafii Maarif respectively, along with other leaders, held a closed-door meeting in Jakarta. At the subsequent news conference, they expressed concern about the rise of more radical voices, and said that in the past conflicts between them had distracted attention from concern for minority faiths. Now they were determined to work more closely together to resist radicalism and to promote inter-religious harmony.² Such closer cooperation was indeed visible as the years passed.³

¹ Hilmy, *Islamism and democracy*, p. 101. Here Hilmy also cites a similar view put by Greg Fealy.

² *JktP* online, 3 Jan. 2002. In the wake of the Bali bombings of October 2002, the head of UIN Jakarta and prominent Islamic intellectual Prof. Azyumardi Azra urged 'moderate Muslim leaders' to address the issue of radicalism head-on and reject 'literal interpretation of Islam'; *JktP*, 11 Dec. 2002.

³ For example, the Muhammadiyah leader Ky. H. Kusnin Basri of Kudus said that there had been many village-level conflicts between Muhammadiyah and NU in the past, but now the relationship was a cooperative one; discussion of 27 March 2004, Kudus. The senior NU leader there, Ky. H. Chusnan, claimed that Muhammadiyah no longer opposed local culture and that they engaged in joint *dakwah*; discussion of 27 March 2004, Kudus. In 2004, the Muhammadiyah University in Malang

NU remains a Traditionalist network led by *kyais*, with its legal thinking rooted in the four orthodox schools of Sunni Islam and its style much influenced by Sufism and the long history of Islam in Javanese cultural contexts. Consequently, as we have noted several times in this book, its ideas could overlap with *abangan* traditions, such that NU has sometimes functioned as a sort of bridge across the *santri-abangan* divide.⁴ NU's *kyais* are still believed to have supernatural capacities, such as communicating with the dead. Such communication is an important idea in Sufism, which is of central importance within Traditionalism, but it is an idea that divides NU thinking profoundly from that of Muhammadiyah, whose Modernist rationalism cannot make sense of such a belief. *Kyais* are also expected to know secret sciences such as invulnerability. Such supernaturally powerful figures and hidden forces are accepted among Traditionalists and make sense to many of *abangan* culture.

Four criteria to be regarded as a *kyai* (for there are no formal procedures to do this) were set out by the head of NU in East Java, Ky. H. Ali Maschan Moesa:

- ability to read the *kitab kuning* (the 'yellow books' that constitute the classic works of Traditionalist Islam),
- popularity as a *pengajian* leader,
- ability to lead ritual prayer, and
- ability to *nyuwuk* (a magical blowing of the breath to cure the sick).⁵

A fifth criterion that commonly applies, not mentioned by Ali Maschan Moesa, is descent from or authorisation by a preceding *kyai*.

published a volume of essays from both sides, most of them originally published in newspapers over 1999–2003, emphasising the importance of Muhammadiyah–NU cooperation, with introductions by Muhammadiyah's Syafii Maarif and NU's Salahuddin Wahid (Abdurrahman's brother): Ma'mun Murod Al-Barbasy *et al.* (eds), *Muhammadiyah–NU: Mendayung ukhrawah di tengah perbedaan* (intro. A. Syafii Ma'arif and Salahuddin Wahid; Malang: UMM Press, 2004).

⁴ Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said observed that the threat of the Revialist 'New Salafis' faced both by Traditionalists and followers of *kebatinan* were bringing the latter two together. Discussion with Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said, *pesantren* An-Nur, Wonocolo, Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008.

⁵ *RK*, 27 Feb. 2004. In Banyuwangi, *nyuwuk* is reportedly known only as a black magic practice; see Nicholas Herriman, 'A din of whispers: Community, state control and violence in Indonesia' (PhD thesis, University of Western Australia, 2007), pp. 101–2.

Kyais often enjoy high esteem from their communities although, as Pieterella van Doorn-Harder reminds us, 'In real life, it must be admitted, there are many not-so-holy *kyai*.'⁶ The truth of that observation notwithstanding, when a *kyai* or group of *kyais* hold a major public event, hundreds of people from surrounding areas are likely to attend. Such was the case with the group 'struggle' of Sufi spiritual exercises (*mujahadah*) led by 15 *kyais* in Yogyakarta in early 2009.⁷ Or again, when several *kyais* in Kediri led communal 'great *dhikr*' in commemoration of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d. 1166), the founder of the Qadiriyya Sufi order, and of the approach of Ramadan, some 7,000 people packed the grounds of the government office where it was held.⁸

NU continues to be organisational home to charismatic *kyais*, among whom Gus Mus (Ky. H. Mustofa Bisri, b. 1944) of Rembang is a prominent example.⁹ His father and grandfather were respected Traditionalist leaders as well. Gus Mus studied in *pesantrens* in Java and at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, where he was a friend of Abdurrahman Wahid and, like him, displayed little interest in his studies. He returned to Indonesia in the 1970s. He is known for his idiosyncrasies, independence, creativity and lack of pomposity. He is also a noted poet and artist. During the national controversy over the raunchy 'drilling' style of Inul Daratista, which the East Java MUI declared to be pornographic, Gus Mus painted a picture of Inul dancing in the midst of a gathering of *kyais* including himself, which he provocatively entitled '*dhikr* with Inul'. He displays a lack of interest in administrative or political roles — having several times declined requests to become head of NU — and although he served as a PPP member of the provincial and national parliaments for a time in the Soeharto era he found this unrewarding and stepped down.¹⁰ He has in fact expressed some reservations about democracy

⁶ Van Doorn-Harder, *Women shaping Islam*, p. 170.

⁷ KR, 8 Jan. 2009; this was an observation of the date of 10 Sura (Muharram), when the commended (but not obligatory) fast of Ashura is carried out by pious Sunnis.

⁸ RK, 11 Oct. 2004.

⁹ The following rests upon the rather hagiographic but nevertheless useful account in [Abu Asma Anshari, Abdullah Zaim and Naibul Umam ES,] *Ngetan-ngulon ketemu Gus Mus: Refleksi 61 tahun K.H.A. Mustofa Bisri* (Semarang: HMT Foundation, 2005), esp. pp. 65–8, 76, 90, 142–8, 202–3, 220, 223–4.

¹⁰ He is, however, on the advisory board of the Libforall foundation, founded in 2003 by Abdurrahman Wahid with the American C. Holland Taylor. Its principle aim is to 'support moderate and progressive Muslims' in working for 'peaceful, tolerant and free societies'. See the foundation's website at <http://www.libforall.org/>.



Illustration 26 Ky. H. Mustofa Bisri (Gus Mus) with his painting 'dhikr with Inul', Rembang, 2005 (photo by Virginia Hooker)

handing all power to the people. He is opposed to state imposition of *shari'a*. He is bluntly critical of MUI and its denunciations of deviant sects, and of vigilante violence. He observed,

If I can make an analogy, if we have a food stall and then there is another food stall that is like ours and clearly some or many of our customers switch to that stall, what do we have to do? According to me, we have to look at ourselves, then upgrade our management, service and the quality of the food. ... Or at most inform our customers that the other stall is not a branch of ours. It is not for us to call the police to shut that stall, let alone burn it.¹¹

Another charismatic *kyai* was Gus Maksum (Ky. H. Maksum Djauhari) of Kediri, who died in 2003 at the age of 57. He was famed for his supernatural capacities and was a striking figure with his long hair, wispy beard and simple dress. He was a master of indigenous martial arts (*pencak silat*) and was leader of NU's martial arts organisation Pagar Nusa. Gus Maksum

¹¹ [Abu Asma Anshari, Abdullah Zaim and Naibul Umam ES,] *Ngetan-ngulon ketemu Gus Mus*, p. 144, quoting comments by Gus Mus published in *Suara Merdeka*, 24 Aug. 2005.

also was believed to be a master of the secret sciences of invulnerability (*ilmu kanuragan*), particularly invulnerability to sharp weapons (*ilmu kebal bacok*). 'That was very useful when the *ninja* issue erupted in 1998,' he said (we will discuss these *ninjas* shortly). Tens of his students lived in his house with him and were treated as if they were his own children. He also cared for children who were the victims of communal violence in Sampit, Central Kalimantan, and was a defender of the environment. By the application of coconut water and (supernaturally powerful) rituals, he cured drug addicts. When he died, it was estimated that more than 10,000 people attended his burial.¹²

In the orthodoxy-enforcing atmosphere created by MUI and others, NU ideas about the occult were at some risk of denunciation. When MUI denounced Ahmadiyya, it also issued a *fatwa* against people believing in prophesies (*peramalan* or Arabic *kahana*) and supernatural healing (*perdukunan* or Arabic *irafa*).¹³ The venerable Ky. H. Idris Marzuki of Lirboyo *pesantren* supported the judgment against the Ahmadis but, he said, 'With regard to *perdukunan*, hang on a minute. If it isn't in conflict with Islamic *shari'a* it's not a problem. The same is true regarding prophesying, for prophesying is after all a custom, just so long as you don't believe in it completely.'¹⁴ Such beliefs carried on among NU followers despite the criticism of non-Traditionalists and MUI. One example is the practice of *sumpah pocong* (shrouded oath), where one swears to one's innocence while wrapped in a shroud and lying in a coffin in a mosque, a practice that may be demanded by villagers whether or not police have resolved on the innocence of someone. This is done in the belief that, if the person has lied, God will subject him or her to torments in the grave.¹⁵

The presumed-to-be supernaturally potent and gnomic style of some *kyais* is nicely illustrated by Ky. H. Salman Dahlawi, the head of the Naqshabandiyya *tarekat* (Khalidiyah branch) headquartered at his small *pesantren* Al-Manshur at Popongan, near Klaten in Central Java. When,

¹² RK, 23 Dec. 2003. See further Tim Pengelola Majalah Misykat, *Gus Maksum: Sosok & kiprahnya*.

¹³ The MUI *fatwa* of July 2005 may be found at http://www.mui.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=95:perdukunan-kahanah-dan-peramalan-irafah&catid=25:fatwa-majelis-ulama-indonesia. For a discussion of these general issues in Islam, see Gabriel Mandel Khān, 'Magic', in Jane Dammen McAuliffe (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of the Qur'ān* (6 vols; Leiden: Brill, 2001–6), vol. 3, p. 245.

¹⁴ Quoted in *MmK*, 2 Aug. 2005.

¹⁵ Such a case is reported from Jombang in *Tempo*I, 8 March 2010.

with others, I visited him in 2006, his room was full of a stream of visitors, mostly male but some women, seeking his blessing, advice, supernatural intervention, and so on. Ky. Salman was venerable and elderly — he said that he was 74 — and conveyed an aura of great sanctity. Everyone calling upon him kissed his hand and whispered in his presence. His responses were almost inaudible. One visitor opened two bottles of water for Ky. Salman to breathe prayers into. On departure, most pressed money into his hand while holding and kissing it. Our discussion — such as it was — consisted of very few words (partly in Indonesian, partly in Javanese). Why, I asked, is Sufism growing in our time, when some people claim that mysticism is inconsistent with modernity? Ky. Salman's answer was '*watak*' (character) — possibly meaning the 'character' of Sufism, or of modern people, or of our times or of something else. Afterwards one of his followers said that he did not know what the *kyai* meant, either. The visit left an impression of the influence, sanctity and supernatural prowess ascribed to a figure such as Ky. Salman, but



Illustration 27 Ky. H. Salman Dahlawi, Popongan, 2006



Illustration 28 Ky. H. Muslim Imampura (Mbah Lim), Karang Anom, 2006

it was also a useful reminder that the most holy are not necessarily the most informative.¹⁶ The same is true of the venerable Ky. H. Muslim Imampura (Mbah Lim), recognised by some as a *waliullah* — a saint who stands close to God. He is elderly — probably in his 80s — toothless, idiosyncratic, with very slurred speech, conveying a welcoming air of conviviality and sanctity

¹⁶ Visit to Ky. H.M. Salman Dahlawi, *pesantren* Al-Manshur, Popongan, Klaten, 5 Nov. 2006.

all at once. In other words, a very Javanese sort of *kyai*.¹⁷ He suffered some illness in the distant past and since then has been unable to speak clearly. So someone close to him acts as a 'translator' when he meets people. But, it is claimed, when he recites the *Qur'an* he can do so clearly.

Kyais are frequently called upon to deal with what people think are supernatural threats. They may be asked to cure suspected cases of individual spirit possession or to exorcise school girls caught up in mass hysteria — although in at least one case to no effect.¹⁸ The greatest call upon their supernatural powers occurred when, in 1998–9, so-called *ninjas* were spotted, particularly in the Banyuwangi area.¹⁹ These were reputedly black-clad villains who could leap over buildings and perform other feats, which multiple witnesses were prepared to attest to. Practitioners of black magic (*dukun santet*) were also believed to be at work. Multiple — some claimed over a hundred — Traditionalist *kyais* lost their lives. People mobilised to defend themselves and perhaps up to 200 suspected *ninjas* and *dukun santen* were murdered by villagers. Many of those killed turned out to be innocent people who were mentally ill. Such outbreaks occurred in West Java, too, and reportedly claimed up to 300 lives.²⁰

In response to the wave of *ninja* and *dukun santet* deaths, the prominent NU leader Said Agil Siradj told *Jawa Pos* that black magic was always present everywhere, and Banyuwangi was particularly famous for sorcery, but it was forbidden by Islam. Black magicians usually inherited their power from their ancestors, he said, and had to use it if they were to avoid disaster, so they always had to seek human victims. To protect themselves, Muslims should read the *Qur'an* frequently, particularly the 'throne verse' (*Ayat al-*

¹⁷ Discussion with Ky. H. Muslim Imampura (Mbah Lim), *pesantren* Al-Muttaqien Pancasila Sakti, Karang Anom, Klaten, 27 March 2006.

¹⁸ *Tempo*, 11 Feb. 2009, reporting a case in Jember, where two *kyais* and three 'paranormals' had been summoned.

¹⁹ The most comprehensive study of these episodes is to be found in Herriman, 'Din of whippers'. See also Nicholas Herriman, 'The great rumor mill: Gossip, mass media, and the ninja fear', *Journal of Asian Studies* vol. 69, no. 3 (Aug. 2010), pp. 723–48; Arif Zamhari, *Ritual of Islamic spirituality*, pp. 168–70. Detailed reports of various cases and of the various — often dubious — kinds of information available at or just after the time may also be found in Abdul Manan, Imam Sumaatmadja and Even Sp Wardhana, *Geger santet Banyuwangi* ([Jakarta:] Institut Studi Arus Informasi, 2001). There were also episodes in Malang, Probolinggo, Lumajang and Lamongan; *SP* online, 20 Oct. 1998; *KmpsO*, 21 Oct. 1998.

²⁰ *JP* online, 20 Apr. 1999.

Kursi, *Qur'an* 2:255, which speaks of the throne of God extending over the heavens and the earth, of God's omnipotence and omniscience). Any member of the family struck by black magic should be taken to a *kyai* to be cured, for many *kyais* could do this, Said Agil said.²¹

Again, Keith Thomas's work on 16th- and 17th-century England should remind us that ideas such as these are neither uniquely Islamic nor particularly Javanese. Traditionalist Islam in Java was in a position rather like Thomas's description of the medieval Catholic Church: 'In the Mass, the healing power of saints and relics, and the exorcism of the possessed, the Catholic Church had a magical repertoire It was precisely because the Church had its own magic that it frowned on that of others.' He ends his book by observing appositely, 'If magic is to be defined as the employment of ineffective techniques to allay anxiety when effective ones are not available, then we must recognize that no society will ever be free from it.'²²

Kyais who convey sanctity and have supernatural reputations are highly regarded in a society so steeped in ideas of the occult, but *kyais* are not just other-worldly figures, as we have seen. In Kediri, where they are so prominent, they have been involved in encouraging and facilitating communications between the giant Gudang Garam tobacco factory and its employees when there are industrial disputes. In 2002, for example, the NU leaders issued advice (*taushiah*) supporting the action of the union in defending the rights of workers, urging the management to be more receptive and prudent, asking both sides to restrain themselves and security authorities not to be repressive, and advising all to be wary of provocations.²³

Since the time of the Japanese occupation, *kyais* have been political actors. In contemporary Indonesia, NU has adopted a position that rejects ideas of an Islamic state, the introduction of *shari'a* law or HTI-style demands for a caliphate, and instead regards the Indonesian national state, governed by the amended 1945 constitution, to be final. We have seen NU as an effective employer of violence, particularly during the Revolution and the

²¹ *JP*, 26 Oct. 1998. Said Agil also said that the killings in Banyuwangi had the smell of politics about them — as everything did in those days just after the fall of Soeharto. On the 'Throne verse', see Jamal Elias, 'Throne of God', in Jane Dammen McAuliffe (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of the Qur'an* (6 vols; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2001–6), vol. 5, p. 276.

²² Thomas, *Religion and the decline of magic*, pp. 326, 800.

²³ *Taushiah Pengurus Cabang NU Kabupaten dan Kota Kediri*, Kediri, 18 Apr. 2002. Other examples of such disputes at Gudang Garam are reported in *Kmps*, 12 Apr. 2000; *KmpsO*, 14 Apr. 2000, 14 June 2002; *Republika* online, 30 Jan. 2003.

mid-1960s, but in contemporary Indonesia it rejects the use of violence.²⁴ Its Banser paramilitaries turn out to guard churches when it looks like trouble is looming²⁵ and, it need hardly be said, protected *kyais* and *pesantrens* from attacks when it was thought that *ninjas* or black magicians were about.

As we pointed out in Chapter 3 regarding the Japanese occupation of Java, there has long been an important difference between Modernist and Traditionalist leadership with regard to political involvement. The mainly urban Modernists have never had any problems with being engaged in political activity, if that could promote their cause. Traditionalist leadership, however, consists of *kyais* whose social and religious standing and influence rest upon from their evidently other-worldly gifts and aims. The more they become involved in the inevitably rather grubby, compromise-filled world of politics, the more others doubt just how other-worldly and pious, how close to God, they really are. Entering the world of politics makes *kyais* seem ordinary — the one thing that no *kyai* should be. And the more ordinary they seem, the less people think their advice to be free of self- or party interest. Thus, from the Japanese occupation to the present, Traditionalist *kyais* have had to face a dilemmatic relationship between their socio-religious standing and their political activism.

It is clear that the involvement of Traditionalist religious leaders in politics since the fall of Soeharto has diminished their standing in the eyes of the community. The PKB party had its roots in NU and was led by one of the most charismatic and idiosyncratic of all *kyais*, Abdurrahman Wahid. We noted in Chapter 7 that his brief time as President of Indonesia (1999–2001) was far from a success. His erratic yet domineering leadership style alienated many *kyais* (among many others), so that PKB itself split into factions and then in 2007 spawned a competing *kyai*-led party, PKNNU, which, however, won only 1.5 per cent of the national vote in 2009 and therefore failed to gain a single seat in the national parliament. Even while some *kyais* were getting involved in party politics, other NU leaders protested that this was

²⁴ NU leaders have made multiple statements to this effect. For example, see Hasyim Muzadi quoted in *JktP* online, 29 Dec. 2002; Said Agil Siradj quoted in *JktP* online, 17 July 2010. Of course, no organisation is perfect or in complete control of its constituents, especially when they number some 40 million. When hundreds of members of NU's martial arts body Pagar Nusa were on their way to a gathering in East Java, they beat up people along the road and put three victims into hospital; *AntaraNews.com*, 15 Jan. 2010.

²⁵ For example, on Christmas eve 2005, Banser mobilised 13,000 members to guard churches in East Java and 3,500 in Central Java; *Tempo*, 24 Dec. 2005.

inconsistent with their fundamentally moral and religious calling, that it caused damaging splits among them and diminished their standing.²⁶ Their compromises did sometimes lack obvious holiness. This was notably so in Kediri, where PKB accepted the support of one Heri Baung, the boss of illegal gambling, alcohol and prostitution and leader of several thousand assistants of doubtful piety. He said that he had given up his worst activities and went on the *hajj* in 2003, but not everyone was convinced of this change of character.²⁷

One NU leader near Yogyakarta said that NU followers had adopted the adage, 'for studying the *Qur'an* follow the *kyai*, for politics follow yourselves'.²⁸ Four hundred people surveyed in Jekulo (Kudus) were

Table 24 Reasons given for supporting political parties in Jekulo, 2004 parliamentary election²⁹

Reason given	% of respondents
Felt close to the candidate	40
Party connection with a mass organisation	22
Followed <i>kyai</i> or social leader	13
Attracted to party vision and mission	12
Because of leading figure of party	7
Religious emotion	2
No reply	4

²⁶ For instance, there are such reports in *JktP* online, 19 May 2007 (quoting the Minister of Religious Affairs Maftuh Basyuni and NU's Ky. H. Masdar F. Mas'udi); *Kmps*, 24 July 2007; *Tempo*, 29 Sept. 2008 (quoting the top NU leader and head of MUI Ky. H. Sahal Mahfudh); *Surya*, 9 July 2009, 10 July 2009, 14 July 2009. Similar judgments were expressed by Ky. H. Malik Madani (discussion, Yogyakarta, 21 May 2008). My colleagues *in situ* commented frequently on the declining social standing of *kyais*. Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said, however, dissented from this general view (discussion of 23 Oct. 2008, Wonocolo, Surabaya), as did Ky. H. Idris Marzuqi (discussion of 29 Nov. 2007, Lirboyo, Kediri).

²⁷ There are multiple reports on this, e.g., *MmK*, 29 March 2004; *RK*, 1 Apr. 2004. Heri Baung's full name is Ahmad Heri Subagyo. The alliance with him was a flop, for most of his followers still voted for PDIP, which led to physical conflict; *MmK*, 13 Apr. 2004, 21 Apr. 2004.

²⁸ *Yen ngaji nderek kyai, yen politik pribadi-pribadi*; said by Drs H. Suharto Djuwaini, chair of the Bantul NU and a senior figure in the Department of Religious Affairs, Yogyakarta, 15 Apr. 2008 (interviewed by Arif Maftuhin).

²⁹ Achmad Ta'yuddin, 'Masyarakat toleran', p. 73. *Ibid.*, p. 111, tells us that of those who voted for PKB, 23 per cent said they did so because they were following their

asked on what grounds they had made their political choices in the 2004 parliamentary election. They responded as seen in Table 24, confirming how little influence was wielded by either *kyais* or the national figures leading political parties, and how free voters felt to choose whatever local candidate they most trusted.

It is a token of the declining influence of *kyais* that election candidates endorsed by them often failed to win elections. In August 2004, 25 leading *kyais* of East Java — led by Iris Marzuqi of Lirboyo — issued a call which, they said, rested on ‘spiritual advice from the great *ulamas* of the Hijaz’, that people should vote for the combination of Megawati and Hasyim Muzadi for President and Vice-President of Indonesia in the second round of the presidential election of that year.³⁰ This was followed by more such advice from the leading *kyais* of Lirboyo and Ploso in September.³¹ When the election was held in September, a majority at polling booths located at *pesantrens* voted for Megawati and Hasyim Muzadi,³² but that was the end of the *kyais*’ influence. Overall, 59.7 per cent of voters in East Java chose instead the combination of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Yusuf Kalla.³³

Another dramatic example was the 2008 election for mayor and deputy mayor of Kediri — a town that is commonly thought of as dominated by Traditionalist *kyais*. They split among themselves in supporting various pairs of candidates, all of whom did poorly. The newly elected mayor and deputy were ‘cleanskins’ — people without previous party political identities — and, even more remarkably, Dr Samsul Ashar (who won as mayor) had a Muhammadiyah background and his deputy, Abdullah Abu Bakar, had Arab ancestry. The new team immediately showed itself to share the general view repeatedly illustrated in this book that as heads of local government their responsibilities extended to religious life, for Dr Samsul expressed the

kyai, 20 per cent because PKB was the party of NU, 46 per cent because they were close to the PKB candidate, and only 4 per cent because it was led by Abdurrahman Wahid.

³⁰ *Seruan ulama pengasuh pondok pesantren*, Madinah Al-Munawaroh, 11 Aug. 2004 (seen in the NU museum, Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008).

³¹ *Taushiyah Masyayikh Lirboyo dan Ploso*, Kediri, 4 Sept. 2004.

³² This was true at Lirboyo, Ploso, the LDII *pesantren* and other such venues; RK, 21 Sept. 2004.

³³ Calculated from *Tabulasi Nasional Pemilu — Pemilihan Presiden Putaran II* at <http://tnp.kpu.go.id>. The percentages voting for SBY and Kalla were 51.7 in Central Java and 59.7 in Yogyakarta.

TAUSHIYAH MASYAYIKH LIRBOYO DAN PLOSO

BISMILLAHIRROHMANIRROHIM


Dengan senantiasa memohon Ridho Allah SWT, dan mempertimbangkan hal-hal sebagai berikut :

1. Demi Kemaslahatan dan Kebesaran Nahdhotul Ulama;
2. Demi menjaga Keutuhan dan Kedaulatan Negara Republik Indonesia (NKRI) dari campur tangan pihak asing;
3. Demi terciptanya negara yang Adil dan Makmur Baldatun Thoyyibatun Wa Robbun Ghofur


Maka kami, Pengasuh Pondok Pesantren Lirboyo dan Pondok Pesantren Al Falah Ploso, **MENYERUKAN** kepada seluruh lembaga, Pondok Pesantren beserta segenap Alumni, Santri dan Wali Santri serta seluruh warga Nahdliyin untuk **BERSATU PADU DALAM MEMENANGKAN PASANGAN HJ. MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI DAN KH. A. HASYIM MUZADI** DALAM PEMILU PRESIDEN PUTARAN KEDUA.

Kediri, 4 September 2004


KAMI YANG MEMBERIKAN TAUSHIYAH


KH. AHMAD IDRIS MARZUQI


Lirboyo


KH. A. ZAINUDDIN DJAZULI


Ploso


KH. M. ANWAR MANSHUR

Lirboyo


KH. NURUL HUDA DJAZULI

Ploso


KH. M. ABD. AZIZ MANSHUR
Ketua Umum PP. HIMASAL



KH. ABDULLOH KAFABIHI MAHRUS
Lirboyo

Illustration 29 Published advice by senior *kyais* of Kediri for NU followers to vote for Megawati Sukarnoputri and Hasyim Muzadi in 2004

hope that the people of Kediri would draw closer to God and become more diligent in observing their daily prayers together in mosques.³⁴

In 2009, *Radar Kediri* editorialised that the public believed 'that many *kyais* more and more forget about the people. They are distracted by worldly wealth and a warehouse-full of ambition for power or office.'³⁵ The prominent NU leader Ky. H. Ali Maschan Moesa said that the status of being a *kyai* had become such that there was even a growing tendency for the sons of *kyais* no longer to wish to follow in their fathers' footsteps.³⁶ A group calling themselves 'The Younger Generation of NU' (Generasi Muda NU) gathered on the town square of Kediri in 2004, performed both an exorcism (*ruwatan*) and *tablilan*, and called upon all NU leaders to withdraw from party politics.³⁷ In 2007, a *Jawa Pos* survey of 486 students at 13 major *pesantrens* in East Java revealed that 47 per cent said that they would not follow the political choice of their *kyais* in the upcoming provincial election.³⁸ The national-level leadership elected at NU's national congress in 2010 for the next five years was led by Said Agil Siradj, who pledged to keep NU out of politics.³⁹

Involvement in party politics was not the only issue that made some younger people of Traditionalist background dissatisfied with their elders, for even *kyais'* interpretations of Islam were coming under challenge. We noted in Chapter 6 above how, in the 1980s and early 1990s, younger NU activists set up organisations such as P3M (Association for *Pesantren* and Community Development, established in 1983), Lakpesdam (Committee for the Study and Development of Human Resources, 1985) and LKiS (Centre for the Study of Islam and Social Transformations, 1992). These promoted more exploratory, Liberal versions of Islam and supported the socially engaged activism that followed from them. Thus, Islamic Traditionalist epistemology was giving birth to Liberal Islamic agendas, particularly (but not only) among younger thinkers. Of the multiple groups encouraging more Liberal thought, one of the most prominent was JIL (Jaringan Islam Liberal, Liberal Islamic

³⁴ The occasion was an observation simultaneously of the supposed 1,130th anniversary of the city's foundation and of the Prophet's night journey to heaven (*isra'* and *mir'aj*), where Emha Ainun Najib and his group Kiai Kanjeng performed; *RK*, 26 July 2009.

³⁵ *RK*, 22 May 2009.

³⁶ Discussion with Ky. H. Ali Maschan Musa, Surabaya, 22 June 2007.

³⁷ *RK*, 20 June 2004.

³⁸ *JP*, 9 Aug. 2007.

³⁹ *Tempo*I, 27 March 2010, 1 Apr. 2010.




Illustration 30 Cover of the JIL volume
The face of Liberal Islam in Indonesia, 2002

Network), established formally in 2001 but with roots in earlier discussions and networks. *Jawa Pos* became the principle platform for columns written by JIL thinkers and activists, led particularly by Ulil Abshar Abdalla (b. Pati 1967 and son-in-law to Ky. H. Mustofa Bisri [Gus Mus]).

The revolutionary character of JIL can be gauged from the following passage, written by Luthfi Assyaukanie (b. Jakarta, 1967), one of its leaders, in a book that republished many of the columns originally in *Jawa Pos*. This passage challenges some of the most cherished views among Sunnis regarding the *Qur'an*:

Islam is not a religion that existed with all its concepts in complete form at the moment it happened. The religion evolved. ... The *Qur'an* is not a book that already existed that was handed down by Gabriel to Muhammad and then it was just left to the Prophet's companions to carry it out. The *Qur'an* was 'created' by the place, by the time and by the interaction between the Prophet and Arab society. This explains why there are many verses which begin with the phrase 'they asked me'. Such verses indicate how much the *Qur'an* is not a command that descended from the skies without consideration of the social context and circumstances.⁴⁰

This was a direct challenge to the view of the medieval Ash'ari theologians that the *Qur'an* was eternal, which has remained Sunni orthodoxy down to the present, in opposition to the Mu'tazili rationalists' doctrine of the createdness of the *Qur'an*.⁴¹

Ulil Abshar Abdalla also challenged deeply cherished beliefs about the Qur'anic verse (33:40) that proclaims Muhammad to be the 'seal of the prophets', conventionally taken to mean that he was the final prophet sent by God. Ulil wrote,

I wish to make a new interpretation of the Qur'anic statement, 'Muhammad is not the father of any one of you men; he is God's Messenger

⁴⁰ Luthfi Assyaukanie (ed.), *Wajah liberal Islam di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Jaringan Islam Liberal, Teater Utan Kayu, 2002), p. xix. The book had a provocative cover design, featuring multiple clocks marking the passing of time and a spotlighted time-bomb. By this time, Assyaukanie held undergraduate degrees from the University of Jordan in philosophy and Islamic law and a master's degree in philosophy from the International Islamic University Malaysia. His earlier education was in the *pesantren* Attaqwa in Bekasi and he later completed a PhD at the University of Melbourne.

⁴¹ On this issue, see Richard C. Martin, 'Createdness of the Qur'ān' in Jane Dammen McAuliffe (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of the Qur'ān* (6 vols; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2001–6), vol. 1, p. 467.

and the seal of the prophets'.⁴² In traditional interpretation, this verse is seen as an argument that Muhammad was the final Prophet. The idea of Muhammad as the final Prophet can make it seem as if the Islamic revelation is not progressive, as if the history of Islam is not progressive, because everything goes back to the Prophet. After all, there is no prophet after Muhammad. That is just one possible interpretation.

This verse, in the standard recitation of the *Qur'an*, can be read in two possible ways. ... *Khatim* means the closing of the prophets, but it can also be read as *khatam* meaning a ring [bearing a seal]. I prefer the second reading. Thereby, the Prophet is like a finger among other fingers, but this one 'finger' is so extraordinary because it wears an esteemed ring. Do I thereby believe that the history of prophethood did not end after the death of the Prophet [Muhammad]? I say, yes! That is why I once said that all individual Muslims are 'little Muhammads' who bear the burden of prophetic history just like Muhammad in the past.⁴³

Such revolutionary, iconoclastic rethinking enthused many younger Muslims and won attention and respect from both Indonesian and foreign scholars of Indonesian affairs; it also attracted support from some *kyais*, but produced storms of outrage from more conservative religious circles. In November 2002 a group of 80 religious scholars gathered in Bandung (West Java), including Traditionalist *ulamas* and *kyais* from various *pesantrens* across Java, as well as people from Persatuan Islam, Muhammadiyah, Partai Keadilan (which would shortly become PKS) and others. The meeting considered three main issues before them — the recent arrest of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in the wake of the Bali bombings, a new anti-terrorism bill and an article by Ulil in *Kompas* of 18 November (perhaps implying that these three were of comparable significance). These *ulamas* issued a *fatwa* declaring that those who insulted Islam should be put to death and called upon the police to heed their decision, but they claimed that this was not just aimed at Ulil. The police should also break up 'all networks and activities ... that insult Islam, God and God's Messenger', for there were strong indications that an anti-Islamic conspiracy was afoot.⁴⁴ JIL was obviously what they had in mind. Seeking to calm the atmosphere, Masdar F. Mas'udi issued a statement on behalf of NU's advisory board (*Syuriyah*) making four points:

⁴² As translated in *Qur'an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem*, p. 269.

⁴³ In Assyaukanie, *Wajah liberal Islam*, 77. Ulil Abshar Abdalla was educated in *pesantrens* on Java's north coast and then completed a first degree at LIPIA in Jakarta. He later did an MA at Boston University.

⁴⁴ *Hidayatullah.com*, 4 Dec. 2002; *Tempo*, 19 Dec. 2002.

(1) that Ulil's views were not motivated by a wish to insult Islam, God or the Prophet, (2) that physical threats against a person merely because of his opinions must be rejected, (3) that in order to avoid misunderstandings Ulil should elaborate his ideas and (4) that 'because there are no human ideas that are absolutely true' the right of others to object to Ulil's thoughts must be respected, no matter how strongly they might wish to put those objections, so long as this was done without threats and in a polite way.⁴⁵ There was, however, little politesse noticeable among Ulil's enemies.

No one tried to murder Ulil at that stage, although he was one of the targets of several mail bombs in Jakarta in early 2011 (but was unhurt).⁴⁶ In August 2005, a gathering of NU *kyais* from across Java and Madura at Lirboyo *pesantren* in Kediri issued advice (*taushiyah*) that JIL should be banned.⁴⁷ This followed upon MUI *fatwas* of July 2005 declaring liberalism, pluralism and secularism *haram*, decreeing that Muslims should not marry non-Muslims,⁴⁸ rejecting joint prayers with non-Muslims and (as we have seen above) renewing an older *fatwa* declaring Ahmadiyya a deviant sect. In these *fatwas*, liberalism was defined as interpretations of the *Qur'an* and *Hadiths* 'using free reasoning, and only accepting religious doctrines which are consistent just with reasoning'.⁴⁹ JIL was unmistakably the principal target.

Traditionalist leaders' responses to these younger Islamic Liberals were mixed, but for the more conservative and hostile among them, this challenge came just as they themselves were moving towards more doctrinaire versions of their faith. Increasing conservatism and even Wahhabi influence among *kyais* was noted in some quarters, the latter attributed to the experiences *kyais* had while studying and undertaking the pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ The text of the statement of 27 December 2002 may be found in Riyadi, *De-konstruksi tradisi*, pp. 181–3.

⁴⁶ The main perpetrator of this bombing campaign was convicted under Indonesia's terrorism law and sentenced to 18 years in prison in March 2012. Several accomplices received shorter sentences. *JktP* online 6 March 2012.

⁴⁷ *Hidayatullah.com*, 8 Aug. 2005.

⁴⁸ We may note that this ruling was in spite of specific *Qur'anic* approval for a Muslim man to marry a pious Jewish or Christian woman, as indeed had the Prophet Muhammad himself.

⁴⁹ The *fatwa* texts may be found at http://www.mui.or.id/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=65&Itemid=73.

⁵⁰ This view was expressed in discussion by Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said, Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008; and by A. Rubaidi and Mashuri, leaders of the Inter-Religious Forum (Forum Lintas Agama) in Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008, with reference particularly to the *kyais* of East Java.

The 1999 national conference of NU passed several decisions that seemed narrow in their religious understandings and a rejection of the Liberal positions associated with Abdurrahman Wahid. These included forbidding inter-religious prayer (not an unusual practice in Indonesia) and declaring it unlawful for a non-Muslim to be a political leader. Reversing the 1984 decision to accept *Pancasila* as its foundation, the conference declared that NU was returning to Islam as its sole foundation.⁵¹ This trend continued in later meetings, such as the national conference of 2010, which decreed (despite the minimum age requirements for marriage in the national law) that in *shari'a* law there was no minimum age for marriage. It was also decreed that Muslims should not be buried together with non-Muslims⁵² — a greater separation in death, we may note, than Indonesians commonly experience in life. In the election for NU leadership for the coming five years — in the end won by Said Agil Siradj as general secretary and Sahal Mahfudh as head (*rois aam*) of NU's advisory board (*Syuriah*) — the conference rules banned anyone with Liberal views from standing. Nevertheless Ulil Abshar Abdalla quixotically did so and gained a few votes in the first round.⁵³

We noted at the start of this chapter that NU was a defensive organisation for Traditionalism from the start, and by the early 21st century it was perhaps more so than ever. It need hardly be said that a significant decline in the standing and influence of Traditionalist *kyais* as we have noted here facilitated challenges to their understandings of Islam. These came from Liberal interpretations of Islam, but not only from that direction. Among others, the Modernist challenge remained significant, not least because of the extraordinary organisational reach and resources of Muhammadiyah. As we turn to Muhammadiyah in post-Soeharto Indonesia, let us note that the contest for authority that we have been discussing — like almost everything else discussed in these post-1998 chapters — represents a debate within an Islamic frame of reference. These are hotly contested arguments about what Islam is. All sides, however, accept the dominance that Islam should have in the lives of Muslims — which, for Liberals, means essentially dominance in their private lives but which, for others, is a much broader view seeking conformity both in what people think and in what they do. Within Javanese society, there had long since ceased to be any significant voice disputing the dominance of Islam. Not even the Christian minority

⁵¹ Bush, *Nahdlatul Ulama and the struggle for power*, pp. 166–7.

⁵² *JktP* online, 27 March 2010.

⁵³ *JktP* online, 28 March 2010.

could credibly deny that, however much it might hope to win some Muslims to Christian beliefs.

Muhammadiyah remains the foremost Islamic Modernist organisation throughout Indonesia, but the tensions inherent in Modernism have created problems for it. Islamic Modernism rested from its beginnings on two potentially divergent aspirations. The first was to return to the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* as the foundation for knowing what Islam is. To this end, Modernism employed human reason and was committed to modern educational innovations to enhance the capacity of reason. Hence Muhammadiyah's massive presence in the realm of modern education. The second aspiration was for a more general Islamic renewal or modernisation (*tajdid* — a ubiquitous term in Muhammadiyah discourse), better preparing Muslims for their encounter with modernity. The first aspiration can give rise to puritan literalism in the name of rejecting medieval innovations, while the second can lead to potentially contradictory openness to innovative ideas of the modern age.

We noted in Chapter 6 that from 1995 onwards, a quite flexible and progressive leadership group dominated Muhammadiyah at national level. These were people such as Amien Rais, Syafii Maarif, Amin Abdullah, Moeslim Abdurrahman and Abdul Munir Mulkhan. When Amien Rais entered party politics as the leader of PAN in 1999, Syafii Maarif succeeded him as chairman of Muhammadiyah, and was reelected to that position for a new five-year term in 2000. Under such leadership, for about a decade Muhammadiyah emphasised what was called *dakwah kultural* (cultural proselytism), which was largely an attempt to bring the Modernist understanding of Islam to *abangan* villagers, a social realm where deeper Islamisation had been mainly a Traditionalist enterprise.

A major landmark of Muhammadiyah's 'cultural *dakwah*' was Munir Mulkhan's Gadjah Mada University doctoral thesis on 'pure Islam in peasant society', published in 2000.⁵⁴ Munir Mulkhan posited that there were four kinds of Muhammadiyah people, one of whom he described as being squarely in the tradition of the founder Ky. H. Ahmad Dahlan in being tolerant towards *abangan* spiritual ideas and practices. For Munir Mulkhan, the issue was how Muhammadiyah should adapt its reforming and purifying aspirations to the reality of Javanese peasant society. In his view, 'the spread of Muhammadiyah to rural villages is not evidence of Islamisation, but of the indigenisation of pure Islam in a special way, consistent with peasant

⁵⁴ Abdul Munir Mulkhan, *Islam murni dalam masyarakat petani* (intro. Kuntowijoyo; Yogyakarta: Bentang, 2000).

tradition, which signifies the emergence of “peasant theology”.⁵⁵ ‘What is needed,’ he said, was ‘a “new road” of Islam in developing social integration in a society that is increasingly open, democratic and plural.’⁵⁶ He argued for the need to rethink what *shari’a* is and to return to the ideas of Ahmad Dahlan in adopting a more flexible approach to peasant society.

Prominent figures such as Nurcholish Madjid and the Muhammadiyah thinker Dawam Rahardjo declared that Muhammadiyah thought had stagnated and compared poorly with the innovation seen from Traditionalists.⁵⁷ Nurcholish saw mysticism as an important part of Islam and so did some of those within Muhammadiyah who found its ideas rather narrow-minded. Thus at around this time it was possible to note within Muhammadiyah an increasing openness to Sufism of the type promoted by Hamka six decades before, that is, ‘Modern Mysticism’, mysticism without a *tarekat* or obedience to a spiritual master (a *shaykh* or *murshid*).⁵⁸ This greater sympathy towards mysticism also facilitated greater sympathy towards Traditionalist and *abangan* ideas.

As had been the case in NU, many younger Muhammadiyah activists responded positively to this sort of rethinking, but a good many — particularly from older generations — did not. A group of younger Muhammadiyah researchers studied the local reality in the relationship between Muhammadiyah and indigenous cultural practices in Lamongan on Java’s north coast, Muhammadiyah’s strongest centre in East Java and where it is generally regarded as quite puritanical.⁵⁹ For the previous 50 years, Muhammadiyah had been growing in this predominantly Traditionalist area where many local practices of a far-from-pious sort continued. Lamongan’s Muhammadiyah leaders were generally opposed to characteristically Javanese arts: to *wayang*, martial arts, village crop-cycle rituals, local dance performances and — it need hardly be said — *slametans*. Local traditions that NU followers regard as piously Islamic, such as songs in praise of the Prophet (*slawatan*), were also condemned by the Lamongan Muhammadiyah people. On gender issues, they were also at the more puritan end of discussion, some even insisting that the parts that a woman should not reveal in public — the *aurat* — include her voice. For their part, NU people regarded

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 4–5.

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 356–7.

⁵⁷ *JktP* online, 2 Dec. 2001.

⁵⁸ Discussion with Prof. Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Kota Gede, 10 March 2005. There were many other indications of this greater openness to ‘Modern Mysticism’.

⁵⁹ Discussion with Prof. Syafiq Mughni, Sidoarjo, 23 June 2007.

Muhammadiyah as being culturally 'dry' and socially rather exclusive and disruptive.⁶⁰ In his study of another north-coastal area, Mudjahirin Thohir commented that 'when NU and Muhammadiyah ... figures gather in one room, it is as if they are tolerant, but when they return to their respective followings, on the contrary they reinforce the importance of a fanatical attitude'.⁶¹ Their activities, in other words, were sometimes pursued in a highly competitive style, but we should note that both of these north-coast studies were done before the post-2001 increase in Muhammadiyah-NU cooperation could have significant grass-roots impact.

Some younger Muhammadiyah figures emulated JIL in forming their own group, called Jaringan Intelktual Muda Muhammadiyah (JIMM, Muhammadiyah Young Intellectuals' Network), in 2003. They regarded themselves as protégés of Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Amin Abdullah, Moeslim Abdurrahman and other leading reformers within Muhammadiyah, but were criticised by other Muhammadiyah figures. They held workshops to debate how to rethink their faith and reinvigorate Muhammadiyah as a reforming (*tajdid*) organisation, returning to the vision of Ahmad Dahlan. They also sought more effective social activism in place of religious formalism and criticised others — depicted mainly as graduates of the Persatuan Islam *pesantren* at Bangil and Middle Eastern institutions — who were implacably opposed to local culture.⁶² JIMM has never become as prominent or influential as JIL, but it precipitated conflict within Muhammadiyah. When JIMM sought to hold a workshop in Kartasura in January 2005, it was physically threatened by a group calling themselves the Muhammadiyah Youth Generation Preparedness Command (Komando Kesiapsiagaan

⁶⁰ Published as Asykuri Ibn Chamim, Syamsul Hidayat, Muhammad Sayuti and Fajar Riza Ul Haq, *Purifikasi dan reproduksi budaya di pantai utara Jawa: Muhammadiyah dan seni lokal* (ed. Zakiyuddin Baidhaw; intro. Abdul Munir Mulkhan; Kartasura: Penerbit Pusat Studi Budaya dan Perubahan Sosial, Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta, 2003).

⁶¹ Mudjahirin Thohir, *Orang Islam Jawa pesisiran*, p. 284.

⁶² Discussion with JIMM group, Yogyakarta, 10 March 2005. Valuable works presenting the views of these innovators include Moeslim Abdurrahman (ed.), *Muhammadiyah sebagai tenda kultural* (Jakarta: Ideo Press and Maarif Institute, 2003); Deni al Asy'ari et al., *Pemberontakan kaum muda Muhammadiyah* (intro. Syafi'i Ma'arif; Yogyakarta: Resist Book, 2005); Nakamura Mitsuo et al., *Muhammadiyah menjemput perubahan: Tafsir baru gerakan sosial-ekonomi-politik* (ed. Mukhaer Pakkanna and Nur Achmad; foreword Ahmad Syafi'i Maarif; Jakarta: P3STIE Ahmad Dahlan and Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2005).

Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah), ostensibly on the grounds that the meeting was being held in a Christian foundation-owned building (which JIMM had merely rented for the occasion). The meeting was forced to relocate to a *pesantren*.⁶³ Syafii Maarif was sympathetic to these younger activists — ‘young Muhammadiyah thinkers whom I always pushed and to whom I lent a protective umbrella’ — but he also warned them that ‘what had to be defended is the organisation as an institution’.⁶⁴ That organisation was becoming subject to serious strains along the lines of innovators vs puritans. While supporters regarded these young intellectuals as the continuation and developers of Muhammadiyah’s vision, their opponents denounced them as destroyers of Muhammadiyah.⁶⁵

The more Liberally inclined Muhammadiyah leadership was challenged not only by grass-roots realities where more puritan views were strong, but also by a returning cohort of younger Modernists who had been educated in the Middle East. From c. 2000 these began to consider how they might take over Muhammadiyah and save it from what was beginning to be called the ‘Liberal virus’. This anti-Liberal group had many prominent Muhammadiyah members in its ranks. Prof. Din Syamsuddin, life-long Muhammadiyah activist and head of MUI, was offering himself as their candidate for Muhammadiyah leadership.⁶⁶ In early 2005 Din was a leading figure at a Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta seminar on the theme ‘Muhammadiyah thought: Response to Islamic liberalisation’, and subsequently wrote the introduction to the published papers. He wrote of Muhammadiyah taking a central position between extremes, but the volume was a straightforward rejection of JIL, JIMM and Liberalism in general. The younger generation who were attracted by Liberalism, wrote Din, included

⁶³ *Tempo*I, 1 Jan. 2005.

⁶⁴ Syafii Maarif, *Titik-titik kisar di perjalananku*, pp. 349–50.

⁶⁵ Discussion with Prof. Syafiq Mughni, Sidoarjo, 23 June 2007. He continued to give JIMM facilities at Universitas Muhammadiyah Sidoarjo for their monthly meetings. In his important study of Bangsri on the north coast, Mudjahirin Thohir reports a strong local impression that ‘Muhammadiyah is firm in its organisation but brittle in its understanding of faith and *shari’at*’ whereas NU is ‘strong in building the foundations of its religious understanding but weak in institution building’; Mudjahirin Thohir, *Orang Islam Jawa pesisiran*, p. 282.

⁶⁶ Din Syamsuddin’s educational background is rather unusual for people on the more puritan side of Muhammadiyah: Gontor, followed by a first degree from IAIN Jakarta and then MA and PhD degrees in political science from UCLA (1982, 1996). His opponents depict him as an opportunist prepared to adopt any ideological position that suits his interest, which he would no doubt deny.

some who had ideas so extreme that they wanted to change Muhammadiyah into a social activist organisation that was neutral in religious questions. Indeed, they thought that 'Christianisation should no longer be an issue for Muhammadiyah', Din claimed. Syamsul Hidayat of the Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta wrote of these young Liberals — especially 'newcomers' in Muhammadiyah, he said — having an inferiority complex in the face of Western civilisation, so that non-Islamic ideas like liberalism, secularism and pluralism could easily infiltrate their thinking. Liberals used Islamic concepts and terminology 'to spread viruses of thought that endangered Islamic faith and conviction'. 'Finally, the structure of Islamic thought will collapse', he wrote.⁶⁷ Adian Husaini contributed to this volume, but also brought out his own collection of columns entitled 'To dam the Liberal current in Indonesia'.⁶⁸

In 2005 a new Muhammadiyah leadership was elected, headed by Din Syamsuddin. Noted progressives were dropped from the central leadership, Liberalism became clearly taboo at the top and 'cultural *dakwah*' disappeared from the agenda, leaving an embittered faction of intellectuals without influence within the organisation.⁶⁹ One of the leadership figures regarded as conservative, Dr Yunahar Ilyas, simply said that 'cultural *dakwah*' hadn't much worked. All the Javanese superstitions would still be strong in a century, he believed.⁷⁰ The more sympathetically inclined Prof. Syafiq Mughni also commented on 'cultural *dakwah*' being, by 2007, 'not so functional'.⁷¹ Younger

⁶⁷ Din Syamsuddin *et al.*, *Pemikiran Muhammadiyah: Respons terhadap liberalisasi Islam* (ed. Syamsul Hidayat and Sudarno Shobron; Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University Press, 2005), pp. xi, xiii, xiv, xvii.

⁶⁸ Adian Husaini, *Membendung arus liberalism di Indonesia*.

⁶⁹ I have heard (somewhat differing) accounts of the 2005 meeting from Prof. Abdul Munir Mulkhan (Kota Gede, 22 Oct. 2005 and 13 June 2007), Prof. H.M. Amin Abdullah (Yogyakarta, 22 Oct. 2005), Dr M. Hidayat Nur Wahid (Jakarta, 7 June 2007), Prof. Yunahar Ilyas (Yogyakarta, 11 June 2007), Prof. Syafiq Mughni (Sidoarjo, 23 June 2007), Prof. Ahmad Syafii Maarif (Yogyakarta, 14 Sept. 2008) and others.

⁷⁰ Discussion with Dr Yunahar Ilyas, Yogyakarta, 11 June 2007. He was born in Bukittingi (Sumatra) in 1956, gained his first degree in the faculty of theology at Imam Muhammad bin Saud University in Riyadh, followed by postgraduate degrees in philosophy and gender studies at IAIN Yogyakarta.

⁷¹ Discussion Sidoarjo, 23 June 2007. A post-2005 Muhammadiyah leadership depiction of 'cultural *dakwah*' — unrecognizable in Munir Mulkhan's terms — may be found in Imam Muchlas, *Landasan dakwah kultural (membaca respon Al-Qur'an terhadap adat kebiasaan Arab jahiliyah)* (intro. Din Syamsuddin; ed. Deni al Asy'ari and Hasanudin; Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2006).

activists and more progressive thinkers were dismayed at the outcome, so much so that it sometimes seemed that Muhammadiyah could fracture along the lines of innovators vs puritans.

Despite such internal strains, a commitment to keeping the organisation together prevailed, Din Syamsuddin moderated his own positions over time, and when he was reelected as head of the organisation in 2010, along with him was elected a more balanced central leadership board. This was partly because the organisation had been brought to the brink of destructive polarisation by the conflict precipitated by Liberalism, so that all sides withdrew from open confrontation, but perhaps more because Muhammadiyah and NU both found themselves threatened by distinctly non-Liberal threats to themselves at grass-roots level. They had to accept that they were not the only ones interested in pursuing an active Islamisation agenda.

In Chapter 12 we will look in greater detail at the origins and aspirations of smaller Islamist and Dakwahist movements at work among the Javanese, notably those who are Revivalists in epistemology. Pending that discussion, here we will see how their wish to spread their interpretations of Islam led them to challenge the much larger-scale movements of NU and Muhammadiyah by infiltrating them, requiring the latter to take defensive measures. By the opening years of the 21st century, suspicions were growing that organisations such as Partai Keadilan (shortly to become PKS) with its barely concealed aspirations for a greater role of Islam in the state, HTI with its aspirations for a global caliphate and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's MMI with its aspirations for the full implementation of *shari'a* law, were successfully undermining the organisational and ideological integrity of Muhammadiyah and NU.

At the 2005 Muhammadiyah meeting that elected the more conservative national leadership, it appeared that Muhammadiyah people who were also in HTI, MMI, MTA and even LDII were influencing the direction of discussion. It was also becoming clear to some Muhammadiyah leaders that they were losing control of some of the organisation's assets. Muhammadiyah mosques, prayer-houses, schools, universities and health institutions, they believed, were falling into the hands of activists particularly associated with PKS, and Muhammadiyah cadres were drifting towards PKS's more uncompromising versions of Islam. Evidently what was taken over in some cases were mosques or prayer-houses that had fallen into disuse or disrepair, or were damaged in Yogyakarta's terrible earthquake of 2006, where PKS activists volunteered to fix them up and then — unsurprisingly — conducted *pengajian* and gave sermons promoting their views. Such circumstances did not, however, explain the spread of PKS influence in Muhammadiyah health

institutions or universities (as well as in state universities, where PKS's main strength was to be found).⁷²

In 2006 the Muhammadiyah leader Haidar Nashir published an analysis of the '*tarbiyah* movement' — the campus cadre-formation circles modeled on those of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood — which gave rise to PKS. This was a closely argued case for Muhammadiyah to guard itself against infiltration by PKS's 'puritan and militant Islamic ideology'.⁷³ The organisation's publication *Suara Muhammadiyah* also expressed this view repeatedly.⁷⁴ PKS publicly and privately denied that there was any plot afoot to infiltrate or take over Muhammadiyah assets. Nevertheless, Muhammadiyah felt threatened.

The external threat posed by 'other ideologies' — as it was often put in Muhammadiyah discourse, represented above all by PKS — reunited the contending wings of Muhammadiyah in defence of the organisation. In December 2006 its central leadership, led by Din Syamsuddin, issued a 'letter of decision' that constituted an instruction, in principle binding on all organs and levels of Muhammadiyah, to strengthen their discipline and reassert Muhammadiyah ideology. It declared that Muhammadiyah must protect itself from

interests of other sides which, either directly or indirectly, openly or surreptitiously, can damage and destroy the Muhammadiyah organisation. ... All members of Muhammadiyah must be conscious of, understand and regard critically that all political parties in this nation, including parties that claim themselves to be, or develop wings/activities, for *dakwah* such as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) are really political parties. Every political party is oriented towards winning power.

⁷² Discussions with Prof. H.M. Amin Abdullah, Yogyakarta, 22 Oct. 2005 and 13 June 2007; with Prof. Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Kota Gede, 22 Oct. 2005 and 13 June 2007; with Abdul Mukti, Jakarta, 8 June 2007; with Prof. Syafiq Mughni, Sidoarjo, 23 June 2007; with Abdul Haris, Triyono and Hari Widasmoro, Kediri, 29 Nov. 2007; with Prof. Siti Chamamah Suratno, Yogyakarta, 21 March 2008; with Prof. A. Syafii Maarif, Yogyakarta, 14 Sept. 2008; and with Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said, Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008. Also Arif Maftuhin interviews in Yogyakarta of Muslih K.S., 11 Sept. 2007; Muhsin Hariyanto, 20 Aug. 2007; Abidah Muflihati, 24 Jan. 2008; and H. Abdul Salim, 2 March 2008.

⁷³ Haedar Nashir, *Manifestasi gerakan tarbiyah: Bagaimana sikap Muhammadiyah?* (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2006); quotation from p. 59. Indonesian *tarbiyah* (Arabic *tarbiya*) means education or training.

⁷⁴ For example, *Suara Muhammadiyah*, 15–31 Oct. 2005, 15 Nov. 2006, 30 Nov. 2006.

Hence, it was declared, PKS or similar organisations were not to have access to Muhammadiyah facilities anywhere for any activities, including ‘activities that call themselves or use symbols of religion or *dakwah* such as *pengajian* and guidance of the *ummah*’.⁷⁵ It was hard to deny — although some did⁷⁶ — that PKS was the principal (indeed the only specifically named) target of this instruction.

Stopping PKS infiltration, however, was unlikely to be achieved merely by issuing an instruction.⁷⁷ One PKS activist reported that the trend for Muhammadiyah cadres to go over to PKS was significant and would be still greater if PKS had not instructed them to remain within Muhammadiyah, thereby avoiding the collapse of the latter⁷⁸ — and also, we may note, thereby maintaining clandestine PKS influence within it. The Yogyakarta PKS activist Ilyas Sunnah spoke of people who just happened to be PKS cadres taking on roles in local mosques, but denied that there was any takeover plot. He said that PKS supplied people to give mosque sermons, but it was impressed upon the local mosque organisers that these speakers should not be identified as being from PKS. The Muhammadiyah instruction of December 2006 was, he said, a warning to PKS to be careful.⁷⁹ And, we may say, his comments indicated that PKS’s influence might not always be visible on the surface.

While Muhammadiyah was acting to defend its widespread educational and social service activities from PKS, NU found it necessary to defend itself from infiltration by HTI. This was a somewhat surprising direction for a threat to come from. Whereas both Muhammadiyah and PKS had roots in

⁷⁵ Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, *Surat keputusan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah nomor: 149/KEP/1.0/B/2006 tentang: Kebijakan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah mengenai konsolidasi organisasi dan amal usaha Muhammadiyah* (Yogyakarta 10 Zulqad’ah 1427 H / 01 Desember 2006 M).

⁷⁶ In discussion of 11 June 2007 in Yogyakarta, Yunahar Ilyas said that PKS was just mentioned as an example in the *Surat keputusan* and that Muhammadiyah was neither pro- nor anti-PKS.

⁷⁷ PKS denied the infiltration (and other) accusations against it in *Risalah untuk mengokohkan Ukhuwah dan Ishlah*, signed by PKS President Ir. H. Tifatul Sembiring and Ketua Dewan Syariah KH Dr Surahman Hidayat, dated Jakarta 15 Ramadan 1428 / 27 Sept. 2007, published in *KR*, 9 Oct. 2007 (and elsewhere). The Yogyakarta PKS leader Kholil Mahmud said that PKS strives to reduce conflicts, that what appeared to be conflict was only at the level of the elite, and there was no issue at grass-roots level, but he then mentioned several such conflicts; discussion Yogyakarta, 22 March 2008.

⁷⁸ Arif Maftuhin interview of Sallabi, Yogyakarta, 20 June 2008.

⁷⁹ Arif Maftuhin interview of Ilyas Sunnah, Yogyakarta, 25 Aug. 2007.

Islamic Modernism (although PKS is not purely Modernist in epistemology) and were largely urban-based, NU and HTI seemed to be from different planets. We will discuss HTI's origins and ideas more in Chapter 12. For the moment, we may note that its ideology is Middle Eastern in origin, rejects democracy and aspires to a universal caliphate, while NU is deeply rooted in Javanese society and committed to the Indonesian national state. From the point of view of aspiring infiltrators, however, NU has the immense attraction of being very large and loosely organised. The extremist organisations MMI and FPI were also believed to be infiltrating NU circles, taking over mosques and prayer houses and spreading their ideas through NU *pengajian* sessions.⁸⁰ In fact, it seems that in many cases what was taken over were mosques and prayer-houses that had fallen into disuse or disrepair, as was also the case with Muhammadiyah facilities that fell under PKS influence.⁸¹ However it happened, the spread of HTI (and other) influences among NU's grassroots following was a challenge for Traditionalists. NU leaders even received reports that at grassroots level there were people who regarded themselves as NU but thought that a caliphate was desirable. So leaders went to local-level branches to explain the differences between NU and HTI thinking. Meetings of around a thousand NU local figures each were held across East Java and Madura in 2007, where these ideological differences were made clear.⁸² Further attention to maintaining NU's ideology at grass-roots level followed. At least one NU leader told HTI that if they did not stop attempting to infiltrate, NU would respond with its 'organs'⁸³ (i.e., Ansor would be sent into action). 'This movement has attacked us far too often; once in a while we need to counter-attack', another said.⁸⁴

Such threats to the coherence and integrity of their own organisations undoubtedly strengthened the Muhammadiyah and NU opposition to militant, extremist, violent or terrorist versions of Islam. This required some-

⁸⁰ *Tempo*I, 1 Apr. 2007. Also discussions with Ky. H. Dr Ali Maschan Musa (then head of NU in East Java), Surabaya, 22 June 2007; and with A. Rubaidi and Mashuri, Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008.

⁸¹ Masdar Hilmy email, 16 Jan. 2008; Arif Maftuhin interview of Drs H. Suharto Djuwaini, Yogyakarta, 15 Apr. 2008. The HTI leader H. Dr Muhammad Usman insisted that HTI only became involved in NU mosques where local people asked them to do so (discussion Surabaya, 24 Nov. 2007).

⁸² Discussion with Ky. H. Dr Ali Maschan Musa, Surabaya, 22 June 2007.

⁸³ Discussion with Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said, *pesantren* An-Nur, Wonocolo, Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008.

⁸⁴ Ky. H. Dr Ali Maschan Musa, quoted in *JktP* online, 5 Nov. 2007.

thing of a shift in position for Din Syamsuddin as head of Muhammadiyah. At the time of Israel's war against Hezbollah in Lebanon in July–August 2006, like many religious leaders in Indonesia, Din was bitterly opposed to Israel's military action. Instead of Indonesians going to fight in person, he said, they should donate money for Hezbollah and Hamas to buy arms to fight Israel. He claimed that Muhammadiyah had already given millions of Rupiah to the Palestinian embassy in Jakarta for this purpose. 'If needed, I will personally hand over the weapons to them', he added.⁸⁵ Only a few months earlier he had said that 'No religion, including Islam, tolerates any use of violence'⁸⁶ and it was in fact this latter view that became more characteristic of these large-scale movements. They frequently reiterated their joint opposition also to the implementation of *shari'a* law or a universal caliphate.⁸⁷ Such ideas not only threatened the Indonesian state and the harmony of its multi-religious and multi-ethnic society, but also — they had now learned — threatened themselves. Defending the Indonesian *status quo* thus meant also defending Muhammadiyah and NU.

⁸⁵ *JktP* online, 14 Aug. 2006.

⁸⁶ *JktP* online, 22 June 2006.

⁸⁷ For a sample of such statements, see *JktP* online, 21 Nov. 2005, 3 Feb. 2006, 22 June 2006, 29 July 2006, 19 Jan. 2007, 5 Nov. 2007, 26 March 2008, 21 June 2008.

CHAPTER 11

Older cultural styles on the defensive

Defending *abangan*, *kebatinan* and related ideas and practices

Javanese society has a long history of people believing in a vast array of spirits, both benign and malign, who demand respect, awe and propitiation. One of the works of older Javanese literature is the *Kidung rumeksa ing wengi* (the song keeping guard at night), a mantra sometimes ascribed — pretty improbably — to the *wali* Sunan Kalijaga, the possession or reciting of which will guard one from evil spirits. We noted in Chapter 6 that *jaranan* performances may end with a version of this text because of its potency as an amulet against evil forces. A related text is the *Kidung lalembut* (the song of the spirits), which includes what is in effect a spiritual geography, listing the spirits that occupy various places across Java. One early 19th-century version of that work ends with the chilling admonition, ‘Honour, all (of you), the history of the spirits, at night be it remembered; it will become a defence for the ill. Be feared the spirits, all, none dare oppose. And when travelling, the spirits and the devils, none shall dare to oppose: in the forests savage beasts do run.’¹ The long history of Islamisation among the Javanese is in some measure a history of the confrontation between such indigenous ideas of the spirit world and the different concepts about unseen beings that originate in Islam. The Javanese Mystic Synthesis, which had been a way to reconcile these different *Weltanschauungen*, had been under

¹ M.C. Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi, 1749–1792: A history of the division of Java* (London, etc.: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 403–7.

challenge for 150 years by the time we are discussing here, and was by now a minority phenomenon.

In Central (but not most of East) Java, older spiritual ideas were associated particularly with the *kratons*. Their influence was a barrier to deeper Islamisation, said the senior *nyai* of Krapyak *pesantren* in Yogyakarta, for *kraton* influence supported ideas about black magic which made it difficult to lead people to God.² Java's rulers were widely believed to have intimate connections with the Goddess of the Southern Ocean (Ratu Kidul) and the spirits of Mount Merapi and Mount Lawu, to be the only persons whose supernatural capacities were such that they dared keep the royal *pusakas* without harm to themselves or to the balance of the universe, and so on. These ideas remained strong after independence in Yogyakarta, where Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX had supported the Revolution and remained in office thereafter as the head of the Special District of Yogyakarta (unlike Surakarta, where the Revolution ended the Susuhunan's administrative authority outside the court). Hamengkubuwana IX was believed to commune with the Goddess and to command other spiritual powers like his ancestors, and was widely respected both for such occult capacities and for his role as a temporal leader. After his death in 1988, his son succeeded him as Sultan Hamengkubuwana X. We noted in Chapter 5 above that he went on the *hajj* to Mecca shortly after his accession and that Embah Wali, the leader of the dancing cult of Tugurejo, announced to his followers that the *Ratu Adil* was no more. For believers in older forms of Javanese occultism, this was indeed a momentous event. Never before in the entire history of Javanese monarchy had a king undertaken the pilgrimage to Mecca. Embah Wali was not the only one to think that Hamengkubuwana X's more Islamic persona ended a spiritual tradition in Java and created a cultural issue of significance.³

It is my impression that the present Sultan of Yogyakarta identifies strongly as a Muslim, carries out Islam's ritual obligations but also accepts local spiritual phenomena, that is, that his ideas are consistent with the

² Discussion with Ny. Hj. Ida Fatimah, *pesantren* Krapyak, Yogyakarta, 27 March 2009.

³ For example, Nur Choliq Ridwan's interviews in Yogyakarta with Listya Thohari (inter-religious activist and daughter of a prominent Indonesian writer, Ky. H. Ahmad Tohari, 27 Nov. 2007), Prapto Darmo (follower of *kejarwen* rituals, 6 Dec. 2007), Ari Budi (*kebatinan* activist, 8 Dec. 2007), M. Jadul Maula (LKIS leader, 9 Dec. 2007). A dissenting view is mentioned in the following note.

three pillars of the old Mystic Synthesis.⁴ The Yogyakarta *kraton* continued to carry out traditional rituals under Hamengkubuwana X's authority. The royal *pusakas* were ritually 'bathed' at the start of each year in the Javanese calendar. Those that were washed in public — such as the royal carriages — attracted crowds who collected the used water in the belief that it contained supernatural powers to heal illness.⁵ Similarly, at the royal graves at Imogiri, south of Yogyakarta, there are four *pusaka* water-containers, each with a male or female name as *nyai* or *kyai*, which are believed to have specific powers to get a husband, bring commercial success, cure chronic illnesses, and so on. These are drained and cleaned at fixed times in the Javanese calendar in the *nguras enceb* (draining the water-pots) ritual, which begins with *tahlilan* and a *slametan* and is carried out by officials of the royal *kratons*. Hundreds attend to gather the water and thus share in the beneficent spiritual powers released on the occasion.⁶ The annual *labuhan* ritual, when offerings are thrown into the water at Parangkusumo on the south coast, the domain of Ratu Kidul, is carried out by the *kratons* of both Yogyakarta and Surakarta. This is also done at the summits of Mounts Lawu and Merapi and other sacred locations.⁷ In 2000 the Sultan and his wife joined President Abdurrahman Wahid and his wife Sinta Nuriyah, the national police chief, various other ministers and dignitaries in overseeing a national exorcism (*ruwatan nasional*) with a *wayang* performance at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, to invoke supernatural assistance in facing the nation's challenges. 'Our people are sick, or motherland is full of sorrow, her tears trickling down,' said the Sultan, explaining the need for 'spiritual measures'.⁸

It remained the case, however, that there were doubts as to whether a Sultan who was more Islamic in style really commanded Java's indigenous spiritual powers. In February 2005, not long after the horrific December

⁴ The view that the Sultan adhered to Islam as taught by the *walis* and respected both Islam and Javanese royal traditions was put by one interviewee: Andi Suryowitono (locally born, unaffiliated Muslim, interviewed by Nur Choliq Ridwan, 5 Dec. 2007).

⁵ For example, *KR*, 3 Jan. 2009.

⁶ For example, *KR*, 19 Jan. 2008, 20 Jan. 2008

⁷ For example, *TempoI*, 9 Feb. 2005; *KR*, 25 Jan. 2008, 27 Jan. 2008, 3 Aug. 2008, 23 July 2009; *Bernas*, 22 Jan. 2008, 4 Aug. 2008. In 2009 the subsidiary Pakualaman principality of Yogyakarta revived its *labuhan* ceremony after a 10-year gap; *KR*, 8 Jan. 2009. On Surakarta's offerings to the goddess Durga in the forest of Krendawahana, see Headley, *Durga's mosque*, esp. pp. 227–30.

⁸ *TempoI*, 19 Aug. 2000.



Illustration 31 Yogyakarta *kraton* celebration of the end of the fasting month, Garebeg Puasa, 1992

2004 earthquake and *tsunami* that devastated Aceh, there was a rumour that a major *tsunami* was about to hit the south coast areas of Yogyakarta. Fisherman would not put to sea and people in general were fearful. To ward off this danger, the Sultan ordered people to prepare soup (*sayur lodeh*) with particular vegetables and to make an offering of a 100 Rupiah coin (equivalent to about 1 US cent) with a depiction of a mountain on it, to be buried in their front garden. Mosques also held group *dhikr* and recitation of the *Qur'an* seven times; water used on these occasions was then taken by the populace as amulets against misfortune. There was, in fact, no *tsunami*.⁹ If the Sultan's powers seemed to work on this occasion, however, they were seriously called into question by a devastating earthquake that hit Yogyakarta and surrounding areas in May 2006, killing over 6,000 people, destroying large amounts of property and rendering some 1.5 million people homeless. Meanwhile, to the north of Yogyakarta, Mount Merapi threatened to erupt. Various tales were told to explain these natural events, among them that the Goddess of the Southern Ocean was angry because Hamengkubuwana X refused to marry her, as all previous Sultans of Yogyakarta had done, and/or that she was angry about the proposed anti-pornography legislation (which we discussed above).¹⁰

Mount Merapi, at just under 3,000 metres, looms over Yogyakarta, steadily produces emissions and erupts with sufficiently regularity and force that it is easy to understand why local people regard it with respect and awe, even believing it to have supernatural power. During Soeharto's last days before his death in January 2008, the shape of Merapi's clouds was interpreted by local spiritual experts as prophesying his death.¹¹ When an eruption threatened in 2006, Merapi's spiritual keeper (*juru kunci*), Mbah Marijan, led various rituals to placate the mountain, which he said was angry because of sand-mining that was destroying its surroundings.¹² He refused to evacuate despite being told by the Sultan to do so, and survived the eruption that followed shortly thereafter. The 80-year-old subsequently

⁹ A useful analysis of this episode by Imam Subkhan was published in *Kmps* (edisi Jogja), 10 March 2005.

¹⁰ This is a brief summary of tales told me by various friends and colleagues during a visit to Yogyakarta in August 2006.

¹¹ *TempoI*, 13 Jan. 2008. The cover story of *Tempo* vol. 8, no. 20 (15–21 Jan. 2008) was about Soeharto's final illness and Javanese spiritualists' explanations of what needed to be done so that he could depart peacefully.

¹² *TempoI*, 18 May 2006; *JktP* online, 18 May 2006, 20 May 2006. For other ritual activities around Merapi, see *TempoI*, 19 Apr. 2006.



Illustration 32 Mount Merapi, with Yogyakarta in the foreground, 2007

became something of a celebrity and was used in the advertising campaign of an energy drink. In 2010 his spiritual powers were, however, inadequate to control the massive eruption of that year and Mbah Marijan died in his house on the mountainside. His body was found kneeling with his forehead on the floor, in the position for prayer.¹³

Kediri lacks a *kraton*, Sultan or tradition of large-scale offerings to spirits, but the city and regency fathers decided that they should have something of the sort in order to encourage tourism. From at least 2003, efforts were made by the Kediri city Tourism Service to revive local traditions that were 'Kediri specialities', although in fact most have analogues elsewhere in Javanese society.¹⁴ Among folk performances, *jaranan* remains the most popular and widespread, with a large number of performing troupes and the continuing support of the police force, which itself has several performing

¹³ *JktP* online, 28 Oct. 2010.

¹⁴ *MmK*, 9 Sept. 2003.

groups.¹⁵ Since *jaranan* usually involves trance and spirit possession, some reject it as *shirk*, but even those who were concerned about this sometimes accept *jaranan* if it was regarded as 'just culture'.¹⁶ A student in a state Islamic senior high school (Madrasah Aliyah Negeri) wrote a paper on *jaranan* that included photos of performers in trance. His teachers thought this contrary to Islam and forbade him to enter his essay in an Islamic student competition. But then the head of the school thought this might embarrass the school, so the paper was submitted, whereupon it won the local competition and went on to a national-level competition.¹⁷ *Jaranan* has the advantage of being cheap to perform, whereas *wayang* is expensive and thus difficult to put on. Consequently, there are few *wayang* performers remaining in Kediri regency.¹⁸ One of the tasks of the Kediri city secretary, Drs H.M. Zaini, was to offer guidance and encouragement to local *jaranan* troupes and to clean up the art's less salubrious aspects such as gang fights and drunkenness.¹⁹ A curious local performance in Kediri that still attracts audiences is *tiban*, which requires both physical and spiritual preparations, such as no sexual relations for three days before a performance, fasting and recitations of mantras. Performers whack each other up to five times with fearsome whips made of palm leaf ribs, with serrations from middle to tip. *Tiban* is usually performed during the dry season and the consequent drawing of blood is said to bring rain.²⁰ (This is not, perhaps, the most sophisticated of folk performances to be found in Java.)

Kediri already had local holy sites and sacred graves that attracted pilgrims, as are found across Java, but they were not on a sufficient scale for local government's needs, it seems. Kediri did, however, have the great

¹⁵ *MmK*, 4 July 2005, 11 Aug. 2005.

¹⁶ Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi asked several female interviewees in Kediri about this matter in June 2008, with mixed outcomes. Their main informants were the President of the Kediri STAIN student body Ratna M. (18 June 2008), the head of a village NU branch Inisiyah (2 July 2008), and a teacher at an Islamic school Wahyu Eka Nugraha (18 June 2008).

¹⁷ *RK*, 27 July 2007.

¹⁸ Discussion with Suradi, the head of the Arts and Culture section of *Kabupaten Kediri*, 16 March 2005.

¹⁹ Discussion with Drs H.M. Zaini, Kediri, 26 Nov. 2007. Zaini later sought to mobilise *jaranan* groups to win support for his 2008 bid to be elected mayor, which failed.

²⁰ There are accounts of *tiban* performances in *RK*, 23 May 2004; *MmK*, 22 Nov. 2004, 17 March 2005, 10 Nov. 2005.

Brantas River and Mount Kelud, just over 3,200 metres high and with a destructive history, so these became the focus for newly invented 'sacred' traditions. From 2002 the popular mayor of Kediri, H.A. Maschut, led an annual 'throwing of offerings' (*larung sesaji*) into the Brantas River — prominent among them the head of a water buffalo — in a rather pale imitation of the *kratons'* *labuhan* ceremonies.²¹ Mount Kelud had its own spiritual guardian — Mbah Ronggo — but there were no particular rituals associated with the mountain. Indeed there were spirits there, he said, along with certain prohibitions from the ancestors (e.g., one should not applaud), as well as a source of sacred water at some distance from the crater, but there were no sacred sites near the crater itself.²² So from 2005 a new *larung sesaji* tradition had to be invented at the mountain, led by *Bupati* Sutrisno of Kediri regency (whom we have met before as a promoter of grass-roots Islamisation) and other regency-level luminaries. Sutrisno was himself a successful entrepreneur and even suggested that Kediri's local attractions could be marketed overseas for the purposes of tourism; this is how Bali started, he observed.²³ This new *larung sesaji* at Kelud attracted crowds of several thousand and was thus thought to be a success from the tourism point of view. To invent this new — and obviously not Islamic — ritual for propitiating local spirits, the Hindus of Kediri were asked to officiate, and Mbah Ronggo was also involved.²⁴ The Gudang Garam tobacco company in Kediri also had its own *larung sesaji* ritual, going to the south coast and taking offerings out to sea in a boat — a risky enterprise on that coast. In 2004, the boat was rolled by a 5-metre wave, but all were saved. This was proof, said the oversight committee, of the power of the company's team of meditators. *Memo Kediri* reported the incident with a headline (perhaps not entirely tongue-in-cheek) proclaiming, 'Gudang Garam subdues the Southern Ocean'.²⁵

²¹ *RK*, 23 July 2004; this ceremony at the Brantas is reported annually thereafter in Kediri newspapers. Kediri also invented a *manusuk sima* (stabbing the free domain) ritual; on at least one occasion this involved a procession with Mayor Maschut playing the role of the ancient king Rakai Kayuwangi; *MmK*, 28 July 2005.

²² Discussion with Mbah Ronggo, Sugihwaras, 3 March 2006.

²³ *MmK*, 21 Nov. 2005.

²⁴ *RK*, 17 May 2005, 18 Sept. 2006, 10 Nov. 2008.

²⁵ *MmK*, 26 June 2004; see also *RK*, 25 June 2004. A similar 'mystical incident' surrounding a *labuhan* on the coast south of Yogyakarta is reported in *Bernas*, 30 Oct. 2007.



Illustration 33 *Larung sesaji* (throwing of offerings) at Mount Kelud, Kediri, by Hindu officiants, 2008, a ‘tradition’ invented in 2005 (photo by Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi)

The small HTI and PKS groups in Kediri objected to these new ceremonies that smacked of polytheism (*shirk*),²⁶ but the need for symbols of local identity and tourism were evidently overriding considerations for the local governments promoting them. So far as I am aware, the *kyais* of Kediri did not comment on these new ‘traditions’, at least in public. Mount Kelud itself, however, seem dissatisfied, for the deep lake previously found in the crater disappeared as a new lava cone arose in its place and the mountain seemed close to eruption. A local *kebatinan* figure explained that this was all because the ritual was wrongly done there, so she was taking propitiatory ritual steps herself.²⁷ *Kebatinan* believers may conclude that those measures worked, for there has been no eruption to the time of this writing.

²⁶ Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi interviews with Sulistyono Budi (chairman of PKS for *Kabupaten Kediri*), Kediri, 19 Oct. 2006; and with Khutub Amrullah (chair of HTI Kediri), Kediri, 1 Nov. 2006. PKS was, however, prepared to accept that these ceremonies were ‘folk culture’ — even though they had in fact been newly invented.

²⁷ Discussion with Ibu Sudarmi, Kediri, 27 Nov. 2007.

In Karanganyar regency, just southeast of Surakarta, another tradition was invented in 2005 and also attracted objections from Islamic purists. This was called *Garebeg Lawu* (Lawu festival), a programme of activities over several weeks on Mount Lawu — a site long associated with indigenous spiritual forces²⁸ and where Hindu communities still exist. The activities attracted those with an interest in both the natural world and the realm of unseen spirits. Sufi dancing and *dhikir* were performed, but also people from *kebatinan* and Hindu backgrounds undertook rituals at the 15th-century Hindu temple Candhi Sukuh and did ascetic exercises at the top of the mountain. There was ritualised planting of trees in celebration of links with nature, a *pusaka kris* from the Mangkunagaran palace in Surakarta was ritually ‘bathed’, a ceremony was carried out at Parangkusumo (Parangtritis) on the south coast, and so on. A leading figure was Suprpto Suryadarmo, who believed that Javanese should rediscover ‘the way of Majapahit’ and the ‘mystical sciences’ (*ngelmu*) of that way — the sort of idea that infuriates Revivalists. Muhammadiyah and PKS were reportedly unhappy about this. The *Bupati* of Karanganyar — Hj. Rina Iriani, one of Java’s female *Bupatis* — had to deflect stronger objections from LDII, MMI, Mohammed Kalono and the frequently violent FPIS (discussed in Chapter 12). Nevertheless, she continued to support the festival in the interest of tourism.²⁹

Large-scale public exorcisms (*ruwatan*) were performed quite often, reflecting a widespread sense that Indonesia was plagued by an unusually high level of natural disasters in the early 21st century. These were often funded by local governments and involved local dignitaries.³⁰ Unlike the new ‘traditions’ of Kediri and Karanganyar, we may accept that these exorcisms were done less for any tourism considerations than as response to genuine beliefs that some malign supernatural powers were behind the deadly earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruptions and land-slips that seemed so common, and which devastated so many lives. Puppeteers who performed such *ruwatans* still had to meet stringent personal requirements

²⁸ *Solopos*, 10 Oct. 2000, contains a discussion of Lawu as the centre of Javanese supernatural forces.

²⁹ Discussions with Hj. Rina Iriani Sri Ratnaningsih *et al.*, Karanganyar, 20 Oct. 2005; with Suprpto Suryadarmo, Karanganyar, 12 and 14 March 2005; and with Slamet Gundono, Surakarta, 1 Oct. 2005.

³⁰ For example, *Tempo*I, 19 Aug. 2000 (on the *ruwatan nasional* in Yogyakarta, described above); *Kmps*, 23 March 2005 (Blora); *Kmps* (Jawa Timur), 7 March 2005 (Surabaya).

and undertake spiritual preparations for their task.³¹ At village level, too, exorcisms might still be performed for genuine purposes of spiritual healing, as in a village near Yogyakarta where a *ruwatan* and mass spiritual exercises were undertaken after a series of suicides.³²

Among the many spirits of Java, the foremost remains Ratu Kidul, the Goddess of the Southern Ocean. She has already appeared several times in this book. Islamic reformers are likely to regard her as the Javanese superstition that most stands in the way of a truly Islamic society, but many people believe her really to exist. It is quite common to encounter people who say that, according to the *Qur'an*, God created both humans and spiritual creatures, and Ratu Kidul is among the latter. That view was, for example, accepted by the head of the Surakarta branch of the Department of Religious Affairs, who also said that there are people who can communicate with spirits.³³ One writer who publishes particularly on mystical matters produced an entire book on 'Her Highness Ratu Kidul in the perspective of Javanese Islam'. He argues that belief in the Goddess represents 'awareness that there is another life behind the life of the physical realm Therefore, belief in her existence and position as one of the creatures "chosen" by God (because she takes on a special task) is not among the kinds of beliefs that are forbidden.'³⁴ Ki Supriyoko, criticised in some circles for increasing the influence of Islam within Taman Siswa schools and who established his own *pesantren*, also assured me of the reality of Java's spirits. In his *pesantren*, the *gamelan* instruments play by themselves on some evenings, which he has heard himself. And spirits have been seen at the school, he said.³⁵

Below the level of *kraton*- or local government-supported rituals, village observances carry on, in many cases with little influence from any reformed version of Islam. The annual village cleansing (*bersih desa*) ceremonies are still observed in many places, although they have also died out in others. Such observances are now sometimes a more Islamised mix of Traditionalist Islamic with *abangan* practices: beginning with *tahlilan*, *slawatan* and/or *dhikir*, proceeding to *tayuban* dancers and all-night *wayang kulit* if it can be

³¹ KR, 15 June 2008, discusses these requirements on the basis of information from the 82-year-old *dhalang* Ki Cipto Subali.

³² This was at Kelurahan Gading, Kecamatan Playen; KR, 20 Dec. 2008.

³³ Discussion with Drs Hasan Kamal, Surakarta, 19 Oct. 2005.

³⁴ Muhammad Sholikhin, *Kangjeng Ratu Kidul dalam perspektif Islam Jawa* (Yogyakarta: Narasi, 2009); quote from pp. 286–7.

³⁵ Discussion with Prof. Ki Supriyoko, *pesantren* 'Insan Cendekia', Donokerto, Sleman, Yogyakarta, 22 March 2008.



Illustration 34 Hindu statue (Durga Mahiśasuramardini) discovered in Kediri, with offerings, 2007 (photo by Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi)

afforded.³⁶ In some cases, people may think this to be ‘just culture’, but no doubt many villagers still believe — or at least dare not disbelieve — in the spiritual forces associated with such practices. It is not surprising in this context that when some very beautiful Hindu statues were unearthed in Kediri, locals at first thought them to be ‘empty’. But Hindu Balinese visitors declared the spirits of these statues to be ‘alive’, whereupon local people began placing offerings for them.³⁷ In another case, when an ancient temple was discovered in a rice field, people came to lay offerings in the hope of getting winning lottery numbers in return.³⁸

In Sleman, Ky. H. Masrur Ahmad is an NU leader who has considerable influence, even though his own *pesantren* is relatively small. He does supernatural healing, mass circumcisions and *pengajian* from village to village. Like the Ihsaniyyat leader Ky. H. Abdul Latif in Kediri, he has supported *abangan*-style arts, including *jaranan* (*jathilan*), to attract *abangan* to his teaching. He interprets the *jaranan* performers’ trance as a kind of *dhikr*, which in Sufi thought can lead to *fana*’ (mystic loss of self). In his view, one must care for all creatures, including spirits such as Sunan Lawu and Ratu Kidul. Such ideas of course attract criticism from others, above all from Modernists.³⁹

The fate of *kebatinan* movements⁴⁰ since the fall of Soeharto has been mixed. One can find as many people who think that they are reviving as think that they are declining, and the evidence gathered for this book is

³⁶ Reports on such observances are found regularly, especially around the beginning of the year in the Javanese calendar. For example, *Kmps*, 1 Apr. 2009; *Bernas*, 12 July 2008; *KR*, 29 Oct. 2007, 11 July 2008, 5 May 2009, 12 May 2009, 6 June 2009, 14 June 2009, 15 June 2009, 30 June 2009. *Tempo*, 17 Apr. 2005, carried an extensive description of village rituals in the month of Sapar in Central Java and Yogyakarta.

³⁷ Email from Suhadi Cholil, 11 Feb. 2007.

³⁸ *RK*, 5 Aug. 2004.

³⁹ Information from Muhammad Hanif, Yogyakarta, 20 Oct. 2005, who had completed a postgraduate thesis on Ky. Masrur. On *fana*’, see F. Rahman, ‘Bakā’wa-Fanā’ in P. Bearman *et al.* (eds), *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (2nd ed.), vol. 1, p. 951, which defines this as ‘(1) the passing-away from the consciousness of the mystic of all things, including himself, and even the absence of the consciousness of this passing-away and its replacement by a pure consciousness of God, and (2) the annihilation of the imperfect attributes (as distinguished from the substance) of the creature and their replacement by the perfect attributes bestowed by God.’

⁴⁰ *Kebatinan* groups now prefer to call themselves *kejarwen* (Javanese — implying that they are authentically Javanese) or *penghayat* (instillers — i.e., instillers of their beliefs), but we will retain the older term here to avoid confusion.

inconclusive. Whether they are growing or not, their numbers seem small in comparison with pre-Soeharto days. Surakarta is an interesting case in this regard. It is part of the social polarisation there that both reforming religious movements such as MTA, the Assalaam school and the Revivalism of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir should co-exist in uncomfortable tension (and sometimes conflict) with *abangan*, *kebatinan* and Christian Javanese. In the early post-Soeharto years, the PDIP leadership in Surakarta was inclined to the view that there were more *abangan* than devout Muslims in the city, with the former stronger in north Surakarta and the latter in the south, and that *abangan* represented PDIP's core political constituency.⁴¹ There was some evidence to support this, but by the time of the 2004 election such *aliran*-type voting patterns were hardly visible any longer⁴² and, as we have seen above, PDIP was taking steps to accommodate devout Muslims. Certainly *kebatinan* groups — the largest among them being Sumarah and Pangestu — exist in Surakarta, but it is doubtful that their following is anywhere near the scale known before 1965. In the more radical and polarised environment of Surakarta, the 'paranormal' Soetiyono Tjokroharsoyo is a one-man anti-Islamic protest movement. He has a strong line in anti-Islamic jokes and proudly wears a shirt that proclaims, 'My ancestry is Majapahit and my guardian is Sabda Palon',⁴³ thus invoking the anti-Islamic figure of *Babad Kedhiri* and the other works originally written in the 1870s, described above.

In Surabaya, too, people speak of *kebatinan* being strong,⁴⁴ but its strength is limited and leading *kebatinan* exponents are concerned about the tendency for the government and police to shut down groups described as deviant.⁴⁵ In Kediri, Ki Bagus Ponari, a Sapta Darma figure and head of an organisation of *kebatinan* groups, said that there were about 120 *kebatinan* followers in the town and about 6,000 in the regency.⁴⁶ Another leader

⁴¹ Discussions with FX. Hadi Rudyatmo (PDIP Chairman), Surakarta, 25 Aug. 2003; Ky. H. Dian Nafi, Surakarta, 30 March 2004.

⁴² Discussion with Surakarta Electoral Commission members, 12 March 2005.

⁴³ Discussion with Soetiyono Tjokroharsoyo, Surakarta and Klaten, 2 Nov. 2006.

⁴⁴ Discussion with the Protestant (Gereja Kristen Indonesia) pastor Simon Philantropa, Surabaya, 24 Nov. 2007.

⁴⁵ Discussion with Drs KRAT Basuki Prawirodipuro and KRT Giarto Nagoro, Surabaya, 25 Nov. 2007. Similar comments were made by another *kebatinan* figure, Drs Sulisty Tirtokusumo, at a seminar in Yogyakarta; KR, 27 March 2008.

⁴⁶ Comments by Ki Bagus Ponari, at seminar at Institute Agama Islam Tribakti (IAIT), Kediri, 29 Nov. 2007. IAIT was founded in 1966 by Ky. H. Mahrus Aly. It now has some 2,500 students and is, in effect, *pesantren* Lirboyo's tertiary-level



Illustration 35 Soetiyono Tjokroharsoyo's one-man anti-Islamic shirt protest: 'My ancestry is Majapahit and my guardian is Sabda Palon', Surakarta, 2006

said that Sapta Darma has been growing again since 1998 in Kediri and by 2004 claimed 25 places of worship (*sanggar*) and perhaps 2,000 followers in the area.⁴⁷ Across the whole of Indonesia, Sapta Darma claimed to have about four million followers in 2008. In the Special District of Yogyakarta there were then 15 *sanggars* and about 3,000 followers.⁴⁸ Such numbers are of significance, but they are not particularly impressive when set against the scale of Java's population. The appeal of *kebatinan* seems to be limited not just by the process of Islamisation. Another *kebatinan* practitioner in

institution. Ki Bagus Ponari is not to be confused with a faith-healer named Ponari; see *KR*, 23 Feb. 2009, 3 March 2009. A list of *kebatinan* organisations in the city and *Kabupaten* of Kediri names Sapta Darma and 20 other such groups, but without any indication of the size of their followings; Dewan Pengurus Daerah, Badan Kerjasama Organisasi Kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa (B.K.O.K.), Kota/Kabupaten Kediri, 15 Jan. 2008.

⁴⁷ Suhadi Cholil's interview with Pak Sarjan, *Papar*, 4 May 2004.

⁴⁸ *KmpsO*, 14 Oct. 2008.

Kediri, Ibu Sudarmi — who is said to be an avatar of a female spirit called Ratu Diah Pithaloka — lamented that the young were distracted from the beliefs of the ancestors by foreign culture, television soap operas and their mobile phones.⁴⁹

Local-level *kebatinan* movements exist without the larger-scale organisation or identity of movements such as Pangestu, Sumarah, Sapta Darma or Subud. One such group near Klaten call themselves *wong kere* (the beggars), having been founded by a man they revere as Ki Kere — reminiscent of Chapter 5's Embah Wali of Tugurejo, who was regarded by his followers as *kerene ratu*, the 'king's beggar'. Symbolising their rejection of normal conventions, the *wong kere* do things in reverse. They shake hands with the left hand and their leader, who is an ordinary peasant farmer, has a wall clock whose hands rotate counter-clockwise. They recognise and honour God and deny that there are any other spiritual creatures, but reject Islam's practices. Each day they pay obeisance to God, then to the earth (for 'it is the earth that brings existence to life') and then pay honour to the four cardinal directions. They regard *Pancasila* as their spiritual guide and reject all forms of organisation. This includes supporting no political party.⁵⁰ Although they have no written work of scripture, they did keep a typescript copy of *Dermagandhul* dating from 2001, taken from the Tan Khoen Swie publication of 1921.

In the very village where Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's school is found there is also a *kebatinan* group. They have neither guru nor disciples, but merely gather together to discuss the visions they receive in meditation. These visions have, they claim, predicted major national events such as the *tsunami* of December 2004 and the outcome of elections. Their aim is direct contact with God and, although they say that their doctrines are secret, they accept a description of their ideas as *ilmu kasampurnan* (the mystical sciences of perfection) — a venerable term in Javanese mysticism. 'Javanese culture is more pure than religion', they say. Their prayer is a nine-line recitation that reflects the diverse religious upbringings of the group, invoking God, then Jesus, then the secret of God: *ya Allah* (x3), *ya Yesus* (x3), *sir Allah* (x3).⁵¹ A similar group meets in Kedungtungkul (north Surakarta), some of them of Christian background and some Muslim. They fast according to the Javanese

⁴⁹ Discussion with Ibu Sudarmi, Kediri, 27 Nov. 2007.

⁵⁰ Discussion with Warno Sawito, Jonggrangan, Klaten, 2 Nov. 2006.

⁵¹ Discussion with Bu Amin, Pak Pardi and others of this group, Cemani, Ngruki, 11 March 2005.

35-day cycle and regard that as superior to Islamic fasting; they take their mystical knowledge (*ngelmu*) from Islam or any other source. The head of their local mosque (the *modin*) is, they say, a *kejarwen* paranormal who knows the local spirits and has never been known to pray in the orthodox Muslim fashion. 'Do not seek pleasure, rather seek tranquility', they say, and 'do not seek wealth, rather seek to have enough'.⁵² On the slopes of Mount Lawu is a group calling themselves Parabu, from Pangudi Rahayuning Budi (Striving for Virtue). They engage in ascetic practices such as pilgrimages to mountain sites and meditating while submerged in rivers up to their necks (*kungkum*). They have had encounters with Sunan Lawu and are able to meet Ratu Kidul, we are told.⁵³ In Gunung Kidul, many people reportedly engage in *kungkum* at night during the first month of the Javanese year and visit holy graves in the hope of receiving supernatural inspiration.⁵⁴

Near Tegal is a group with Buddhist-like teachings that they say are handed down from the time of Majapahit.⁵⁵ Despite the New Order's bloody suppression of what seems to have been a version of the older Saminist movement in Blora and Ngawi in 1966 (discussed in Chapter 5 above), Saminist communities survive, with their rejection of outside authority and emphasis upon sexuality, agricultural labour and passive resistance.⁵⁶ In the Magelang area, near the Borobudur temple, is found a *kebatinan* group calling themselves Kawruh Urip Sejati (True Knowledge of Life) with some 3,000 followers.⁵⁷ Similar movements can be found in other places, but so far as I am aware none are of any great size.

The limited influence and prospects of *kebatinan* movements is a function of their nature as much as their size. The organisations of Islamic activists and zealots of the kind that we will discuss below and characterise as the protagonists in our drama, in many cases would be no larger than some of these *kebatinan* movements. But *kebatinan* has been on the defensive for over 40 years and has got used to keeping a low profile in a game in which the recognised world religions seem to be the only legitimate players.

⁵² Discussion with a group of the villagers of Kedungtungkul, Jebres, Surakarta, 31 March 2004.

⁵³ Discussion with the Parabu leader Sularto Hardipartono, Ngargoyoso, Kemuning, Karanganyar, 11 Sept. 2008.

⁵⁴ *KR*, 9 Jan. 2009.

⁵⁵ This group is called Maneges; email from Suhadi Cholil, 27 Apr. 2008.

⁵⁶ There is lengthy reporting about Saminists in Bojonegoro in *Kmps*, 4 March 2005.

⁵⁷ *Bernas*, 18 Jan. 2008.

Moreover, as we have just noted, it is common for such movements to reject outside authority, to seek to live within a limited village community insulated as far as possible from outside interference, and to seek both the social and personal harmony that such insulation can bring. Unlike in the days of *aliran* politics, no political party can be called the party for *kebatinan* adherents. It is rare for such movements to proclaim any political allegiance (although two ‘paranormals’ did claim to have mobilised their powers to give strength to Amien Rais as a presidential candidate in 2004).⁵⁸ It is precisely this antipathy to organisation, this rejection of institutionalisation that makes such movements vulnerable to influence (indeed, to threats) from better-organised religious organisations. Add to that the impact of religious education in schools, the widespread *dakwah* activities we have frequently noted, Ibu Sudarmi’s lament (quoted above) about the young being distracted by foreign culture, television soap operas and their mobile phones, and the wish of many movements principally to be left alone to seek harmony — and it is hard to imagine that *kebatinan*’s prospects can be very rosy in Java.

Among *kebatinan* people, some claim to be at the same time practicing Muslims who carry out the five pillars of orthopraxy⁵⁹ but others have been attacked by religious zealots on a charge of deviancy. One movement that has suffered in this way is called Tri Tunggal (Three-in-One); this is a term also used in Indonesian Christian circles for the concept of the Trinity, and no doubt makes Tri Tunggal a particular target for angry Islamic zealots. In this case, however, the trinity that is meant is the three-in-one in the human being of body, ‘thinking-spirit’ (*jiwa pikiran*) and soul. While it is rooted in Javanese *kebatinan*-style rituals, which it has performed publicly on a large scale, it also seeks to act as a bridge across religious traditions in the interest of promoting harmony. The founder was one Sapto Rahardjo (later called Sat Guru Sabdo Langit IV, the ‘heaven-speaking guru’), who — like some other leaders of the movement — is a Catholic, but one steeped in indigenous Javanese traditions. He was born in 1974 in Yogyakarta to *priyayi* parents, his father a military officer. With parental encouragement, the young man undertook various ascetic exercises, which

⁵⁸ Paguyuban Sukmo Suminar, *Amien Rais: Satriya linuwih; Kajian supranatural tokoh-tokoh nasional* [Surakarta: c. 2003–4]. This pamphlet described Amien’s descent from the last king of Majapahit Brawijaya V and his receipt of a princely (Pangeran) rank from the Surakarta *kraton*.

⁵⁹ For example, Ki Bagus Ponari, Kediri, 29 Nov. 2007 (Sapta Darma); *Tempo*, 2 Sept. 2008 (on Aboge or Islam Aboge, in Malang and Banyumas Regencies).

included encounters with a number of spirits, until, in 1995, in the midst of meditation he received a spiritual command: 'Fear not! Carry on! Your place is just as far as your belief.' On the basis of this (not-entirely-transparent, it must be said) inspiration, he founded the Tri Tunggal Association (Paguyuban Tri Tunggal). This Association was active in spiritual healing and teaching meditation and mystical doctrines. It became well known for its conduct of exorcisms (*ruwatan*) and other such spiritualist rituals. For followers of Tri Tunggal, *kungkum* (meditating while submerged in water up to the neck) is an almost daily practice and *ruwatan* exorcisms are done weekly and on important dates. The ultimate aim of these practices is the unity of self with God, of servant with master (*manunggaling kawula-gusti*) — a long-established aim of Javanese mysticism but one that easily gives rise to accusations of polytheism (*shirk*). There is also a Tri Tunggal music group called Adiluhung Tak that is rather like Emha Ainun Najib's Kiai Kanjeng group in combining Javanese *gamelan* and other folk instruments with modern sounds. But instead of pious Islamic music, Adiluhung Tak presents Javanese religious songs composed by Sapto Rahardjo and inspired by pre-Islamic Old Javanese literature or works such as Mangkunagara IV's *Wulangreh*. Tri Tunggal can be followed by people of any religion, but Sapto Rahardjo is of the view that all the world religions have 'colonised' Java and acted to destroy its indigenous faith and culture.⁶⁰

Given such ideas and the Catholic background of its leadership, it is hardly surprising that Tri Tunggal (and other such movements) attracted criticism and threats from some Islamic circles. Tri Tunggal had a branch at Cemani, Ngruki, where Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's Al-Mukmin school is located. In 2006, a group of zealots there denounced Tri Tunggal as a deviant sect promoting Christianisation and forced the branch to close.⁶¹ In Yogyakarta

⁶⁰ This discussion rests upon the valuable study of Tri Tunggal in Burhan Ali, 'Kebatinan dan keberagamaan dalam paguyuban Tri Tunggal Yogyakarta' (MA thesis, Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies, Gadjah Mada University, 2006), esp. pp. 6–7, 32–9, 50–3, 61–70, 78–84, 112–3, 127–8, 132–3, 164–9.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 57, identifies the attacking group as 'Front Pembela Islam (FPI) Surakarta', almost surely meaning the FPIS (Surakarta Islamic Youth Front). Laskar Umat Islam Surakarta (LUIS, Surakarta Islamic *Ummah* Militia, est. December 2000, which included FPIS) was named as the attackers by Eko Sriyanto Sapta Wijaya of the rather idiosyncratic Gerakan Moral Rekonsiliasi Indonesia (Moral Movement for Indonesian Reconciliation, founded in Surakarta by Abdurrahman Wahid, Pakubuwana XII and others, according to the founding notarial document of 18 March 2003); discussion, Surakarta, 26 March 2007.

and elsewhere, Tri Tunggal carried on with its activities,⁶² although its leaders expressed concern about Muslim groups who were prepared to denounce such movements as unbelievers (*kafirs*) or polytheists (*musyrik*).⁶³ Sapta Darma came under attack in a small village near Yogyakarta, where there had been a Sapta Darma centre (*sanggar*) since 1984. In 2008, some 50 FPI thugs attacked the *sanggar* late at night, smashed the place up, punched one of the adherents and seized publications which proved, they said, that this was a 'deviant sect' because its followers prayed facing east rather than towards Mecca, and demanded that it be disbanded. The Sapta Darma people said they did face east, but this was just one of the Javanese ways of paying obeisance to God. The FPI mob intended to carry on to attack a Tri Tunggal branch nearby, but were dissuaded by the police. The latter brought the two sides together to 'straighten out perceptions on each side'. The Sapta Darma group ceased their activities for a time until the atmosphere cooled, they said. Evidently no one was arrested.⁶⁴ Shortly thereafter, in Brebes, near the north coast, thousands of local people forcibly closed a Sapta Darma building where a small number of adherents met, denouncing the movement as 'deviant' because its followers pray facing east and there was a picture of the clown-god Semar on the wall. The police prevented them from burning the building. Other Sapta Darma sites in the region were also threatened. The police again arrested no one but sought to mediate,

⁶² *KR*, 25 Jan. 2008 reports Tri Tunggal activities in Yogyakarta, Semarang, Purwokerto, Den Pasar and elsewhere. *KR*, 16 Apr. 2008 reports on Tri Tunggal's public performances including *wayang*, translation projects, 'holistic healing' and other activities to mark the observation of 'National Awakening Day', a century after the founding of Budi Utomo.

⁶³ Zayyin Alfijihad interview with Mas Jeje (one of the top Tri Tunggal leaders), Yogyakarta, 3 Dec. 2007. A report on Tri Tunggal's rituals at the south coast and Candhi Cetha is in *Bernas*, 27 Oct. 2007.

⁶⁴ *KR*, 12 Oct. 2008; *Kmps*, 13 Oct. 2008. There is also a report in [Zainal Abidin Bagir, Suhadi Cholil, Budi Ashari and Musaghfiroh Rahayu,] *Laporan tahunan: Kehidupan beragama di Indonesia tahun 2008* (Yogyakarta: Program Studi Agama dan Lintas Budaya, Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies, Sekolah Pascasarjana, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2008), pp. 23–4. The head of FPI was reported to the police for beating up a person in the same village, but this seems to be a separate case; *KR*, 16 Oct. 2008. FPI was sometimes on the receiving end, e.g., NU activists attacked the FPI headquarters in Yogyakarta in June 2008, following the violence at the national monument in Jakarta on 1 June; email from Noorhaidi Hasan, 9 June 2008.

achieving an agreement whereby the Sapta Darma adherents should either cease to call themselves Muslims or repent and recite the *Shahada*, thereby returning to Islam.⁶⁵

Such conflicts led some Javanese to feel that certain elements of Islam had become a disruptive force, a threat to that tranquility which older forms of Javanese mysticism and *abangan* villagers generally sought. A Yogyakarta *kraton* servant and guardian of the grave of the Mataram dynasty's founder, Panembahan Senapati, commented (romanticising Javanese history as he did so),

Make no mistake: since early times, Javanese people have sought to live in peaceful tranquility, with good order and good fortune, and that was not because of religion but because of the roots of Javanese tradition which always emphasised empathy for others and polite conduct. It was not at all because of religion! [But nowadays] Islam in fact seems to bring misfortune; I see on television people who often shout *Allahu akbar* and wear Muslim-style clothes (*baju koko*), even cudgeling and punching people — it's unheard-of!⁶⁶

While some who were committed to *abangan*, *kebatinan* and related ideas and practices thus lamented the presence of violence in the name of Islam (as did many devout Muslims), there was also a positive response to the prevailing atmosphere of deepening religiosity — a response consistent with the general process of Islamisation seen in this book. In the Kediri area the annual *bersih desa* (village cleansing) rituals still include older Javanese performances such as *wayang* or *tayuban*, but it is now common for them also to have religious teachings (*pengajian*) led by the local *kyai*.⁶⁷ A village in the Kulonprogo area revived its *bersih desa* ceremony after having abandoned the tradition for 20 years. The day before there was Sufi spiritual 'striving' (*mujahadah*). On the day itself, the ritual consisted of the recitation of several passages of the *Qur'an*, followed by the Traditionalist devotional practices of *slawatan* and *tahlilan*, and prayers for well-being. Then it culminated in a *wayang* performance.⁶⁸ In the Sleman area, another village instituted the *bersih desa* ritual where there had been none before in the hope of attracting

⁶⁵ Email from Suhadi Cholil, 6 Jan. 2009. The Brebes incident is also reported in [Zainal Abidin Bagir *et al.*,] *Laporan tahunan*, p. 24.

⁶⁶ Mas Bekel Hastono Wiyono, 4 Dec. 2007 (interviewed in Kota Gede by Zayyin Alfijihad).

⁶⁷ Email from Imam Subawi, 2 Feb. 2009.

⁶⁸ *KR*, 12 Jan. 2009.

tourists. Prominent among the reinvented 'tradition' were 'songs of an Islamic flavour' sung to various forms of instrumentation.⁶⁹

As we have seen throughout this book, *abangan*, *kebatinan* and related ideas and practices were intimately involved in many of the art forms found in Javanese society, for those arts often invoked supernatural powers. For that reason, they, too, have been affected by efforts to make Javanese society more perfectly Islamic. It is to those arts that we now turn.

Older arts and performance styles in a more Islamic society

In this age of deeper Islamisation of Javanese society, the fate of older art forms has been rather like that of *abangan*, *kebatinan* and related practices in general. While there are occasionally optimistic reports about the survival or revival of such arts and while there can be no reasonable doubt that there are still Javanese who believe in the spiritual forces associated with them, it does seem that they have declined in frequency and popularity, have been in large measure denatured culturally by a decline in the number who believe in their older spiritual aspects, have sometimes become more Islamised like the rest of local culture, and have survived best where local authorities support them for the purposes of tourism or reinforcing senses of local identity. The last is of particular significance in the post-2001 age of regional autonomy. In the early 21st century we can see a pattern that is over a century old, as Islamic reformers seek to rid Javanese society of older superstitions, which frequently means a wish to abolish the associated art forms altogether. The only major religious actor that takes a different position is the Catholic Church, with its policy of 'inculturation' (a matter to which we will return below). But we must remember that, even if there were no religious reformers, modernisation and globalisation of entertainment would kill off many older art forms anyway.

The head of the Yogyakarta Special District, Sultan Hamengkubuwana X, and his government put special effort into supporting older art forms. From 2005, villages were selected for support and guidance from the Tourism, Art and Culture Service to maintain and develop 'traditional culture' such as *jaranan* (called *jathilan* there) and *ande-ande lumut* of the more *abangan* style, courtly *gamelan* (*karawitan*), plus Traditionalist performances including *slawatan* and *kasidah* (religious chanting to percussion instruments, but also done in the modern form called *kasidah*

⁶⁹ *KmpsO*, 28 Sept. 2009.

pop or *kasidah modern*), along with music of colonial-era vintage such as *kroncong* (ballads sung to accompaniment of the guitar and other modern instruments). Performance festivals and competitions were to encourage these arts.⁷⁰ The Yogyakarta Tourism Service had a task to develop these arts, said its head, because tourism represented 'the locomotive of the economy'.⁷¹ Nevertheless Yogyakarta observers continued to report that some types of performance seemed to survive while others languished. Spiritual aspects continued to be reported in some circumstances. To mark 1,000 days since the Yogyakarta earthquake of May 2006, a village in Bantul put on a *gamelan* performance in the dark of the night with no lights, 'but the players experienced no difficulties in playing the *gamelan* because, so they say, they received guidance from spirits'.⁷²

Even long-established religious practices could become little more than tourist attractions. To observe the 'Night of Power' (Arabic *laylat al-qadr*) during the month of Ramadan, when God is believed to have sent down the *Qur'an*, about a thousand tourism promoters, agents, workers and people running 'tourism villages' gathered to do a 'cultural performance of Islamic religious arts', such as *slawatan*, which are 'rarely performed nowadays, under pressure from modern entertainment'.⁷³ Similarly, a celebration of the Prophet's birthday on the slopes of Mount Wilis, near Kediri, was described as a way to promote tourism, although the local people thought it could fend off calamities.⁷⁴ Such dual understandings and purposes are probably widespread, with local people (perhaps just the older generation) taking part in rituals because they believe in the power of spirits, and local governments supporting them because they believe in the power of tourism. Over time, asserted the leader of an annual ritual at a holy grave in Gunung Kidul, the people would become more aware that such rituals are only symbolic.⁷⁵

⁷⁰ *Tempo*I, 23 Feb. 2005, reports 35 villages were picked; *Kmps* (Gunung Kidul), 11 June 2009, reports 32 being selected in Gunung Kidul. Other reports on such activities are in *KR*, 30 Oct. 2007; *Kmps*, 8 Oct. 2008.

⁷¹ *KR*, 2 March 2008.

⁷² *KR*, 23 Feb. 2009.

⁷³ *Kmps*, 11 Sept. 2009. Other reports on older art forms being sustained for the purposes of tourism may be found in *Bernas*, 21 July 2008; *KR*, 28 July 2008.

⁷⁴ *RK* online, 27 Apr. 2005.

⁷⁵ *KR*, 4 May 2008. This was Sumarwanto, a local leader at Sodo, the site of the reputed grave of Ki Ageng Giring III, a founding figure from the obscure 16th-century history of the Mataram dynasty.

Kraton-style performances tend to be expensive and, on the whole, the spiritual ideas associated with them do not seem to have fared well in recent years. Sultan Hamengkubuwana X himself choreographed a new *bedhaya* dance, but the newspaper report of its performance, at least, did not mention a connection with the Goddess of the Southern Ocean, but rather said that this 'sacral dance ... symbolised the spirit of patriotism and the philosophy of leadership'.⁷⁶ A local aficionado regretted that the *bedhaya* was increasingly seen as an 'ordinary dance' rather than one that is 'sacral'.⁷⁷ The main royal-sponsored Habirandha school for *wayang* puppeteers in Yogyakarta, founded in 1925, has a diminishing number of students who begin their studies and even fewer who finish.⁷⁸ The burlesque *kethoprak* also experienced varying fortunes. The leading performer Bondan Nusantara bemoaned its decline in popularity in Yogyakarta to Barbara Hatley,⁷⁹ a view shared by others.⁸⁰ Evidently *kethoprak* in Yogyakarta was, however, at least surviving better than *wayang kulit* (shadow play with parchment puppets) and *wayang wong* (dance drama).⁸¹ Nevertheless, in 2007 there were just 32 *kethoprak* troupes in the whole Yogyakarta Special District, whereas there had been 95 in Gunung Kidul alone seven years before.⁸²

In Surakarta, too, there was little in the way of folk performances in the city. *Wayang wong* was still performed at its famous Sriwedari theatre, but to tiny audiences.⁸³ There still seemed to be popular interest in *kethoprak* in the countryside. A leading exponent, Hanindyan, performed simplified *kethoprak* in villages with a small troupe. On one occasion, however, plans for a performance had to be cancelled because the local people thought it to be irreconcilable with Islam.⁸⁴ *Kethoprak* was nearly dead in Kediri; only one troupe remained there, performing some nights to no audience, under

⁷⁶ *Bernas*, 2 Apr. 2008.

⁷⁷ KRT Sunaryadi Maharsiwara, quoted in *KR*, 8 Jan. 2008.

⁷⁸ *JktP* online, 6 Apr. 2010.

⁷⁹ The comment was made c. 2003–4; Hatley, *Javanese performances*, p. 197. He repeated these concerns in *Kmps*, 18 Oct. 2008.

⁸⁰ For example *Kmps*, 1 Aug. 2009.

⁸¹ *KR*, 15 July 2008.

⁸² *Kmps*, 18 Oct. 2008.

⁸³ *KR*, 14 Nov. 2007, citing the well-known *wayang wong* dancer Darsi Pudyorini (then 74 years old).

⁸⁴ Discussion with Hanindyan, Surakarta, 18 Oct. 2005. The failed performance was to be at Tegalsari. According to Hanindyan, *kethoprak* continued to be popular in Pati.



Illustration 36 *Wayang wong* performance in the Yogyakarta *kraton*, 1969

a roof that leaked if it rained.⁸⁵ In that region, *kethoprak* performers earned hardly enough to live, while their poverty and constant travel from place to place to perform meant that their children were unable to attend schools, according to one report.⁸⁶

The village of Tutup Ngisor, on the slopes of Mount Merapi, continued its tradition of artistic performances by villagers without government support.

⁸⁵ *RK*, 15 Apr. 2005; *MmK*, 16 Sept. 2005.

⁸⁶ *RK*, 26 July 2009.

Wayang wong, *jaranan*, *gamelan* and much else remained part of the daily life of this small village, with its population of about 200. In 2005, the leading figure there, Sitras Anjilin, along with others announced an 'Academy of Mountain Culture' (Akademi Budaya Gunung) which put on a 'Five Mountain Festival' (Festival Lima Gunung). This presented performances from the five mountains Merapi, Merbabu, Sumbing, Menoreh and Andung, but also invited performers from Surakarta, Yogyakarta, Bali and elsewhere. The performances preserved older supernatural ideas, with mantras being recited and other spiritual preparations, although Sitras Anjilin's brother commented that some of these spiritual traditions had died and only the performance remained. Traditionalist Islamic observances and performances were also included, such as *Maulid Nabi* to commemorate the birth of the Prophet, observance of the end of the fasting month (*Idul fitri*) and *wayang Menak* (with stories about the Prophet's uncle Amir Hamza).⁸⁷

Such traditional arts were subject to the influences of modernisation, with unclear effects on their popularity. A group near Yogyakarta began teaching *jaranan* to youngsters without trance, emphasising this as an art form of music and dance alone.⁸⁸ Indeed, said the LKiS leader Jadul Maula, *jaranan* was now just entertainment.⁸⁹ At the Yogyakarta *Gamelan* Festival in 2008, the Women's Studies Centre at Universitas Gadjah Mada was the moving force for *wayang* performed by three female *dalangs* (one of them a Japanese visitor), with scripts about female heroes.⁹⁰ *Gam Rock* has even been born, with *gamelan* instrumentation augmented by electric guitars, bass guitar, drum and organ,⁹¹ as have forms sometimes called *gamelan gaul* (mixed *gamelan*) which add saxophone, flute, guitar, bass and/or keyboard to the orchestra and are reportedly popular among school pupils in Yogyakarta.⁹²

Sometimes NU has endorsed Javanese artistic forms that Modernists and Revivalists regard as legacies of the pre-Islamic age of ignorance, above all the *kris*, but this is done in a way consistent with NU's ultimate aim of purifying local culture. Ansor in Kediri promoted '*kris* folk culture', but in a

⁸⁷ Discussion with Bambang Tri Santoso (the elder brother of Sitras Anjilin), Tutup Ngisor, 21 Oct. 2005; *Kmps*, 24 Sept. 2005; *JktP* online, 15 Jan. 2011.

⁸⁸ *KR*, 19 Oct. 2007.

⁸⁹ M. Jadul Maula (interviewed by Nur Choliq Ridwan), Yogyakarta, 9 Dec. 2007.

⁹⁰ *Bernas*, 12 July 2008; *KR*, 16 July 2008.

⁹¹ *KR*, 15 Apr. 2008.

⁹² *KR*, 15 May 2008, 23 Oct. 2008; *Kmps*, 30 Oct. 2008.

despiritualised form, as a part of ‘*dakwah* and struggle in a cultural way’. Said the Ansor leader Abu Muslich,

With the ever more intense internalisation of religion, for the past several decades the fate of the *kris* has gone through a gloomy period. It has been accused of being a source of polytheism (*shirk*) and the bearer of deviance and superstition. The *kris* is regarded as a thing of black magic, which has its own evil spirit ... So now it's time to place the *kris* in its proper place, as an ancient object and cultural object left to us by history, which bears high esthetic and artistic standards.⁹³

Kediri's *kyais* were unhappy with the promotion of *jaranan* as a characteristically Kediri art form. They had successfully blocked an earlier idea that *tayuban* — with all its lascivious associations — should be picked as the special art form reflecting Kediri's identity.⁹⁴ But it was harder to resist *jaranan*, evidently. The city secretary Zaini said that a PKB member of the local parliament came to him to say that *kyais* had contacted him to express their concern that their students were enjoying *jaranan*. Zaini felt that he must proceed slowly in this matter but believed that more moderate *kyais* were coming around to his view and, indeed, many *pesantren* students were watching *jaranan*. The *kyais* of course did not approve of trance — seeing it as possession by evil spirits — but in Zaini's view trance was just being faked anyway. To encourage a change of opinions about *jaranan*, Zaini — himself the son of a *kyai* from Nganjuk — began a *dakwah* section within the local *jaranan* association that he had formed, with the aim of having *pengajian* by a local *kyai* once every three months.⁹⁵

Surabaya, like Kediri, lacked the *kraton* culture that was so important in Central Java, and thus struggled to find what it was that, in a cultural sense, made Surabaya special. The answer might have been the burlesque *ludruk* theatre — bawdy, raunchy, vulgar and iconoclastic that it was. But as well as being in bad taste it had been anti-elite, anti-*santri*, and particularly

⁹³ Quoted in *RK*, 29 Apr. 2007. Similar views were put by the promoter of a display of *krisses* at a Toyota showroom in Kediri; *RK*, 27 Dec. 2007. The artistic and esthetic standards of *krisses*, as well as the technical processes involved in making them, are set out with wonderful illustrations in Isaäc Groneman, *The Javanese kris* (preface and intro. David van Duuren [transl. Peter Richardus and Timothy D. Rogers]; Leiden: C. Zwartenkot Art Books and KITLV Press, 2009).

⁹⁴ Discussion with Suradi, head of the Arts and Culture section of *Kabupaten Kediri*, Kediri, 16 March 2005.

⁹⁵ Discussion with Drs H.M. Zaini, Kediri, 26 Nov. 2007; *MmK*, 5 Nov. 2007.

associated with PKI in Sukarno's days — none of which recommended it for government support. In 2005 the Surabaya government proposed a one-year attempt to modernise the management of *ludruk* and clean it up, making it more 'artistic' and satirical rather than simply vulgar.⁹⁶ But two years later the four theatres that had existed in Surabaya around the year 2000 had dwindled to just one survivor, operating in a slum with poor attendance. A problem for *ludruk* has been that its performers are predominantly impoverished gays, transsexuals and transvestites, living on the margins of society and respected by only a few human rights activists. Their art was not a target of Islamic activists' hostility — it was just dying from neglect and lack of public interest. *Ludruk* performers were obliged to search for other sources of income on the legal and moral margins of society to survive.⁹⁷

NU continued to promote its own Traditionalist art forms which are at the same time spiritual practices, but of a kind seen as bearing acceptably Muslim spirituality. The performances that we have often encountered above — *slawatan*, *tahlilan*, *rebana*, *nasyid* and all the rest — carried on in the post-Soeharto years. Traditionalists' belief in supernatural forces continued also in the semi-performance and semi-spiritual world of martial arts, where belief in invulnerability (*ilmu kanuragan*) was publicly advertised as a skill that could be taught by a 'Maestro of Banser in Central Java'.⁹⁸ Another form of martial arts, reputedly handed down from the *wali* Sunan Bonang and consisting of bodily positions based on Arabic letters, was said to convey both invulnerability and healing.⁹⁹ Yet another form attributed to Sunan Kalijaga called *Ilmu Banyu Mataram* (the mystical science of Mataram water) rested on orthodox Sufi roots, said its leader, although it had recently suffered from deviations.¹⁰⁰

NU was prepared to embrace some innovation in its arts. At a *Festival Bedug dan Selawatan Rebana* (mosque-drum and *slawatan* with tambourine

⁹⁶ *Kmps* (edisi Jawa Timur), 7 March 2005.

⁹⁷ Discussion with Pak Sapari at the *ludruk* theatre Irama Budaya, Pulo, Wonokromo, Surabaya, 26 Nov. 2007. See also *Tempo*, 25 Dec. 2005, reporting on the dying of *ludruk*, when in the whole of East Java there were only about 30 groups surviving.

⁹⁸ Hairus Salim, *Kelompok paramiliter NU*, p. 108, referring to an advertisement in *Warta NU* of Dec. 2001. This 'Maestro' was Abah H.M. Suyuthi al-Ghozali of Cepu.

⁹⁹ This was called *Ilmu Sujud* (*KR*, 4 May 2008).

¹⁰⁰ *KR*, 9 Sept. 2008. In Javanese historical legends, Sunan Kalijaga had a special connection with the Mataram dynasty (Mataram being today's Yogyakarta region); see Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi*, p. 75.

festival) in Pare, audiences were attracted by the religious pop star Opick, along with others performing devotional songs (*nasyid* and *kasidah*), the whole occasion being sponsored by Yamaha.¹⁰¹ *Kyais* were, however, mostly unenthusiastic about television and often hostile to the Internet, which was seen as a source of pornography and other forms of immorality.¹⁰² In Yogyakarta in 2008–9, Jadul Maula and others revived Lesbumi as a modern sort of organisation to promote the artistic side of Traditionalism and defend it from globalisation's challenges. Festivals were to promote *slawatan* and other performances of a Traditionalist kind.¹⁰³ At a festival in Yogyakarta in 2008, Lesbumi introduced a new sort of *wayang*, with puppets made of translucent mica and accompanied by modern stringed instruments and drum, called *wayang Mika-EL*, the name taken from the angel Michael (*Mikael*). The story, however, was based on that of *Dewa Ruci*, telling of the spiritual searching of Bima (a figure from the *Bratayuda* epic).¹⁰⁴

Traditionalist artistic-cum-spiritual practices represent a barrier to the reforming aspirations of Revivalists, and came under formidable attack from that quarter. From its inception, Islamic Modernism has been at least unenthusiastic about such practices and at times downright hostile, but in Indonesia's post-2001 atmosphere of 'moderates' collaborating, Muhammadiyah's objections were moderated. So it was left to Revivalist quarters to denounce Traditionalist observances as heresy. Ky. H. Mahrus Ali (not to be confused with Ky. H. Mahrus Aly of *pesantren* Lirboyo) was born in a village near Gresik in 1957, studied and taught in *pesantrens*, eventually becoming a teacher at the YAPI¹⁰⁵ *pesantren* in Bangil, one of Java's very few Shi'ite institutions, then led by its founder Ust. Husein al-Habsyi. Under the latter's influence, Mahrus Ali began to see the error of some Traditionalist ways, he said. He then lived and studied in Saudi Arabia for seven years, returning to Indonesia in 1987. In 2007 he published two books in which he identified himself as a 'former *kyai* of NU'. These works denounced NU practices such as *tahlilan*, *slawatan*, *dhikir*, pilgrimages to the

¹⁰¹ *RK*, 5 May 2007.

¹⁰² There was no Internet allowed at Lirboyo in 2007 and pupils were not allowed to watch television, but an exception was made for the World Cup soccer competition; discussion with Ky. H.A. Idris Marzuqi, Lirboyo, Kediri, 29 Nov. 2007. Getting the Internet into *pesantrens* has been a considerable challenge for modernisers.

¹⁰³ *KR*, 18 Apr. 2008, 1 July 2009, 10 Sept. 2009.

¹⁰⁴ *KR*, 21 Oct. 2008.

¹⁰⁵ Yayasan Pesantren Islam, Islamic *pesantren* Foundation. Its website is at <http://www.yapibangil.org>. The Bangil *pesantren* was established in 1973.

graves of *walis*, seeking blessings from the dead, prophesying, accepting the religious authority of *kyais* and invulnerability — all on the narrowly textual grounds that any practice not specifically approved in the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* represents illegal innovation in Islam (*bid'a*).¹⁰⁶ We have noted earlier in this book that Modernists generally take such a view, rejecting as *bid'a* what is not specifically allowed by those basic scriptures, while Traditionalists generally take the inverse position that anything can be accepted that is not specifically forbidden by the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* and which is good in itself. But Mahrus Ali's position was an extreme form of Modernism and, resting solely on the *Qur'an* and *Hadith*, it is Revivalist in the analytical terminology we use in this book. Page after page cites those scriptures (and sometimes Saudi *fatwas* or other judgments based on them) to reject Traditionalist practices in uncompromising terms. Mahrus Ali also rejects democracy,¹⁰⁷ which both Muhammadiyah and NU support. 'Remember,' he says, 'that Islamic *shari'a* is already perfect and the Messenger of God has passed to us all of God's commands If we add to or take away from Islamic *shari'a*, it means that we regard Islamic *shari'a* as imperfect and God's Messenger as a deceiver.'¹⁰⁸

NU *kyais* were angry at this challenge. They rejected the label 'former *kyai* of NU', saying that a *kyai* could not stop being a *kyai* and that Mahrus Ali had never been active in NU. Some published a book rejecting his arguments and wished to report him to the police for lying to the public.¹⁰⁹ Others chose to ignore his claims and to explain carefully to their *pesantren* students the scriptural foundations of Traditionalist practices¹¹⁰ — for *kyais* are at least as adept as Mahrus Ali at citing scripture. Imam Ghazali Said was of the view that Mahrus Ali had been persuaded of Wahhabi theology while in Saudi Arabia and that his writing was funded by the Saudis. He

¹⁰⁶ Mahrus Ali, *Mantan kiai NU menggugat sholawat & dzikir syirik (Nariyah, al-Fatih, Mujiyat, Thibbul Qulub)* (intro. KH. Mu'ammal Hamidy; rev. ed.; Surabaya: Laa Tasyuk! Press, 2007); idem, *Mantan kiai NU menggugat tablilan, istighosahan dan ziarah para wali* (intro. H. Abdul Rahman; rev. ed.; Surabaya: Laa Tasyuk! Press, 2007). Biographical information from the biographical sections of these books and from the first of these works, pp. ix–x. Mahrus Ali advertised a series of further books to prove Traditionalist practices to be heretical, but I do not have copies of those.

¹⁰⁷ Mahrus Ali, *Mantan kiai NU menggugat tablilan, istighosahan dan ziarah para wali*, pp. 229–32.

¹⁰⁸ Mahrus Ali, *Mantan kiai NU menggugat sholawat & dzikir syirik*, p. 305.

¹⁰⁹ *Duta Masyarakat* online, 27 Jan. 2008; *NU Online*, 24 Feb. 2008.

¹¹⁰ Discussion with Ky. H. Anwar Iskandar, Kediri, 26 Oct. 2008.

viewed this as part of a general trend of increasing Wahhabi influence among NU *kyais*.¹¹¹

Others who were inclined to an uncompromising puritanism also had objections to arts. One typical example was the leader of a small *Salafi pesantren* in Kediri which was supported with Saudi Arabian-based funding and had links to other Revivalist *pesantrens* including the Yogyakarta school of Ja'far Umar Thalib, the founder of Laskar Jihad. His view was that 'All local arts are human creations and ... are *bid'a* and forbidden in Islam. ... [They] regard Islam as not sufficient and not complete, whereas Islamic teachings are already complete and final.'¹¹² The HTI leader Ismail Yusanto said that it was acceptable to enjoy an art so long as the spiritual ideas associated with it were got rid of. If it is not possible to 'straighten out' such arts, then they will disappear. Beliefs about *krisses* are unacceptable, he said, as is the making of offerings to spirits.¹¹³ PKS has been readier to embrace local arts, but with appropriate amendments. It has put on *wayang* at its meetings, but with the singers wearing head-scarves (*kerudung*). On the other hand, the *bedhaya* dance, with its female dancers and links to the Goddess of the Southern Ocean, needed 'cultural dialogue' so as to be 'straightened out' in the view of the Yogyakarta PKS leader Kholil Mahmud.¹¹⁴

More extreme attacks on older arts are rare, but not unknown. In Sukoharjo regency south of Surakarta — an area with a reputation for Islamic hard-liners, where Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's Ngruki school is found — Islamic extremists attacked several *wayang* performances in late 2010, the first time this is known to have happened. Waving swords, throwing rocks and shouting *Allahu akbar*, people who reportedly described themselves as *Laskar Jihad* (Holy war militia) injured several persons and forced the performances to stop.¹¹⁵ I do not know whether this group had any connection with the

¹¹¹ Discussion with Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said at *pesantren* An-Nur, Wonocolo, Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008.

¹¹² Husnul Qodim interview of Ust. Sapto Atmo Wardoyo, *pesantren* Ath-Thoifah Al-Manshuroh, Jl. Papar-Pare, Kab. Kediri, 27 Feb. 2006. Almost all of the 150 pupils received funding from the International Islamic Relief Organisation, which is a Saudi Arabia-based charity whose office in Jakarta has been put on a United Nations list (last updated 30 Dec. 2011) of organisations associated with al-Qaeda; see <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/AQlist.pdf>.

¹¹³ Discussion with Muhammad Ismail Yusanto, Jakarta, 8 June 2007.

¹¹⁴ Discussion with Kholil Mahmud, Yogyakarta, 22 March 2008. See also *KR*, 16 May 2008.

¹¹⁵ *JktG*, 14 Oct. 2010.

former Laskar Jihad organisation set up by Ja'far Umar Thalib, which was disbanded in 2002 (see the following chapter).

Older art forms were sometimes subjected to conscious Islamisation, that being the best way to survive in more Islamised Java. We have already noted the likelihood nowadays that *bersih desa* ceremonies will include *pengajian* and/or Traditionalist devotional practices. An interesting case of Islamising an art form concerns the *gandrung* dance and singing performance of Banyuwangi, associated particularly with the Osing (or Using) people. In the 19th century, *gandrung* performers were boys, but in the 20th century women took over *gandrung*, attired in alluring form-fitting outfits, with bare arms and shoulders. They danced sensuously with male watchers in turn, and the performance was often associated with drinking and immoral conduct, as in the case of *tayuban*. The performance had supernatural aspects, too, and was thought to bring protection particularly to fishermen. In the late 1980s local bureaucrats sought to make *gandrung* the artistic symbol of the Osing, but pious Muslims objected. In 2000–5 the elected *Bupati* of Banyuwangi was Osing and wished to promote *gandrung* as a tourist attraction, including opening a school to train performers. Again there were objections from devout Muslims, although some *kyais* were willing to accept *gandrung* as 'just culture'. Meanwhile the dance has become slowly but progressively more Islamised to deal with these objections and songs have been introduced that promote Islamic piety. The local government runs month-long *gandrung* training sessions which include *pengajian*.¹¹⁶ So this characteristically *abangan* Osing performance is growing more Islamic, along with the rest of Javanese society.

Similarly, in 2009 Gadjah Mada University put on an Islamised *wayang* version of the *Bratayuda* to celebrate the revelation of the *Qur'an* (Arabic *nuzu l-Qur'an*). This was dubbed *wayang sambung* (connection *wayang*) and was said to be about the connection between God and humankind. In this version there were no female singers as is customary but rather men. The puppets were of parchment as usual but the Pandawa puppets (in effect, the 'good guys' of the drama) appeared in Islamic dress while their opponents the Kurawa side were traditionally depicted. The characters all had Islamised

¹¹⁶ Chintya Novi Anoegrajekti, 'Identitas dan siasat perempuan gandrung', *Srinthil: Media perempuan multikultural*, no. 3 (Apr. 2003), pp. 64–79; Abd. Ghafur and Chintya Novi Anoegrajekti, 'Gandrung demi hidup menyisir malam', *Srinthil: Media perempuan multikultural*, no. 3 (Apr. 2003), pp. 6–28; Chintya Novi Anoegrajekti, 'Kesenian Using', pp. 804–5; Bisri Effendy, 'Pengantar', in *Kebijakan kebudayaan di masa orde baru*, pp. 669–71; email from Novi Anoegrajekti, 4 March 2011.

names, such as Muhammad Gathukaca and Abdullah Gareng and the story was about Bima spreading Islam and creating a *pesantren*.¹¹⁷

Modernists — represented above all by Muhammadiyah — have mixed and contradictory views about all art, and about old-fashioned Javanese arts with their spiritual associations in particular. This reflects the potentially divergent aspirations of Modernism that we have noted above. Muhammadiyah's aim to return to the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* on the one hand and its wish for Islamic renewal or modernisation on the other can give birth to a contradiction between wooden literalism and puritanism driven by the first aspiration and openness to innovation and modernity driven by the second. In Muhammadiyah's home in Yogyakarta, this distinction is sometimes depicted as geographical. With the River Code as the dividing line, people speak of Muhammadiyah 'west of the river' (*kulon kali*), which means the *Kauman* area (seen as the base of the conservative and puritan side of Muhammadiyah) versus Muhammadiyah 'east of the river' (*wetan kali*) (which means Kota Gede, regarded as the base of the liberals and modernisers). The former is generally hostile to older forms of local culture and, in the more modern realm, regards the guitar as *haram*.¹¹⁸ The *wetan kali* people, by contrast, are reputedly more open to local and modern arts.¹¹⁹

Muhammadiyah's uncertainty about local arts, even on the part of the supposedly more open people 'east of the river' in Kota Gede, was exemplified in 1999–2000. Kota Gede is commonly thought of as a town dominated by Muhammadiyah and Modernist Islam. It had put on a festival of folk arts and performances in the 1960s, but that came to a halt after 1965–6, when many *kethoprak* (and probably other) performers were arrested. Like elsewhere, thereafter *abangan*-style arts were thought insufficiently Islamic and carried a whiff of Communism. In 1999 this festival was revived with some World Bank funding and the organising committee set a top-down artistic agenda. When the festival was repeated in 2000, however,

¹¹⁷ *JktP*, 22 Sept. 2009.

¹¹⁸ The scriptural authority for this view is probably the 14th-century Shafi'i work *Umdat al-salik*, in which the Prophet is reported to have said that God sent him 'to do away with all musical instruments, flutes, strings' and 'It is unlawful to use musical instruments ... like mandolin, lute, cymbals and flute'; see r40.1 and r40.2 in Ibn al-Naqib al-Misri, *Reliance of the traveller: The classic manual of Islamic sacred law 'Umdat al-salik* (ed. and transl. N.H.M. Keller; rev. ed.; Beltsville, MD: Amana Publications, 1994). I am grateful to Amelia Fauzia for locating this source.

¹¹⁹ Discussion with Dr Sidik Jatmika (Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta academic staff), Yogyakarta, 8 March 2005.

local people rather usurped control and programmed performances such as *jaranan* (*jathilan*) with their local non-Islamic spiritual aspects. This challenged the image of Kota Gede as a Muhammadiyah fortress and senior Muhammadiyah leaders were upset. One gave a Friday sermon objecting to a particular performance and saying that the *ummah* must be saved from such things. Muhammadiyah wrote a formal letter of objection to the festival organising committee, but no resolution of the disagreement was possible; both sides stood firm. Younger Muhammadiyah figures were, however, inclined to be more tolerant of these local arts. In the wake of this episode, there was surprise in some quarters on discovering that that Kota Gede was not yet as purified of older superstitions as Modernists had thought.¹²⁰

The prominent Muhammadiyah-affiliated artist Prof. Tulus Warsito, who is also Dean of the Faculty of Social and Political Studies at Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, expressed the view that Muhammadiyah was not as smart as NU in its use of local culture. The Islamic Studies Centre at his university, he said, opposed all modern sculptures even if they were not statues of living beings, and regarded the guitar as the sound of Satan. And even though Muhammadiyah in 2005, with its talk of ‘cultural *dakwah*’, seemed more open to local culture, in fact most Muhammadiyah people held dissenting views¹²¹ (as we saw above also with regard to the 2005 triumph of anti-Liberal figures in the Muhammadiyah leadership).

Muhammadiyah opinions range from qualified openness to local culture (with provisos, such as men and women being kept separate, prayer times not being disrupted and women dressing modestly) to simple opposition by people whom their opponents describe as ‘puritans’ and ‘confrontative’.¹²²

¹²⁰ M. Jadul Maula, ‘The moving equilibrium: Kultur Jawa, Muhammadiyah, buruh gugat, dalam Festival Kotagede 2000’, in M. Jadul Maula *et al.* (eds), *Ngesubi desa sak kukuban: Lokalitas, pluralisme, modal sosial demokrasi* (intro. Robert W. Hefner; Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2002), pp. 5–20. The particular performance that was objected to was *jailangkung*, which involves the summoning of a spirit.

¹²¹ Discussion with Prof. Tulus Warsito, Yogyakarta, 8 March 2005.

¹²² Discussions with the Muhammadiyah figures Ky. H. Kusnin Basri, Kudus, 27 March 2004; Drs H. Dahlan Rais, Surakarta, 18 Oct. 2005; and Drs H. Subari, Surakarta, 18 Oct. 2005; and with the Department of Religious Affairs leader Muammal, Kediri, 17 March 2005. Further, Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi’s interviews of the former head of Muhammadiyah Youth (Pemuda Muhammadiyah) Abdul Haris, Kediri, 31 Aug. 2005; their interview of Fauzan, the Secretary of Muhammadiyah in Kediri City, Kediri, 31 Aug. 2005; and their interview of the current head of Muhammadiyah Youth, Agus Umar, Kediri, 31 Aug. 2005; also Nur Choliq Ridwan’s interview of the JIMM leader Dr Zuly Qodir, Yogyakarta, 3 Dec. 2007.

The organisation remains split on this issue. Some Muhammadiyah schools introduce their pupils to *wayang* or traditional Javanese dress,¹²³ and Muhammadiyah meetings sometimes open with local cultural performances, as did the national meeting of 2005 which *inter alia* put on a Ponorogo *reyog* performance at the opening (but — we may assume — without trance).¹²⁴

As noted earlier in this chapter, the religious group that is most supportive of older forms of indigenous Javanese arts is the Catholic Church, which pursues its policy of ‘inculturation’, the current term for an approach that goes back over a century. It has its roots in the views of the Jesuit father Franciscus van Lith (1863–1926), who arrived in Batavia in 1896 and promoted Catholic accommodation of Javanese culture.¹²⁵ This process is facilitated by the fact that the hierarchy and almost all the priests are ethnically Javanese. There are Catholic versions of *wayang*, *slawatan* and even *ruwatan*. *Gamelan* is used in some churches and services are sometimes in Javanese rather than Indonesian. The spiritual content of these performances is of course Catholicised, and these arts, too, face challenges from the forces of modernisation and globalisation, including young people’s declining facility in Javanese (which we will return to below).¹²⁶ This pattern of the Catholic Church seeking to be ‘Javanised’ while some Islamic activists seek cultural ‘dejavatisation’ is about a century old. Another echo of the past is the emergence of some puritans within Javanese Protestantism who are also hostile to local culture.¹²⁷ Despite the latter, the generally more culturally receptive approach of Christianity among Javanese is a cause of worry to some Muslim activists, who feel that this gives Christianity an advantage in inter-religious competition for adherents.¹²⁸

¹²³ For example, *KR*, 15 Dec. 2003, 4 May 2008 (this second report interestingly being in *ngoko* Javanese rather than Indonesian).

¹²⁴ *Suara Muhammadiyah*, no. 15 (1–5 Aug. 2005), p. 7.

¹²⁵ See Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese society*, pp. 120–4.

¹²⁶ Discussion with the Catholic Father Haryanto, Surabaya, 24 Nov. 2007. *Ruwatan* has been performed particularly by the Jesuit scholar of Old Javanese Dr Ignatius Kuntara Wiryamartana SJ. On *slawatan*, see Latifah, ‘Seni slawatan Katolik di paroki Ganjuran: Sebuah kajian inkulturasi dari perspektif religi dan budaya’ (MA thesis, Program Studi Ilmu Perbandingan Agama, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, 2007).

¹²⁷ Discussion with Pastor Simon Philantropa, Surabaya, 24 Nov. 2007.

¹²⁸ Discussion with Imam Subkhan, an inter-religious activist of Muhammadiyah background, Yogyakarta, 13 Sept. 2008.

Generally speaking, recent decades have not been good for older Javanese art forms, and along with their observed decline has gone increasing concern about loss of Javanese language skills. Command of more elevated forms of that hierarchical language (such as *krama* and *krama inggil*) and of Javanese script are both declining, continuing a process already noted in previous years. School students are reported to avoid studying Javanese if they can. It would be a very rare high school graduate today who could read Javanese script, for publications are in roman script. Javanese script is used for public signs in Yogyakarta and in 2007 the mayor of Surakarta, Joko Widodo (known popularly as Jokowi), ordered a similar policy in Surakarta, but the signs are also written in the roman alphabet and, since it is not necessary to read the Javanese-script version, few people do or can.¹²⁹ The Yogyakarta government ordered its civil servants to communicate with one another in Javanese at certain times¹³⁰ (which, given bureaucratic conventions, should require command of the language's hierarchical levels), but I do not know whether this experiment has produced significant benefits for the language. Newspapers appear in the Indonesian language but some have columns in Javanese, and there are magazines using Javanese, but these are invariably in the roman alphabet and normally employ 'low Javanese' (*ngoko*). Modern novels have been written in Javanese in the past, but the current fate of this literature is unclear to me. Certainly there is no sign that it is prospering, but whether it is facing extinction is not clear.¹³¹

These cultural changes are driven only partly by the forces of deeper Islamisation. Modernisation generally, the availability of other forms of entertainment, education that has led to general decline in knowledge or

¹²⁹ For example, *Bernas*, 5 Nov. 2007, 21 May 2008; *Tempo*, 6 Nov. 2007; *Kmps*, 30 March 2009, 1 Apr. 2009, 28 Sept. 2009.

¹³⁰ *Kmps*, 7 Sept. 2009.

¹³¹ For an earlier stage in the writing of modern novels in Javanese, see George Quinn, *The novel in Javanese: Aspects of its social and literary character* (VKI vol. 148; Leiden: KITLV Press, 1992). A more comprehensive overview by Quinn of issues related to Javanese in recent times, in which he discerns some positive signs even though he writes that 'it would be unrealistic to claim that the fall of the New Order has restored a healthy glow to the emaciated face that Javanese acquired under the New Order', may be found (p. 68) in his chapter, 'Emerging from dire straits: Post-New Order developments in Javanese language and literature', in Keith Foulcher, Mikihiro Moriyama and Manneke Budiman (eds), *Words in motion: Language and discourse in post-New Order Indonesia*, Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2012.

sympathy regarding older views of spiritual powers and declining command of the Javanese language have all played their role. But certainly those pressing for deeper Islamisation are an important part of this story, for they have been championing their cause on all fronts. It is to the smaller groups of Islamic activists that we now turn, for it is they who, as in a classical Greek drama, have most often played the role of protagonist, opening the play and setting its plot in motion, requiring responses from others, and thus moving Javanese society towards something very different from what it was just half a century ago.

CHAPTER 12

The protagonists and new totalitarians: Smaller Islamist and Dakwahist movements

We began the preceding chapter concerning the large-scale movements Muhammadiyah and NU — those usually described as ‘moderate’ — by citing the caveat that the label ‘moderate’ is of limited analytical value. In this chapter we will have less terminological difficulty, for we are turning to movements most of whom would be almost universally regarded as immoderate, hard-line, extremist or radical. Here are people and movements that, on the whole, may be regarded as totalitarian in the sense that in their ideal world there would be conformity in both what people do and what they believe.

In pursuing their totalitarian objective of defining both what people do and what they believe, several of the groups discussed in this section are involved (as we have already seen) in attacks on ‘deviant sects’ (what people believe). Here we will see them also attacking what they regard as irreligious conduct (what people do). The overall objective is to shut out voices, lifestyles and ideas other than their own, to close the public space to them and to prevent them winning a wider adherence. These movements include those whose *modus operandi* is to deploy violence or the threat of violence.

We must, however, observe an important distinction between ideology and action. We will be discussing movements whose ideology is extremist and which engage in extremist, violent action, but also others whose religious aspirations are not significantly different, yet who eschew violence and aim to play constructive roles in society. Some want utopia tomorrow and feel a need to act on its behalf. They may even engage in extremist action,

including suicide bombing, with no practical political goal in sight but to please God.¹ Others are prepared to wait for utopia until it is delivered by God, or to work pragmatically and gradually towards its achievement — the latter being the people whom Masdar Hilmy calls meliorists.² That description relates to the political party PKS, which is a complicated, partial exception to the patterns otherwise seen in this chapter. We will consider PKS below.

A preliminary comment on terrorism is needed. Indonesia has a terrorism problem which is rooted in Islamic religious extremism born out of Revivalist epistemology and Islamist and Dakwahist agendas. Indonesia also has a specialist anti-terrorist police force in Densus 88, which has a strong record of penetrating terrorist networks, breaking them up, capturing terrorists and/or killing them. In fact, a common criticism is that Densus 88 kills too many of its targets, preventing use of the intelligence they might provide. Densus 88's answer is that they face dangerous people who are prepared to kill, indeed to blow themselves up, and police officers often have little choice but to use deadly force in order to stop them and to protect themselves. In this book about the deepening Islamisation of the Javanese, however, terrorism is marginal. The people and movements we will discuss below might, in some cases, segue effortlessly from *pengajian* to plotting terrorism, but it is only their *pengajian* that promotes deeper Islamisation.

Terrorist acts of violence have arguably constituted an obstacle, not a path, to deeper Islamisation among Javanese. Sidney Jones has suggested that 'the more thoughtful *jihadis*' themselves accept that the suicide bombings carried out in Indonesia since 2002 have had little or no political impact and 'implicitly that the pro-Sharia civil society groups have been more effective'.³ We already noted in the 1970s in Surakarta what seems to have been a dialectical relationship between energetic Islamic reform movements and high levels of Christianisation, so that by the 1980s a quarter of Surakarta's populace was Christian. Terrorism in the early 21st century probably had a similar effect on some Javanese, discrediting Islamic reform in their eyes and possibly making Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, or *kebatinan* seem more attractive options. For the pious Javanese Muslim middle class, the JI

¹ A phenomenon observed more widely in Islamic extremism by Olivier Roy; see his works *Failure of political Islam*, pp. 65–6, 157; and *Globalized Islam: The search for a new ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), pp. 246–8.

² Hilmy, *Islamism and democracy*, esp. pp. 8, 83.

³ International Crisis Group. *Indonesia: From vigilantism to terrorism in Cirebon* (Asia briefing no. 132; Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 26 Jan. 2012), p. 10.

bombing of Christian targets in 11 cities across Indonesia on Christmas Eve 2000 and in Bali in 2002 were too close for comfort, but it was the 2003 JI bombing of the Marriott hotel in Jakarta, which claimed the lives of 12 Indonesians (including the suicide bomber, plus one European), that was the more direct attack on their social realm. While we cannot doubt that there are pious Muslims among the Javanese middle class who share the religious values and aspirations of Islamists and Dakwahists, terrorist violence directly threatens the social stability, rule of law and security of property that reassure middle classes that their and their children's futures can be secure and predictable. It is, thus, likely to be a way to lose middle class sympathy. This is not a peculiarly Javanese or Indonesian pattern. Gilles Kepel has noted with regard to terrorism in the Islamic world more generally, that 'resorting to spectacular terrorism was a high-risk gamble which ... was bound to engender ... a far greater, far deeper *angst* among the devout middle class, who feared that such explosions of violence might threaten its vital interests in the long run.'⁴ This is not particularly Islamic, either, for in the 1970s and 1980s the aspirations of the Baader-Meinhof group, the Japanese Red Army Faction, the Red Army Brigades in Italy and Action Directe in France all claimed some middle-class sympathy, which was largely lost through their terrorist outrages. What may be more peculiarly Indonesian is the supposed involvement of shady military men with terrorists for their own purposes, which — in the opinion of many observers — declined or came to an end after the Bali bombings, as the terrorists became too dangerous to be played with.⁵ Indonesians are prone to believe such plot theories, not least because there have in fact been many plots.

Terrorism is thus an important subject in itself but a marginal one for this book about Islamisation. Readers interested to learn more about it would be well advised to turn to the International Crisis Group publications found in the bibliography of this book and to the other specific works that will be cited below. They should generally avoid the writing of self-labelled 'experts on terrorism', whose work has too often been characterised by superficial research and analysis and television sound-bites.⁶

⁴ Kepel, *Jihad*, p. 320.

⁵ Among many others, the head of PPP in Surakarta, Hasan Mulachela, believed this to be so; discussion of 25 Aug. 2003, Surakarta.

⁶ For a thorough analysis of the weaknesses of some of this literature, focusing on publications by Rohan Gunaratna, Zachary Abuza, Maria Ressa and others, see Natasha Hamilton-Hart, 'Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Expert analysis, myopia and fantasy', *The Pacific Review* vol. 18, no. 3 (Sept. 2005), pp. 303–25.

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir has already appeared multiple times in this book. He and his colleague Abdullah Sungkar returned to Surakarta from Malaysia shortly after Soeharto's 1998 fall from power. Sungkar died in 1999, however, leaving Ba'asyir to carry forward their Revivalist ideas. In 2000 he created MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Indonesian Holy Warriors' Council). In subsequent years Ba'asyir frequently said that he does not approve of violence and prosecutors' attempts to connect him operationally to terrorism failed until, in mid-2011, he was finally convicted of supporting a terrorist training camp in Aceh. Even before this conviction, he clearly acted in ways that inspired and legitimised violence and he was generally understood to be the spiritual leader of the terrorist group JI.⁷ Ba'asyir's speech at the opening congress of MMI was uncompromising and militant:

The sole intention and purpose of God (glorified and exalted is he) in creating men and spirits on this world is to worship him. ... But in order to put this worship into practice the essence of this worship, Islamic *shari'a*, must be implemented in a complete way. ... Without [political] power, much of God's *shari'a* cannot be put into practice. ... Thus, in order to implement Islam's *shari'a* in a complete, coordinated and orderly fashion, what is needed is affirmation of its position and what is needed is [political] power. ... [What is needed] may, in broad terms, be summarised as *dakwah* and *jihad*.

Because *mujahidin* [holy warriors] are the upholders of religion, they must have the capacity to carry out *dakwah* and *jihad*. ... The enemies of Islam know that as long as the Islamic *ummah*, including its fighters, no longer has an understanding of *jihad* and the spirit of *jihad* has died, just so long can it easily be dominated, even if in other respects its struggle is spirited. Because of this there grows in the soul of the *mujahidin* an

⁷ The best studies are International Crisis Group, *Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia*; idem, *Indonesia's terrorist network: How Jemaah Islamiyah works* (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 11 Dec. 2002); and idem, *Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's current status* (Update briefing no. 63; Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 3 May 2007). A brief and more general overview is in Greg Barton, *Indonesia's struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the soul of Islam* (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2004). Ba'asyir's defence against the charge of terrorism can be read in Fauzan Al-Anshari, *Saya teroris? (Sebuah "pleidoi")* (Jakarta: Penerbit Republika, 2002). Another sympathetic account by a former Ngruki student is in Es Soepriyadi, *Ngruki & jaringan terorisme: Melacak jejak Abu Bakar Ba'asyir & jaringannya dari Ngruki sampai bom Bali* (Jakarta: Al-Mawardi Prima, 2003). On the 2011 conviction and sentencing to 15 years' imprisonment, see *KmpsO*, 16 June 2011; *JktP* online, 20 June 2011. Ba'asyir's sentence was reduced on appeal to nine years (*JktP* online, 26 Oct. 2011) and then restored to 15 years by the Supreme Court (*JktP* online, 27 Feb. 2012).

understanding and spirit of *jihad*, right to the borders of love of *jihad* and of martyrdom in *jihad*, [a realization] that this is the most important task of Islamic mass organisations in guiding their members, above all their *mujahidin*. And we are certain that without implementing war in the path of God (*jihad fi sabilillah*), the consolidation of the position of the Islamic faith, above all its [political] power, cannot possibly be achieved.

Fiqh al-qital (knowledge of combat) ... is the endeavour to give training in the tactics and strategy of combat and to practice skills in handling weapons. Of the companions of the Prophet, there was not one who could not employ weapons, although their skills were not all the same. Specifically to develop the sciences of *jihad* and *qital*, it would be best if Islamic mass organisations had their own camps.

Pesantrens are the fortress of the Islamic *ummah*. ... So that *pesantrens* truly represent a cauldron for the building-up of a cadre of *mujahidin*, *pesantrens* must be distanced from the influences of secular knowledge and thinking. To the contrary, they must bring to life the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* and the spirit of war in the path of God.⁸

Books that were read at Ba'asyir's school at Ngruki indeed included a volume on guerilla strategy and tactics, as well as works by Osama bin Laden's mentor Abdullah Azzam.⁹

⁸ Irfan Suryahardi Awwas (ed.), *Risalah Kongres Mujahidin I dan penegakan syariah Islam* (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 1421H/2001M), pp. 79–90. This text (with some small alterations) is also available at <http://www.geocities.ws/kongresmujahidin/abubakarbasyir.html>. See also Hilmy, *Islamism and democracy*, pp. 109–14. Other reports on the MMI congress are in *Tempo*, 5 Aug. 2000, 8 Aug. 2000. A useful account of MMI is in Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, *Gerakan Salafi radikal di Indonesia* (Jakarta: PT Raja Grafindo Persada, 2004), pp. 47–84.

⁹ Abu Fath Al Pastuni, *Gerilya: Strategi, taktik & teknik* ([Surakarta:] Afkar, n.d. [c. 2000]). The author's name may be a pseudonym. I was given a copy of this and other works by the journalist Blontank Poer, who collected them at Ngruki. On Abdullah Azzam, see Kepel, *Jihad*, pp. 144–7. Other books being studied at Ngruki, according to Blontank Poer, included predictable texts such as an Indonesian translation of Abdullah Azzam's *Join the caravan (Bergabung bersama kafilah)* (London: Azzam Publications; Jakarta: Penerbit Ahad, 2001) and a collection of his speeches (Abdullah Azzam, *Tarbiyah Jihadiyah*; transl. Abdurrahman; multiple vols; Solo: Pustaka al-'Alaq, 1423/2002 –). Other related works from there are Lembaga Study dan Penelitian Islam Pakistan, *Membangun kekuatan Islam di tengah perselisihan ummat* (intro. Usamah bin Laden; Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 1422H/2001M) and Abdullah Azzam, *Pelita yang hilang* (transl. Abdurrahman; Solo: Pustaka al-'Alaq, 1422H/2002M). On the Jihadist publishing industry in general, see the International Crisis Group report *Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's publishing industry*.



Illustration 37 Ust. Abu Bakar Ba'syir, Ngruki, 2007

From being an obscure Revivalist cleric, little regarded by his fellow Arabs¹⁰ and absent from Indonesia for many years, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was quickly catapulted to the status of an international celebrity, known of and loathed in Washington and Canberra as much as in Jakarta, denounced as a terrorist leader but with no one able to prove in a court of law that this was so until his conviction in June 2011. It is my impression that he much enjoys his celebrity status and probably takes it as a sign that he is succeeding in God's work. Whenever the Indonesian government tried to hold him responsible for terrorism, his followers denounced this as a Western plot and demonstrated to support him — in one case even attacking the police headquarters in Surakarta.¹¹ His mid-2011 conviction will do nothing to diminish — indeed will almost certainly enhance — his reputation among Indonesian extremists.

Ba'asyir travelled to many places in Java, where he attracted large crowds (many of them, no doubt, simply interested to see this celebrity in action) and where the very simplicity of his message was persuasive to many. He has an effective rhetorical style, smiling, laughing, using humour,¹² but it is all nailed down to his Revivalist conception of the *Qur'an* and *Hadith*, and of *shari'a* (as he understands it) as the absolute determinant of how to live. He is discursive and articulate but has no room for subtleties on basic matters. Such simplicity of message is one of the advantages that Revivalists hold, in contrast to the legalistic complexities of Traditionalism or the intellectuality of Modernism.¹³ When he visited a small mosque south of Kediri in 2006 and 2007, he reportedly attracted an audience in the thousands. The young Muhammadiyah activist who was among his inviters commented that Ba'asyir's message of returning to the *shari'a* was 'simple,

¹⁰ This comment has been made widely. Hasan Mulachela, then head of PPP in Surakarta and himself of Hadhrami descent, also expressed such a view in our discussion of 25 Aug. 2003 in Surakarta.

¹¹ *Tempo*, 2 May 2004.

¹² I should add that, in his three meetings with me, he was unfailingly courteous and ready to discuss any issues. I did not ask about his involvement in terrorism, however, since no answer he might have given could be of value as evidence. In our discussion of 26 March 2007, Ba'asyir volunteered his view that the real terrorist in the world was the USA and that Osama bin Laden *et al.* were 'counter-terrorists', although, he said, he did not agree with their methods.

¹³ Similar observations were made in discussion by Prof. Azyumardi Azra (Jakarta, 4 Feb. 2008) and Prof. A. Syafii Maarif (Yogyakarta, 14 Sept. 2008).

timely, practical and functional'.¹⁴ Other Muhammadiyah leaders who were interested in Ba'syir's ideas invited him to a Muhammadiyah mosque in Kediri, and believed that this was not inconsistent with the December 2006 Muhammadiyah 'letter of decision' that denied PKS or similar organisations access to Muhammadiyah facilities, even for 'activities that call themselves or use symbols of religion or *dakwah* such as *pengajian* and guidance of the *ummah*'.¹⁵ But Ba'asyir also aroused local opposition and on more than one occasion local people or local Islamic leaders objected to, or even prevented, him speaking in their area.¹⁶

The supposedly 'simple, timely, practical and functional' quality of Ba'asyir's ideas is debatable. The *shari'a* code proposed by MMI was utopian, poorly drafted, emotive, inflammatory, discriminatory towards minorities and women and obsessed with sexual issues.¹⁷ M.B. Hooker regards it as having 'no credibility in terms of either the classical [Islamic] jurisprudence or contemporary Indonesian circumstances'.¹⁸ Similarly quixotic was Ba'asyir's support of using gold *dinars* and silver *dirhams* as legal tender, on the grounds that this was necessary for the full implementation of *shari'a*.¹⁹ His celebrity and consistency in his cause made it difficult for other Muslim leaders to ignore him and encouraged them to downplay frequent allegations of him being linked to violence. Although the national-level MUI

¹⁴ Discussion with Ashari, Ngadiluwih, 28 Nov. 2007; the originals of the translated words that he used were *sederhana*, *aktual*, *praktis*, *aktif*. Ba'asyir's speech at Ngadiluwih is also reported in *MmK*, 7 Nov. 2007.

¹⁵ Discussion with Abdul Haris, Triyono and Hari Widasmoro, Kediri, 29 Nov. 2007.

¹⁶ For instance, in Banten (*JktP* online, 1 Nov. 2009, 17 May 2010); the first occasion nearly led to a fight between his followers and opponents; on the second occasion it was the local MUI that objected to him coming. People in Blitar also refused his presence, but his admirer Ashari (discussion in Ngadiluwih, 28 Nov. 2007) said that this was just opposition by ex-PKI and street thugs (*preman*). Similar opposition occurred in Nganjuk in Nov. 2006, where only about 200 people attended, most of them policemen and military in plain clothes (*MmK*, 8 Nov. 2006; Suhadi Cholil email, 14 Feb. 2008).

¹⁷ Tim Lindsey and Jeremy Kingsley, 'Talking in code: Legal Islamisation and the MMI shari'a criminal code', in Peri Bearman, Wolfhart Heinrichs and Bernard G. Weiss (eds), *The law applied: Contextualising the Islamic shari'a; A volume in honor of Frank E. Vogel* (London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 2008), pp. 295–320.

¹⁸ Hooker, *Indonesian syariah*, pp. 277–81 (quote from p. 281).

¹⁹ See <http://wakalanusantara.com/detilurl/Terbentuk,.Komunitas.Pengguna.Dirham.Dinar.Solo/239>.

repeatedly denounced terrorism, when Ba'syir was arrested by Densus 88 in 2010, MUI demanded a full explanation for the arrest of this 'well-known and respected figure'.²⁰

Surakarta was a relatively congenial base for Ba'asyir, with a history since the 1970s of Islamic activism by several organisations, a society polarised on Christian-Muslim lines, and a long and ever-permutating list of vigilante groups prepared to threaten or commit mayhem.²¹ Surakarta was not unique in the last respect. One list of 'Muslim hard-line groups' in Yogyakarta claimed that there were 40 of them, many linked to PPP.²² But stronger political leadership in Yogyakarta than in Surakarta (a general topic that will be addressed in the appendix on research methodology and case studies below) meant that there was far less violence in Yogyakarta. This did not mean, however, that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's Surakarta base for either *jihad* or *dakwah* was stable, for it is in the nature of extremist organisations to be brittle and easily rent by accusations of ideological deviance or hypocrisy. And so it was that MMI and Ba'asyir split in 2008, with the bitterest accusations being hurled in both directions. Thereupon Ba'asyir created his new organisation, Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid (Congregation of the Helpers of Divine Unity, JAT), which was to give emphasis to *dakwah* activities but which in 2010 was accused of running a terrorist training camp in Aceh (the discovery of which eventually led to Ba'asyir's conviction).²³ While the subsequent trials continued, in April 2011 a suicide bombing in a police headquarters mosque in Cirebon led to the further discoveries about terrorist links to Ba'asyir's JAT. Several arrests followed and in May two alleged terrorists were killed by Densus 88 in a shoot-out in Cemani (where Ngruki is found).²⁴

²⁰ *JktP* online, 9 Aug. 2010.

²¹ An account of these groups in Surakarta from a rather sympathetic perspective is in Zainuddin Fananie, Atiqa Sabardila and Dwi Purnanto, *Radikalisme keagamaan dan perubahan sosial* (Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University Press and The Asia Foundation, 2002).

²² *JktP*, 25 June 2001.

²³ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: The dark side of Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)* (Asia briefing no. 107; Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 6 July 2010).

²⁴ *JktG*, 18 Apr. 2011; *KR*, 14 May 2001; *Kmps*, 14 May 2011; *TempoI*, 15 May 2011. The group that was involved here was reportedly called Tauhid wal Jihad; on this, see also International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: The dark side of Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)*, pp. 3, 10. The group was said also to be involved in the murder of an

While Abu Bakar Ba'asyir undoubtedly has influenced some of his listeners to adopt a more pious way of life, his political involvements and links to extremism have almost certainly limited his impact, and that of his organisations, in actually changing Javanese society. He has made no headway whatsoever towards his Islamist goals. Nevertheless the educational and proselytising work by his followers is significant, if on a much smaller scale than that of NU or Muhammadiyah.

The *pesantren* at Ngruki — with about 1,600 pupils²⁵ — has played a role in the deeper Islamisation of surrounding society since the 1970s, as we have seen in previous chapters, but it is also part of a wider and influential network of schools. This has been characterised by the International Crisis Group as a JI school network, consisting of something like 20 *pesantrens*, most of them in Java, particularly in the area around Surakarta.²⁶ How this network operates to spread Revivalist ideas in a more Islamised society is illustrated by the story of the villages of Blumbang and Kalisoro, on the slopes of Mount Lawu.

Blumbang has an ancient holy site (*pundhen*) where the annual *bersih desa* takes place, funded by contributions gathered from villagers. Until the 1990s, the villagers are said all to have been Muslims of the *abangan* or *kejawen* style; neither Muhammadiyah nor NU had a presence. Then more pious forms of Islam began to develop there, which led to tension and divisions within the village. More recently — evidently c. 2000 or so — some young people began to style themselves as *Islam kaffah* (complete Muslims). According to their leader Edi Suwarnoto — then in his mid-20s and wishing to abandon a rather dissolute, aimless life — they followed *pengajian* in Surakarta. At some point, LDII also established a presence in the village, but Edi's *Islam kaffah* group of course rejected LDII's teachings, as they also rejected mysticism. Similar developments occurred in the nearby village of Kalisoro. In early 2006, for the observations in the first month of the Javanese year (*Suran*), Kalisoro's villagers gathered the usual financial contributions, but about 20 *Islam kaffah* families refused to contribute to what they now regarded as heathenism. The same was done by Edi's group in Blumbang. In Kalisoro, the village elders sought to impose a fine on the

army officer and in church bombings, including the suicide bombing in Surakarta in September 2011. See further International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: From vigilantism to terrorism in Cirebon*.

²⁵ Discussion with Ust. H. Wahyuddin, Ngruki, 26 March 2006.

²⁶ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's current status*, pp. 5–9.



Illustration 38 Blumbang village, 2006

pious recalcitrants, which they refused to pay. Their friends in Blumbang thereupon organised support for the *Islam kaffah* group in Kalisoro, which consisted of calling up some 200 motorbikes from as far away as Surakarta, which rolled into the village ridden by members of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's MMI and others of similar views. One can imagine the intimidating effect of this invasion of aspirant *mujahidin*. Before any actual mayhem could occur, the matter was referred to court in Karanganyar (with an outcome not known to me). This episode evidently helped to solidify a connection between the devout groups in the mountain villages and radical groups from outside. The young village *Islam kaffah* people now go farther down the slopes to Karangpandan (Karanganyar) for religious guidance at the Isy Karima mosque and *pesantren*, identified by the International Crisis Group as part of the JI network.²⁷

²⁷ Discussion with Edi Suwarnoto, Blumbang, Karanganyar, 4 Aug. 2006. On Isy Karima, see International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's current status*, p. 7. The *pesantren* is under the guidance of its founder Dr Tunjung S. Soeharso and Ngruki's Ust. Wahyuddin (Abdullah Sungkar's son-in-law). DDII played a role in

Another flamboyantly violent organisation, Laskar Jihad (Holy War Militia), grew from a small *pesantren* near Yogyakarta founded by Ja'far Umar Thalib. He and his movement are the subjects of an outstanding study by Noorhaidi Hasan, which we follow here. Ja'far Umar Thalib was born in 1961 in Malang into a devout family of Arab (Hadhrami) descent. The young man studied at the Persatuan Islam *pesantren* at Bangil and then LIPIA, whence he proceeded in 1987 to study in Pakistan at the Mawdudi Institute. During his time abroad, he had experience with the Afghan *mujahidin* then fighting the Soviet occupation. He returned to Indonesia and, with others, was active in spreading Revivalist versions of Islam, especially among the younger generation. He established his own *pesantren* Ihyaus Sunnah in 1994 north of Yogyakarta. A dozen or so other such Revivalist schools were set up, linked to Ihyaus Sunnah, in following years. But Ihyaus Sunnah failed to win significant domestic or overseas funding and never spawned a network as large and important as that of Ngruki.

Ja'far Umar Thalib was most influential through his capacity to mobilise people for street demonstrations and, above all, through his Laskar Jihad, which recruited several thousand fighters to do battle against Christians in the sectarian conflict in Maluku. In this military role in Maluku, Laskar Jihad seems to have acted hand-in-hand with elements of the Indonesian military. When Laskar Jihad tried to get involved in the conflict in Aceh, however, local leaders rejected it because they saw it as a tool of the military. Laskar Jihad also had an agenda in Java, but it provoked opposition as well. After a Laskar Jihad attack on 'places of immorality' in Ngawi during Ramadan 2001, the group was counter-attacked by PDIP supporters. A PDIP figure was reportedly kidnapped and repeatedly stabbed by the Laskar Jihad side. The police — who raided the Laskar Jihad headquarters and found knives, machetes, bombs, a handgun and ammunition — arrested 80 Laskar members, plus another 38 coming from Surakarta, Yogyakarta and Magelang to join the fight.²⁸

In 2002, after Ja'far had managed to offend other Revivalist leaders and inspire distrust among his own followers by pursuing what was seen as his personal aggrandisement, a *fatwa* from a major Saudi Arabian religious

organising the 1996 grant of land on which the mosque was erected, according to <http://www.isykarima.com/profil/sejarah.html>. The Blumbang holy site is more widely known and was referred to repeatedly during my discussion with Drs KRAT Basuki Prawirodipuro and KRT Giarto Nagoro, Surabaya, 25 Nov. 2007.

²⁸ *JktP* online, 3 Dec. 2001.

scholar declared that Laskar Jihad had deviated from its proper religious objectives and should be shut down. Ja'far then disbanded it (just days after the Bali bombs) and most of the students at his *pesantren* left to study at other Revivalist schools.²⁹ While undoubtedly Laskar Jihad had inspired several thousand younger activists to a greater militancy and willingness to make sacrifices for its version of the Islamic cause, and had claimed lives in the Maluku conflict, the small size of its *pesantren* network meant that it was always of marginal significance in the deeper Islamisation of Javanese society.

Other violent groups focused more on local Javanese society in the name of purification. The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) was created in Jakarta in 1998 and led by the *Habib* (descendant of the Prophet) Muhammad Rizieq Shihab (b. 1965, Jakarta). Habib Rizieq, as he is known, studied at LIPIA and then took his first degree at King Saud University in Riyadh, followed by a master's degree in Malaysia.³⁰ While FPI's main field of activity has been Jakarta and West Java, it also established branches in towns in Central and East Java. As with Laskar Jihad, so with FPI there have been frequent allegations that it has links with, or is manipulated by, elements in the military. In its early years its main activity was physically attacking 'places of immorality' (*tempat maksiat*) such as cafes, bars, discotheques, billiard halls, gambling joints, and places of prostitution. Probably its most spectacular success was its protest at the second Jakarta Biennale arts show in 2005, where the work of over 300 Indonesian and international artists was displayed. FPI demanded the removal of a particular installation displaying naked humans with their genitalia covered by small circular dots and featuring two television soap-opera stars. The organisers of the Biennale gave in to the implicit threat of violence, whereupon other artists covered up or withdrew their own works in protest. The curator then

²⁹ This account of Laskar Jihad rests on Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, militancy and the quest for identity in post-New Order Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2006).

³⁰ A useful account of FPI is in Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, *Gerakan Salafi radikal*, Chapter 5. For more details on this and other organisations in Jakarta and West Java, see Chader S. Bamualim's forthcoming work, tentatively entitled *Islamisation and resistance in West Java: A study of religion, politics and social change since c. 1965*. Valuable also is Chaider S. Bamualim *et al.*, 'Laporan penelitian: Radikalisme agama dan perubahan sosial di DKI Jakarta' ([Jakarta:] Tim Peneliti Pusat Bahasa dan Budaya IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah and Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (Bappeda) Pemerintah DKI Jakarta, 1999/2000).

announced that there would be no more Jakarta Biennales.³¹ From around 2005 or so, FPI began to put more effort into violence against 'deviant sects' (*aliran sesat*), several examples of which we have seen above, at least partly because it had been successful in mobilising the police to act against 'immorality'.³²

Coordination between FPI and local police or military was obvious in several cases, and may go far to explain why the government has never declared FPI illegal. That is, the views and objectives of the state and its security apparatus at least sometimes parallel those of FPI. March 2010 saw an Asia-wide gay and lesbian conference convened in Surabaya. The Forum Umat Islam (Islamic *Ummah* Forum) of East Java, an umbrella group comprising FPI, MUI, Al-Irsyad and other organisations, surrounded the hotel where it was being held and demanded that the conference be stopped. Some physical conflict occurred. Under the supervision of the South Surabaya police chief, the organisers agreed to cancel their conference and attendees left for their homes.³³ In June 2010, FPI acted in cooperation with the military in Banyuwangi to stop a meeting intended to disseminate information about new health programmes, claiming that this had been cover for a meeting of former Communists.³⁴ In January 2011, the Surabaya FPI acted jointly with the Surabaya police to shut down a discussion by human rights groups in a major hotel on the subject of freedom of belief, to which Ahmadiyya and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender groups had been invited. Policemen and FPI people arrived together, could not intimidate the activists there, but did sufficiently intimidate the hotel management to shut down the discussion.³⁵ In both the Banyuwangi and Surabaya cases, it appears to have been the military or police who took the initial step of informing FPI of the meetings that were to be shut down.

³¹ *JktP*, 23 Oct. 2005.

³² In August 2010 the Jakarta governor Fauzi Bowo and the police chief Timur Pradopo attended FPI's anniversary, where Habib Rizieq offered FPI's assistance in enforcing a Jakarta by-law closing some places of entertainment during Ramadan; *JktP* online, 7 Aug. 2010. Roy, *Failure of political Islam*, pp. 80–1, comments on Islamic, Christian and Jewish puritans' shared opposition to most forms of entertainment and leisure.

³³ *AntaraNews.com*, 26 March 2010. It may be noted that there is no law against gay, lesbian, transsexual or transvestite activity in Indonesia.

³⁴ *JktP* online, 28 June 2010, 2 July 2010.

³⁵ Based on a 13 Jan. 2011 report by Ahmad Zainul Hamdi, director of one of the organisations involved, provided by Masdar Hilmy (email, 28 Feb. 2011).

FPI is somewhat unusual among violent movements in having Traditionalist aspects. It professes loyalty to the Sunni schools of law and in its early days the practices of the Tijaniyya Sufi order were taught as a means to develop members spiritually.³⁶ Among others, the NU leader Ky. H. Sahal Mahfudh, however, explicitly denied that FPI could be thought of as anything like NU. 'FPI was set up by *Habibs*,' he said, 'so it is not NU ... Those FPI characters are Wahhabi.'³⁷ FPI's political attitudes (particularly opposition to Abdurrahman Wahid) and its social violence meant that it often found itself opposed by NU's Ansor, which demanded that FPI be shut down, something the government never agreed to do.³⁸ After the Bali bombings of 2002, however, FPI found it more difficult to get funding and tended to deteriorate into a protection racket (something the police are also good at) until cleaning up its ranks again.³⁹

A local Surakarta extremist group that is sometimes confused with FPI is FPIS (Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta, Surakarta Islamic Youth Front). This is based at the exclusive Islamic Community of Gumuk (Jamaah al-Islam Gumuk) in Surakarta, the subject of an important study by Fajar Riza Ul Haq. This community was originally founded in the 1970s, as were Ngruki, MTA and Assalaam. Since the late 1970s it has been led by Ust. Mudzakkir, a native of Surakarta and pharmacist by training, whose ideas agreed with those of his contemporaries Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. To Mudzakkir, the *Qur'an* is the primary source of knowledge, with the *Hadith* occupying a second rank. *Pengajian* and militia activity are both seen as ways to build up the cadres of the community. At the Gumuk *pesantren*, students are instructed in a strictly Revivalist version of Islam, but are also given secular lessons (although the government curriculum is not followed). The community dress in what they regard as an Arabic fashion and women are restricted to domestic roles in the *Salafi* (Revivalist) style, but other *Salafis* dislike Gumuk and accuse it of being Shi'ite. Gumuk has established branches elsewhere and gained some thousands of followers. Like Sungkar and Ba'asyir, Mudzakkir regards *Pancasila* as *haram* and rejects political parties (including Islamic parties) on the grounds that they foster divisions in society,

³⁶ M. Zaki Mubarak, *Geneologi Islam radikal di Indonesia: Gerakan, pemikiran dan prospek demokrasi* (intro. M. Syafi'i Anwar. Jakarta: LP3ES, 2008), pp. 228–9.

³⁷ Interviewed in *Tempo*, 29 Sept. 2008.

³⁸ This was particularly so after the violence at the national monument in Jakarta on 1 June 2008 (e.g. *KR*, 4 June 2008; *detikSurabaya* online, 3 June 2008).

³⁹ Ian Douglas Wilson, 'As long as it's *halal*': Islamic *preman* in Jakarta', in Fealy and White, *Expressing Islam*, pp. 199–203.

but he expects followers to maintain loyalty to him. Street politics is his style, including violent actions against 'immorality'. Mudzakkir is the main ideologue of FPIS, which was established in 1999 and still has its base in the Gumuk community. It is one of the most violent groups in Surakarta.⁴⁰

Such groups' identities and memberships change, overlap, fuse into umbrella organisations for particular actions and then split again over personal or ideological differences, but nevertheless represent a constant presence pushing forward a violent Dakwahist and Islamist agenda. The month of Ramadan has been a particular focus for activity, the month regarded as the most holy of the year, when Muslims should be fasting from sunrise to sunset. Places of entertainment are attacked, patrons are threatened or roughed up, courting couples are hauled off to the police for further admonition, bottles of alcohol are smashed, prostitutes are driven away, and so on. *Laskar* this or *laskar* that, *front* this or *front* that, *koalisi* this or *koalisi* that, with their various open and clandestine links to political parties, the police, the military, businessmen, criminals and religious teachers, are a bewildering cacophony, but the general outlines of the social, political and religious symphony they aspire to is common. They want Javanese (and more widely Indonesian) society to conform to their picture of a more moral and more perfectly Islamic society, which is in almost all cases a Revivalist version. Javanese should live as nearly as possible as the Prophet and his companions lived, in that most perfect of times. Hence their predilection for wearing beards and turbans and for waving swords. Their attitude towards technology tends to be schizophrenic. While they may insist on wearing Arab-style clothes and brushing their teeth with a small wooden stick (*miswak* or *siwak*), as did the Prophet, they also use flush toilets, mobile phones and the Internet and, given a chance, would see no objection to exchanging their sword for an AK-47.

The violence in Surakarta reached a peak during Ramadan in December 2000. A number of cafes refused to close during Ramadan, as demanded by Laskar Jihad and similar gangs. So they attacked these cafes and destroyed several of them, but met stiff resistance from people who protected these 'places of immorality'. This was the last major street battle between Islamic

⁴⁰ Fajar Riza Ul Haq, 'Islam dan gerakan sosial: Studi kasus gerakan Jamaah al Islam di Gumuk Surakarta' (S2 thesis, Progam Studi Agama dan Lintas Budaya, Program Pascasarjana, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, 2006); email from Fajar Riza Ul Haq, 11 March 2011. In this thesis, FPIS is mistakenly referred to as Front Pembela Islam Surakarta. The Gumuk mosque is one of those covered (pp. 247–59) in Ridwan al-Makassary and Ahmad Gaus AF (eds), *Benih-benih Islam radikal di masjid*.

vigilantes and *abangan* resisters in Surakarta. Among the *laskars*' principle targets were *Kafe 2000* which was owned by a PDIP follower and *Kafe Skorpio* which was owned by a policeman. The conflict lasted over several days, featuring competing convoys of motorbikes around the streets of Surakarta, mutual threats and reportedly considerable drunkenness on the *abangan* side. At one stage, the *abangan* carried their counter-attack to Ngruki, where their enemies went into hiding. NU's Ansor then decided to intervene, calling upon the Surakarta government and police to stop the violence, failing which it would mobilise thousands of its own people to barricade Surakarta against outsiders. The conflict then calmed down, under the threat of NU joining the fray against the *laskars*.⁴¹

In the wake of this violence, the Surakarta police decided it wise to take measures to close entertainment venues at least at the start and end of Ramadan. It can hardly be doubted that this was a painful decision, since policemen routinely had a personal interest in such places or took a cut for protecting them. The local context was, however, changing. Surakarta's popular new mayor Jokowi (2005–10, then reelected with 90 per cent of the vote for a further five-year term) brought a refreshing level of competence and transparency to local government. He opened lines of communication to the *laskars* and was even able to communicate with the Gumuk community, the most difficult to approach.⁴² In early 2006, Yotje Mende was appointed as the new Surakarta area local police chief (until 2009). He was from east Indonesia from a mixed Muslim-Christian family. Unlike his predecessor, who had allowed the Islamic *laskars* considerable freedom to operate, Yotje Mende was prepared to take a stand against street violence. He faced organisations of considerable size, with MMI alone having some 12,000 members, he believed. But he declared 'sweeping' must stop, and the extremists then had to become more cautious. It was agreed that places of entertainment would close during the first and last weeks of Ramadan, but could operate in the middle weeks, although sometimes they did not do so out of fear of attack.⁴³ 'Sweeping' of entertainment sites by

⁴¹ An account is in Zaki Mubarak, *Geneologi Islam radikal di Indonesia*, p. 196. Other details are from a long report prepared for my colleague Soedarmono by Muchus Budi R., who was present at the events and interviewed several of the participants, dated 1 Oct. 2003.

⁴² Discussion with Ir Joko Widodo (Jokowi), Surakarta, 3 Nov. 2006.

⁴³ Discussion with Kombes Pol. Drs Yotje Mende, Surakarta, 4 Nov. 2006. As *Kapolwil* his responsibilities encompassed Surakarta, Sukoharjo, Boyolali, Karanganyar and Klaten.

Islamic *laskars* still happened from time to time, with some episodes of violence, but often they went to attack a place only to find it already closed, locked and empty. The closures of some places were rather tokenistic, as the extremists turned their attention more to suppressing ‘deviance’, as we have seen above. During Ramadan in 2006, the food court at Surakarta’s main shopping mall reported that the agreement was merely that they would open every day until 5pm, then close for two hours and reopen at 7pm.⁴⁴

There were still violent incidents. When a *laskar* attack on drinkers led to the death of two of them in 2008, the Surakarta police arrested several perpetrators and Ba’asyir hastened to the police station to offer them his support.⁴⁵ Generally, however, in Surakarta the police themselves by then were doing most of what the extremists demanded, shutting down illegal gambling joints, publicly destroying bottles of alcohol, arresting prostitutes and shaming courting couples discovered in such places.⁴⁶ In cities other than Surakarta, ‘sweeping’ against places of ‘immorality’ and threats against restaurants and food stalls by FPI and others still continued, especially during Ramadan.⁴⁷



Illustration 39 Ir Joko Widodo (Jokowi),
Mayor of Surakarta, 2006

⁴⁴ *RS*, 25 Sept. 2006.

⁴⁵ *KR*, 22 March 2008. Also described in [Zainal Abidin Bagir *et al.*,] *Laporan tahunan*, p. 13.

⁴⁶ For example, *RS*, 6 Oct. 2006; *Solopos*, 12 Sept. 2008.

⁴⁷ For example, *KR*, 7 Sept. 2008.

East Java NU criticised violent 'sweeping' as inconsistent with the spirit of Ramadan, urging that improper conduct instead be referred to the police.⁴⁸ Just as in Surakarta, local government bans and police raids on 'places of immorality' came to be regularly reported, particularly during Ramadan.⁴⁹

It must be emphasised that, even though many Javanese dislike the violence of the *laskars*, the suppression of gambling, drinking, prostitution and the like is supported by many people (Muslims and non-Muslims) on moral grounds, and is welcomed when done by local government and the police. Rarely is there resistance. In 2001, prostitutes and workers who depend on prostitution (parking attendants, etc.) demonstrated against the closure of their business for Ramadan in Kediri, but five years later most of them accepted the inevitable and went home for the fasting month.⁵⁰ One is reminded of the comment by the lighterman at Ramsgate in 1581, quoted by Keith Thomas: 'It was never merry England since we were impressed to come to the church.'⁵¹

Not all smaller Dakwahist and Islamist groups regard violence as acceptable. In Surakarta, the purification movements MTA and the Assalaam school that began in the 1970s carry on, contributing to the deeper Islamisation of the society. They do so without violence, relying on education and *pengajian* and, it may reasonably be presumed, are thereby more effective in bringing about social change than are the sword-waving *laskars*. They are not, of course, entirely free of controversy from time to time. The leader of MTA Ahmad Sukina was denounced in extreme terms by an Arab *Habib* from Grobogan for overthrowing Traditionalist ideas.⁵² 'We regard no one as enemies, even though we are treated like an enemy by others', said Ahmad Sukina.⁵³ MTA continues its opposition to spiritually embedded Javanese beliefs and practices such as *slametans*, *jimats*, *krisses*, Ratu Kidul and the like. At its headquarters MTA has a display of *krisses* and other *jimats*, with the warning, 'Muslim men and women who still have *JIMATS*:

⁴⁸ *JktP* online, 2 Sept. 2008.

⁴⁹ For example, regarding Kediri: *RK*, 28 Oct. 2003, 19 Nov. 2003, 14 Oct. 2004, 15 Oct. 2004, 23 Sept. 2006, 26 Sept. 2005. Regarding Yogyakarta: *KR*, 23 Aug. 2008, 6 Aug. 2009, 18 Aug. 2009, 21 Aug. 2009; *KmpsO*, 19 Aug. 2009.

⁵⁰ *TempoI*, 29 Nov. 2001; *MmK*, 14 Sept. 2006.

⁵¹ Thomas, *Religion and the decline of magic*, p. 179.

⁵² *MTA-online*, 12 July 2007. Habib Yahya evidently even went so far as to claim that MTA is a Zionist front, than which there could hardly be any worse charge.

⁵³ '*Kita tidak punya musuh walaupun dimusubi*'; comment by Ust. Drs Ahmad Sukina, Surakarta, 6 Nov. 2006.



Illustration 40 Ust. Drs Ahmad Sukina of MTA and the collection of surrendered *jimats*, 'a clear source of deviance', Surakarta MTA headquarters, 2008

Repent immediately, for this is an act of *shirk!*', such polytheism being the most heinous form of disbelief in Islam. MTA leaders resist getting involved in politics. 'You can't do *dakwah* through politics,' a Surabaya MTA leader insisted.⁵⁴ Assalaam also carries on in its educational work.

There are two political parties which are to a greater or lesser degree Dakwahist and Islamist and which have a significant impact among the Javanese: HTI and PKS. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia⁵⁵ is a political party connected to the international Hizbut Tahrir — literally the 'Liberation Party' — which is based on the ideas of the Palestinian Taqiuddin al-Nabhani (1909–77). The Indonesian branch was founded in 1982 and won followers among university students, but could operate openly only after the fall of Soeharto. Although Hizbut Tahrir is regarded as a terrorist organisation and banned on those grounds in some countries, it has not been associated with terrorism in Indonesia. HTI seeks to create a universal caliphate, a global Islamic state and society. Because it rejects democracy, however, in Indonesia it pursues these goals without taking part in elections. It thus exemplifies the strategy of taking power from below and outside state structures, but unlike MMI it seeks to do so peacefully. Masdar Hilmy describes HTI in the following terms:

HTI is one of the better organised Islamist groups in Indonesia, comprising mainly middle-class Muslims with a strong longing for spiritual assistance. The organisation offers a unique mixture of modernity and elements of Salafism, even though at times it is unclear whether it represents a version of indigenous or Arabicised Islam. ... HTI tends to choose a moderate, intellectual stance as its means of *dakwah*. Most of its members are attracted to the ideas of HTI not because of coercive indoctrination, but because of the intelligibility of the narratives on Islam provided by its ideologues. HTI mostly deploys international issues affecting Islam and the Muslim world as the basis of its campaign towards the establishment of *Khilafah Islamiyah* [the Islamic caliphate], even though its activists are also very much concerned with domestic social and political issues.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Mohammad Rokib interview of Ir. Hasan Ikhwan, head of the MTA branch in Sukolilo, Surabaya, 4 Dec. 2008. Hasan Ikhwan added that they could get along well with other religions, but if non-Muslims should provoke and threaten Islam, then they would have to be wiped out entirely (*dibumihanguskan*).

⁵⁵ See Hilmy, *Islamism and democracy*, esp. pp. 117–22; unless otherwise indicated the discussion here rests mainly on this source.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 118–9.

HTI's most spectacular public performance was the holding of an 'International Caliphate Conference' in Jakarta in August 2007. This was widely reported in the Indonesian press, with estimates that over 100,000 people attended. The Indonesian government refused entrance to a few of the international attendees, but many Indonesian Muslim leaders put in an appearance.⁵⁷ At local levels, HTI activists often take part in pro-caliphate, anti-government, anti-Israeli and anti-American demonstrations, along with other Islamic organisations.⁵⁸

While HTI eschews electoral politics, it is aware of the desirability of a larger mass base than the tertiary-educated cadres that it now has. Integrated Islamic Schools (*Sekolah Islam Terpadu*) run by its activists are both a source of income for themselves and a long-term project for building up a following and changing the society. HTI is also appearing in at least some high schools.⁵⁹ More immediately effective strategies for winning a larger following may also be in hand. We saw above NU's fears that its followers were being influenced, its branches infiltrated or its mosques taken over by HTI. The senior NU *kyai* Idris Marzuqi was unequivocal about HTI being 'our enemies' who would destroy the nation. If necessary, he insisted, NU would respond with its martial arts and mystical sciences of invulnerability (*ilmu kebal, ilmu jadhugan*).⁶⁰ We may be sure that such 'sciences' were of little account in the thinking of HTI's Revivalists. If HTI's thinking is not subject to Traditionalist superstitions, however, it is subject to its own utopian naivety. Its leading spokesman Ismail Yusanto explained that there were two major problems in Indonesia. The first was a problem of leadership, which would be solved by having a caliph. The second was a problem of 'the system', which would be solved by implementing *shari'ah*.⁶¹ Another spokesman even suggested that if the caliphate could be first established in Indonesia, then Indonesia could become the centre of the Islamic world. So there was no reason to fear that Indonesia would disappear in the caliphate,

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 121.

⁵⁸ For example, *JktP* online, 12 Jan. 2003; *Tempo*, 25 Oct. 2004; *RK*, 4 June 2005, 6 March 2006, 29 July 2006, 5 Jan. 2009; *Surabaya Post*, 4 Jan. 2009.

⁵⁹ Febi Taufiqurrahman (17 years old, a student leader) said that HTI was present in his senior high school (SMAN 4) in Kediri; Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi interview, Kediri, 28 July 2007.

⁶⁰ Discussion with Ky. H.A. Idris Marzuqi, Lirboyo, Kediri, 29 Nov. 2007.

⁶¹ Discussion with Muhammad Ismail Yusanto, Jakarta, 8 June 2007.

he said; rather, it would grow by taking into itself other Islamic nations around the world.⁶²

Unlike HTI, PKS has a non-utopian, pragmatic leadership that is working within Indonesia's democratic political system to create what it regards as a more perfect political, social and religious order. We have often referred to this organisation above, and now need to look at how it carries out its political and *dakwah* aims in Javanese society. As noted above, this party was born out of the *tarbiyah* movement on university campuses (especially secular campuses) modeled on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Its religious practices, however, are not entirely Modernist or Revivalist. Although many followers of the *tarbiyah* movement follow daily litanies compiled by Hassan al-Banna,⁶³ there are also people in PKS who observe Traditionalist rituals such as *tablilan* and *yasinan*.⁶⁴ Upon the fall of Soeharto, in July 1998 the activists of this movement decided to create a political party to compete in the expected national parliamentary elections, and they called it Partai Keadilan (Justice Party). With an Islamist platform for implementing *shari'a* law, it did poorly in the 1999 elections, winning only 1.4 per cent of the national vote, which rendered it unqualified to stand again. So the party was refounded as PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperous Justice Party) and deemphasised its Islamist aspirations. It still called itself a *dakwah* party, but underlined that it was 'clean and caring', emphasising above all its opposition to corruption and concern for the disadvantaged. Its leader Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid⁶⁵ was impressive, its cadres maintained their discipline and exemplified the moral standards the party claimed, and the electorate rewarded them. In the 2004 elections, PKS won over 8.3 million votes nationally, amounting to 7.3 per cent of the national vote. This was an impressive achievement for a new party in a multiparty

⁶² Arif Maftuhin interview with HTI spokesman Tindyo Prasetyo, Yogyakarta, 16 Aug. 2007.

⁶³ Known as the *al-ma'tsurat*; Arif Maftuhin interview of Cahyadi Takariawan, Yogyakarta, 15 Sept. 2007.

⁶⁴ Including one of its founders, Ky. H. Hilmi Aminuddin; *PK Sejahtera-online*, 23 July 2008. This point was also made by Dr M. Hidayat Nur Wahid in our discussion, Jakarta, 7 June 2007, and in a lecture he gave at the Lapangan Tambaksari, Surabaya, on 5 April 2009 (notes provided by Masdar Hilmy).

⁶⁵ Hidayat Nur Wahid was born in Klaten in 1960, educated at Gontor, IAIN Yogyakarta and the Islamic University of Madinah (where he gained his doctorate); he taught at both Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta and IAIN Jakarta. Further details at <http://www.tokoh-indonesia.com/ensiklopedi/h/hidayat-nur-wahid/index.shtml>.



Illustration 41 PKS election banner in Kediri, 2009.
The Javanese slogan says, 'Come on, build the nation along with
PKS' and points out that the candidate is 'original NU'.



Illustration 42 Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid, Jakarta, 2007

democracy in which the largest party (Golkar) took just 21.6 per cent of the vote and the NU-based PKB won only 10.6 per cent. In the simultaneous elections for local parliaments, PKS did similarly strongly.

This more pragmatic approach represented a compromise between those who were prepared to work patiently and realistically to gain political power and those who were more committed to quicker and purer implementation of Islamist goals. In the wake of the 2004 outcome, the pragmatists could claim that their strategy was a success. PKS aimed at winning 20 per cent of the vote in the 2009 elections, when it presented itself as 'clean, caring and professional'. It also declared itself more pluralist, more nationalist and more open to new phenomena like pop music.⁶⁶ Its aspirations were,

⁶⁶ PKS leader Anis Matta quoted in *Kmps*, 7 Oct. 2008. Similar sentiments were repeated at a PKS national meeting of some 3,500 cadres held in Yogyakarta in 2011, which opened with performances from a 'Five Mountain Festival' group, traditional Javanese dance and a hiphop performance; *JktP* online, 26 Feb. 2011.

however, unrealistic. The party's result was little different from 2004, winning 8.2 million or 7.9 per cent of votes, making it fourth in size but far behind PDIP, Golkar and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's Partai Demokrat.⁶⁷ Doubts must have grown within PKS about how successful the pragmatists' strategy really was. In March 2011 internal conflict within PKS became public, with accusations of dishonesty being made against major leaders and signs that idealistic figures may have been deserting the party as early as 2003, with others reportedly being pushed out or sidelined.⁶⁸ The public began to suspect that perhaps PKS was not so different from other parties after all.

PKS is a Janus-faced organisation, with different internal and external presentations of itself, as many have observed. While publicly advocating democracy, 'internally', Masdar Hilmy notes, 'PKS activists must adhere to a rather stringent internal code of behaviour that would appear to contradict some basic principles of democracy'.⁶⁹ PKS leaders emphasise that they are democrats and have no interest in creating an Islamic state. 'We are tired of the polemics' (about an Islamic caliphate), said Hidayat Nur Wahid, by then speaker of the national parliament (MPR), 'and it is better to concentrate on carrying out the teachings of Islam'.⁷⁰ He said to me that PKS wanted no violence, no poverty, no ignorance and no terrorism, and that such views were contrary to those of the *Salafis*, Wahhabis, HTI, MMI and so on. He denied that it had any Islamist 'hidden agenda', as many have claimed. Nor, he said, was there truth in the stories about PKS trying to infiltrate Muhammadiyah.⁷¹

The aspirations of PKS cadres and the party's internal representations are not always in line with the leaders' public positions. The PKS office in Yogyakarta reflected the Janus-faced quality of the party. On the occasion of one of my visits, the front office displayed a banner celebrating PKS's Korsad (Korps Satuan Tugas Keadilan, Corps of Duty Units for Justice), a sort of scouting outfit roughly comparable to NU's Ansor. The banner bore quotes from the PKS leaders Tifatul Sembiring and Anis Matta, the latter admonishing Korsad to 'prepare the physique so as to be fit for the *jihad*

⁶⁷ PKS and its electoral performance have attracted a great deal of attention from analysts. A good overview is in Hilmy, *Islamism and democracy*, pp. 123–6 et passim.

⁶⁸ *Tempo*I, 18 March 2011; *JktP* online, 29 March 2011.

⁶⁹ Hilmy, *Islamism and democracy*, p. 254. See also Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, *Joining the caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia* (Lowy Institute Paper 05; [Sydney:] Lowy Institute, 2005), pp. 72–4.

⁷⁰ *Tempo*I, 25 Oct. 2004.

⁷¹ Discussion with Dr M. Hidayat Nur Wahid, Jakarta, 7 June 2007.

caravan', probably an allusion to Abdullah Azzam's well-known *jihadi* work *Join the caravan*.⁷²

PKS declares itself to be a *dakwah* party — one that aims for deeper Islamisation of the society — but in addition to its Dakwahist aims, at grass-roots level it is often Islamist. One of its leaders in Kediri, a 25-year-old former student activist, told Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi that he was not yet sure whether he supported democracy, for a caliphate was obligatory and better than secular democracy. So, he said, HTI was good.⁷³ A PKS Ustadz told them that whether Indonesia needed a caliphate still needed to be discussed.⁷⁴ The deputy head of PKS in Kediri town told them that both democracy and a caliphate were merely tools to an end.⁷⁵ PKS grass-roots international sympathies tend to be like those of other Islamist organisations. Its activists and sympathisers turned out in their hundreds in Kediri in May 2006 to celebrate the victory of Hamas over Fatah in the Palestinian elections the previous January. They carried banners denouncing *inter alia* 'the wicked greed of American Zionists'.⁷⁶

Lower-level departure from what is supposed to be PKS policy was exemplified by a vigorous discussion about politics at the Jogokariyan mosque in Yogyakarta during the 2009 election campaign. If PKS has a 'hidden agenda', it was not so hidden on this occasion. This was billed as a panel discussion 'for and against parliamentary *dakwah*', but in fact it turned out that there was little disagreement on the matter among the four speakers, all billed as *ustadz*. Supposedly in favour of 'parliamentary *dakwah*' were two PKS figures who were elected members of local parliaments, Abdullah Sunono and Ahmad Khudlori. Against it were Mush'ab Abdul Ghaffar and the MMI luminary Abu Jibriel Abdurrahman.⁷⁷ Before an audience that grew to about 300 (mostly young) men, the latter two denounced democracy

⁷² I do not of course know whether this is a conscious allusion to Abdullah Azzam's famous work, but I doubt that many would have failed to be reminded of it.

⁷³ Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi interview of Warsono, Kediri, 16 Apr. 2007.

⁷⁴ Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi interview of Imron Muzakki, Kediri, 15 Apr. 2007.

⁷⁵ Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi interview of Ahmad Salis, Kediri, 24 March 2007.

⁷⁶ *RK*, 1 May 2006.

⁷⁷ Abu Jibriel (sometimes spelled Jibril) studied at Ngruki, was closely linked to Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, also spent time in prison in the 1980s and fled to Malaysia in 1985, fought in Afghanistan, and helped to found JI and MMI. He was held in Malaysia under the Internal Security Act from 2002 to 2004. In 2005 Indonesian police failed

in uncompromising terms, labeling it an offence against God because it rests on sovereignty of the people, whereas only God is sovereign. Democracy is 'great *shirk*' declared Abu Jibriel. These statements were greeted with cries of *Allahu akbar*. Mush'ab Abdul Ghaffar said that he had once been a cadre of PKS in the belief that it was working to implement *shari'a*, but discovered that it was not, so he had 'repented' — a comment greeted with laughter. The PKS speakers were clearly on the defensive in this environment and adapted themselves to the context, whether out of principle or lack of courage I cannot judge. Abdullah Sunono distributed a prepared paper and spoke well in defence of democracy as something that existed in the early days of Islam. He went on, however, to say that democracy was just a vessel or tool with which to work towards a caliphate. Ahmad Chudori was even blunter. He said that he did not agree with being depicted as a defender of 'parliamentary *dakwah*' for he agreed with Abu Jibriel and Mush'ab Abdul Ghaffar that democracy conflicts with Islam. It was, however, an opportunity to be made use of in the name of *dakwah*, to make Islam central to social life. If they were successful (in winning power), he said, then political parties would be abolished.⁷⁸ The whole 'debate' had a rather ritualistic quality, reminding one of the Soviet zealot depicted in Yevtushenko's 'Zima junction': 'steamed up, banging his bossy fist — / There's iron in his eyes; and as for speeches, / it isn't words to get the business done, / it's business only there for the sake of words, / for smooth, obvious speeches.'⁷⁹

The following day Arif Maftuhin and I took the opportunity to ask the deputy head of the PKS fraction in the local Yogyakarta parliament, H. Muh. Wajdi Rahman, about the views expressed at the mosque. We asked particularly about the statements by the PKS speakers that democracy conflicted with Islam and that, if power was achieved, political parties would be abolished. Wajdi Rahman responded that these were just private opinions, not the policy of PKS (despite the speakers being PKS members

to lay charges against him after a bomb went off at his house, reportedly because of pressure from PKS and PAN politicians, including the PAN figure Patrialis Akbar, who later became Minister for Justice and Human Rights; *JktP* online, 13 March 2010. See also International Crisis Group, *Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia*, pp. 2–3, 17, 19, 21.

⁷⁸ Based on my notes taken at the time and papers distributed at the *Diskusi panel pro-kontra dakwah parlemen*, Masjid Jogokariyan, Yogyakarta, 29 March 2009. It may be noted that the area was dominated by PPP election banners.

⁷⁹ Yevgeny Yevtushenko, *Selected poems* (transl. Robin Milner-Gulland and Peter Levi; intro. Robin Milner-Gulland. London, etc.: Penguin Books, 2008), p. 31.

of local parliament). PKS members were free to argue their views, he said, but when the central leadership adopted a policy that had to be adhered to by all followers (although clearly that had not applied the previous day at the Jogokariyan mosque). I suggested that this sounded rather like Leninist 'democratic centralism', a comparison to which he did not object.⁸⁰

No issue more provokes the anxiety and anger of these smaller Islamist and Dakwahist movements — and of Muhammadiyah, too, for that matter — than conversions from Islam to Christianity. We have noted above several cases of Muslim anger or suspicion directed at Christian activities. The 'inculturation' policy of the Catholic Church seems a particular threat to those Dakwahists seeking to get rid of Javanese customs which they see as heathen remnants of the pre-Islamic age. Javanese churches often seek to preserve inter-religious harmony through joint activities with Muslims, such as breaking the fast together during Ramadan or undertaking social welfare activities together. These, too, are seen as threatening by hard-line Revivalists, who object to anything that makes Christianity seem a normal or welcome part of the society.

Some Christian activity is confrontative, echoing Muslim hard-liners' style and probably feeding a dialectical relationship between the two sides. Local Chinese are often Christians, so that anti-Christian and anti-Chinese feelings can reinforce each other. One Chinese-led Pentecostal movement was founded by Yusak Tjipto Purnomo (b. 1935 in Jepara). His son Petrus Agung Purnomo heads a movement called the Indonesian Christian Community of the Gospel of the Kingdom (Jemaat Kristen Indonesia Injil Kerajaan), with a 'Holy Stadium' in Semarang that can seat many thousands. A daughter runs a branch in Cirebon and proselytises via a local radio station, which was attacked by FPI and others in 2006.⁸¹ In Temanggung, a 2010 Pentecostal revival meeting featured faith-healing and speaking in tongues and much display of emotion. By that time there were said to be 40 churches in Temanggung, where there had been none 50 years before.⁸² In October of that year, a Menadonese Protestant preacher in Temanggung was arrested for distributing leaflets that defamed Islam. When his trial

⁸⁰ Discussion with H. Muh. Wajdi Rahman, Yogyakarta, 30 March 2009.

⁸¹ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: 'Christianisation' and intolerance* (Asia briefing no. 114; Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 24 Nov. 2010), p. 3n16. The church has a website at <http://www.jkiinjilkerajaan.or.id/TSOA%202.htm>. An image of the Holy Stadium can be seen at <http://www.jkiinjilkerajaan.org/lama/index.php>.

⁸² Hannah Beech, 'Christianity's surge in Indonesia', at <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1982223,00.html>.

took place in February 2011, the prosecutors demanded that he be given the maximum sentence of five years, but local Islamic activists who had packed the courtroom rioted. They attacked the judge, the prosecutors and the defendant, set motor bikes and cars on fire, burned two (some reports said three) churches and a Christian school and threw stones at other Christian properties. They had wanted the death sentence.⁸³

Revivalist groups often mobilise in the name of protecting the Muslim *ummah* from the threat of conversion to Christianity. In 2007 in Yogyakarta, MMI, HTI, PKS, MUI and others objected to a healing 'festival' to be led by the Canadian evangelist Peter Youngren. They pressed the police to withdraw permission for it to be held (their threat of violence being implicit), the police gave in 'in the interest of security considerations' and the previous permission for the gathering was withdrawn.⁸⁴ The magazine *Sabili* regularly depicts Indonesia as a Muslim society under constant threat of Christianisation — something which readers of this book might think to be somewhat exaggerated. It is a touch ironic that the Minister of Religious Affairs, Maftuh Basyuni, opened a Pentecost World Conference in Surabaya in July 2007, proclaiming that the conference itself demonstrated that 'people of different religious creeds in this country can get along well'.⁸⁵

Anti-Christian activists have relied on a law which says that a place of worship may not be built without official permission. In a country where many things are determined not by what the law says but by whether someone cares to enforce it, small activist groups have insisted on churches having such official permission and have done what they can to delay or prevent it being given. In Surakarta, extremists' 'sweeping' of hotels with the ostensible aim of driving Americans out of town was, at least some of the time, a cover for disrupting religious services in hotels by Christians who lacked permission to build a church. There were also physical assaults on churches that militants declared to be illegal. There were such attacks (the attackers waving swords but not causing serious injuries or death) in

⁸³ The accused was named Antonius Richmond Bawengan. The police withheld information about which Islamic groups were involved. *JktP* online, 8 Feb. 2011; *Tempo*, 8 Feb. 2011, 9 Feb. 2011; *Solopos* online, 8 Feb. 2011; *Republika* online, 8 Feb. 2011.

⁸⁴ *Suara Merdeka* online, 30 May 2007; Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, *Pernyataan sikap tentang penjagaan aqidah umat dari upaya pemurtadan*, 27 May 2007. See also Imam Subkhan, *Hiruk pikuk wacana pluralisme di Yogya*, pp. 115–8.

⁸⁵ *JktP* online, 18 July 2007.

September, October, November and December 2006 and on three Sundays in February 2007. According to the Protestant pastor Bambang Mulyatno, the attack of 14 October 2006 was on a church which in fact had permission to build, but then someone else wanted to buy the land and organised militants in an organisation called LUIS (Laskar Umat Islam Surakarta, Surakarta Islamic *ummah* militia) to attack. A church that was meeting in Solo Grand Mall escaped such violence by paying protection money to LUIS, pastor Bambang said.⁸⁶ In 2005, the police accompanied hundreds of members of MMI and a militia called Laskar Hisbullah to seal a private house suspected of being used as a church in Sukoharjo.

Anti-Christian violence has not been uncommon. A few examples will suffice here. In Yogyakarta, between November 1997 and October 2006, local people attacked and burned or otherwise destroyed two churches, the Islamic *Ummah* Forum (Forum Umat Islam) protested about the construction of four others, stones were thrown at two and one was fire-bombed. During this time a mosque in the *Kauman* of Yogyakarta was also set afire and a bomb was found there, but I am aware of no evidence that was done by Christians in retaliation — an unlikely act for the underdogs in such a competition in any case.⁸⁷ During the first days of December 2010, police defused bombs at two churches in Klaten, Molotov cocktails were thrown at a church in Sukoharjo and a shot was fired at another in Surakarta.⁸⁸ A suicide bomber killed himself and a parishioner, and injured several others, at a church in Surakarta in September 2011.⁸⁹ On the slopes of Mount Wilis, in a village where inter-religious relationships were amicable, a Catholic church began to be built in 2004 with approval from local people but without having yet obtained official permission for construction. It was destroyed by attackers who, however, were not from the smaller extremist groups but rather from NU's Ansor. The Ansor leadership quickly expressed regret at the incident and further construction was halted until the official permission was obtained.⁹⁰ This was indeed quite out of character for Ansor and Banser, which usually turn out to guard churches when they seem under threat from Muslim extremists. For Christmas 2005, Banser ordered 3,500 members to

⁸⁶ Discussion with Pastor Bambang Mulyatno, Surakarta, 23 March 2007.

⁸⁷ Imam Subkhan, *Hiruk pikuk wacana pluralisme di Yogya*, pp. 62–3.

⁸⁸ *JktG* online, 8 Dec. 2010.

⁸⁹ *JktP* online, 25 Sept. 2011. See further International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: From vigilantism to terrorism in Cirebon*.

⁹⁰ *RK*, 7 Aug. 2004, 9 Aug. 2004.

guard churches in Central Java and 13,000 to guard them across East Java, with a detail of at least 3,000 members in the Kediri area.⁹¹

Behind this agitation and violence lies a fear — reminiscent of what we have seen in the 1970s and 1980s — that the Islamisation of the Javanese is in danger of being reversed by Christian proselytisation. This idea is sustained principally by the fact that most conversions are concentrated in towns and cities and are thus particularly obvious. But the statistics that are available suggest that the great wave of conversions took place in the early years after the violence of 1965–6 and that changes since then have been small.

Neither Yogyakarta nor Surakarta has seen increases in the Christian population in recent years comparable to what happened in the 1960s and 1970s, but there has been growth. We saw in Table 11 above that the percentage of Surakarta's population that was Christian reached 24.5 per cent by 1980 and only advanced further to 25 per cent by 1990. In 2006, that figure was 26 per cent,⁹² although that may be an understatement because it is based on the religions recorded in residents' identity cards and local officials were sometimes reluctant to change those when a Muslim converted to Christianity. In Yogyakarta city the Christian percentage actually fell during the 1990s, from 18.1 per cent in 1980 to 16.6 per cent in 1990.⁹³

Table 25 Christian population in Yogyakarta as percentage of total population, 2001–6⁹⁴

Year	Christian population (Catholic + Protestant) ⁹⁵
2001	17.7
2002	18.5
2003	18.8
2004	19.8
2005	20.6
2006	20.8

⁹¹ *Tempo*I, 24 Dec. 2005; *MmK*, 26 Nov. 2005.

⁹² Dinas Kependudukan dan Catatan Sipil, Pemerintah Kota Surakarta, 'Jumlah penduduk dan pemeluk agama Kota Surakarta April 2006', 4 July 2006.

⁹³ Statistical data gathered on my behalf by Arif Maftuhin from Yogyakarta statistics.

⁹⁴ Based on data compiled by Arif Maftuhin from the *Yogyakarta dalam angka* series for 2001–6 and received from him on 13 Oct. 2008.

⁹⁵ In Surakarta, Christians are split roughly equally between Protestants and Catholics, whereas in Yogyakarta Catholics are the larger group, representing around 60 per cent of the total.

In 2000, that figure was just 17 per cent, and that actually represented a drop in absolute numbers, from 71,323 Christians in 1980 to 67,348 in 2000. Thereafter, however, numbers and percentages began to grow again, reaching and surpassing the 1980 percentage, as shown in Table 25. This also represented a growth in absolute numbers of Christians in the city, from 87,749 in 2001 to 108,650 in 2006.

We may note that this growth took place in Yogyakarta during years when the anti-Christian schools campaign was at its height and when there was some anti-Christian violence (although much less than in Surakarta). This may lead us again to speculate that there is a dialectical relationship between Christian conversions and the more extreme forms of Islamic activism, each inspiring the other. But another element in religious changes is marriage. I am not aware of persuasive data on this, but there are indications from some areas and the opinion is held by knowledgeable figures from various sides that interreligious marriage is a major cause of conversions.⁹⁶

There are two other groups that Sunni extremists love to hate throughout the Islamic world: Jews and Shi'ites. Both, however, are so small in Indonesia that they offer limited opportunities to be hated. Nevertheless, there has been some violence against them. There is a small Jewish synagogue in an old Dutch-era house in Surabaya, with a tiny congregation mostly of Baghdadi Jewish background. It is almost impossible to be an orthodox Jew in Indonesia, because of both the small size of the community and dietary difficulties. Generally the Surabaya Jews have had no trouble.⁹⁷ In 2009, however, a group of Muslim activists organised demonstrations against Israeli attacks on the Gaza Strip, burned American and Israeli flags and forced the synagogue to be sealed, before moving on to Kentucky Fried Chicken and McDonalds.⁹⁸

Shi'a may have had a presence in Indonesia in the early years of Islamisation centuries ago, but was almost entirely unrepresented in more modern times until after the Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution in Iran in 1979.

⁹⁶ This opinion was expressed by Drs H. Sunardi Sahuri, Yogyakarta, 14 Sept. 2008; and by the Catholic priest Father Haryanto in our discussion in Surabaya, 24 Nov. 2007. Pastor Simon Philantropa also was aware of conversions through marriage (discussion in Surabaya, 24 Nov. 2007). Data gathered by Suhadi Cholil on marriages in Gunung Kidul in 2005–6 showed that some 17–19 per cent of the 546 marriages there involved a change of religion.

⁹⁷ Discussion with the woman who looks after the synagogue, Surabaya, 24 Oct. 2008. She asked that her name not be given, which I am respecting.

⁹⁸ *JktP* online, 14 Jan. 2009.

Since that time, Iran has offered scholarships for Indonesians to study there. Within Indonesia, Shi'a has been represented particularly by Dr Jalaluddin Rakhmat (b. Bandung, 1949) but also by others. In Javanese-speaking areas, its main strength is at Bangil, where there is a Shi'ite *pesantren* founded in 1973 by the *Habib* Husein al-Habsyi, Jalaluddin's teacher. There have been demonstrations against Shi'a from time to time and it has been roundly denounced by Sunnis of Arab descent, *inter alia* in the magazine *al-Kisab*.⁹⁹ The Bangil *pesantren* experienced some conflict in 2007. After the joint ministerial decree against Ahmadiyya came out in June 2008, a banner was put up in Ampel (an Arab precinct in Surabaya where is found the grave of the *wali* Sunan Ngampel) saying that now it was the turn of Shi'a to be dealt with, but as head of the local inter-religious forum Ky. H. Imam Ghazli Said had it taken down.¹⁰⁰ In early 2011, the *pesantren* was attacked by about 100 youths on motorbikes who threw stones, injuring two students and a guard,¹⁰¹ but there has not yet been a serious arson attack of the kind that Christian churches have experienced or murderous violence such as the Ahmadi have suffered.

How much impact these smaller Islamist and Dakwahist movements have on the general Javanese public is difficult to assess in detail, but there is no doubt that they are active, attract attention and are constantly pushing Islamist and Dakwahist agendas forward, fighting 'Christianisation', 'immorality' and 'deviance'. A research group from UIN Jakarta studied 'seeds of radical Islam' in 10 mosques in Surakarta.¹⁰² They established that speakers such as Abu Bakar Ba'asyir or people from organisations such as HTI (which they included in their definition of 'radical') gave sermons and *pengajian* lessons at some of the mosques. The extremist organisation Hidayatullah was represented and the selection of study sites included the Gumuk community, the home of FPIS. Among mosque organisers and attendees,

⁹⁹ See *al-Kisab* no. 12/4, 17 June 2007. On this magazine, which was established in 2003 and appeals particularly to Indonesian Muslims inclined towards Sufism and accepting the authority of *Habibs*, see Ismail Fajrie Alatas, 'Securing their place: The Bā'alawī, prophetic piety and the Islamic resurgence in Indonesia' (MA thesis, National University of Singapore, 2008), pp. 90–1.

¹⁰⁰ Discussion with Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said, *pesantren* An-Nur, Wonocolo, Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008.

¹⁰¹ *JktP* online, 15 Feb. 2011, 17 Feb. 2011; 'Pernyataan resmi Ponpes YAPI' at <http://www.yapibangil.org>.

¹⁰² Ridwan al-Makassary and Ahmad Gaus AF (eds), *Benih-benih Islam radikal di masjid*.

there were people affiliated with HTI, MMI, MTA and other such activist movements (as well as the larger Islamic organisations Muhammadiyah and NU). There were some who thought Islam to be inconsistent with democracy, believed that a caliphate should be established, wanted *shari'a* law to be implemented, or were sympathetic to extremist actions. But it was more difficult to establish how widely held such ideas were or how much impact they had on others. Among the interviewees there were also people who were tolerant of religious pluralism and rejected Islamist or extremist ideas. In the main mosque (*Masjid Agung*) of Surakarta, teachings about *jihad* and implementing *shari'a* evoked 'very low' enthusiasm from the congregation. When a HTI speaker gave a fiery Friday sermon there about the need for a caliphate, most of the congregation 'was nodding off'. At another mosque, an invited speaker gave a sermon that was very radical, the congregation was unhappy about that, and he was never invited again.¹⁰³ Guinness noted similarly in Yogyakarta in 2000 that sermons in the local *kampung* mosque sometimes 'actually preached violence' and 'used the cry of *jihad*' but local people did not always agree and, when they came out of the mosque, most simply 'went about their daily business'.¹⁰⁴ While it cannot be doubted that mosques are a major channel for spreading understandings of Islam among the community through their *pengajian* programmes and Friday sermons, it remains unclear how many teach concepts associated with the smaller Islamist and Dakwahist movements under discussion here or what impact they have on their congregations. It needs to be remembered that the number of mosques and prayer halls affiliated with NU and Muhammadiyah is vastly greater than those linked to these smaller movements. That does not, of course, mean that there is a single 'party line' taught in NU and Muhammadiyah mosques.

It is important to note who constitute the cadres of these movements, for they represent an important element within Indonesia's future leadership. Something of a consistent — but not universal — pattern is observable.¹⁰⁵ These people tend to be young, aspiring to upward mobility and engaged in tertiary study or already tertiary graduates. Their studies are usually in non-humanities and non-Islamic disciplines — in science, medicine, veterinary

¹⁰³ Ibid., pp. 153, 155, 200.

¹⁰⁴ Guinness, *Kampung, Islam and state*, pp. 184–5.

¹⁰⁵ In the absence of widely based surveys of these groups' followers, what follows is necessarily rather impressionistic. The impressions are, at least, shared by others, e.g., Hilmy, *Islamism and democracy*, p. 118.

medicine and engineering. The latter are faculties in high demand, attracting some of the highest-achieving students. So the stereotypical follower of, say, HTI or MMI is smart and well-educated in technical fields, but knows of Islam mainly through campus mosques and the leaders of these movements. They have mostly studied at major state universities: Gadjah Mada, the University of Indonesia, Bandung Institute of Technology and so on. The minority who have formally studied Islamic sciences have typically done so in Saudi Arabia, where Wahhabi interpretations dominate. It is not unusual for the leading figure of a movement to be of Arab ethnic background and thus to bear a certain authority within Islamic societies, especially in the case of a descendant of the Prophet (*Habib*). The state Islamic tertiary system of STAIN, IAIN and UIN is more rarely represented among these groups. NU's Hasyim Muzadi observed that Liberalism may be more dominant in the state Islamic system because the students often come from *pesantren* backgrounds and then study at these Islamic institutions until they 'are tired of having to be pious'.¹⁰⁶ The Yogyakarta PKS leader Kholil Mahmud commented that IAIN was difficult terrain for the party, which was more successful in gaining support in faculties of science.¹⁰⁷ As IAINs are converted into UINs, however, they add new faculties of the kind that have supported these smaller and more extreme activist groups and indeed it is in those new faculties that the PKS-associated student movement KAMMI finds support.¹⁰⁸

Noorhaidi Hasan interviewed 125 Laskar Jihad fighters who had been involved in the Christian-Muslim bloodshed in Maluku. They were mostly between 20 and 35 years of age and students, graduates or drop-outs from state universities in Central Java, where most were enrolled in faculties of science and engineering. Some were from well-off families and of *santri* background, but many were of rural *abangan* family background and had only learned about Islam when they arrived in a city for their university education. There were, however, also people who had only pre-tertiary education recruited to Laskar Jihad, often from communities on the edge of cities (above all from the environs of Surakarta); again many of those were of *abangan* background and had been converted to a more committed understanding of Islam through the work of Revivalist *pesantrens* and other

¹⁰⁶ Quoted in *JktP* online, 30 Nov. 2010.

¹⁰⁷ Discussion with Kholil Mahmud, Yogyakarta, 22 March 2008.

¹⁰⁸ For example, Moh. Irfan Zamzami interview of Jeje Jaelani, a KAMMI leader at UIN Yogyakarta, Yogyakarta, 28 Aug. 2008. KAMMI stands for Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Students' Action Unit.

forms of proselytisation.¹⁰⁹ A study of 80 followers of extremist movements in Jakarta done in 2000 — encompassing Laskar Jihad, FPI, MMI's Laskar Mujahidin and a student activist organisation called HAMMAS — found a similar pattern. The middle ranks of these organisations consisted mainly of people with tertiary education in various sciences.¹¹⁰

The patterns observable in the followers of these movements are not unique to Indonesia. Studies of similar movements in the Middle East — for which the term 'fundamentalist' is employed — have shown, as Valerie Hoffman summarises them, that

A consistent pattern emerges, across all these different countries, of fundamentalists drawing heavily from students and university graduates in the physical sciences, usually students of rural or traditionally religious backgrounds. These movements seem to attract the beneficiaries of the expanded university systems in all of these countries, people who have, therefore, likely made recent adjustments to a modern urban intellectual and cultural environment after being raised in a fairly traditional milieu In fact the background of the fundamentalist movements in all countries has been largely the intelligentsia of middle- or lower-middle-class backgrounds.¹¹¹

There is considerable speculation about why this pattern should emerge so strongly, but little consensus in the way of an answer. We may add our own speculations here. Young people with such psychological, cultural, social and educational profiles as we have seen also in the Indonesian case are among

¹⁰⁹ Hasan, *Laskar Jihad*, pp. 159–70.

¹¹⁰ Chaider S. Bamualim *et al.*, 'Laporan penelitian: Radikalisme agama dan perubahan sosial di DKI Jakarta', p. 90. HAMMAS stands for Himpunan Mahasiswa Muslim Antar Kampus, Inter-Campus Muslim Students' Association. The International Crisis Group has suggested that by late 2011 there was a generational shift under way in the ranks of actual terrorists to people 'less skilled, less experienced and less educated than the Afghan and Mindanao alumni, most ... from poor backgrounds and relying on petty trade'; International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: From vigilantism to terrorism in Cirebon*, p. 1.

¹¹¹ Valerie J. Hoffman, 'Muslim fundamentalists: Psychosocial profiles', in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds), *Fundamentalisms comprehended* (The Fundamentalism Project, vol. 5; Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 206. This covers movements in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Iran and Pakistan. Essentially the same observations concerning Soviet Central Asia, North Africa, Iran, the Middle East generally and South Asia are made in Roy, *Failure of political Islam*, pp. 3, 49–53. It is striking how often engineers appear as Islamist leaders in Kepel, *Jihad*.

the brightest of their generation. They face significant personal life transitions as well as challenges in breaking through existing social structures to the better future they desire, and are attracted to fields of study which — unlike the humanities and social sciences — seem to promise straightforward, clear and unequivocal answers (so long as they stay away from theoretical physics, of course). For those attracted to such kinds of studies, a version of religion that also promises straightforward, clear and unequivocal answers may offer at once psychological security, a reassuring social identity and network, perhaps a ladder to advancement and, crucially, the promise of eternal rewards. Small wonder that it attracts.

Thus it is that these smaller Islamist and Dakwahist movements are creating cadres of followers who are likely to play crucial leadership roles in Indonesia's future. They are the ones seeking major change, and it is people who seek change who by definition hold the initiative. They are the cutting edge, the game-changers, the protagonists who push the agenda forward at its edges. They can do so because — as we have seen throughout Chapters 7–12 — they operate in an environment in which Islam permeates Javanese life through educational institutions, through efforts to impose conformity of Islamic belief and through the activities of large-scale Islamic movements, leaving *abangan*, *kebatinan* and related ideas and practices on the defensive and older arts and performance styles to be Islamised or wither. In the discussion of the post-1998 period since Chapter 7, we have recorded a profound transition in Javanese society in the decade-and-a-bit since the fall of Soeharto, a transition that built upon foundations laid down in previous decades. We described other and larger movements with contending views of Islam in Chapter 10, but those larger movements seem to be on the defensive in the face of these smaller game-changers.

We may ask who now stands against a more thorough-going Islamisation of Javanese society. Who now are the opponents who figure in the title of this book and who played such a strong role until the 1960s? The answer is — as we shall see in the next chapter — hardly anyone.

CHAPTER 13

The remaining opposition: Seeking a neutral public space

There is now no significant opposition to the deeper Islamisation of Javanese society. There is only difference of opinion about what shape Islamic life should take, the extent to which variety and pluralism within Islam are acceptable or desirable, how Islamic society should relate to the significant non-Muslim minorities in its midst, and what role Islam (or, indeed, religion more generally) should play in public life. On none of these issues is there a clear consensus. There is hardly anyone — at least hardly anyone who is publicly visible — who thinks that the deepening influence of Islam is undesirable or should be reversed, except of course for Christian proselytisers seeking a harvest of souls for their own version of the supernatural and individuals like Soetiyono Tjokroharsoyo in Surakarta. But even the most unrealistic Christian can hardly imagine, as some did in the 1970s, that a majority of Indonesians might be converted to Christianity; religious people may live lives that depend on leaps of faith, but it would take a gigantic leap to think that. There is no political force that resists the influence of Islam, as there was in the first two decades of independence. History has moved on, bringing profound social change with it.

The main form of resistance now concerns how religion should affect public life, about the undesirability of that very thing Islamists want: an Islamised government and public space. In Chapter 10 we looked at the small Liberal Islamic movements, for whom religion is a private matter in which the state should not interfere. This view has significant intellectual roots within Indonesia, as we have seen above. Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, Djohan Effendy, Dawam Rahardjo, Said Agil Siradj, Masdar F. Mas'udi and others sought a neutral public space for years, during both the

New Order and the subsequent democratic age.¹ In the midst of deeper Islamisation across society, from the urban middle classes to country villagers, their arguments have remained at an intellectual level rather detached from the social and political realities surrounding them. Liberals' views parallel those of the American-based Sudanese authority on Islam and human rights, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, who argues that one can only live as a true Muslim when one does so freely, without government or other compulsion, and thus argues for a separation of religion and the state. His views have been disseminated in Indonesia and are influential, but have been criticised by Islamists.² Such Liberal ideas do attract wider support, but have limited political weight behind them.

It is necessary for those who seek a non-religious public space in Indonesia to work within a religious discourse. Their situation is not like that of secularists in Europe but does parallel that of similarly minded people in the United States. Susan Jacoby observes that in the 1950s American Christian liberals became progressively more divided from conservatives, so that in effect a Catholic and Protestant conservative alliance against Communism and secularism came into being. This meant that, in an age of rising religiosity, American secularists (i.e., those who 'who do not subscribe to any faith', have a predominantly secular worldview and think religion to be a private matter) found themselves in alliance with religious liberals in opposing church influence in public life. She goes on,

American secularists' recognition of their common ground with religious liberals was (and is) tactically necessary in the pursuit of shared political, social and legal aims. But that recognition, since the end of the Second World War, has precluded the kind of direct challenges to religion that freethinkers mounted in the nineteenth century.³

In the current political and religious atmosphere of Indonesia, those who seek a Liberal separation of religion and the state must couch their

¹ This history is considered further in Assyaukanie, *Islam and the secular state*, Chapter 5.

² These views are argued particularly in Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, *Islam and the secular state: Negotiating the future of Shari'a* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University press, 2008). The Indonesian translation of this was published in 2007, before the English edition, and provoked significant controversy.

³ Susan Jacoby, *Freethinkers: A history of American secularism* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005), pp. 311–5; quotation from p. 313. Her definitions of 'secularist' are on pp. 6–7.

appeal in more acceptable terms than secularism or Liberalism (both declared by MUI, after all, to be *haram*), so they usually turn to *Pancasila* (which MUI cannot declare *haram* since it is the foundation of the Indonesian state). That concept remains contested, as it has been since 1945. It was thoroughly corrupted by Soeharto and in the immediate post-Soeharto years it seemed to disappear from public discourses altogether. Yet in political, legal and constitutional terms it remains important, for the constitution rests upon *Pancasila* as its foundation and *Pancasila's* first principle is *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*, 'belief in the one God'. So the Indonesian state — and, in decentralised Indonesia, over 500 local branches of that state — are constitutionally entangled in some unclear way in religious affairs. That lack of clarity provides room for contention. We noted that when the Constitutional Court upheld the blasphemy law in April 2010, it commented that

The state — consistent with the mandate of the Constitution — also has a responsibility to upgrade piety and noble character. The religious domain is a consequence of the acceptance of *Pancasila* ideology. In the *Pancasila* state there may be no activities that cause estrangement from religious standards and religiosity.⁴

It is thus unconstitutional to be an atheist in Indonesia and unconstitutional to deny religion a role in public life, but what that role should be remains a matter of controversy.

There was a time, in the 1940s to 1960s, when *Pancasila* was seen as the alternative to Islam, as the non-Islamic philosophical option. Given the religionising of virtually all discourse in Indonesia, reflected in the words of that Constitutional Court argument above, this is no longer so. 'Belief in the one God' is generally seen as making religion a core function of the state, as exemplified in the existence of a Ministry of Religious Affairs. To Islamists like Abu Bakar Ba'asyir or Ust. Mudzakkir of Gumuk, *Pancasila* is *haram* because it underpins the Indonesian state, which is itself unacceptable because national identities divide and thus weaken the world-wide Islamic *ummah*. Others who accept the idea of an Indonesian nation, however, can interpret *Pancasila* as facilitating a state role in Islam and vice-versa.

So for those who want a secular or religiously neutral public space, a particular interpretation of *Pancasila* has to prevail. In 2006, a symposium was held at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta on the theme 'The restoration

⁴ The Constitutional Court ruling is reported at <http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=website.BeritaInternalLengkap&id=3941>

of *Pancasila*: bringing peace to the politics of identity and modernity'. This was organised by the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences of the University of Indonesia, the *Tempo* organisation, the Brighten Institute for Public Policy and Development Studies and the Democratic Education Association (Perhimpunan Pendidikan Demokrasi). This brought together many of the nation's leading intellectuals to consider how *Pancasila* might reclaim a place in national life after its corruption by Soeharto. Some of the essays, it must be said, were rather tediously theoretical, but the general thrust was to link *Pancasila* to the values encapsulated in the national motto *Bhinneka tunggal ika*. That is an Old Javanese phrase officially (if rather inaccurately) translated as 'unity in diversity'.⁵ It was adopted in the early days of the Republic as a 'classical' Indonesian equivalent to the United States' *e pluribus unum*.

For the participants in the Jakarta seminar, it was important that *Pancasila* be understood as an expression of the unity of Indonesia within the reality of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity, and as something that rules out any idea of an Islamic state. Goenawan Mohamad, for instance, criticised the idea of an Islamic state for its naivety about the possibility of perfecting human society.⁶ Azyumardi Azra explicitly linked the terms 'multiculturalism' and *Bhinneka tunggal ika*.⁷ Dawam Rahardjo labelled *Pancasila* 'secular' and said,

Of course *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* [belief in the one God], or monotheism, is the foundation of the state. But the state is not founded on the teachings of a particular religion, still less on a particular school of a religion. In this matter the state is neutral towards the religions that are adhered to by its people.⁸

⁵ The phrase comes from the 14th-century Old Javanese work *Sutasoma* and expresses the mystical unity of Śiva and the Buddha: 'They are different, but yet they are one (*bhinneka tunggal ika*), as there is no duality in the Truth of Reality'. For a discussion of how this 'yoga of non-duality' (as Ensinnck called it) survived into Islamised Java in the 18th century, see my paper 'Unity and disunity in Javanese political and religious thought of the eighteenth century', *Modern Asian Studies* vol. 26 (1992), no. 4, pp. 663–78.

⁶ *Restorasi Pancasila: Mendamaikan politik identitas dan modernitas; Prosiding symposium peringatan Hari Lahir Pancasila, Kampus FISIP UI, Depok, 31 Mei 2006* (Bogor: FISIP UI, Kelompok Tempo Media, Perhimpunan Pendidikan Demokrasi, and Brighten Institute, 2006), pp. 46, 51.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 151, 154. 'Multiculturalism' became a preferred term in the wake of MUI's 2005 *fatwa* declaring 'pluralism' to be *haram*.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 303.

The seminar culminated in an 'Indonesianness Declaration' (*Maklumat Ke-indonesiaan*) which declared, *inter alia*,

Thus, Indonesia does not regard *Pancasila* as a religion — just as Indonesia has never based and does not wish to base itself on any single religion. The great values of religions inspire us, but just because of that, we recognise the limitations of humankind. Within those limitations, there is no one who can compel, who has the right to monopolise the truth, who should dominate discussion. ... Therefore on this day we call: let us build the spirit of Indonesia, build its body, within difference and unity!⁹

We need hardly add that this was not a call that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Mudzakkir and his FPIS followers or the cadres of HTI were interested in hearing.

Even in this essentially Liberal assembly, however, there were echoes of the problems seen on the ground. The Dean of the Faculty observed,

Implementation of the principles of *Pancasila* can give birth to contradictory attitudes. The principle of tolerance in religious life as hoped-for in the first *sila* can give birth to an intolerant attitude if the Minister of Religion permits one religion to invite the followers of another faith to its religious ceremonies.¹⁰

In other contexts, too, there were efforts to remind the people of *Pancasila* as a set of ideas that could bind Indonesians together regardless of their diversity. PDIP of *Kabupaten Kediri* held such an occasion on the same day in 2006 as the Jakarta seminar. It featured Budiman Sudjatmiko, now a PDIP member, who ten years before had led the leftist People's Democratic Party (PRD) which the Soeharto regime crushed. There were also ordinary farmers and workers there to tell of their problems (which *Pancasila* would help to solve, it was implied).¹¹ Three years later a '*Pancasila Congress*' was held at Gadjah Mada University, where there were calls to get rid of the stigmatisation of *Pancasila* as the ideology of Soeharto's New Order.¹² In 2010 the head of the State Intelligence Agency As'ad Said Ali expressed concern at another Yogyakarta seminar about *Pancasila* losing credibility with the young, for which he blamed the schools.¹³

⁹ Ibid., p. 434.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 21.

¹¹ *RK*, 27 May 2006.

¹² *Kmps*, 1 June 2009.

¹³ *JktP* online, 19 May 2010.

This was mostly whistling in the dark: Soeharto's damage to *Pancasila* and its own inherent lack of specificity cause it to remain the weakened philosophical foundation of a weakened state. Although all political parties engaged in electoral politics would say that they support *Pancasila* and *Bhinneka tunggal ika*, none would use this as an appeal to stand against the tide of Islamisation. That would run the risk of reviving the murderous *aliran* politics of the past and stand in the way of using Islamic appeals to win votes. There would be no political advantage in going down that route. So *Pancasila* has become an orphan of the revolutionary past. Liberal intellectuals remain willing to support it as a means of reclaiming a secular or religiously neutral public space, but in the real world of contemporary Indonesia it can regain little or no political or social traction.

NU and Muhammadiyah figures have no difficulty in supporting *Pancasila*. For them it merits support because *Pancasila* (a) endorses Indonesian nationalism while also (b) religionising the public space. We may recall Ky. H. Muslim Imampura (Mbah Lim), who named his *pesantren* near Klaten Pondok Pesantren al-Muttaqien *Pancasila* Sakti, a name which combines a place for believers with 'supernaturally powerful *Pancasila*'. It would be rare for an Islamic leader to depict *Pancasila* as 'secular', as Dawam Rahardjo did in the Jakarta seminar. In 2010, Ky. H. Agus Miftach, an NU *kyai* and head of an organisation called the National Unity Front (Front Persatuan Nasional),¹⁴ spoke of the need to reinforce *Pancasila* as the national ideology so as to bring the nation back to its rightful path, for the sacral ideas encapsulated in *Pancasila* would prevent evil conduct, such as corruption. He is quoted as saying,

A nation having 'belief in the one God' has already embedded a religious spirit into the implementation of state affairs, so that the doings of the state are in the realm of the sacral, and places everything that is profane below it. This, then, is the purification of the state with the national *Pancasila* ideology.¹⁵

¹⁴ Information on Agus Miftach and FPN found at the organisation's website, <http://persatuan.web.id/>.

¹⁵ Quoted in *AntaraNews.com*, 7 Apr. 2010. The idea 'that the doings of the state are in the realm of the sacral' (*olah kenegaraan berada di wilayah yang sakral*) seems treacherously close to Ayatollah Khomeini's 1988 declaration that his government represented a divinely ordained 'absolute mandate', making the affairs of state religious in character and giving its commandments the status of divine commandments. I cannot, however, think that that was what Agus Miftach actually meant. See Said Amir Arjomand, 'Shi'ite jurisprudence and constitution making in the Islamic Republic of Iran', in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds), *Fundamentalisms*

Below the level of intellectuals and people with influence in public affairs, *Pancasila* is often invoked by *kebatinan* people to justify and protect their beliefs. To them, it is attractive because it is of Indonesian origin and associated with Sukarno (still a heroic figure to many) and it justifies their *Weltanschauung*, which they think of as also being rooted in Java's indigenous heritage. Thus, to *kebatinan* adherents, *Pancasila* is not some complex philosophy that intellectuals can have seminars about. Rather, it is a protective concept — a sort of *jimat* perhaps — that is (a) undeniably acceptable to most Indonesians and (b) not Islam. We noted in Chapter 11 that the *wong kere* claim *Pancasila* as their spiritual guide. Its importance was also underlined by the head of a *Kebatinan* movement in Yogyakarta.¹⁶ *Kebatinan* figures in Surabaya say that *Pancasila* is 'final, settled', that it is 'our way of life'.¹⁷ A 2009 seminar held in the National Library in Jakarta was advertised as being about 'Sabda Palon Nayagenggong from age to age', thereby invoking the anti-Islamic figures of *Babad Kedhiri* and the other anti-Islamic books originally written in Kediri in the 1870s, described above. The meeting was less an intellectual occasion than one for assertions of Javanese cultural superiority, especially over Islam. Most attendees expressed their *pro-Jawen* sentiments and distance from or opposition to Islam, at least in its hard-line versions. Not surprisingly, several spoke of the necessity to preserve and promote *Pancasila*, one presenter (from Surakarta) even insisting that it needed 'enforcement'.¹⁸

What all of this means is that *Pancasila* has next-to-no chance to be a secularist doctrine, for (like the rest of society) it has been religionised. That is not to say that it has been made into a religion, but rather that it is widely taken as an ideology which (a) actually does not matter much any more and (b) insofar as it does matter, encompasses and welcomes all nationally recognised forms of belief.

Therefore Liberals of all persuasions, secularists, Christians, Hindus, Buddhists and *kebatinan* adherents cannot hope for a secular public space

and the state: Remaking politics, economics and militance (The Fundamentalism Project, vol. 3; Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 96–7.

¹⁶ The group is called 'Ngudi Utomo' (with obvious echoes of Budi Utomo); *KR*, 17 Dec. 2007.

¹⁷ Discussion with Drs KRAT Basuki Prawirodipuro and KRT Giarto Nagoro, Surabaya, 25 Nov. 2007.

¹⁸ The seminar was held 6–7 Oct. 2009. I was an invited speaker and gave an academic paper about the historical origins of the Sabda Palon story which was of interest to hardly anyone.



Illustration 43 Villagers at the sacred tree of Sempu, 2007
(photo by Suhadi Cholil)

but must hope for a religiously neutral one, in which all beliefs can take part on equal terms. That is, however, a challenge in a nation where the overwhelming majority of the populace — according to 2011 estimates, some 86 per cent, or over 211 million people¹⁹ — are Muslims. Many Liberal Muslims and figures from the large-scale organisations Muhammadiyah and NU also support such a conception of the public space, and it is only for that reason that it is a reasonable aspiration and a significant counter to Islamists' wish to make Islam the determinant of public affairs.

At grass-roots level, we have seen multiple episodes of inter-faith conflict in this book, but there are also many examples throughout Javanese society of the wish for village-level harmony providing support for positive inter-faith relations. Take the village of Sempu in Bantul, south of Yogyakarta. Here the myths about Sabda Palon are still known. There one can see rather grand Chinese graves nicely kept, a Buddhist temple, a mosque, a Catholic church and a tree that villagers regard as sacred. In the midst of

¹⁹ According to the online CIA World Factbook: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html>.

this plurality of faiths, the spirit of village tolerance and harmony remains strong.²⁰ We noted above that, near Kediri, the village Tanon has a population of some 3,000, most of them peasant farmers. They are about 30 per cent Hindu, 10 per cent Christian (mostly Catholic), and the remaining 60 per cent Muslim, with one Buddhist, each faith with its own place of worship. This diversity, according to the village head, developed in the years after 1965–6. There is harmony, not least because there have been multiple inter-religious marriages and many families thus have more than one religion within themselves.²¹

To maintain a harmonious public space in the midst of this Islamising but still pluralistic society — with its inherent risks of fanatical conduct and inter-religious conflict emerging, as they have from time to time — several communities took initiatives to create inter-religious forums. The Yogyakarta version was one of the first. In January 1997, at a time when Indonesia was experiencing tragic episodes of inter-communal conflict, a meeting of inter-religious activists was held at the LKiS offices in Yogyakarta and continued under the umbrella of an organisation known as DIAN/Interfidei (standing for Institut Dialog Antar Iman, Inter-faith Dialogue Institute), then led by the Protestant theologian Dr Th. Sumartana (1944–2003, b. Banjarnegara).²² Another active participant was the prominent Catholic priest, writer, architect and general cultural figure Y.B. Mangunwijaya (1929–99, b. Ambarawa). The Muslim side was represented particularly by Ky. H. Abdul Muhaimin (b. Kota Gede 1953). These discussions led to the formal declaration in February 1997 of the FPUB (Forum Persaudaraan Umat Beriman, Fraternity Forum for Communities of Faith). In the context of the dying stages of the New Order, FPUB attracted suspicion from the Soeharto government. Then extremist Muslim voices denounced it as a clandestine Christianisation project and Abdul Muhaimin was called a *kafir*, an apostate, or a secret agent of Zionism. FPUB ignored all of this. It has equally ignored MUI's 2005 *fatwas* by continuing with joint prayer activities and supporting pluralism, which it simply renamed multiculturalism. It has continued to do its work of maintaining inter-religious discussions and defusing conflicts in Yogyakarta. It has the support of Sultan Hamengkubuwana X and the active involvement

²⁰ Email from Suhadi Cholil, 18 Aug. 2007.

²¹ RK, 13 Dec. 2004

²² DIAN/Interfidei was founded in Yogyakarta in 1992. More information found at its website, <http://www.interfidei.or.id/>. On Th. Sumartana, see http://www.tokoh-indonesia.com/ensiklopedi/s/sumartana-th/sumartana_th2.shtml.

of supporters of inter-communal harmony.²³ Other aspects of Yogyakarta are conducive to inter-religious tolerance. There are no religiously defined housing enclaves and all faiths mix with each other on a daily basis; even graveyards are mixed.²⁴ The press is restrained and does not blow up episodes of conflict.²⁵

In Kediri city a similar organisation was established in 1998, at the time of conflict in other places. Ky. H. Anwar Iskandar (Gus War), who was then leading Ansor in Kediri and was thus involved in guarding churches, played a leading role in setting up this Paguyuban Kerukunan Antar Umat Beragama (PKAUB, Association for Harmony among Religious Communities). Thousands of local people of all faiths met at the local Universitas Islam Kediri campus for joint prayers. From this was born PKAUB, which aspired to encompass all religious groups in the town. Even the exclusivist LDII took part. At some point this *paguyuban* expanded its membership from officially recognised world religions to encompass also *kebatinan* groups, so that it is now known as Paguyuban Kerukunan Antar Umat Beragama dan Penghayat Kepercayaan (PKAUB-PK, Association for Harmony among Religious Communities and Instillers of Beliefs). Gudang Garam recognises its own self-interest in having a peaceful town and has consistently funded PKAUB-PK activities. At meetings, matters of belief are not touched upon — those are private matters for each person or community — but rather common social issues are addressed.²⁶

Managing inter-religious relations in Kediri city is undoubtedly made easier by the fact that non-Muslim minorities are small. The Christian population has remained at around 9 per cent at least since the 1990s. Hindus and Buddhists together amount to less than 1 per cent, *kebatinan* does not register in the statistics at all (although there are certainly some followers there) and 90 per cent of the population is recorded as Muslim.²⁷

²³ Imam Subkhan, *Hiruk pikuk wacana pluralisme di Yogya*, pp. 78–102; discussion with Imam Subkhan, Yogyakarta, 13 Sept. 2008.

²⁴ Comments made by Prof. H.M. Amin Abdullah in our conversation in Yogyakarta, 13 June 2007.

²⁵ An observation by Imam Subkhan, Yogyakarta, 13 Sept. 2008.

²⁶ Discussions with Ky. H. Anwar Iskandar (Gus War), Kediri, 28 Aug. 2003, 26 Oct. 2008; *RK*, 21 Sept. 2003, 7 July 2006; *MmK*, 19 Jan. 2005, 8 Apr. 2006.

²⁷ Based on the series *Kota Kediri dalam angka*. According to the volume for 2005/6, the percentages then were Muslim 90.2, Christian 9.0, Hindu 0.3 and Buddhist 0.4. Almost the same figures can be found in the volume for 1998.

This is quite unlike Surakarta or Yogyakarta, where Christians are a much more significant proportion of the population.

The fate of similar organisations elsewhere has been patchy, to say the least. Surakarta saw some of the worst rioting anywhere in Indonesia in 1998 and again in 1999 and an attempt was made there to establish a forum for inter-communal harmony. As soon as the rioting died down, however, the local business people whose support and funding was crucial lost interest and the initiative died. One of the problems there is that many owners of local businesses actually live in Jakarta and have been slow to acknowledge that they have social responsibilities in Surakarta.²⁸ The new mayor (2005–15) Jokowi established a programme of inter-religious meetings, with a group of about 40 meeting at his residence once a month. He noted that, at least in the early stages, the Islamic leaders were forthright in their views but the minority religious representatives still tended to hold back.²⁹ There are other small-scale initiatives by various groups, but as we have seen amply displayed above, Surakarta remains a place where religious differences are a major source of tension and conflict.

In 2006, in the face of multiple conflicts over the building of places of worship, the Ministers of Religious Affairs and the Interior ordered that organisations should be established in all jurisdictions to resolve these matters locally. These were to be called Forums for Harmony among Religious Communities (FKUB, Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama). Some have evidently worked reasonably well, but there is no suggestion that they constitute a significant guarantee of inter-religious harmony.³⁰

In these various efforts to diminish or eliminate conflict, whether through some form of *Pancasila* revival or through inter-religious dialogue, the leaders and activists discussed in this chapter are promoting a Liberal position. The same is true of the villagers of Sempu, whether at Friday

²⁸ According to information from Drs Soedarmono on several occasions. A major study of the background to social conflict in Surakarta is Mulyadi and Soedarmono, *Runtuhnya kekuasaan 'Kraton Alit'*.

²⁹ Discussion with Ir Joko Widodo (Jokowi), Surakarta, 3 Nov. 2006.

³⁰ In Surabaya, the local FKUB seems to function acceptably. It is headed by Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said and has 17 members: 6 from NU, 3 from Muhammadiyah, 2 from MUI (one each from Muhammadiyah and NU), 1 Catholic, 2 Protestants, 1 Confucian, 1 Hindu and 1 Buddhist. LDII, *Shi'a* or *kebatinan* are not represented. Inter-religious conflict has been limited and no churches have been burned. Discussion with Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said, *pesantren* An-Nur, Wonocolo, Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008.

prayer at the mosque, saying Mass in the church, or paying homage to their sacred tree. That is to say, they are defending the rights of individuals and their communities to enjoy freedom in their religious and broader life, so long as no harm is done to the rights of others. They are opposed to the use of violence in any context and seek ways to prevent it. They prioritise associated values such as freedom of thought, interfaith harmony and social and religious pluralism (or ‘multiculturalism’). They regard these as sources of social enrichment rather than as threats or, at the very least, they recognise them as realities in Javanese society that must be managed. Among the Islamisers whom we have concentrated on in this book, however, are many who hold quite different views. In the concluding Part below we will consider further the significance of this difference of view, of this contest about how to seek a better future.

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CHAPTER 14

The Islamisation of the Javanese in three contexts

This book and its two predecessors (*Mystic synthesis in Java* and *Polarising Javanese society*) have chronicled a story of profound political, social, cultural and religious change in Javanese society. Chapter 1 above briefly retold the story to 1930, and in subsequent chapters of this volume we have followed it to the present. As I pointed out with regard to the period down to c. 1930,¹ so also for the period covered in this book, none of this was a predetermined outcome. Instead, we have observed the results of multiple historically contingent circumstances.

The process of deeper Islamisation is significant for the Javanese — all 100 million or so of them — and also for Indonesia as a whole, with its population nearing 250 million, the Javanese being the largest ethnic group in the nation.² A stereotype of the Javanese as being ‘really’ *abangan* has been shown to reflect circumstances that developed over barely more than a century (c. 1850s–1960s) within the nearly seven-century-long story of Javanese Islamisation. We noted in Chapter 4 above Geertz’s observation in the 1950s that it was, in his view, ‘very hard, given his tradition and his social structure, for a Javanese to be a “real Moslem”’.³ In the following decades, Javanese society changed so profoundly that such an observation became inconceivable.

¹ In *Mystic synthesis*, p. 221.

² Population data based on 2011 estimates in the CIA World Factbook, at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html>.

³ Geertz, *Religion of Java*, p. 160.

This Javanese history is also significant within a world context, as part of the universal experience of human societies over recent centuries. This concluding chapter will consider the significance of the Javanese tale in three particular contexts. The first is the general history of religions, where some common themes and differences may be seen. The second is the position of Islam in the contemporary world, where again the Javanese case can shed light on broader issues. Finally we will turn to the interaction between politics and religion, which has been central to this book. We will consider this in the context of how humans, as political animals, seek a better life, and argue that this represents essentially choosing between freedom and justice as antidotes to tyranny — each of which options carries its own risks and promises.

In the history of religion

We will leave aside the question of why most human beings in most parts of the world believe in religions at all. Here we simply accept that most do believe and look at the social, political, cultural and religious assumptions, arrangements and institutions that are involved in their beliefs. The Javanese story above has emphasised particularly the interaction between the religious and political spheres. This has not been a continuous, logically unfolding narrative. Rather, there have been twists and turns and surprises in Javanese history (as no doubt there will be in the future). The general direction of change, however, is fairly clear. The Javanese progressed from a stage of contested faiths and identities in the 14th century to a widespread acceptance of what I have dubbed the Mystic Synthesis by the late 18th and early 19th centuries. There followed roughly a century of increasingly volatile polarisation, culminating in the terrible violence of the 1960s. Thereafter, political circumstances facilitated a resumption of the Islamisation process interrupted for the previous century. The overall direction has been unmistakably towards a society that is more recognisably Islamic — marked by greater orthopraxy and orthodoxy.

Part of this Javanese story mirrors a more universal change in what religion means in personal and social life. That is, the transition from religion as principally a marker of identity, an assertion and enactment of cultural and social belonging, to religion as a matter more to do with personal faith and internalised piety. This has happened in different times in different places. Keith Thomas observes that in medieval England, religion provided 'appropriate rites of passage Religion was a ritual method of living, not a set of dogmas.'⁴ In Java, there was plenty of dogma and mystical

⁴ Thomas, *Religion and the decline of magic*, p. 88.

speculation for the minority who were literate, but Thomas's description would probably apply to most Javanese down to, say, c. 1850. This began to change in the mid-19th century with the appearance of the first purification movements and accelerated in the early 20th century with the arrival of Islamic Modernism. These developments brought increased attention to what people believed in their heart of hearts and were thus a cause both of deeper Islamisation and of the polarisation that marked that period, for a good many Javanese decided that they did not in fact believe the sort of ideas then being presented by the purifiers as the true Islam. If believing truly in the God of Islam necessarily meant not believing in the Goddess of the Southern Ocean or the village spirit — whose task it was to regulate the seasons and deliver the harvests — then the many who were called *abangan* just could not (or dared not) share that belief.

The position in Islam and in fact in most faiths (in Java as elsewhere) is actually something of a mix of 'a set of dogmas' and 'a ritual method of living'. Many would agree that the strength of one's internalised piety and true faith — while ultimately knowable only to God — is reflected in how (and how often) one recites the *Shahada*, performs the five daily prayers, pays the *zakat* alms and fasts in Ramadan, and whether one goes on the *hajj* if able to do so — the five pillars of Islamic orthopraxy. But there is more to it than this. Whether you state your intention to pray silently or aloud, whether you engage in *tahlilan* and other such Traditionalist practices or not, whether you do *dhikr* or other Sufi practices, whether you wear trousers that show the ankle bone or not or wear a *jilbab* in a certain way, whether you have a bruise on your forehead to indicate the intensity with which you pray, whether you call your teacher a *kyai* or *ustadz* — all these things and more may mark not only your degree of piety, but just what style within the global Islamic *ummah* you adhere to.

Comparing the Javanese experience in the 20th and early 21st centuries with 16th- and 17th-century England reveals a significant difference in the midst of broad similarity. Both cases concern a process by which all sorts of local ideas about supernatural powers gave way before the more organised and institutionally solid force of a world religion. A similar development may be traced in the Catholicisation of the Philippines⁵ and in other cases in world history, including the long history of the progressive Christianisation

⁵ See John Phelan, *The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish aims and Filipino responses, 1565–1700* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959); Horacio de la Costa, *The Jesuits in the Philippines, 1581–1768* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961).

of Europe. In Catholicism, however, there was a Pope who at least in theory commanded a world-wide hierarchy of divines. In England, there was similarly a monarch who was head of the Church and styled 'Defender of the Faith' (a title granted by the Pope to Henry VIII, who not long thereafter abandoned the Catholic Church that he no longer defended, but kept the title). Javanese kings, in their time, had similar pretensions to religious authority and employed titles such as *Panatagama* (regulator of religion) and *Kalipatulah* (God's caliph). Such pretensions were often tested by dissent and rebellion and frequently had little reality behind them. Whatever the case, from the time that the power of Javanese monarchs was eclipsed by Dutch imperialism in the 19th century, there was no Javanese political power that could in fact wield religious authority, even though the Javanese monarchs (like Henry VIII) retained their pretentious religious titles.

From about 1830 to 1966, no political authority exercised control of Javanese Islam. During colonial rule, the Dutch were aware that meddling with Islam could lead to trouble for their *kafir* regime and thus sought to avoid direct involvement in religious affairs as much as possible. The Japanese encouraged religious leaders to support their war effort, but in the midst of the chaos of World War II their three-and-one-half-year occupation could not entail much political control of a religious agenda. The Revolutionary period extended the chaos, with no political authority in very effective control of much of anything. The first democratic experiment from 1950 to 1966 was a time of further chaotic politics — albeit with real progress on many fronts for the nascent Indonesian state — in which religion was intimately involved, but certainly not controlled by any political power.

It was only with Soeharto's New Order after 1966 that there was again a government that made credible attempts to control religious life. This was the first serious totalitarian experiment — an attempt to control both the actions and the thoughts of the people — for a very long time, perhaps really the first ever in the history of the Javanese. *Pancasila* was drummed into the population, but in such a way that it was part of a larger Islamisation agenda within the regime's social control policies. The regime's aim was effectively to have more social control via more Islam (of a kind congenial to the government) and no Communism, and to call it all *Pancasila*, which the regime — which, indeed, Soeharto himself — would personify. Inefficiency, incompetence and corruption limited the government's capacity to implement its totalitarian aspirations. We have seen how contested its religious role was from both Modernist and Traditionalist sides, but also how Soeharto achieved much of his agenda and in the later years won many Islamic leaders to his side. Considerable integration of state structures and

religious organisations was one of the fruits of the Soeharto era. At the end, Islamists in particular found the regime quite congenial. This was for the obvious reason that a government directing Islam set a promising precedent for Islam directing a government. Both Islamists and the regime's leading elements felt threatened by globalisation, liberalisation and democratisation and by supposed global plots of capitalists, Christians, Americans and Jews, so their interests could be reconciled.

In the post-Soeharto era, Indonesia again embraced democracy. As noted throughout Part II of this book, in this era many religious organisations and movements remained linked to state institutions and had a remarkable degree of influence over state actors. We leave aside the question whether this was because the latter were pious or just timorous in the face of an obvious social trend — probably it was a mix of such motives — or in the case of lower-level functionaries whether this was also a matter of doing what superiors seemed to want done. Whatever the case, it remains remarkable that some *fatwas* of MUI should be treated by the President of the nation and the police as if they had the force of legislation or that police should sometimes act as allies of FPI.

In broad terms, the Javanese story reflects global patterns. In the 19th and 20th centuries, Javanese life was influenced by the Dutch colonial presence. This did not, however, prevent waves of religious reform originating in the Islamic Middle East bringing change to Javanese Islam, a process which continued into the 20th century and down to today. These waves of reform paralleled the so-called 'Great Awakenings' in the history of American Protestantism in about the same periods from the mid-18th to mid-20th centuries. Christian sensibilities were also strengthening in 19th-century Europe, which represented part of the background to the Christianising mission work that began to produce Javanese converts from the middle years of that century, thus breaking the nearly universal identification of being Javanese with being Muslim.⁶

In the years since the mid-20th century, Islam in Indonesia has paralleled a rising tide of religiosity seen in most faiths around the world, which confounded many observers. This was especially true of those who thought that they could predict how the 'third world' would evolve, who were confident that modernisation and secularisation were automatic bedfellows. These ideas were projected onto the 'developing world' as a matter of

⁶ At this time there still remained some pockets of pre-Islamic religious belief among Javanese in more remote locations.

certainty. One of the most-used textbooks of the time — authored by the major figures of ‘third world’ political science — asserted that ‘wherever the modernization process has had an impact, it has contributed to secularization, both social and political’.⁷ For the Americans among such analysts, even as they held firm to their ideas about the ‘third world’, their own society was proving them wrong by becoming itself more religious in many ways.⁸

In the Indonesian case, there were specific political circumstances that facilitated this deepening Islamisation, yet its coincidence with a global revival of Islam helped the process along. The devout who believe that God directs things on earth may think it more than a coincidence that the Soeharto government’s initiatives in this area coincided with the phenomenal rise of oil prices and consequent explosion of Arab petro-dollars throughout the Islamic world. As Mohammad Roem said in 1977, ‘We have no idea how rich they are’.⁹ The Ayatollah’s Iranian revolution of 1979 was important, too, for it had a widespread psychological impact in the Islamic world. This growing religiosity was not, however, just something of the Islamic world, a matter of Arab money, Iranian inspiration or Indonesian regime *dirigisme*. In the United States — so like Indonesia in these ways, and both of them so unlike later 20th-century Europe — fundamentalist Protestant movements developed from the 1960s, spawning their own schools and right-wing social and political activism and eventually becoming powerful within the Republican Party. Presidents (not only Republicans) from the ‘born-again’ Democrat Jimmy Carter (1977–81) onwards, and other politicians, have had to make much of their Christian piety. The reasons for this remain unclear in the American case. Jacoby wonders how it can be that ‘intolerant fundamentalism’ has led to circumstances in which ‘so many Americans today are attracted to forms of religion that educated men and women were beginning to reject a century ago’.¹⁰ Yet it is so, and because it is so in places as far apart historically, culturally, socially and religiously, as well as geographically, as the United States and Indonesia, we must accept that we are dealing with a global phenomenon for which we have yet no satisfactory explanation.

⁷ Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds) *et al.*, *The politics of the developing areas* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 537. In addition to Almond and Coleman, the authors were Lucian W. Pye, Myron Wiener, Dankwart A. Rustow and George I. Blanksten.

⁸ Cf. Micklethwait and Wooldridge, *God is back*, p. 17.

⁹ Discussion with Dr Mohammad Roem, Jakarta, 3 Aug. 1977.

¹⁰ Jacoby, *Age of American unreason*, p. 204.

Nor is this just a matter of the United States and Indonesia, or of Protestant Christianity and Islam. In other faiths, too, similar phenomena are apparent. Half a century ago, it would have been hard for scholars of Indian Hinduism to imagine the politicisation and extremism associated with its version of fundamentalism today. The growth of this general phenomenon across several religious traditions inspired the five-volume *Fundamentalism project* led by Marty and Appelby, several of the contributions to which are cited in this book. The parallels among these movements are striking. Generally speaking, they conform to Grayling's description of them as 'opposed to democracy, liberal pluralism, multiculturalism, religious toleration, secularism, free speech and equal rights for women. They ... assert the literal and unrevisable truth of their ancient holy writings.' All, he believes, 'are determined to take control of the states in which they exist, and to impose their view of the world upon them'.¹¹

Within this global phenomenon, there are of course Javanese (and Indonesian) as well as Islamic specificities. The former have been the main topic of this entire book. It is time now to look a little more closely than we have so far at the latter.

In the contemporary Islamic world

Olivier Roy's book *The failure of political Islam* — first published in French in 1992 and in English translation in 1994 — still stands up well as an account to that time of Islamist political movements in the areas he covered. His fieldwork was in Afghanistan and then-Soviet Central Asia, but his book also discusses the Middle East, North Africa, Iran and South (but not Southeast) Asia. It constitutes a long interpretive and imaginative essay which has been highly influential. For Roy, the failure of political Islam was less its failure to gain and hold political power (although it is partly and importantly that) than its failure to change societies. 'Islamism is a failure historically', he says. This failure does not mean that Islamist parties cannot achieve power, but rather 'that those parties will not invent a new society'. For the rich, the model is 'Saudi Arabia (revenue plus *sharia*)' while for the poor it is countries like Pakistan and Sudan ('unemployment plus *sharia*').¹² He writes that Islamism

marks the streets and customs but has no power relationship in the Middle East. It does not influence either state borders or interests. It

¹¹ A.C. Grayling, *What is good? The search for the best way to live* (London: Phoenix, 2004), pp. 92–3.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. x.

has not created a 'third force' in the world. It has not even been able to offer the Muslim masses a concrete political expression for their anticolonialism. Can it offer an economic alternative or deeply transform a society? The answer seems to be no.¹³

Roy's subsequent book *Globalized Islam* (2004) could take advantage of events since the 1990s, including the al-Qaeda attacks in the United States in September 2001, terrorist atrocities elsewhere and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Here he develops further the concept (used but not clearly defined in his earlier book) of 'neo-fundamentalism'. This is the *Weltanschauung* of those who 'reject the idea that there can be different schools of thought and consider themselves the only true Muslims'. This 'neo-fundamentalism' is new, says Roy, because it is global in its imagination and rejects the idea of Islam being embedded in particular cultural environments — 'the end of Dar-ul-Islam [*dar al-Islam*] as a geographical entity'. It deals instead 'with a religion that is no longer embedded in a given society and thus is open to reformation'. A characteristic of such 'radical neo-fundamentalists' is their 'bypassing racial and ethnic divides'.¹⁴ These are, in essence, the people whose epistemology is Revivalist in the terms used in this book. Roy records how such movements are hostile to local cultures and to Islamic Traditionalist scholarship, subject to '*de facto* political marginalisation' and anti-intellectual.¹⁵ We have seen parallels in our account of such people among Revivalists, Dakwahists and Islamists operating in Javanese society.

Another powerful paradigm is conveyed by Gilles Kepel's *Jihad: The trail of political Islam* (French original 2000, English translation 2002), which also deals with the Middle East and South Asia. This argues that terrorism was the outgrowth of political failure and its attendant frustrations, but that embracing terrorism only hastened the decline of 'political Islam', essentially by alienating the pious middle classes who are crucial to the success of any political movement. Kepel argues that 'the waning of the [Islamist] movement's capacity for political mobilisation explains why such spectacular and devastating new forms of terrorism have now been visited on the American homeland. ... September 11 was an attempt to reverse a process in decline, with a paroxysm of destructive violence.'¹⁶ The Afghan

¹³ Ibid., p. 131.

¹⁴ Roy, *Globalized Islam*, pp. 232–4, 311.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 4, 35, 155, 259.

¹⁶ Kepel, *Jihad*, pp. 4–5.

jihad was a central episode, producing veterans who scattered globally as ‘the free electrons of *jihad*’,¹⁷ several of whom we have encountered amongst the Javanese in this book.

Our study of the history of Islamisation among the Javanese has some obvious parallels with these studies (and, of course, with others) but there are important departures that have implications for our understanding of the global influence of Islam in today’s world. Contrary to the views of these scholars, it is hard for us to speak of a failure of Islam (political or otherwise) amongst the Javanese except in two rather narrow respects. The first is the failure of explicitly Islamist political parties to gain power. Masyumi was a major political player during the first democratic experiment of the 1950s but circumstances precluded any real Islamising agenda, as we saw in Chapter 4. Masyumi was banned by Sukarno and remained banned under Soeharto. Thereafter, Islamists failed to gain power either by cuddling up to the disintegrating Soeharto regime or through the ballot box in the post-Soeharto era. The second failure is that of violent organisations such as *Darul Islam* or JI to take power (a highly unlikely outcome anyway) or to destabilise the country or society. But it does not seem to me possible to speak of the failure of Islam when multiple Islamising agendas, resting on varying epistemologies and socio-political agendas, have dramatically increased the influence of Islamically derived ideas and standards on Javanese society, culture and religion. And on its politics.

The relationship between the political realm on the one hand and the religious, social and cultural realms on the other has been central throughout this book and I hope that readers have agreed with me about its centrality. In this relationship lie general issues about how power works that are not specific to Java, Indonesia or Islam. An excursus on this matter may be appropriate, for there is a commonly held myth which seems to me unhelpful. That is, the idea that a separation of the religious and the political is a specifically modern and Western idea, one that is contrary to the traditions of Islam, or of the non-Western world more generally. That idea suits Islamists just as well as it suits Western commentators who wish to depict Islam (or the non-West generally) as fundamentally, culturally and in other ways, so unlike the West that a ‘clash of civilisations’ (to borrow Huntington’s dubious term) is likely, even inevitable. But it is not so. It is true that ‘church’ and ‘state’ came to be regarded as separate sources of authority

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 219.

in Europe.¹⁸ But in fact the idea of two distinguishable forms of elites and their authority can also be found in non-Western traditions.¹⁹

Political and religious authority and elites are conceptually and socio-logically differentiated in non-Western as in Western political philosophies and practices.²⁰ To avoid confusion, we need to be clear whom we are talking about. By 'political elite' or 'state-controlling elite', I mean those who control the state, its apparatus, institutions and symbols, or those who are in competition with other similar figures to do so. Examples are the kings and emperors of previous days and their colleagues, and the politicians of our day — including politicians in parties that declare themselves to be religious, whether PPP and PKS in Indonesia or the Christian Democrats in Europe. By 'religious elite', I mean leaders who are defined, legitimated and/or inspired by their religious standing. Examples are priests in religions that have priests, ordained theologians in others, or — particularly in Islam — the learned scholars of the faith, the respected interpreters of scriptures who are recognised as such by their community. There are no formal processes by which one achieves such recognition in Islam, no doctorates in theology or priestly investitures. We noted earlier Ali Maschan Moesa's account of the four criteria to be recognised as a *kyai*: ability to read the classic works of Traditionalist Islam known as the *kitab kuning*, popularity as a *pengajian* leader, ability to lead ritual prayer, and capacity to *nyuwuk* (a magical blowing of the breath to cure the sick).²¹ One he did not mention is descent from or authorisation by someone who is already regarded as a *kyai*. For non-Traditionalist leaders, to be recognised as an *ustadz* can be even less formally describable and more open to disputation.

¹⁸ Bertrand Badie analysed how this distinction evolved in European history; see his *Les deux États: Pouvoir et société en Occident et en terre d'Islam* ([Paris:] Fayard, 1997).

¹⁹ While Badie argues (*ibid.*, p. 192) that in the Islamic Middle East a different concept of sovereignty evolved, he also recognises the existence there in modern times of two kinds of authority represented by the *ulama* and the modern state — what he calls 'deux rationalités contradictoires'. Salim considers the question 'Is there unity of Islam and the state?' in *Challenging the secular state*, pp. 16–23, and answers that the idea of such unity 'actually existed only in the period of the Prophet Muhammad at Medina, for about ten years'. See also An-Na'im, *Islam and the secular state*, p. 51, on 'the fundamental difference' between 'political and religious leadership'.

²⁰ The arguments that follow are set out at greater length in my paper 'Religious elites and the state'.

²¹ *RK*, 27 Feb. 2004.

Islamic, Hindu and Buddhist classical traditions (all of them of relevance in the history of Southeast Asia) all distinguished between religious and political elites. The religious elites who were frequently the authors of the treatises may have flattered themselves that they were the superior of the two groups and devised ritual matters so as to make themselves indispensable, but there was no serious doubt about who was actually in charge. In Islamic thought we find a difference between the *'alim* (pl. *'ulama'*: the scholars, the doctors of religious sciences) and the *za'im* (pl. *zu'ama'*: the chiefs, leaders, military commanders and politicians) or the *amir* (pl. *umara'*: the commanders, governors and princes). Hinduism also observed such a differentiation. Ignoring multiple complexities, we may observe that (at least in theory) the caste system distinguished the Brahmins — the religious elite, priests — from the Kṣatriyas — the warrior elite, i.e., the politicians. In principle, kingship in ancient India was consecrated by the priesthood. But the religious elite was distinct from the ruling elite; the Brahmins were distinct from the Kṣatriyas, rather as the *'ulama'* were different from the *zu'ama'* or *umara'* in Islam. It was clear that, even though the Kṣatriyas should have ritual validation by Brahmins to be regarded as legitimate and supernaturally endorsed monarchs, it was the Kṣatriyas who in the end were in control.

The distinction between elites and their authority was even clearer in Buddhism. Here the central religious institution was (and remains) the monastic order (*sangha*) which, in principle, should be entirely non-political.²² In principle, Buddhism was meant to be so devoid of a political role that it was difficult to offer legitimating rituals to kings. Hence, state rituals tended to remain largely Brahminical in South and Southeast Asia, Confucian in China and Korea and Shinto in Japan, regardless of how Buddhist the state and society were in other respects. Buddhist monarchs sought to demonstrate their piety and to gather merit, but it was clear that it was the state-controlling elite that set the tone of the relationship between *sangha* and power-holders.

This distinction between different kinds of elites and different kinds of authority has been clear to many Muslim leaders in Indonesia. We noted earlier in this book Wahid Hasyim's 1951 distinction between the 'clever', Western-educated Modernists on one hand and the religious experts 'who

²² See the analysis in Heinz Bechert, *Buddhismus, Staat und Gesellschaft in den Ländern des Theravāda-Buddhismus*, vol. I: *Grundlagen; Ceylon* (Frankfurt am Main and Berlin: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1966), esp. p. 22.

really master Islamic religious knowledge' on the other.²³ He was drawing a distinction between the *zuama* who led the Masyumi party and the *ulama* (*kyais*) of NU. Nowadays this distinction is reflected in the tensions and animosities sometimes seen between NU's *kyais* and the politicians of PKS or other parties that declare themselves to be Islamic in inspiration. It has also been evident within NU between the *kyais* in the countryside and the Jakarta-based politicians leading NU when it was a political party or within PKB more recently. Within NU, which is no longer a political party in its own right, similar tensions can still arise between the advisory board (*Syuriyah*) and the executive board (*Tanfidziyah*).

Historically there are multiple examples of religious elites — and not just Islamic ones — attempting but failing to take power in a state. The most prominent example of a successful takeover is Ayatollah Khomeini's 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. We need to remember, however, that a decisive event was the decision by the army — a key state institution — to go over to Khomeini's side, thus making the Ayatollah's victory possible. Moreover, it has been argued that what then transpired in fact constituted a state takeover of the revolution. Khomeini's personal dictatorship displaced anything more conventionally Islamic and the authority of the jurists was set aside. In 1988 it was even declared that Khomeini's commandments were comparable to God's commandments and that obeying the government was thus a religious obligation. Thus, argues Said Amir Arjomand, the consequence was 'the strengthening of the actual authority of the bureaucratic state rather than the hypothetical authority of the jurist'.²⁴ This view can be disputed, however, for the state and Islam (as Khomeini interpreted it) — that is to say, the political elite and the religious elite — subsequently became so entwined in Iran's power structures that the distinction itself became difficult to defend.²⁵

Accepting the analytical complexity posed by the Iranian case, it remains generally true that it is the power-holders, the political elite, who set the tone of the relationship with religious elites and who decide how far the influence of those religious elites extends in political affairs. This is not some departure from Islamic (or other) traditions but a continuation of them as well as a recognition that this is how power actually works. As Peter Beyer

²³ Quoted in Choiratun Chisaan, *Lesbumi*, p. 99.

²⁴ See Arjomand, 'Shi'ite jurisprudence and constitution making in the Islamic Republic of Iran'; quote from p. 105.

²⁵ See also Arskal Salim's distinction between Saudi Arabia, where the *umara*' (the ruling dynasty) has 'effective authority', and Iran, where the Ayatollah gained the 'right to rule on behalf of God'; Salim, *Challenging the secular state*, pp. 27–30.

notes, 'religious authorities do not have at their disposal effective religious mechanisms to enforce their orthodoxies / orthopraxies. Instead, they tend to rely on the capacities of other systems, notably but not exclusively the political, legal or educational where such resort proves possible; and on the family socialisation of the young.'²⁶

We have seen how power-holders set the tone for this relationship in Indonesia. In Chapters 5–6 of this book we observed Soeharto seeking to create a totalitarian state in part by facilitating deeper religious influence in society. The Javanese were a particular target of this enterprise, being seen as the *abangan* foundations of PKI power. So wiping out PKI influence meant more thoroughly Islamising the *abangan*, a task in which success was achieved to a considerable degree. By the end of the Soeharto regime, the state's earlier competition with older religious organisations was largely replaced by cooperation. There was even something of a honeymoon created between an increasingly 'green' New Order elite and Revivalist and Islamist groups — two forms of aspirant totalitarianism recognising their shared interests in opposing (as we noted above) the common threats of globalisation, liberalisation and democratisation along with those widely believed plots of capitalists, Christians, Americans and Jews.

This honeymoon continued under Habibie's brief presidency (1998–9). Since 1990 Habibie had been the most prominent figure in ICMI and was thus one of the architects of the alliance of the pious middle class, prominent military figures and the regime. By the time he became President, it already seemed natural for the state and religious interests to coincide. The alliance could make little headway, however, in those tumultuous first months of post-Soeharto Indonesia. As President, Habibie did more to liberalise and democratise Indonesia than had been expected. Yet his term ended in the midst of financial scandal and denunciations for various of his policies, notably the excision of East Timor via a UN referendum and the subsequent scorched-earth revenge there by the military.

Abdurrahman Wahid brought to the Presidency (1999–2001) a Liberal commitment to secular politics, openness, pluralism and nationalism, which severed the connection between Islamists and the Presidency, but this was only a brief interlude in the story of that alliance. That is, however, an important interlude for our analysis, for it is consistent with the argument that it is the state-controlling elite who set the tone of the relationship.

²⁶ Peter Beyer, *Religions in global society* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 95.

Abdurrahman was President less because he was a senior *kyai* than because he was a successful politician. But he was also very ill, inexperienced, incautious and over-confident of his own knowledge and abilities. He was toppled by the parliament from power and replaced by his Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001–4). She achieved little in any direction, but presided over a time when (as we noted in Chapter 7) there were dramatic developments that led to some quite extreme religious movements rising to public prominence. Her Vice-President Hamzah Haz of the Islamist PPP took opportunities to show his respect for figures such as Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Ja'far Umar Thalib, thus suggesting that a restoration of the regime-Islamist alliance was possible.

During Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's two terms as President (2004–14), the national state effectively opened its doors to conservative and even violent forms of Islam. While the government acted strongly and effectively against terrorist groups such as JI, it said to MUI — as the President himself put it in 2005 — 'We open our hearts and minds to receiving the thoughts, recommendations and *fatwas* from the MUI and *ulamas* at any time ... so that it becomes clear what [are] the areas where the government or state should heed the *fatwas* from the MUI and *ulamas*'. This was so that the state could carry out 'the task entrusted by the *ulamas* to the government ... to wipe out evil [and] to fight all forms of evil and immorality'.²⁷ Thus some MUI *fatwas* have been treated as if they have the force of legislation.

Whether in Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's case this arises out of political calculation or personal piety is uncertain, but it is possible that the latter explains his conduct as President. His biography published in March 2004, just days before the parliamentary elections and undoubtedly with the upcoming presidential election in mind, emphasises his commitment to Islam. There are three poems by him at the front, one entitled 'Light of Islam', which opens, 'I bring news to you, O all humankind / of Islam, the spreader of mercy to all the world'. The book emphasises that he leads a devout Islamic life and is inspired by the Qur'anic injunction to command the right and forbid the wrong (*amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar*). 'To SBY, all is very clear within the boundaries of religious doctrine concerning *amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar*', wrote the authors. 'All that is good (*makruf*) must be upheld, and that which is *mungkar* (which destroys) must be crushed.' After going on the *hajj* in 2000, says the book, the future President invited a *kyai* to his own home to give *pengajian*. 'SBY's intensity in delving into Islam made

²⁷ <http://www.presidentri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2005/07/26/370.html>.




Illustration 44 A volume produced for the 2004 election campaign emphasising the Islamic piety of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, entitled *The Islamic-Nationalist face of SBY*

his discourse concerning Islam ever broader, until he himself gave speeches to *santris* [here in the sense of religious students] and *ulama*'. He was so proficient in quoting the *Qur'an*, claims the work, that it was as if he were a *pesantren* graduate himself'²⁸ (which he is not). Whatever the truth of this matter — for we would be naïve to take politicians' campaign biographies at face value — we may safely assume that the many thousands of politicians and bureaucrats across Java understand such messages. They therefore need find no conflict between acting in ways which they regard as pious and doing what they believe their superiors will approve of.

These are favourable circumstances for Islamic interests to advance their influence in politics as in social and cultural affairs, but it must be emphasised that this does not mean the advance of a single, coherent ideology called 'Islam'. For, as we have often noted, the meaning and content of the faith are contested today, as they have been for the last 1,400 years (and as they have been since ancient times in other religions). How one knows what the Islamic revelation actually means is contested amongst Traditionalist, Historicalist, Modernist and Revivalist epistemologies. What social and political agendas that understanding leads to has produced contending Dakwahist, Islamist and Liberal projects. Traditionalist Sufis and 'modern' Sufis and opponents of mysticism find it hard to share common ground. Such contestations have significant social, political and cultural consequences today, as they have in the past. Roy observes how deeper Islamisation 'is accompanied everywhere by an increase in sectarian and religious feuds within the Muslim community. Competition for religious legitimacy means also competition for the right to say who is a good Muslim and conversely who is not.'²⁹ Cultural attitudes are caught up in this, as we have often seen. Roy again:

US evangelical Protestantism and Islamic fundamentalism share, *mutatis mutandis*, many common patterns. Faith is the fault-line between the good people and the wicked. ... Culture (novels, films, music) may bring about dereliction of mores. Religious norms and creeds can apply to anybody anywhere: hence there is no need for 'cultural sensitivity'. The divide is between believers and non-believers within so-called cultures and not between different cultures.³⁰

²⁸ Usama Hisyam *et al.*, *SBY: Sang Demokrat* (Jakarta: Dharmapena Publishing, 2004), pp. [viii], 812–3, 860–2. The original of the quotation from the poem *Cahaya Islam* reads *Ku khabarkan kepadamu wahai semua insan / Islam, penabur rahmat bagi semesta alam*.

²⁹ Roy, *Globalized Islam*, p. 161.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 329.

James Piscatori regards fragmentation and contestation about who holds religious authority and, in effect, can thereby claim to be successor to the Prophet, as ‘the most notable aspect of modern political Islam’.³¹ Daniel Brown adds that ‘even secularists implicitly recognise Prophetic authority when they appeal to the Prophetic example to justify their secularism’.³² This is no less true in Indonesia, as we have repeatedly seen. The distinguished Islamic scholar and leader Prof. Azyumardi Azra argues that extremist forms of Islam cannot come to dominate Indonesia precisely because of this plurality of authority in Islam.³³ Unlike the Catholic Church, but like ever-schismatic Protestantism, there is just too much room for differences of opinion in Sunni Islam.

In this competition for religious authority and in the search for followers, however, today’s Revivalists hold advantages over other epistemologies: the advantages of simplicity and certainty. Traditionalist epistemology rests upon the scholarly traditions of the four Sunni schools of law with their complex legal arguments and disputes, plus the insights and practices (themselves full of variety) of Sufism — no simple matters. Historicalism is a highly intellectual approach to the faith, a fashion that arose in the political context of the New Order and whose day may be over. Modernism is rooted in modern rational approaches along with a return to the *Qur’an* and *Hadith* as guides to understanding God’s revelation, and also makes serious intellectual demands. You are unlikely to become a leader in Modernist circles nowadays if you lack a PhD. Implicit in these approaches is a recognition that understandings of Islam have changed over time and may change in the future. This can be a ‘hard sell’ amongst the pious masses. The Revivalists need none of this.

We need only turn to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir to illustrate Revivalist views. To understand Islam, he believes, it is necessary to return to the learned guides of the time of the Prophet, who were ‘more expert than we’ (*lebih pintar dari kita*). He believes that human thought cannot reform Islam, for the faith rests upon the perfect word of God. How does he know that his interpretation is correct, given 1,400 years of contestation? He knows because

³¹ James Piscatori, ‘Accounting for Islamic fundamentalism’, in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds), *Accounting for fundamentalisms: The dynamic character of movements* (The Fundamentalism Project, vol. 4; Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 368.

³² Daniel Brown, *Rethinking tradition in modern Islamic thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 80; see also pp. 59, 75, 79.

³³ Conversation with Prof. Azyumardi Azra, Jakarta, 22 Oct. 2010.

God directs him, he says. Those who rely on the intellect such as JIL are enemies because they 'deify reasoning' (*mempertuhankan akal*) and think that they are smarter than God, whereas the human mind is only for technology, Ba'asyir believes.³⁴ When he gives such messages, many listeners find their simplicity and certainty attractive. We observed above that when he appeared at a small mosque near Kediri in 2006 and 2007, thousands reportedly came to hear him. A young Muhamadiyah leader who was inspired by him described his ideas as 'simple, timely, practical and functional'.³⁵ His ideas are none of these things except for being simple. By ejecting intellectualism and rationality from religious discourse, Ba'asyir and other Revivalists can appeal through their simplicity and certainty to the almost-universally literate but certainly not well-educated general populace of Indonesia, as well as to what Olivier Roy calls the 'lumpenintelligentsia', those who have 'spent enough time in school to consider themselves "educated" ... but ... haven't pursued higher education'.³⁶ We already noted Micklethwait and Wooldridge's comment that 'certainty has proved much easier to market'.³⁷ 'In a time of constant transformation,' Salman Rushdie writes, 'beatitude is the joy that comes with belief, with certainty'.³⁸

So it is that the more categorical forms of religious belief and practice, the ones that offer certainty and simplicity, may have an advantage over more subtle and complex forms of faith. If so, this is an important element that is undervalued in the 'failure-of-political-Islam' literature. We noted at the start of Chapter 10 Masdar Hilmy's comment that Islamist ideas can be 'contiguous with "moderate" ones' and that they can 'gain broad resonance' in organisations like NU and Muhammadiyah which are normally labeled 'moderate'.³⁹ Once one accepts the basic premises of any religion (since such premises rest upon supernatural explanations and are thus beyond intellectual

³⁴ Discussions with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Ngruki, 26 March 2007 and 13 Sept. 2008.

³⁵ Discussion with Ashari, Ngadiluwih, 28 Nov. 2007; Ba'asyir's speech at Ngadiluwih is also reported in *MmK*, 7 Nov. 2007.

³⁶ Roy, *Failure of political Islam*, p. 51.

³⁷ Micklethwait and Wooldridge, *God is back*, p. 17. Jacoby, *Age of American unreason*, p. 201, similarly notes in the context of American religiosity that 'Unlike religious moderates who, like most human beings, want to have things both ways — God and science, belief in eternal life and the medical pursuit of every means to prolong earthly life — fundamentalists have no doubts.'

³⁸ Salman Rushdie, *The ground beneath her feet: A novel* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1999), p. 353.

³⁹ Hilmy, *Islamism and democracy*, p. 101.

testing or measurement), there need be no logical break between 'moderate' and 'extreme' versions.

Atheist writers have made the same point as a part of their critique of all faiths.⁴⁰ Without needing to accept such an atheist analysis, we must agree that religion is a potent force in many societies, including the Javanese, that it is crucial to most humans' search for a better life and that its manifestations are not always or necessarily of a moderate kind. There may be only two circumstances in which 'moderation' is a natural position for believers to adopt. The first is when doubt arises — doubt about some aspect of the faith, about one's own understanding of it, about its contemporary manifestations or about the best strategy for implementing its imperatives in this world. The second is when one's social and political agenda is Liberalism, with its search for greater individual freedom in religious and other matters, for this leads inevitably to the view that religious belief is a private, individual matter — that individuals have a right to freedom of thought.

As the story has unfolded, in the end there is little that we can regard as a 'failure' of Islam in this Javanese history (except, as noted above, in the two narrow respects of [a] the failure of explicitly Islamist political parties to win power through elections and [b] the inability of religiously inspired terrorist organisations to destabilise the country or society or to take over the state). There is much evidence that confirms its growing potency. We should accept that believers believe what they say they believe. Of course there are frauds, self-promoting careerists and fools in religion, as in any walk of life, but for the purposes of our analysis we must accept that people's commitments to their faiths are genuine. Certainly in my experience there have been only very few whom I suspect to be hypocrites. So let us take the faith of our subjects as genuine and their search for a better, more perfect life as real. In the next section, I will suggest that this search for a better life fundamentally revolves around a choice between two differing antidotes to the threat of tyranny: freedom or justice, each of which brings its own promises and carries its own risks.

In the search for the better life: Freedom vs justice

Here we approach contending philosophies and ideologies which transcend Islamic, Javanese, Indonesian, or East-West particularities, and which may

⁴⁰ Richard Dawkins, *The God delusion* (London, etc.: Bantam Press, 2006), p. 306; Grayling, *What is good?* p. 234.

help us (even in the brief discussion here) to understand issues arising in this book. Socio-political thought in all places and traditions has been remarkably consistent in identifying tyranny as the principal barrier to a better life — an identification that can be richly supported from history. Given that there is no shortage of tyranny in any age, there has been no end to the search for ways to restrain it.

Before we begin our own study of freedom and justice, we must address a monument in the English-language literature that gets in our way and is of only little help. I refer to John Rawls' *A theory of justice*,⁴¹ to which many writers refer (and defer). This is written within Western parameters. Its argument only suits an idealised Western-style parliamentary democracy and may be said even to fit the real world of parliamentary democracy poorly. Justice is defined as 'fairness', something which itself is defined by a contract arrived at among the governed in a hypothetical 'original position'. So Rawls' 'justice' is not something that can be externally validated or that corresponds to some abstract or absolute standards: it is the outcome of a contract. Neither 'justice' nor 'fairness' has any definition beyond what people in their 'original position' agree them to be. In the end, Rawls' principles of justice turn out to be something to do with individual rights, freedoms and liberties,⁴² that is to say, less about justice as we will discuss it here and more about freedom instead. Rawls' work does help us in one important respect: it is consistent with the belief there is no abstract standard of justice which people of all societies and all times might recognise, hence his 'justice' must be negotiated by people who can agree on it in their hypothetical 'original position'. This helps us to understand why, down through the ages, people have thought that only some deity can define true justice. This is not the idea of justice found in phrases such as 'bring X to justice' or 'make X face justice', where 'justice' equals 'judgment', 'punishment' or 'retribution'. Rather, this is above all justice as something that inheres in a righteous, morally perfect utopia.

Let us turn to the conceptualisation of justice that is relevant to our enquiries, which in due course will be seen to have roots in Platonic, Islamic

⁴¹ John Rawls, *A theory of justice* (rev. ed. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999).

⁴² See *ibid.*, pp. 266–7. We may add that Rawls' argument is not just Western but distinctively Protestant: 'Each person must insist upon an equal right to decide what his religious obligations are. He cannot give up this right to another person or institutional authority' (p. 191). There is no room for Catholicism or *shari'a* law here.

and Javanese traditions. This is justice as something absolute that arises from divine imperatives. This idea rests, in principle, upon a pessimistic view of human society. It understands that human 'justice' is not true justice; that what might seem just to you would seem unjust to someone else. This also reflects a pessimistic view of individuals, seeing human beings as more given to evil than to good. Freedom is therefore to be distrusted: if humans were entirely free, society would become a chaos of licentiousness, violence, anarchy and — of course — injustice. This conceptualisation, however, takes an optimistic view of the possibilities of government, believing that government can be just, that a just ruler can be found. Below we will see Plato's importance in the evolution of this school of thought (and remember that Plato's writings greatly influenced Islamic philosophy), so we may note here the comment by H.D.P. Lee, Plato's translator, that 'The argument against Plato's system, in fact, is not that it trusts the common man too little but that it trusts his rulers too much.'⁴³

Proponents of justice as the answer to the human predicament must hold a utopian view that perfect justice is possible, even if it has only been known at some golden age in the past and might only be found again in an afterlife. Here on earth it may be necessary to restrain government which is in the hands of imperfect human beings, but that is done in the interest of allowing maximum justice to reign, without abandoning the hope that a just ruler can be found. This implies that perfect justice is knowable, even if it is not discoverable by humankind unaided. So it must be what God says it is, as God has revealed it to humans. There is a corollary to this: if there is such a thing as perfect justice, known to God and revealed to humans, then while our experience of it may be imperfect, there can be no question of deciding to limit justice. We must always strive instead to remove limitations upon it. You can't have too much justice.

When we turn to the concept of freedom as the antidote to tyranny, we find something that does not have strong roots in Islamic or Javanese traditions, but rather is more associated with modern Western thought. There is a related concept in Javanese and Indonesian, captured in the term *bebas*, meaning free of restraints, unimpeded. Thus, one can be made *bebas* from imprisonment, for example, or *bebas* from an obligation. This has never become a major political concept. Another local term that did acquire political relevance is Javanese *mardika*, which derives ultimately from

⁴³ H.D.P. Lee introduction in Plato, *The republic* (transl. and intro. H.D.P. Lee; Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1955), p. 45.

the Old Javanese word (itself from Sanskrit) *maharddhika*, found in pre-Islamic literature. This conveys meanings of exceptional qualities, eminence, perfection and of the wise sage or holy man.⁴⁴ This sense can still be found in the Modern Javanese usage *sang mardika* for a sage. Presumably because sages should be free of the impositions of rulers, the more common Modern Javanese usage of *mardika* has come to mean freedom from the authority of an overlord and thus free of taxes or other demands from a superior. In the Indonesian language this appears as *merdeka*, which means freedom from control and particularly political independence, in which sense it was a rallying cry for Indonesian nationalists. None of this actually leads to the concept of individual freedoms that Liberals seek.

Generally speaking, Liberals' concept of freedom as the defence against tyranny rests upon an optimistic view of human society. It recognises that individual humans are imperfect but believes that they can work together in their own self-interest to create a better society. It accepts that there can be no perfection in human societies, but believes that improvement is possible through human action. It has a generally optimistic view of individual humans, thinking them more inclined to do good than to do harm; if individuals are allowed personal freedoms, then they will accept personal responsibility for their actions and show respect for others. Given human imperfection, however, and given the real possibility that one person's freedoms might have the effect of inhibiting the freedoms of another, there must be restraints upon freedom (to which we will return shortly).

Advocates of freedom in principle have a pessimistic view of government. They think a 'just ruler' to be a chimera, since unrestrained governments will always incline to tyranny. They agree with Lord Acton's famous dictum that 'Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely'. Government must therefore be restrained through constitutionally mandated and actually practiced limitations on its power. For advocates of freedom, democracy with all its imperfections is still the best form of government.

This school of thought rejects utopian ideas of perfection. Society must seek a balance of freedoms, for any sort of absolute freedom would be unsustainable and a source of conflicting claims. Hence freedoms must in practice be limited. The classic example is the oft-quoted case where freedom of speech cannot include a right to shout 'fire!' in a crowded cinema. Freedom

⁴⁴ For authoritative definitions and source citations, see P.J. Zoetmulder with the collaboration of S.O. Robson, *Old Javanese-English dictionary* (2 vols; 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), vol. 1, p. 1086.

can only function as an antidote to tyranny if the freedom of each individual is limited and balanced against the freedoms of others. Note the important difference here with the idea of justice. Freedom, in its essence, must include the concept of limitations upon freedom. Justice admits of no limitation. It is not possible to have too much justice, but it is possible to have too much freedom. Indeed, that is just what advocates of justice fear will happen: too much freedom. But advocates of freedom must equally recognise this risk, so that limitations on freedom are an essential part of the case.

Isaiah Berlin sets the political implications of these contending views of humanity in a broader context in Western philosophy:

Philosophers with an optimistic view of human nature and a belief in the possibility of harmonising human interests, such as Locke or Adam Smith or, in some moods, Mill, believed that social harmony and progress were compatible with reserving a large area for private life over which neither the State nor any other authority must be allowed to trespass. Hobbes, and those who agreed with him, especially conservative or reactionary thinkers, argued that if men were to be prevented from destroying one another and making social life a jungle or a wilderness, greater safeguards must be instituted to keep them in their places; he wished correspondingly to increase the area of centralised control and decrease that of the individual.⁴⁵

Freedom as a political principle is not essentially religious in origin, although it is sometimes depicted in that way and may be justified on religious grounds. It is frequently and often emotionally invoked in American politics where, given the rise of religious influence in American life in recent decades, freedom may be described by religious believers as something that is 'God-given'.

We must address the question of the role played by the idea of justice in totalitarian ideologies. Plato's *Republic* is a foundational text. This proposes an ideal state to be governed by 'the superior minority' in which 'justice is the principle we laid down at the beginning and have consistently followed in founding our state'. In this state, the various classes would know their places and keep to them, for interference in each other's roles would do 'the greatest harm to our state' which 'gives us a definition of injustice'. Plato's *Republic* rested also on a fear of too much freedom: 'an excessive desire for liberty' which would 'lead to the demand for tyranny', since 'a democratic society in its thirst for liberty may fall under the influence of bad leaders' and lead

⁴⁵ Berlin, *Proper study of mankind*, p. 198.

people to 'disregard all laws'.⁴⁶ Karl Popper's monumental *Open society and its enemies*, first published in 1945, begins with 'the spell of Plato' (the title of the first volume) and proceeds to Hegel and Marx in the second volume, Popper's purpose being to show how Platonic ideas can be traced in the great European tyrannies of the mid-20th century.

A few quotations from Popper will suffice to show how, in his view, a Platonic concept of justice can be used to support tyranny and how this idea of justice is the enemy of freedom:

It will be seen that Plato's concept of justice is fundamentally different from our ordinary view Plato considers justice not as a relationship between individuals, but as a property of the *whole state*, based upon a relationship between its classes.⁴⁷ ...

The humanitarian theory of justice makes three main demands or proposals, namely (a) the equalitarian principle proper, i.e., the proposal to eliminate 'natural' privileges, (b) the general principle of individualism, and (c) the principle that it should be the task and the purpose of the state to protect the freedom of its citizens. To each of these political demands or proposals there corresponds a directly opposite principle of Platonism, namely (a') the principle of natural privilege, (b') the general principle of holism or collectivism, and (c') the principle that it should be the task and the purpose of the individual to maintain, and to strengthen, the stability of the state.⁴⁸ ...

Plato recognises only one ultimate standard, the interest of the state. Everything that furthers it is good and virtuous and just; everything that threatens it is bad and wicked and unjust. ... This is the collectivist, the tribal, the totalitarian theory of morality: 'Good is what is in the interest of my group; or my tribe; or my state'.⁴⁹

Thus Popper's assault on Plato. It would take only a few changes to attach similar charges to Islamist political thought, to which we will return below, for it, too, rests upon the principle that the foremost objective of political action is justice. Hannah Arendt makes similar judgments.

⁴⁶ Quotations from Plato, *The republic* (transl. H.D.P. Lee), pp. 179, 181, 183, 335–7.

⁴⁷ Karl Popper, *The open society and its enemies* (2 vols; London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2003 [originally published 1945]), vol. I, p. 96.

⁴⁸ Ibid., vol. I, p. 100. We may note that Popper's 'humanitarian theory of justice' involves the 'freedom of ... citizens', thus bringing together (as does Rawls) two ideas that I am distinguishing from one another in this discussion.

⁴⁹ Ibid., vol. I, p. 113.

In her writing about Soviet and Nazi totalitarianism, she comments on totalitarianism's typical defiance of positive laws: 'Totalitarian lawfulness pretends to have found a way to establish the rule of justice on earth — something which the legality of positive law admittedly could never attain. The discrepancy between legality and justice could never be bridged.'⁵⁰

Others have made recent contributions to the issues we are considering here. In the course of a powerful critique of 'Rational Choice Theory' (the idea that maximising one's narrowly defined self-interest constitutes the most rational thing to do), Amartya Sen benefits from his knowledge of non-Western (principally Indian) philosophy and history. He does not refer to Popper's *Open society and its enemies*, although his views are similar. Sen's book is to a considerable degree a more recent version of Popper's arguments in favour of the application of reason, individual freedom and piecemeal improvements rather than sweeping utopian solutions such as the search for an abstract reign of justice. As for Berlin and others, for Sen the essence of freedom is the freedom to make choices, which 'gives us the *opportunity* to pursue our objectives — those things that we value'.⁵¹ He emphasises the importance of an open public realm as a site of discussion, debate and compromise among contending views that can make it possible for democracy to function. He does not (I think) give sufficient weight to the risk that the public space can be monopolised by a dominant ideology to such an extent that it can inhibit discussion, debate and questioning — that this realm can become, not a space for reason, but one for dogma and repression.⁵²

Grayling argues from a humanist (non-believer) position, denying the truth claimed by religions. This leads him to support the concept of freedom as the key to a better life. Grayling writes,

In everything that has been said in this book about the humanist conception of the good life, the concepts of freedom and autonomy have been central. From classical antiquity to modern philosophy the fundamental idea has been that people possess reason, and that by using

⁵⁰ Arendt, *Origins of totalitarianism*, p. 462.

⁵¹ Amartya Sen, *The idea of justice* (London, etc.: Penguin Books, 2009), p. 228.

⁵² Late in the book, however, he contemplates the possibility that 'a ruthless majority that has no compunction in eliminating minority rights would tend to make the society face a hard choice between honouring majority rule and guaranteeing minority rights. The formation of tolerant values is thus quite central to the smooth functioning of a democratic system' (ibid., p. 352).

it they can choose lives worth living for themselves and respectful of their fellows. ... Given that the metaphysics of religion is man-made, and that human psychology is the source of belief in the power of transcendent authority to reward obedience or punish its opposite ... it follows that the chief motivation for religious ethics is the need felt by potentates of many kinds to exert control over individuals, to limit their freedom, to make them conform, obey, submit, follow where led, accept what is meted out to them, and resign themselves to their lot.⁵³

Even if we do not accept the 'given' in that last sentence, the description that follows it is clearly consistent with multiple historical examples.

From this discussion of justice and freedom,⁵⁴ we may come to the view that neither of these concepts as ultimate political objectives is free of risks. Each has defensible criticisms of the other. But only one of them — that is, the search for justice — is prone to support totalitarianism, to facilitate the very tyranny which, in principle, it seeks to resist.

We must turn from these more general considerations to the specific traditions of Islam, in which justice has been a central aim since the earliest times. World history offers no examples of an ideal system of justice in operation, but Revivalists believe it to have existed in the seventh century, in the time of the Prophet and the four 'rightly guided caliphs' (three of whom, we may note, were assassinated in that most perfect of times).⁵⁵ The Arabic term for justice is *'adl*, which we find in Javanese and Indonesian as *adil* and various derived forms. As one of the fundamental dogmas of Islam, this refers to the perfect justice of God.⁵⁶ The term for freedom is *huriyya*, which originates as a 'legal term denoting the opposite of "unfree, slave"'; for

⁵³ Grayling, *What is good?* pp. 247–8.

⁵⁴ We might have discussed a full trinity (a hat-trick?) of Harvard writers by adding Michael Sandel to Sen and Rawls. But Sandel's *Justice: What's the right thing to do?* (London, etc.: Penguin Books, 2009) is less helpful to our discussion, although readers may find it of interest. Sandel struggles with the issues until arriving at what seems to me a position akin to what Amartya Sen calls the 'transcendental institutionalism' mode of thought (that is, seeking some universally applicable way of finding justice through ideal institutions), rather than Sen's 'realisation-focused' approach, which (like Popper's) consists of seeking incremental means of ridding the world of its worst injustices without imagining that perfection is achievable.

⁵⁵ Abu Bakr died in his mid-60s in 634, 'Umar was assassinated in 644, 'Uthman was assassinated in 656 and 'Ali was assassinated in 661.

⁵⁶ See E. Tyan, "Adl", in P. Bearman *et al.* (eds), *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (2nd ed.), vol. 1, p. 209.

the latter there is the term *'abd*, which appears in Indonesian languages as *abdi*. *Huriyya* did not make it into Javanese, but its meaning is conveyed in the word *bebas*, discussed earlier. Rosenthal comments that *huriyya*, 'although much discussed, did not achieve the status of a fundamental political concept that could have served as a rallying cry for great causes'. Rather, 'The individual Muslim was expected to consider subordination of his own freedom to the beliefs, morality and customs of the group as the only proper course of behaviour. ... Politically, the individual was not expected to exercise any free choice as to how he wished to be governed.'⁵⁷ The reign of justice that has been lost since the time of the Prophet and the four rightly guided caliphs will be restored by the future Mahdi, who will reign before the end of the world and again be a 'rightly guided one' whose task will be to fill the world with justice. This messianic idea gained greater strength among Shi'ites than among Sunnis, but it played some role in Sufism, which has been so important among the Javanese.⁵⁸ We will discuss the analogous Javanese 'just king' (*Ratu Adil*) below.

These ideas were elaborated and debated as Islamic philosophy developed, with the writings of Plato being an important part of the Islamic intellectual tradition. Scholars argued what the qualities of the ideal ruler must be, how that person could rule with virtue and impose justice with divine guidance. Muslim philosophers (particularly luminaries of the ninth to twelfth centuries such as Al-Farabi, Abu Bakr al-Razi, Abu Hatim al-Razi, Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd) considered how there might be constructed a regime that could rely on the moral superiority of the ruler to administer God's laws, which constitute what justice is. The core question was how to restore the just governance of the time of the Prophet and the first four caliphs, not how to achieve freedom for individuals.⁵⁹

The search for justice (not freedom) as the principal cure for this world's ills was also central to Javanese thought. Various texts call for a

⁵⁷ See F. Rosenthal and B. Lewis, 'Huriyya', in P. Bearman *et al.* (eds), *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (2nd ed.), vol. 3, p. 589. Rosenthal refers readers further to his own work *The Muslim concept of freedom prior to the nineteenth century* (Leiden: Brill, 1960).

⁵⁸ See W. Madelung, 'al-Mahdi', in P. Bearman *et al.* (eds), *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (2nd ed.), vol. 5, p. 1230.

⁵⁹ There is a vast literature on this subject. For an overview, see Hans Daiber, 'Political philosophy', in Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (eds), *History of Islamic Philosophy* (Routledge History of World Philosophies, vol. 1; 2 vols; London and New York: Routledge, 1996), vol. 2, pp. 841–85.

purifying time of destruction, after which justice will reign. The leader of this time of justice is usually called the *Ratu Adil*, the 'just king'. *Adil* of course comes from the Arabic *'adl*, but it is reasonable to presume that Javanese messianic ideas had older, pre-Islamic roots. Such ideas are found in the so-called 'prophecies of Jayabaya', which are ascribed (very possibly apocryphally) to king Jayabhaya of 12th-century Kediri. The *Ratu Adil* was usually said to take *Erucakra* as one of his titles — a term of uncertain origin, but suggested by Pigeaud to derive from the name of the Vairocana Buddha and thus, if so, of pre-Islamic derivation.⁶⁰ Whatever the case, the hope for the *Ratu Adil* was deeply rooted in Javanese tradition and was consistent with the Islamic search for justice.

People claiming to be the *Ratu Adil*, bearing the title *Erucakra*, arose from time to time and rallied the support of both ordinary and elite Javanese. In 1718 a son of the reigning king called Png. Dipanagara rebelled and took the *Erucakra* title. He surrendered in 1723 and spent his remaining days in exile in Sri Lanka. In 1825, the most famous of the princes to carry the name Dipanagara rebelled and took the name *Erucakra* along with others of religious and messianic import such as Lord of the Faith (*Sayidin*), Regulator of Religion (*Panatagama*), Caliph of the Messenger of God (*Kalifat Rasulullah*), First among Believers (*Kabirulmukminina*) and Commander in Holy War (*Senapati Ingalaga Sabilullah*). We noted in Chapter 1 what a pivotal figure Dipanagara was in Javanese history. He initiated the disastrous Java War of 1825–30 and his defeat ushered in the truly colonial period of Javanese history. Other aspiring *Ratu Adil* figures arose after him in Central Java. A rather weak-minded Yogyakarta prince named Suryengalaga, while still a child, was nominated by some conspirators in 1864 as the future *Ratu Adil* and his mother plotted a rebellion in his name in 1883. The Dutch colonial regime was well established by then and this *Ratu Adil*'s reign lasted less than a week. In 1890 another aspiring rebel who claimed supernatural powers prophesied the coming of the *Ratu Adil*, but he was quickly exiled

⁶⁰ Th. G. Th Pigeaud, 'Erucakra-Vairocana', in *India antiqua: A volume of oriental studies, presented by his friends and pupils to Jean Philippe Vogel on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of his doctorate* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1947), pp. 270–3. For a fuller discussion of these messianic traditions, see J.A.B. Wiselius, 'Djāḡā Bāḡā, zijn, zijn Leven en Profitieën', *BKI*, 3rd series, vol. 7 (1872), pp. 172–217. A briefer discussion with reference to several further sources is in M.C. Ricklefs, 'Dipanagara's early inspirational experience', *BKI* vol. 130 (1974), nos. 2–3, pp. 244–7.

before any justice could appear. In 1918 another *Ratu Adil* came to grief. As late as 1967 there was an *Erucakra* who claimed to be a reincarnation of Png. Suryengalaga.⁶¹ It has been reported that the spirit of the aspiring *Ratu Adil* Suryengalaga even appeared twice to the present Sultan Hamengkubuwana X of Yogyakarta while he was still crown prince and demanded for himself the right to succeed as the next Sultan.⁶² Early in the 20th century, the charismatic leader of the ostensibly modern organisation Sarekat Islam was Tjokroaminoto (the scholarly spelling of whose name would be Cakra-aminata), who was taken by some to be a fulfillment of the prophecies of the *Ratu Adil*, not least because of the appearance of *cakra* both in his name and in *Erucakra*. In the account of the 1930s in this book, we have seen both Png. Surjodiningrat and the Surakarta politician Singgih regarded by their followers as the *Ratu Adil*. Embah Wali proclaimed Yogyakarta's Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX to be the *Ratu Adil*, and said that there was no longer such a Just King after the latter died in 1988.

The search for justice remains a strong theme in recent and contemporary Islamic discourse in Indonesia. We noted above how the Traditionalist activists who set up LKiS in 1992 described their mission as being to 'bring into being a transformative form of Islam on the side of justice and plurality with an Indonesian foundation'.⁶³ The prominent NU figure Ky. H. Masdar F. Mas'udi said in 2008 that 'Clearly, in Islam there is a primary mandate of "justice" to which the state must be fully dedicated'. Further, 'Because religion, being the soul of the state, gives justice to all. ... it is our job to discover how to infuse the secular institutions of the state (its political, legal and legislative systems) with the spirit of justice and mercy as their sacral and transcendental duty'.⁶⁴ It is no surprise that the 1990s campus

⁶¹ These post-Java War cases are described in A.L. Kumar, 'The Suryengalagan affair of 1883 and its successors: Born leaders in changed times', *BKI* vol. 138 (1982), nos. 2–3, pp. 251–84.

⁶² From an anonymous, but I believe absolutely reliable, source. Readers may notice that the present Sultan's position seems consistent with what I have called the Mystic Synthesis style of Javanese Islam.

⁶³ http://www.lkis.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=89&Itemid=88.

⁶⁴ Masdar F. Ma'sudi, 'Islam and the state: The social justice perspective', in Ota Atsushi, Okamoto Masaaki and Ahmad Suaedy (eds), *Islam in contention: Rethinking Islam and state in Indonesia* (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute; Kyoto: Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University; Taipei: Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies RCHSS Academia Sinica, 2010), pp. 17, 25.

cadre-formation movement modeled on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood should have given rise to a political party that called itself the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan), now transformed into PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), the Prosperous Justice Party.

Bernhard Plattdasch explored the Partai Keadilan (PK, later PKS) understanding of justice and shows its roots in the medieval Islamic thought we have discussed here. His analysis is based in particular on interviews with Hidayat Nur Wahid and Irwan Prayitno in 2001–2:

To understand PK's interplay of rhetoric and political action it is crucial to point out that, in the classical Islamic perception, justice only exists where *shari'a* rule has been established and religious obedience accomplished. Because understanding of the term 'justice' was embedded in the *Qur'an*, by definition, justice only existed in the Islamic context. The Qur'anic imperative (verse 5:8), PK President Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid explained, was to 'act justly because this is what is closest to piety'.⁶⁵ ... Mankind, the party declared, had to be liberated from all forms of tyranny. Yet to understand the true meaning of 'justice', Hidayat Nur Wahid emphasised, it was necessary to understand the Qur'anic use of the term. 'Actual justice', he argued, 'was of divine origin [*ilahiyyah*], [something] that is religious, evolving from religious and moral values'. It had to do with 'fundamental principles', which will prevent 'anything that is tyrannic', as Islam prohibited any activity that 'kills the soul'. ... As such, PK epitomised the archetypal Islamist credo that the only way to bring about justice ultimately was through *shari'a* rule and complete submission to Islam. Irwan Prayitno argued: 'As for the concepts, they are already standard, for example "justice". What remains is the medium. Stealing — hand will be cut off. Whoever kills — is killed. If in ancient times with a sword, today there is the electric chair. These things can still be discussed but the concept is justice.' ... Such statements illustrated that the party's conception of *shari'a* went beyond that of 'universal values'. In particular, it highlighted the inseparability between PK's understanding of 'justice' and explicit Islamic *hudud* rulings. It also showed that, despite the frequent advocacies of independent reasoning, PK leaders preserved various medieval traditions in the elucidation of Islam.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ In Abdel Haleem's translation: 'You who believe, be steadfast in your devotion to God and bear witness impartially: do not let hatred of others lead you away from justice, but adhere to justice, for that is closer to awareness of God. Be mindful of God: God is well aware of all that you do.' *Qur'an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem*, pp. 68–9.

⁶⁶ Plattdasch, *Islamism in Indonesia*, pp. 232–3. *Hudud* punishments are those that are regarded in Islamic law as crimes against religion and for which there are fixed

In the minds of many Islamic thinkers of all inclinations, the search for justice is paired with opposition to, even fear of, the idea of freedom. The HTI figure Farid Wadjudi expressed this as follows:

Liberalism is ... dangerous. On behalf of free thinking, for instance, they feel free to question the authenticity of soundly indicated religious texts, such as the *Qur'an* as Allah's revelation. On behalf of freedom of speech, no kind of thinking can be prohibited even if it is in contradiction to Islamic belief and *shari'a*. Then on behalf of freedom of expression, adultery, homosexuality, and lesbianism must be tolerated; prostitution is supported and considered as a profession; pornography and pornographic actions are accordingly defended. This is really dangerous because it can lead humankind to destruction, putting humans at the level of animals, even lower than that.⁶⁷

The concept of individual freedoms is defended in today's Indonesia by the Liberals whom we have discussed earlier in this book. Current circumstances, however, limit the possibility of mounting a robust case for individual freedoms (rather than justice) as a paramount political objective. In particular, the prevailing religiosity of public discourse makes it difficult to question whether religion should dominate both private and public affairs at all. Furthermore, given that in Islamic, Javanese and wider Indonesian thought, justice is so strongly embedded as the principle solution to life's woes, the prospects of winning a public debate for the cause of greater individual freedoms are reduced.

Can the search for greater freedom and the search for greater justice not be reconciled? An elegant Liberal case for a way to do this in Muslim societies is made in Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im's *Islam and the secular state*, the Indonesian-language version of which was published in 2007 by the Islamic publishing house Mizan⁶⁸ (the year before the English-language version from Harvard). An-Na'im distinguishes between the state as an institutional structure and politics as day-to-day social reality, and seeks to mediate the distinction between the separation of the state from religion (for which he argues) and a legitimate involvement of religion in politics

and harsh punishments such as death by stoning, amputation of limbs and flogging. These offences include unlawful sexual intercourse, false accusations of such sexual activity, drinking alcohol, highway robbery and theft.

⁶⁷ In a 2005 article in *al-Wa'ie*, quoted in Hilmy, *Islamism and democracy*, p. 166.

⁶⁸ Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, *Islam dan negara secular: Menegosiasikan masa depan syariah* (Bandung: Mizan, 1428/2007).

through what he calls ‘civic reason’.⁶⁹ This consists of the reasonable exercise of freedom (such as ‘freedoms of opinion, belief and association’) with respect for others by participants in the public realm, so that the meaning and application of *shari’a* can be freely discussed. This rests on the view that ‘rights are ultimately the tools for realizing the objectives of social justice, political stability, and economic development...’.⁷⁰ In this way, the exercise of freedom is the necessary means to a collective effort to engage the diversity of human understandings of God’s perfect justice through free discussion, consistent with the Qur’anic principle (2:256) that ‘there is no compulsion in religion’.

The problem in practice is not the Liberal view of how things should be, but the Revivalist and Islamist view of how things must be. Revivalists will reject the epistemology upon which this Liberal agenda rests: that is, that the understanding of sacred texts inevitably involves the application of reason, of ‘human interpretation’.⁷¹ They would see this as — to quote Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s rejection of JIL — a case of *mempertuhankan akal* (deifying human reasoning) by people who think that they are smarter than God, whereas the human mind is only for technology.⁷² Revivalists and Islamists are likely to be unreasonable in two senses of the word: they cannot be reasoned with and they are likely not to behave fairly in the circumstances of a free public space.⁷³ They believe that there is a clear divinely defined thing called justice that is encapsulated in *shari’a* (which is to say, of course, their

⁶⁹ An-Na‘im, *Islam and the secular state*, esp. pp. 92–101, 274–5. This concept is close, but not identical, to Rawls’ ‘public reason’.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 103.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 30.

⁷² Discussion with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Ngruki, 26 March 2007.

⁷³ Yet again, this is not an issue unique to Islamic societies. Cf. Popper, *Open society*, vol. 2, pp. 267–8, arguing that debate between the rational and the irrational (our Revivalists) is unlikely to lead to agreement: ‘since it is impossible to discuss such profundities with a rationalist, the most likely reaction will be a high-handed withdrawal, combined with the assertion that there is no language common to those whose souls have not yet “regained their mystical faculties”, and those whose souls possess such faculties’. This may involve ‘the Hegelianising intellectualist who persuades himself and his followers that their thoughts are endowed, because of special grace, with “mystical and religious faculties” not possessed by others, and who thus claim that they “think by God’s grace”’. And how times have changed: Popper believed (in 1945) that ‘this division is present in every religion, but it is comparatively harmless in Mohammedanism, Christianity, or the rationalist faith’.

understanding of it) and the Islamist project requires this to be enforced by the state in the name of *amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar* (commanding the right and forbidding the wrong). There is no room for free citizens to debate what this *shari'a* is — although there are, in practice, plenty of arguments about it among Revivalists and Islamists themselves. Thus, unlike the Liberal political agenda supported by the intellectual substantiality of An-Na'im's arguments, the Revivalist and Islamist position seeks not to open but to close the public space, to reject intellectuality and to call that justice. A reconciliation of the competing priorities of freedom and justice thus faces a formidable obstacle from those who reject Liberalism.

It is the Islamic, Javanese and Indonesian traditions that most concern us, but the issues here are not unique to these traditions. As the references to European and American writers and to the history of other parts of the world have shown, the search for a better life through either greater freedom or greater justice is not unique to Islam, Java or Indonesia. Both of these ideas in principle carry risks. Freedom carries the risk of anarchy. Justice carries the risk of totalitarianism. The latter, as Popper has shown, can be traced back to Plato. Because advocates of greater freedom recognise the need for it to be limited in the interest of the community as a whole, it is hard to find a case where a commitment to freedom as the main objective has actually led to anarchy, although we can certainly think of examples where it has led to confused and inefficient government (the United States in the early 21st century offers an example). As the global financial and economic crisis developed from 2008, Islamists in Indonesia (and not only they) were inclined to say that this demonstrated the anarchy arising from excessive freedom within the realms of finance and business, and hoped that this presaged the very collapse of global capitalism. Because it is not possible to conceive of limiting justice, however, there is less difficulty in finding cases where the idea has been used to support totalitarian states. We need only think of the horrific European totalitarianisms of the 20th century or of Khomeini's Iran.

In principle, Islamism seeks to restrain the potential tyranny of a state or ruler by requiring it or him to heed the advice of the *ulama*, who are qualified — unlike everyone else — to interpret God's revelation in such a way that it becomes divine law imposed on earth. Thus, Islamism is (like Plato's ideal state) a class-based government — the *ulama* class being the law-givers on behalf of God. While the goal is an ideal, pious ruler in the form of a caliph, even a caliph must listen to the *ulama*. The egalitarianism of Islam in principle thus becomes in practice an inegalitarian political system led by the *ulama*, whose political purposes are two: to restrain the potential

tyranny of the ruler and to restrain the freedom of individuals, for free individuals are likely to disobey God's commandments unless restrained by law and the punishments attached to it. Both Plato and Islamism thus can give rise to totalitarianism, which in both cases claims to represent justice. Class roles and privileges, proper modes of thought, limitations on individual rights are all to be imposed by the state and it is the duty of individuals to adhere to these rules.

We may say also that both Plato and Islamist ideas rest upon what Popper calls an 'irrational attitude which springs from an intoxication with dreams of a beautiful world. ... [which] seek[s] its heavenly city in the past ... [and whose] appeal is always to our emotions rather than to reason'.⁷⁴ Popper denounces such thought in unequivocal terms. 'The more we try to return to the heroic age of tribalism,' he says — or of the Prophet, we might add — 'the more surely do we arrive at the Inquisition, at the Secret Police, and at a romanticised gangsterism.'⁷⁵

But the appeal of these ideas is a powerful one. Like the secular creeds of fascism and Communism that Popper analyses, the Islamist 'modern totalitarianism is only an episode within the perennial revolt against freedom and reason. From older episodes it is distinguished not so much by its ideology, as by the fact that its leaders succeeded in realising one of the boldest dreams of their predecessors; they made the revolt against freedom a popular movement.'⁷⁶

Thus, it seems appropriate to consider recent and contemporary Islamist ideas and organisations in Indonesia (and elsewhere, of course) as being linked to the very long history of totalitarianism, at least as much as — and arguably more than — an aspect of comparative religion. Like other totalitarian ideas, they have spun off terrorism, although that remains a marginal phenomenon within the wider range of Islamist groups and movements. This means that comparisons of Jemaah Islamiyah or al-Qaeda with European anarchists of a century ago, the Baader-Meinhof group, the Japanese Red Army Faction, the Red Army Brigades in Italy and Action Directe are appropriate — probably more appropriate than, say, comparing them with the Branch Davidians, Jonestown or Aum Shinrikyo, which one might do if they were to be thought of as primarily some perverted or extreme version of religion. These are terrorists like those predecessors, but

⁷⁴ Popper, *Open society*, vol. 1, pp. 177–8.

⁷⁵ Ibid., vol. 1, p. 214.

⁷⁶ Ibid., vol. 2, p. 65.

their ideology is Islamist rather than Marxist or anarchist.⁷⁷ In both cases, significant general sympathy was initially won by the terrorists, but they lost much support when their violence became a clear threat to the interests of the middle class.

We leave this section thus with a comparative context for the issues facing a more deeply Islamised Javanese society, and Indonesia as a whole. This comparative context confirms that this is not an exotic, parochial history that we are considering, but something which goes to the heart of the way in which many contemporary societies are evolving.

Concluding observations

We have seen Javanese society travel a long way in this book. Under colonial rule in the 1930s it was polarised along lines of identity between *santri* and *abangan*, a polarisation that had become politicised and was about to become more so. The *abangan* majority were not irreligious, for they had a rich spiritual life, but it was only partly touched by what reformers regarded as the true Islam. *Abangan* art forms encapsulated understandings of the supernatural that permeated Javanese life in the countryside and were in some cases linked to those of the royal and princely courts — themselves tamed clients of the colonial state. Islamic Modernism and Traditionalism were active, the former in particular pioneering a modernisation of educational and welfare activities that strengthened the *santri* side of Javanese society, while the colonial state sought to stay out of religious affairs as much as possible.⁷⁸ Modernists played roles in nationalist political movements, but none of the latter could make much headway under a repressive colonial regime and during the hard years of the Great Depression. Traditionalist *kyais*, conveying sanctity and possessed of superhuman capacities, were often held in high regard by rural society, even by many *abangan* it seems, but they had no effective political presence.

⁷⁷ A comparison of al-Qaeda with anarchist terrorists in Europe and the USA in the late 19th and early 20th centuries is in Mat Carr, 'Cloaks, daggers and dynamite', *History Today* vol. 57, no. 2 (Dec. 2007), pp. 29–31. Carr makes the point that the most powerful parallel between the two lies 'in their strategic conception of violence'.

⁷⁸ The strengthening of Muslim civil society under colonial rule is explored in the specific context of Islamic philanthropy in Fauzia's important work 'Faith and the state'.

The Japanese occupation and subsequent Indonesian Revolution of 1945–9 saw the first opportunities for Traditionalist leaders to join their Modernist fellows in active political involvement and leadership. As they did so, however, the combination of their religiosity with politics led to questioning of their sanctity. During this time, *santri-abangan* polarisation and politicisation generated the first serious episodes of violence, particularly in connection with the Madiun uprising of 1948 which left thousands dead. With this spilling of blood the *santri-abangan* chasm deepened and reinforced the bitter political contest between PKI and its *abangan* followers on one side and *santri* on the other, represented above all by NU (at that time still within Masyumi). PNI had a more *priyayi* leadership but also recruited followers of *abangan* religio-cultural identity.

During Indonesia's first attempt to create a democracy in the years after the Revolution, *santri-abangan* conflict deepened still further. The politics of this period followed the *aliran* style, that is to say, polarisation followed socio-religious-cultural identities more than lines of class. In this context, it was the PKI and PNI that represented the principal barriers to deeper Islamisation among the Javanese. Was this independent Indonesia's one and only 'secular moment'? Probably not. PNI was a rather elitist, *priyayi*-led party without any real secularist agenda, just seeking power and hoping for no social revolution. PKI's version of Communism was adapted to *aliran* realities. The Party had literacy and educational campaigns to raise the level of understanding of its cadres and followers, but I am not aware of a Party policy to get rid of the superstitions that underlay much of *abangan* life. The Party used *kethoprak*, *ludruk*, *reyog*, *jaranan*, *tayuban* and so on for propaganda without, so far as I am aware, trying to persuade audiences that the supernatural ideas encapsulated in many such performances had to be abandoned. Many *kebatinan* followers felt close to PKI (principally because it was the main opposition to the dominance of Islam, no doubt) but the party did not try to undercut *kebatinan* spiritualism. At national level, a debate dragged on about whether *Pancasila* or Islam should be the foundational philosophy of the state, coming to no conclusion down to the time when the Constituent Assembly that was supposed to resolve this was log-jammed and then dissolved by Sukarno in 1959. By the mid-1960s *aliran*-defined political violence reached serious levels, culminating in the slaughter of hundreds of thousands — perhaps millions — in 1965–6.

Soeharto's years from 1966 to 1998 constituted the first period after independence when there was a political power in charge with genuinely totalitarian aspirations and prospects of achieving them. These decades were truly transformative in many ways. The regime was determined to control

everything possible, to wipe out all traces of Communism, to shape both what people thought and how they acted. Its aspirant totalitarianism was limited by the scale of the society it was dealing with and its own administrative shortcomings, incompetence and corruption. It was not, however, short of brutality, so the threat of the government no doubt often achieved more than its capacities could otherwise have delivered. The Soeharto regime established (or, perhaps we should say, reestablished) a tradition of the integration of the state with religion. The experience of Islamic organisations and leaders was mixed — some found cooperation with the state easy, many found it problematic but unavoidable, others were discomfited by being sidelined as competitors to the state at grass-roots level, and yet others objected loudly about the regime to little effect. Some went about their business of deepening the Islamisation of Javanese society as best they could in the circumstances. Islamic organisations often found in the end that the state's anti-Communist and Islamisation agendas in pursuit of social control suited their own agendas well enough. Institutions — above all the political parties — that were previously supported by *abangan*, and in turn supported *abangan* identities, were destroyed. *Abangan* arts declined, as did *kebatinan*, both of them being under pressure for links with Communism and for being not properly Islamic. Towards the end of the New Order, old-fashioned Javanese forms of entertainment (and their spiritual suppositions) were also under threat from modern entertainments and globalisation. Education and literacy advanced dramatically, and with them regime-approved and more orthodox forms of religious instruction.

The *santri* side lost its political parties under Soeharto, too, but still had a vast range of other institutional structures available, including MUI, NU, Muhammadiyah, mosques, *pesantrens*, *madrasahs*, Muhammadiyah's educational and social welfare activities and much more. The government funded the IAIN and STAIN network, producing a new Islamic intelligentsia mostly inclined towards Liberal interpretations. While facilitating grass-roots Islamisation as a way of imposing a conservative discipline on society, the government also enabled DDII to function and, because of DDII's intimate connections with Saudi Arabia, a flow of petrodollars followed. Saudi-funded LIPIA was important, too, in promoting the spread of a more Wahhabi-style interpretation of Islam.

By the early 1990s, the production of an Islamist intelligentsia began to produce real impacts at grass-roots level. DDII and LIPIA-sponsored Revivalists, including Afghan *jihad* veterans, and others were beginning to influence the *abangan* masses through *Salafi* educational institutions, which mushroomed. Indonesia was influenced — like just about everywhere else

except Western Europe — by the rising global tide of religiosity which involved most world religions. Religion seemed more and more to be a part of modernity to many Javanese. The military elite saw a potential ally — and encouraged — Revivalist and other generally conservative views of Islam as a way of countering globalisation with its human rights and democratisation agendas.

By the end of the Soeharto years, there was a growing alliance among ‘green’ military leaders, other leaders of the regime and emerging Islamist movements. At grass-roots level, Javanese society was visibly more Islamic in its beliefs, rituals, entertainments, social life, discourse, presumptions and expectations. Christianity also became a more prominent part of Javanese life in the Soeharto period. Although it remained a small minority overall, its presence in urban areas grew significantly and helped to fuel what seems to have been a dialectical relationship between conversions to Christianity and more extreme forms of Islam. This continues in some places to the present, notably in Surakarta.⁷⁹

The New Order collapsed in 1998, allowing another period of democracy to blossom. This also enabled a still-small Islamist movement to flourish, supported also by external developments, notably the growing strength of international extremist networks and the American-led ‘global war on terror’, which was interpreted in many parts of the Islamic world as a Western Christian crusade against Islam. Prior Islamisation meant that the social and political polarisation that now emerged was no longer between *abangan* and *santri*,⁸⁰ for there was no longer any serious opposition to deeper Islamisation. Rather, one can observe a profound competition about how to know what the Islamic revelation means and who can claim authority to interpret that revelation. So we see an ongoing contest among differing epistemologies — mainly Traditionalist, Modernist (which two look increasingly like each other) and Revivalist — and competing social, cultural and political agendas. The national governments of post-Soeharto Indonesia have taken sometimes differing approaches to religious affairs,

⁷⁹ This also seems true in West Java; see the forthcoming work by Chaider Bamualim provisionally entitled *Islamisation and resistance in West Java: A study of religion, politics and social change since c. 1965*.

⁸⁰ Even the meaning of those terms was changing, as we noted in Chapter 7. *Abangan* are now more likely to describe themselves as *kejawan* (Javanese, or Javanist, implying a truly authentic Javanese identity), while the term *santri* seems now to be used more commonly in its original meaning of a student at an Islamic school (a *pesantren*, the place of the *santri*).

and since the introduction of regional autonomy beginning in 2001 so have local governments. But generally speaking, governments at all levels have accepted the tradition bequeathed by the Soeharto years and thus regard the integration of the state and religion as normal, but unlike Soeharto they have been willing to concede initiative over many matters to religious institutions. The arts remain a field of contestation, particularly for Modernism, Revivalism and Dakwahism. Traditional and folk arts are targeted because they convey contending world views and dissenting spiritualities: the process of their Islamisation is well advanced. Modern arts are often suspect because they challenge conservative norms.

Thus, the history of the Islamisation of the Javanese and opposition to it may have approached a decisive stage, in the sense that it is difficult to imagine that the deepening influence of Islam among Javanese can be stopped or reversed by any remaining opponent. No historian should of course dare to suggest what the future may hold. No one in 1830 in Java is likely to have predicted the reform movements, social changes and polarisation that were soon to follow. No one in 1930 or 1950 would have predicted such a great decline of the *abangan* and predominance of Islam in Javanese life. No one in 1965 expected that Wahhabi-style Islam could become important in Javanese society. But these and other surprises happened and no doubt there will be more to come. As far as we can see at the present, however, the history of the Islamisation of the Javanese has reached a significant stage.

If we are right to think that the deepening Islamisation of the Javanese is incapable of being reversed and that conflict over who holds authority to interpret Islam's message will be incapable of final resolution, then the central contemporary dynamics and most salient analytical issues may be two:

- the extent to which political elites (at all levels of government) allow religious elites, organisations and issues to dominate the public realm, policy making and state conduct; and
- which political philosophy — the search for justice or the search for freedom — has greater influence within a more deeply Islamised society and state.

Terrorism is a significant but peripheral issue in this context. The main Islamist agenda now is about influencing, infiltrating and taking over state, semi-state and civil society organisations, in which they are having considerable success. Meanwhile, Dakwahism continues powerfully at grass-roots level, supporting deeper Islamisation in all its forms.

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